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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case No: 2025/181301
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED.
DATE 18/2/26
SIGNATURE
In the ex parte application of:
CORNELIS ABRAHAM DIEDERICKS
(Identity Number: 9[...]) Applicant
and
Case No: 2025/160660
In the ex parte application of:
IZAK JOHANNES MINNAAR Applicant
(Identity Number: 6[...]) (Divorced)
JUDGMENT
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DM LEATHERN, AJ:
[1] These matters came before me as applications for the voluntary
surrender of each of the applicants’ estates in the special Insolvency Court
for the week 9 to 13 February 2026.
THE AFFIDAVITS AND COMMISSIONING THEREOF:
[2] Each application was supported by w hat is entitled a
“DECLARATION” by the valuer Mr Koop de Vries Styger purportedly signed
by him as an appraiser to the High Court and purportedly also signed by a
commissioner of oaths above an endorsement which reads:
“signed and sworn in front of me in Pretoria on the ….of September
2025. I certify that the person giving his affidavit is well acquainted
with the content of this affidavit and that there was complied with
the requirements of the Government Gazette in nr R1258 of 21
July 1972.”
[3] In each of the matters the “DECLARATION” was worded in exactly
the same manner, with the necessary changes to reflect the items in fact
valued, including the same typographical and grammatical errors.
[4] On examining the various “DECLARATIONS” it became clear that
the signatures of both Mr Styger and the commissioner of oaths were exactly
the same and in exactly the same position relative to the remainder of the
document concerned.
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[5] The immediate concern was whether in fact these declarations
(sometimes referred to as affidavits) had in fact been properly deposed to
and whether they constituted admissible evidence.
[6] These matters were stood down in order to provide affidavits by the
valuer and the commissioner dealing with the above aspects. Mr Styger filed
an affidavit which was supported by what purports to be a confirmatory
affidavit by the commissioner of oaths. From such affidavit inter alia the
following is clear:-
[6.1] the valuation was a desktop valuation and no physical or visual
inspection of the property was conducted by him;
[6.2] certain submissions, legal and otherwise, are made regarding
the signature and commissioning as statements of law without
Mr Stoop indicating that he relied on advice from legal
representatives in making such legal submissions. As will
appear hereinlater, such legal submissions are almost without
exception, wrong.
[7] The content of paragraph 4 of each of the affidavits is reproduced
hereunder:
“SIGNATURE AND COMMISSIONING - VIRTUAL EXECUTION
AND ECTA
4.1 I confirm that I personally signed the valuation report and this
affidavit.
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4.2 The signature was affixed electronically, constituting an
electronic signature as contemplated in section 13 of the
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002
(“ECTA”).
4.3 The electronic signature was applied by me with the intention
to authenticate and adopt the contents of the document.
4.4 Due to practical constraints, the affidavit was commissioned
virtually, with the Deponent and the Commissioner of Oaths
being in remote locations at the time of signing.
4.5 The Commissioner of Oaths:
4.5.1 identified me by way of real -time audio -visual
communication;
4.5.2 satisfied himself / herself as to my identity;
4.5.3 confirmed that I understood and acknowledged the contents
of the affidavit; and
4.5.4 thereafter affixed his / her signature and official stamp
electronically.
4.6 The method of signing and commissioning complies with:
4.6.1 section 13 of ECTA;
4.6.2 the Justices and of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths
Act 16 of 1963; and,
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4.6.3 prevailing court practice recognising the validity of
electronically signed and virtually commissioned affidavits.
4.7 The electronic execution does not detract from the
authenticity, reliability, or admissibility of the valuation or this
affidavit.
[8] In sub -paragraph 4.2, Mr Styger submits that the signature was
affixed electronically constituting an electronic signature as contemplated in
Section 13 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 25 of
2002 (“ECTA”) and states in paragraph 4.3 that it was “applied” by him.
Section 13(1) of ECTA provides:
“(1) Where the signature of a person is required by law and such
law does not specify the type of signature, that requirement in
relation to a data message is met only if an advanced electronic
signature is used.”
Sub-section 2 provides:
“(2) Subject to sub -section (1), an electronic signature is not
without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it is
electronic form.”
[9] It is to be noted that nowhere do either Mr Styger or the
Commissioner of Oaths indicate:-
[9.1] how the “electronic signatures” were supposedly applied; or,
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[9.2] whether the document concerned could at any time have
constituted a “data message”.
