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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE NO: 2025/249561
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
DATE: 20 February 2026
SIGNATURE:
In the matter between:
F[...] B[...] S[...] Applicant
and
THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS 1st Respondent
MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 2nd Respondent
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 3rd Respondent
THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
SUN CITY CORRECTIONAL CENTRE 4th Respondent
JOHANNESBURG CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
SUN CITY PRISON 5th Respondent
THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS 6th Respondent
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS 7th Respondent
THE SOUTH AFRICA POLICE SERVICES 8th Respondent
THE INVESTIGATION OFFICER IN THE MATTER
OF THE APLICANT UNDER CASE NUMBER 3/5921/2022 9th Respondent
THE MAGISTRATE OF THE RANDBURG
MAGISTRATE'S COURT RANDBURG 10th Respondent
JUDGMENT: HABEAS CORPUS APPLICATION
(This matter was heard in open court on 5 February 2026 after it paid visits to the
urgent court on 23 and 30 December 2025. Having heard arguments on behalf of the
applicant and the respondents, judgment was reserved to be uploaded onto the
electronic file of the matter on Caselines. The parties were informed that the
reserved judgment will be uploaded onto Caselines and the date of uploading will be
deemed as the date of the judgment).
BEFORE: HOLLAND-MUTER J:
[1] The Applicant has been in detention since 29 November 2022. The Applicant
paid several "visits" to various courts with applications clothed in almost similar ways
for relief largely similar in all the applications. The main and ultimate relief sought is
the unconditional release of the applicant from custody. The outstanding applications
will be referred to below.
[2] The latest application is clothed as a Habeas Corpus Application . The
habeas corpus is an lnterdictum de libero homlne exh ibendo, literally meaning to
issue a writ requiring that a person under arrest be brought before a court to secure
the person's release unless lawful grounds are shown for continuing the detention of
the person.
[3] The applicant is at present involved in at least three different criminal matters,
the first for alleged kidnapping of his minor child from Zimbabwe and robbery, the
second for immigration offences including the unlawful entering the Republic of
South Africa and thirdly at least nine counts of contravening the Tax Administration
Act 28 of 2011 (“TAA"). He was arrested during November 2022 on an Interpol
warrant regarding the alleged kidnapping charges and released on bail in the amount
of R 150 000 -00 af ter paying the R 150 000 -00 bail amount set. For some
undisclosed reason he remained in custody.
[4] The criminal matter regarding the contraventions of the Immigration Law is
part heard in the Magistrate's Court at Randburg. The applicant has pleaded an d the
trial will continue on 20 February 2026. The tax matter, as far as being informed by
the applicant's counsel is set down for March 2026. The parties did not inform the
court on the kidnapping and robbery matter regarding a trail date. Mention was made
of a possible extradition application from the Zimbabwean Authority but nothing has
materialised in this regard. Fact remains the appellant is trial waiting on three
different criminal cases and of which one part is part heard.
[5] The detention of the appellant from which he seeks his immediate release is
his detention by court orders by the relevant criminal courts in which he is standing
trial.
URGENCY:
[6] Rule 6(12)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court clearly requires that an applicant
set out the reasons for urgency and set reasonable time frames within which the
opponent should answer. The applicant has to set out why the matter be heard out of
order and the reason why he would not be afforded substantial redress in due course.
This aspect was ruled upon in East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle
This aspect was ruled upon in East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle
Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd 2011 ZAGPHJ JHC 196 at para [6] the court should
consider that if the matter were to follow its normal course as laid down by the Rules,
whether the applicant will be afforded substantial redress. If not, then the matter
qualifies to be enrolled on the urgent roll.
[7] It will be clear below that the applicant is no stranger to litigation, and that he
is aware what urgency entails. The court will deal with his numerou s urgent
applications during 2024 to 2025 when he lodged at least ten different urgent
applications for similar relief, with no relief awarded in any of the urgent applications.
The majority were struck from the roll for lack of urgency or removed by the applicant
shortly before the hearing thereof.
[8] The applicant lodged the present urgent application on 22 December 2025
which was served on the Office of the State Attorney on 22 December 2025 at 13h54.
