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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO : CC08/2022
DATE : 26 -02 -2026
In the matter between 10
TSAKANI CHARLOTTE NGOBENI Applicant
And
THE STATE Respondent
J U D G M E N T
MATLAPENG , AJ:
1. This is an application by the applicant on the
following terms:
(i) That the State did not conduct criminal 20
proceedings and/or that the State unlawfully
authorised Prudential Authority to conduct
criminal investigations against her and that a
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE : YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES : YES / NO
(3) REVISED
......................................... ...........
SIGNATURE
DATE: .............................
trial -within -a-trial should be conducted to
determine if the evidence was
unconstitutionally obtained or not;
(ii) That the State relied on false information to
unlawfully seek a search and seizure warrant,
which was granted on 14 February 2019 on the
premises of Werksmans Attorneys in Sandton;
(iii) That the Prudential Authority is conflicted
because it is the complai nant and the
investigating officer at the same time; 10
(iv) That the case against her is manipulated by
mala fides , and avers that she will not receive
a fair trial;
(v) That this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate
her matter in terms of section 106(1)(f ) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and that
she should be acquitted in terms of section
106(1)(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
2. The issues raised by the applican t are interrelated
and/or intertwined. Her argument is principally that 20
this Cour t does not have jurisdiction to entertain her
matter.
3. A brief synopsis of what transpired before the present
application is necessary.
4. It is of utmost importance to know that the case
against the applicant was trial ready ever since
October 2022. Ever since then to date hereof it has
been set down for trial, but did not proceed because
the applicant kept on changing legal representatives.
5. Adv Meyer for the State informed the Court that this
matter was previously set for trial on five different
occasions, and that it did not proceed. Adv Mhlanga
for the applicant on the other hand informed the Court
that he is the sixth legal representative to appear for
the applicant, that there were five leg al 10
representatives who previously appeared for the
applicant. He was briefed on 21 May 2024, and
received docket disclosure few days thereafter. To be
exact, he received disclosure on 26 May 2024.
6. Adv Mhlanga filed an application compelling the State
to disclose Part B and C of the docket. This
application was dismissed by Johnson, AJ on
25 May 2025, and on that day the matter was
postponed until 2 February 2026 for trial.
7. On 28 January 2026, exactly three working days 20
before the trial date, the a pplicant filed the present
application. She contends, amongst others, that this
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain her matter . She
argues further that the Court should acquit her on all
the charges preferred against her. It is of cardinal
importance to know that the defence waited for a
period of nine months. They filed the present
application just a mere three days before the trial
date.
8. On 2 February 202 6 the State requested a
postponement , and justifiably so , in order to respond
to the specia l plea. The matter was then postponed
until 17 February 2026. On the latter date, the State
put charges to the accused (now the applicant ). After
the charges were read in English, the interpreter, 10
Mr Mas enya , placed it on record that it has been
agreed by Adv M hlanga for the applicant . as well as
the accused (now the applicant ) that it will not be
necessary for him to interpret the charges to the
accused, and that he will only start to interpret to her
when the trial starts, or when the State will be cal ling
its first state witness , a nd immediately thereafter, the
Court enquired from the applicant what her plea is to
the charges preferred against her. Surprisingly, she
changed her tune and said that she now needs a 20
Tsonga interpreter , who was not available at the time.
The matter had to be postponed until the following
day, 18 February 2026, for a Tsonga interpreter.
9. It is evident that the applicant is using monkey tricks
to delay the continuation of this trial.
10. One of the rights in the Bill of Rights is the right to a
speedy trial, as stipulated in section 35(3)(d) of the
Constitution, and it provides, I quote:
“Every person has the right to a fair trial,
which includes the right, (d), to have the
right to begin and conclud e without
unreasonable delay.”
11. One of the predominant cases in South Africa, and an
example of delay in criminal matters in the criminal
justice system, is the arms deal case. 10
12. In 2007 Mr Jacob Zuma was charged with corruption,
money laundering and fraud. Charges were later
withdrawn and seven years later the high court in
Pretoria ruled that the charges should be reinstated.