[10] Section 1 of the Act contains definitions and defines inter alia:-
[10.1] “advanced electronic signature” as an electronic signature
which results from a process which has been accredited by the
Authority as provided for in Section 37; and,
[10.2] a “data message” as data generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic means and includes-
(a) voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction;
and,
(b) a stored record.
[11] Clearly no attempt has been made to bring the present document
within the definition of a data message, nor the electronic signature within the
frame of an “advanced electronic signature”. Even less has there been any
attempt to indicate that that electronic signature is approved as provided for
in Section 37 of the Act.
[12] Section 1 further provides the definition of “electronic signature” as
meaning data attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other
data and which is intended by the user to serve as a signature. “Data” means
electronic representations of information in any form.
[13] Again, the document put forward clearly does not constitute data
as defined and the mere fact that the purported signature may have been
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intended to have served as a signature, does not do away with the remainder
of the requirements in the definition of “electronic signature”.
[14] In paragraph 4.4 of the affidavit quoted above, the statement is
made that the affidavit was commissioned virtually due to “practical
constraints”. Mr Styger does not take the Court into his confidence by
indicating what such practical constraints may be but it is noted that Mr
Styger has provided a number of valuations which came before this Court
during this week and no doubt provides many such valuations. Clearly the
method followed is not due to “practical constraints” but simply one of his
personal convenience. There is not reason why Mr Styger cannot appear
before a commissioner of oaths and comply with the regulations in regard to
a batch of valuations at one time.
[15] The valuer furthermore makes the surprising submissions that the
process purportedly followed by him and the Commissioner of Oaths
complies with:-
[15.1] Section 13 of ECTA;
[15.2] the Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act, 16
of 1963; and
[15.3] “prevailing Court practice recognising the validity of electronically
signed and virtually commissioned affidavits”.
[16] In the matter of Africa’s Best Foods (Pty) Ltd v Edie Foods S.R.L
(82024/061772) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1008; [2025] 4 All SA 589 GJ) a full bench
Page |8
on appeal specifically considered the question of virtual commissioning and
whether an interpretation of Regulation 3(1) of the Regulations governing the
administration of oaths of affirmations requires a deponent to sign the
document in the presence of the Commissioner of Oaths.
[17] The Court, after having considered the case of Briedenhann1 and
various other cases in the Division , while accepting that the Act may be
outdated and should probably be amended to embrace the age of
digitalisation in which we live , was unable to find that the decision in
Briedenhann was clearly wrong and that, in the absence of legislative
intervention to bring the Act and Regulations in line with modern
technological advances, virtual commissioning of affidavits is impermissible
and not sanctioned in terms of the existing legislation.2
[18] The Court there furthermore dealt with the discretion that a Court
may have to condone non -compliance if there is substantial compliance with
the Regulations and reiterated that the discretion is not unfettered but must
be exercised judicially upon a consideration of each case.3
[19] The Court referred to cases in various divisions where the
discretion had been exercised to permit affidavits deposed to virtually before
a Commissioner of Oaths in South Africa where the deponents were abroad.
1 FirstRand Bank Limited v Briedenhann (3690/2021) [2022] ZAECQBHC 6; 2022 (FSA215)
(ECGq).
2 Paragraphs 16 &17.
3 Paragraph 35.
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[20] In the present instance, the Court is obliged to exercise its
discretion judicially upon a consideration of all the relevant facts and
circumstances and consider whether the interests of justice require the
admission of such affidavits. The following facts are relevant as they appear
from the papers in this matter:-
[20.1] both the deponent and the Commissioner of Oaths are within the
Republic of South Africa and in fact both in Pretoria;
[20.2] there was no explicit urgency to deposing to the affidavits;
[20.3] the deponent being in Pretoria would have had access to
numerous attorneys and other Commissioners of Oaths,
including officers of the South African Police Service;
[20.4] in each of these matters the original affidavits explicitly stated
that the deponent appeared before the Commissioner of Oaths
and appended his signature before the Commissioner of Oaths.
This appears from the statement that it was “signed and sworn in
front of me”.
[21] Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate that the Court’s
discretion be exercised in favour of the applicant s, the valuer and the
Commissioner of Oaths. Where it is truly necessary that the Regulations not
be complied with and the failure to do so be condoned , a case therefor must
be made out. At the very least one would expect that it be recorded that the
affidavit had been deposed to virtually (remotely) and that the signatures
which are put forward purportedly as original signatures are in fact electronic
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signatures. One is left with the overriding suspicion that the document is
simply a document which includes both of the alleged signatures and is
generated from a template which is used in the office of Mr Styger , which is
supported by the fact that the electronic signatures always appear in exactly
the same place relative to the remainder of the document.