The abridged time frames set for the respondents w ere to file any intention to
oppose before 12h00 on 22 December 2025 (before service occurred) and any
answering affidavit before 16h00 on the same day. This was on very last days before
the festive season came into full swing. It needs no experienced prac titioner to
realise the impossibility of the chosen time frames laid down by the applicant for the
respondents to answer.
[9] The matter was set down for 23 December 2025 before Retief J but was
removed from the roll before hearing. On 25 December 2025 ( Christmas day) the
applicant served the State Attorney with a Rule 28(1) notice amending the existing
notice of motion for set down on 30 December 2025. The amended notice required
the respondents to file its intention to oppose by 28 December 2025 and ans wering
affidavits before 29 December 2025 at 16h00. This was impossible and the matter
was postponed by Neukircher J sine die with the proviso that the applicant should
approach the DJP for a special allocation after all affidavits were commissioned and
served. The applicant annexed unsigned affidavits to the original notice of motion.
The matter was then set down by the ADJP for 5 February 2026 in this court.
The matter was then set down by the ADJP for 5 February 2026 in this court.
[10] After hearing both parties' representatives on 5 February 2026, this court was
convinced that there is no urgency for this application, but decided to hear the merits
of the matter to give some finalization to the ongoing litigation saga although the
court is of the view that the applicant will have substantial redress in due course the
merits.
THE APPLICANT'S CASE:
[11] The applicant advanced four propositions justifying his application namely:
11.1 The first proposition is that his arrest and continued detention is
unlawful because the Department of Home Affairs has now confirmed that his
identity document was issued by Home Affairs. His argument is based on the
affidavit obtained from a Home Af fairs office in Durban in December 2025. He
does not mention that this urgent application was struck from the urgent roll
early December 2025. Al that was stated in the affidavit he relies upon is that
the Home Affairs official merely stated that the applicant is in possession of an
identity document issued by Home Affairs. This fact is not in dispute. What is
in dispute in the part heard criminal trial is the completing of the preceding
documentation to obtain the identity document. The state is alleging that the
information completed on the application is false. It is not for this court to
intervene in the part heard criminal matter and to pronounce any verdict on
the status of the issued identity document. The aspect of unlawfulness would
have been consid ered during the bail applications and appeals thereof. The
court is not privy thereto. This court cannot assess the merits of the part heard
criminal case to determine whether the state's case is strong enough and
order his release.
11.2 The second proposition by the applicant is that the State has no prima
facie case against him, particularly in relation to the allegations of fraud,
misrepresentation and contraventions of the Immigration Act. It is not for this
court to scrutinise the section 212 statem ent (ito the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977 "CPA") and to pronounce on the part heard criminal matter. This
court is not to pronounce on the status and value of the section 212 statement;
this is for the criminal trial court to decide on the evidence produced in the trial.
this is for the criminal trial court to decide on the evidence produced in the trial.
This court is not sitting as a court of second instance and the correct way is to
have the criminal trial finalised in the Magistrate's Court and thereafter follow
the correct procedure to appeal the outcome if dissatisfied with the outcome
of the trial.
11.3 The applicant is referred to section 212 (1) of the CPA to satisfy himself
that the provisions of section 212 finds application in criminal matters (my
emphasise). In par 97 in the heads of arguments on behalf of the applicant
reference is made to section 112 presumably of the CPA. Any affidavit in
terms of section 212 of the CPA will be prima facie proof by mere production
thereof of the contents of it in criminal matters. The present application is not
brought in terms of the CPA but as an urgent application in a civil court. The
argument on behalf of the applicant is meritless in the present matter.
HABEAS CORPUS:
11.4 The third proposition by the applicant is that his arrest, the dates
thereof, the case docket and the 48 hour requirement in the CPA renders his
continued detention unconstitutional. The applicant disputes the dates if his
arrest, the contents of the various police dockets and the 48 hour requirement
in section SO of the CPA. Although the purpose of section 5 0 (c) (ii) is that a
detainee be brought before a court within 48 hours after arrest, the period can
be extended in terms of section SO (2) (i} &(ii) of the CPA. The purpose of the
48 hour is to prevent detaining a person indefinite or for prolonged period s
which will contravene the constitutional right in section 35 (l)(d) of the
Constitution.