13 . Since 2018, Jacob Zuma's legal team have postponed
the matter on many instances. They brought a
number of interlocutor y applications, consequently
causing a delay in the trial.
14 . In April 2020 Jacob Zuma cha nged his legal team,
and in 2021 he insisted that the prosecutor, Mr Billy 20
Downer, should be removed from the case. It is
unheard of that the applicant would engage the
services of six different legal representatives in a
space of two years, from October 2022 until
21 May 2024, when Adv Mhlanga was briefed in this
matter .
15 . This hi re and fire policy of legal representatives by
the applicant in this matter will no t be tolerated
because it delays the continuation of the trial.
16. The above exposition demonstrates in clear and
unequivocal terms that the applicant in this matter is
dilly -dallying deliberat ely . She does not want this
matter to proceed, and this is unacceptable.
17. Once an accused or an applicant frustrate the judicial
process in order to delay the trial, this is called 10
Stalingrad [spelt], Stalingrad strategy. It refers to a
legal defence strategy designed to delay, obstruct,
and wear down an opponent by relentlessly
challenging every aspect of the trial.
18 . On ce enough time has passed, the defence team may
raise a defence that the accu sed’s trial , her right to a
fair trial is being violated , and might ask that a
permanent stay of p ro secution be granted.
19 . Spe edy trial rights ensure that an accused person is
brought to trial within a reasonable time, preventing 20
indefinite detention if he is in custody, and protecting
against prolonged anxiety, expenses, and memory
degradation of witnesses.
20 . I am concerned about cases that take a long time to
be finalised . I t is a known fact that human beings in
this planet earth do not live forever and ever, they
die . If not, they forget after a lapse of time, and an
accused person will get acquitted simply because
their matter took a long time to be finalised.
21 . It is evident that the applicant in this matter is using
all the tricks in the book to frustrate the continuation
of this trial . T his is condemned in the strongest
possible terms.
22 . A legal representative must understand the facts,
analyse the law, and advise client on his or her 10
options, risks, and the best course of action. A legal
represe ntative must, amongst others, also advise
client about the provisions of section 342A of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which deals with
unreasonable delay in a tr ial, and the consequences
thereof.
23 . The applicant cannot file an application after an
application , like in the arms deal matter. The
question that forcefully comes to the fore is, why
does the applicant file her applications, in a 20
piecemeal fashion. This is, in my view, a clear
indication that the applicant is embarking on a fishing
expedition or is buying time. This is unacceptable
and must stop here and now.
24. I now turn to the issues raised by the applicant in this
matter. The departure point is that it is of cardinal
importance to note how paragraph 2 of her special
plea is phrased. It reads, I quote :
“I confirm that I plead not guilty to all the
charges put to me and provide the
following special p lea e xplanation in
terms of section 106 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. ”
25. Section 106 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977:
“Pleas: 10
1. When accused pleads to a charge, he
may plead :
(a) That he is guilty of the offence
charge d or of a ny offence of
which he may be convicted on the
charge ; or
(b) That he is not guilty ; or
(c) That he has already been
convicted of the offence with
which he is charged ; or 20
(d) That he has already been
convicted of the offence with
which he is charged ; or
(e) That he has received a free
pardon under section 372 (6) from
the State President for the
offence charge d; or
(f) That the Court has no jurisdiction
to try an offence ; or
(g) That he has been discharged
under the provisions of
section 204 from prosecution for
the offence charge d; or
(h) That the prosecutor has no title to
prosecute; or 10
(i) That the prosecution may not be
resumed or instituted owing to an
order or a court under section
342A(3)(c);
2. Two or more pleas may be pleaded
toget her , except that a plea of guilt
may not be pleaded with any other plea
to the same charge.