[22] If the content of Mr Styger’s affidavit quoted in paragraph 14.3
above is intended to indicate that there is a prevailing Court practice
recognising the validity of documents deposed to as in the present case ,
recognising them as electronically signed and virtually commissioned, this
cannot be the case. Where a document does not indicate that it has been
electronically signed or virtually commissioned, it certainly cannot be
accepted that the Court has made a practice of accepting such documents
where inter alia the document explicitly states that it was “signed and sworn
in front of me”.
THE DESKTOP VALUATIONS:
[23] In the Diedericks matter, there was only a valuation of movable
property. In the Minnaar matter, there was a valuation of immovable property
as well as movable property. In each of the valuations of movable assets, Mr
Styger made the following declaration:
“I, Koop Styger, do hereby declare that on the basis of all the
information presented to me and which information is attached
hereto, I completed the attached valuation. Based on my
experience within the field, I placed a value of R32, 000 (Thirty Two
Page |11
Thousand Rand) on the items. To my knowledge, the
abovementioned information is true and correct.”
[24] No information which was supposedly “presented” is attached to
either valuation. It also does not appear from either valuation that it is in fact
a “desktop” valuation.
[25] On that basis and prima facie one would accept that the valuation
has been done properly, with at least a physical inspection of the items
concerned. After further affidavits were filed, the Court is informed for the
first time that such inspection did not take place and that it is a “desktop”
valuation.
[26] Mr Styger is no stranger to the requirements for valuations in
voluntary surrenders and friendly sequestrations. His valuations were the
subject of a decision by Binns -Ward J in the Western Cape Division in the
matter of Ex parte J.C. Crafford & H. Crafford and Ex parte C.E. Napier
(reported on Saflii as Crafford v Crafford & another (19421/13, 19422/13)
[2014] ZAWCHC 14 (13 February 2014) where two voluntary surrender
applications were brought by an attorney (other than the attorney of record in
the present instance) each supported by sworn valuations by Mr Styger and
the Learned Judge also examined three other files and stated:
“Moreover, in each such case the arithmetical calculation of the
alleged advantage to creditors resulted in an estimated dividend to
concurrent creditors of precisely 21c in the rand. That exactly the
same dividend was estimated in each of the five matters identified
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reflects, in the context of the circumstances described earlier, a
coincidence that raises a strong suspicion that the values used
were falsely determined to support a predetermined result.”
[27] The valuations purportedly done by Mr Styger were subject to
severe criticism, inter alia in paragraph 3 of the judgment it was pointed out
that it was inherently improbable that an appraiser would travel twice between
Pretoria and Cape Town in the course of a single week to assess the value of
estates containing meagre assets and that it would be feasible for the sworn
appraiser to carry on business in the manner that the affidavits in both cases
considered together would suggest. There it was indicated by Mr Styger in a
further affidavit that he failed to notice mistakes regarding the dates in both of
the documents, which the Learned Judge found difficult to accept. The
attempt to withdraw the applications was re fused and the Learned Judge
proceeded to conduct an examination in terms of s3(3) of the Insolvency Act.
The attorney gave evidence and confessed that Mr Styger had not come to
Cape Town to value the applicant’s movable assets.
[28] In paragraph 19 of the judgment, Binns -Ward J the affidavits made
by Mr Styger were described as being “apparently perjurious” and referred to
the appropriate authority. Binns-Ward J stated in this regard:
“It is a grievous matter for any witness to perjure him -or-herself, but
such conduct is especially egregious when he or she does so in
the context of purporting to discharge the functions of an office in
which legislation and practice repose particular trust. Sworn
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appraisers are ordinarily appointed by the Masters of the High
Court in terms of s 6 of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of
1965. They are specially entrusted with functions in terms of a
number of statutes, including the Insolvency Act, for example. 4
The proper operation of the statutory provisions concerned is
obviously negated if sworn appraisers perjure themselves and
produce false valuations.”
[29] In Ex parte Bezuidenhout; in re: Ex parte Pieterse (1858/2014;
1859/2014) [2014] ZAECPEHC 60 (19 August 2014) again an investigation
was done into how Mr Styger and a Pretoria attorney became involved in
voluntary surrenders in the Eastern Cape Local Division and an enquiry was
held in terms of s3(3) of the Insolvency Act. There it was again found that Mr
Styger had not examined the items which he purported to value.
[30] Mr Styger was examined and relied on a mistake by “his lady” for
the inclusion of a property in the valuation which was simply not comparable.