* Section 35 (2)(d) empowers anyone in detention to challenge the lawfulness of his
detention before a court and if unlawful, to be released. This is subject to the 48
hours not being extended. This is for the criminal court to decide upon.
* In Minister of Law and Order v Kader 1991(1) SA 41 (A) at 49 -50 the Appellate
Division dealt with the 48 hour period. It was held that the function of a judicial officer
was t o guard against the accused being detained on insubstantial or improper
was t o guard against the accused being detained on insubstantial or improper
grounds in any event and to ensure that the detention is not unduly extended. If
applied to the present matter the court cannot find that detention of the appellant
after his first a ppearance was on insubstantial or improper. The charges against the
appellant are serious and part heard. The appellant previously made use of the legal
mechanisms available to convince different courts to try and secure his release. The
48 hour issue was most probably central in the previous urgent applications and
needs no further attention. The court will deal with these pending urgent applications
below.
* The scope of Habeas Corpus is not limitless. The enquiry is whether the detention
of the applicant is unlawful or not. In this matter the applicant is detained by way of
the order granted by the Magistrate Randburg where the criminal matter against the
applicant is part heard. It is not whether the case against him is weak and he is not
entitled to release merely because he disputed the case against him. He should
raise this aspect in the part heard criminal case. His argument about the section 212
affidavit can only apply in criminal matters where the evidential value of the section
212 statement will be decided. The court is of the view that the applicant has not
made a case for his release on these grounds. The court is further of the view that
his detention is lawful.
11.5 The fourth proposition is that the length of his detention, coupled with
his dissatisfaction with the bail applications' outcome, justifies the habeas
corpus relief sought.
* The appellant launched various unsuccessful bail applic ations before the
Magistrate as early as in the beginning of 2023 shortly after his detention . He
appealed the refusal of bail in the Magistrate Court to the Johannesburg High Court
without success. Yacoob J and Wanless J dismissed his bail appeals on two
different occasions. It is not for this court to "review" these decisions.
* The appellant brought several urgent applications in the High Court to secure his
* The appellant brought several urgent applications in the High Court to secure his
release for detention. Although the relief sought in these urgent applications were not
titled to be habeas corpus, the result if granted would have resulted in the immediate
release of the applicant from detention. The list of these applications is as follows:
[12] The applicant has followed the prescribed route for applying for bail on more
than one occasion. His first bail application during December 2022 was refused by
the Magistrate in Randburg and the subsequent bail appeal dismissed by the
Johannesburg High Court. See supra.
[13] What will follow is a brief overview of the various legal pr ocesses instituted by
the applicant and the outcome thereof. There is no need to give the detail of each
application and outcome thereof. Suffice to state that the majority of the urgent
applications were struck from the roll for lack of urgency. An applic ation struck from
the roll for lack of urgency is still a pending matter and should be enrolled in the
ordinary course business. To date of the hearing all these matters are still pending.
[14] The applicant brought two different bail applications, two b ail appeals,
numerous urgent applications and one unsuccessful attempt for direct access to the
Constitutional Court. The underlying relief in all these matters were the release of the
applicant from custody.
14.1 He was held in custody in lieu of a cour t order granted by the
Magistrate Randburg after an unsuccessful bail application on 3 December
2022. This was within a few days after his initial arrest. This refusal of bail was
appealed to the Johannesburg High Court where the appeal was dismissed
by Yacoob. J
14.2 A further bail application was launched on 20 March 2024 which was
refused by the Randburg Magistrate. The subsequent bail appeal was
dismissed by Wanless J during July 2024. The gist of the judgment was that
the court held that the appellant was a flight risk.
14.3 On 16 August 2024 the applicant filed an urgent application against his
former immigration consultants. The applicant withdrew this application shortly
before the hearing.
14.4 On 25 August 2024 another urgent application was filed, this time
against the Minister of Home Affairs. The set down was for 3 September 2024
and the relief sought was declaring his detention unlawful and to order his
release from custody. The reality of the requested relief is nothing more,
nothing less than a habeas corpus application. The matter was struck from
the roll for lack of urgency.
14.5 The application in 14.3 above was re -enrolled on the urgent court for 3
October 2024 but it was removed from the roll before hearing thereof.
14.6 The applicant again re-enrolled the urgent application in 14.5 above for
8 October 2024 but removed before hearing, the applicant alleging that a
settlement was reached with his immigration consultants.
14.7 On 22 October 2024 another urgent application was brought against
the Minister of Home Affairs, the relief sought an interdict against the Minister
preventing the deportation of the applicant. It was removed from the roll and is
currently pending.
14.8 On 29 October 2024 the applicant re -enrolled the urgent application in
13 6 supra. The application stood down to 1 November 2024 when it was
struck from the roll for lack of urgency.
14.9 On 12 November 2024 the applicant brought an urgent application
against the Magistrate of Randburg and various other parties seeking an
order to set aside all decisions taken by inter alia the "Hawks" (Directorate of
Priority Crimes Investigating Litigation Unit) since the applic ant's first
appearance on 22 November 2022. The matter was struck from the roll by
Strijdom J for lack of urgency.
14.10 On 3 December 2024 another urgent application found it way to the
urgent court which was struck from the roll by Van Niewenhuizen J f or lack of
urgency.
14.11 On 10 December 2024 another unsuccessful urgent application was
struck from the roll by Joyini AJ for lack of urgency.
14.12 On 9 December 2024 the applicant brought an urgent application
against Captain MP Magetse for his removal from any further involvement in
the investigation, alleging that the Captain misled the court. The matter was
removed from the roll.
14.13 On 19 December 2024 yet another urgent application was brought
before Pienaar AJ but it was removed before hearing. The appellant was
ordered to pay the costs of the application.
14.14 On 1 December 2024 the next urgent application was brought before
Lenyai J but it was removed from the roll before hearing.
14.15 On 4 December 2024 the applicant's direct approach of the
Constitutional Court was refused. The relief sought was the alleged breach of
the applicant's constitutional rights of liberty and his req uest was for his
immediate release form detention. The Con Court refused the applicant direct
access to the court.
14.16 The latest urgent application was brought in the Kwa -Zulu Natal High
Court on 11 December 2025 indirect seeking similar relief but th e application
was dismissed with costs for lack of urgency. The applicant now tries to
incorporate an affidavit in terms of section 212 of the CPA by an official from
the Durban Home Affairs Office in the current application as prove that the
part heard cr iminal case has no merit. The Durban High Court did not
pronounce on this aspect and the attempt to incorporate such cannot succeed.
[15] The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) provides for a comprehensive
framework to obtain the relief of releasing form detention/custody. The CPA provides
for bail applications, appeals against refusal of bail, representations to the Director of
Public Prosecutions for stopping the prosecution. The applicant has utilised these
options without success and it does not entitle him to substitute a civil urgent
application for the statutory criminal relief provided for in the CPA.
[16] It is clear that these urgent applications were disguised habeas corpus
applications. The aim with these was to have the applicant releas ed from detention.
During arguments this was denied, but an unexpected turn about occurred after the
hearing via a letter sent to the court via the clerk by the attorney of the applicant. In
this letter dated 12 February 2026 the writer thereof in no uncer tain terms "placed it
on record that the applications of concern wherein similar relief has been sought has
been withdrawn ”. There is no other finding that a pattern emerged in multiple
applications in different courts that the applicant seeks the same outc ome to be
released from detention without the part heard criminal trial to proceed and be
finalised. This is an abuse of proceedings.
[17] This letter is nothing more than an unashamed attempt to manipulate the
court after the hearing by conceding what d enied during arguments. There is now
no uncertainty that the majority of the urgent applications supra were disguised
Habeas Corpus applications. The conduct of the applicant's attorney to send such
letter to the judge is unacceptable and borders on co nduct unbecoming. This kind of
conduct is not expected from legal representatives and must be discouraged at all
costs. It however confirmed that the applicant was persistent in his abuse of the
court process. A copy of the letter is annexed to this judgment as annexure "A".