His statement that he did not even know what the purpose of the valuation
was, was stated by the Learned Judge Goosen J (as he then was) to be
“entirely unconvincing” where the attorney had already stated that h e solely
had an insolvency practice involving as it would voluntary surrender
applications and that he makes use of the services of Styger in all those
applications because Styger was prepared to operate on a contingency fee
agreement.
4 See ss 4(4) and 69(1) of the Insolvency Act. See also, for example, s 27(2), 38(1) and 43(2) of
the Administration of Estates Act and s 118 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011.
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[31] If that was not enough, Bertelsmann J in this Division had cause to
consider the actions of Mr Styger and the valuations produced by him in the
matter of Ex parte Q.R.E. and Another (55075/2014) [2014] ZAGPHC 919;
2015 (1) SA 540 (GP) 15 October 2014 . Bertelsmann J referred to various
authorities and particularly emphasised that where surrender applications are
ex parte applications, they require a full and frank disclosure . He referred as
well to the matter of ex parte Cloete5 where Daffue J emphasised that valuers
are obliged to act honestly and conscientiously when furnishing their expert
opinion of the value of assets falling into estates. In dealing with the
valuation by Mr Styger, Bertelsmann J referred in paragraphs 9 and 10 of his
judgment to that valuation wherein Mr Styger confirmed that the valuation
was prepared after all the relevant information had been obtained from the
applicant for purposes of the valuation and which included a list of assets,
condition of the assets, age and photographs thereof while the assets were
not inspected physically . Bertelsmann J found that such valuation was
completely unacceptable.
[32] The Learned Judge explained in paragraph 11 of his judgment that
a valuer’s contribution to an application for voluntary surrender depends for
its admissibility as opinion evidence upon the indisputable independence of
the expert and that whatever information the so -called expert valuer used to
perform this function was neither obtained nor assessed nor analysed by the
witness. He pointed out that the applicant was not an expert and could not
5 1097/2013 [2013] ZAFSHC 45
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provide the information required nor could photographs be relied on. The
Learned Judge stated in paragraph 13 of his judgment:
“(13) This practice is a clear abuse of the process that must immediately
be nipped in the bud. It has always been an obvious principle – albeit
unwritten - that the valuator must personally inspect assets that must be
valued. With the approval of the Hon Deputy Judge President of this
Division it is now laid down as a formal rule of practice that a valuator in
applications of this nature must confirm under oath that he or she
personally inspected the assets that are referred to in the valuation. In
such affidavit the date upon which, and the time and locality at which the
assets were inspected must be set out and the applicant or his or her
proxy must confirm in his or her affidavit that he or she was present when
the assets were viewed and that he or she pointed out the assets to the
valuator.”
CONCLUSION:
[33] It is quite clear that the same “cottage industry” that has been
referred to in the judgments previously and in particular of the judgment of
Gorven J (as he then was) in Ex parte Arntzen 2013 (1) SA 49 (KZP)
continues in this Division. It is past surprising that so many of the
applications for voluntary surrender are supported by so -called “desktop”
valuations where dividends calculated at the most optimistic managed to
achieve 21 cents (as in the case of Minnaar) in the Rand or 21.5 cents in the
Rand. This, despite the judgment of Bertelsmann J referred to hereinbefore
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and the provisions of the Gauteng: Pretoria Practice Manual which provides
in Section 15.14.4.2 that
“the valuation must be on oath and the appraiser must be qualified
as any other expert witness.”
[34] The “valuations” in casu are n ot acceptable valuations where the
movables have not been examined or inspected. They are furthermore not
confirmed on oath.
[35] One is left with the overriding impression that the applications are
box-ticking exercises that the Court is expected to rubber-stamp.
[36] This judgment is referred to the Chief Master to consider the
actions of Mr Styger.
[37] In the light of the aforesaid, the applications have been postponed
to the next available date being the 13 th of April 2025 in order that the
applicants can take the necessary steps to regularise the papers
appropriately, if possible.
___________________________________
DM LEATHERN
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e -mail and by being uploaded to CaseLines .
The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 14h00 on the 18th of February
2026.
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COUNSEL FOR BOTH APPLICANTS: Adv. B. Lee
ATTORNEYS FOR BOTH APPLICANTS: Michael Senekal Attorney
Tel: 082 873 7917
Email:
michael@senekallaw.co.za
Ref: MD0261 & MM0381
Date of Hearing: 10 & 12 February 2026
Date of Judgment: 18 February 2026