[18] The court is well aware of the constitutional provisions for a fair trial, the
unlawful deprivation of liberty (Bernstein v Bester 1996 ZACC 1996 (2) SA 751 CC)
and that justice must be seen to be done ( S v Tshilo 2000(4) SA 1078 ; 200(1)
BCLR 1252 CC ) but also that the Constitutional Court held that these principles are
not unqualified. It was held that if an application is frivolous, vexatious or
inappropriate the worthiness of its cause will not immunise it against an adverse co st
inappropriate the worthiness of its cause will not immunise it against an adverse co st
order. See Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources and Others 2009 96)
SA 232 CC.
[19] The "admission" by the attorney in the letter supra confirms that the urgent
process was abused in the past and in a vague unspecified manner making a
sweeping statement that the applications of concern wherein similar relief has been
sought has been withdrawn. There is no proof of such withdrawal nor any indication
which of the pending applications previously struck for lack of urgency are now
withdrawn. This is "litigation" outside the application before court and such conduct is
unbecoming.
[20] in view of the above the court is satisfied that the applicant failed to prove the
application for Habeas Corpus.
[21] There were other "side issues" which has no bearing on the question whether
the applicant made a case for the relief sought. Much was ma de of the history of the
matter and the judgments handed down in the bail appeals, side issues not
necessary to embark upon which have no real impact on the Habeas Corpus relief
sought. In view of the pattern of ongoing abuse of the urgent application proc edure
these issues will not impact on the ultimate order.
COSTS:
[22] The normal principle is that costs follow success. I considered in view of the
blatant abuse of the procedure to visit the applicant with a punitive cost order. After
further consideration taking into account the wasted costs incurred by the during the
saga ongoing litigation, I eventually decided that an order on a party -and-party scale
will be most appropriate.
ORDER:
The application is dismissed with costs. The costs to be on a party and party scale
"B".
POST SCRIPT:
[23] The only respondents that opposed the matter were the 1st to 4th and 6th & 7th
respondents. The relief sought is the same against all the respondents and in the
court's view the joining of the 5th to 11th respondents was unnecessary and indicative
of the litigation fever suffered by the applicant. It is in the court's view not necessary
to make any order in favour of these joined parties in view of the dismissal of the
application.
HOLLAND-MUTER J
Judge of the Pretoria High Court
20 February 2026
Matter heard on 5 February 2026
Judgment delivered and uploaded onto the electronic file of the matter on Caselines
on 20 February 2026
ANNEXURE "A": Letter by Danel Campbell Attorneys dd 12 February 2026.
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Adv T Sellem (Indicated as a SC in the practice note dated
December 2025, but not confirmed in court)
Adv V Rathilal
For the Respondents: Adv M D Sekwakweng
ANNEXURE “A”
Danel Campbell
ATTORNEYS
Personal Injury Litigation / General Litigation / Cost Consulting / Correspondent Work
BY EMAIL MESSAGE
To: S[…]
CC:
From: d[…]
My ref: DC/177
Your ref: 2025-249561
Date: 12 February 2026
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE HOLLAND-MUTER
Dear Honourable Jude Holland Muter,
IN RE:F[...] B[…] S[…]//NDPP & OTHERS
CASE NUMBER: 2025-249561
We refer to the above matter which was argued before Your Lordship on 5 February
2026.
This matter concerns a habeas corpus a pplication and accordingly involves the
liberty interests of the Applicant.
We respectfully enquire whether an indication may be provided as to when
Judgment Is likely to be delivered, in order that we may properly advise our client.
We are mindful of the demands upon this Honourable Court and raise this enquiry
with the utmost respect, given the nature of the relief sought and its constitutional
implications.
Lastly, we wish to place on record that the applications of concern wherein similar
relief has been sought has been withdrawn.
We remain grateful for the Court's attention to this matter and thank Your Lordship in
advance for any guidance that may be provided.
Yours faithfully,
DANEL CAMPBELL ATTORNEYS
DANEL CAMPBELL
Checked and signed electronically