3. An accused shall give reasonable
notice to the prosecution of his 20
intention to plead or plea other than
the plea of guilt y or not guilty, and
shall, in such notice , state the ground
on which he bas es his plea, provided
that the requirement of such notice may
be waived by the attorney general or
the prosecutor , as the case may be,
and the Court may on good cause
shown dispense with such notice, or
adjourn the trial to enable such notice
to be given.
4. An accused who pleads to a charge
other than a plea that the Court has no
jurisdiction to try the offence, or an
accused on behalf of whom a plea of 10
not guilty is sent out by the Court,
shall , save as is oth erwise express ly
provided by this act or any other law ,
be entitled to demand that he be
acquitted or he be convicted. ”
26. Section 106 of the Crimin al Procedure Act details
specific pleas, including a plea to the jurisdiction of
the Court. The section is clear and specific. It does
not provide for a special plea explanation, as stated
in paragraph 2 of the special plea mentioned supra by 20
the applica nt.
27. A p lea explanation is governed by section 115 (1) of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 , and provides
as follows , I quote :
“W he re an accused at a summary trial
pleads not guilty to the offence charged,
the presiding judge, regional magistrate,
or magistrate, as the case may be, may
ask him whether he wishes to make a
statement indicating the basis of his
defence.”
28. Paragraph 2 above of the applicant's special plea is
vague and embarrassing. It is difficult to fathom the
nature of the plea tender ed, and is not in conformity
with the provisions of section 106 of the Criminal 10
Procedure Act.
29. Paragraph 26 of the applicant's special plea
compounds the problem. It states, I quote :
“I n the event that my plea in terms of
section 106 (1)(f) and /or 106 (4) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, is
successful, I am entitled to be acquitted
in terms of section 106 (1)(f) and /or
106 (4) on the bas is that no fair trial may
be conducted under the circumstances 20
set out in the special plea. ”
30. Paragraph 26 of the applicant's special plea is not in
harmony with the provisions of section 106 (4) of the
Criminal Procedure Act , which reads as follows , I
quote :
“An accused who pleads to the charge
other than that a plea that the Court has
no jurisdiction to try the offence , or an
accused on behalf of whom a plea of not
guilty is entered by the Court , s hall , save
as is otherwise expressly provided by
this act or any other law , be entitled to
demand that he be acquitted or be
convicted. ”
31 . The provisions of section 104 (4) of the Criminal 10
Procedure Act are clear, specific and unambiguous .
An accused who raises a plea that the Court does no t
have jurisdiction to try an offence is not entitled to
demand that he or she be acquitted o n the offence
preferred against him or her.
32 . It stands to reason therefore that the submission by
the applicant that she be acquitted in terms of
section 106 (4) is misplaced . I t is baseless , without
merit and bound to be rejected.
33 . I now turn to the argument raised by the applicant in 20
her special plea that the State did not conduct a
criminal investigation and /or unlawfully authorised the
Prudential Authori ty to conduct criminal investigations
against her. Paragraph 12 of her notice of special
plea reads as follows, I quote:
“As alluded to above, o n 15 February
2019 the DPCI unlawfully mandated , or
alternatively delegated its authority to P A
to conduct a cr iminal investigation
against me. ”
34 . The applicant states further at paragraph 14 , I quote :
“O n 14 February 2019 and prior to the
filing of the complaint by the Momoniat .
the DPCI was granted a search and
seizure warrant to seize all evidence that 10
was obtained and relied upon by the
investigators of the PA , which resulted in
a report by Adv Terry Mo tau SC dated
30 September 2018. I attach here to a
copy of the abovementioned search and
seizure warrant marked NG02.”
35. In the case of S v Botha en Andere , 1995 (2) SAC R
598 (W) , a substantial portion of the investigation
was done by Eskom I nvestigation Service. The latter
obtained statement of witnesses and in some 20
instances tr avelled as far afield as England to
interview a suspect. Members of the SAPS were in
possession and /or in custody of the docket, but the
investigation was done by Eskom I nvestigation
Service. After the closure of the State case,
accused 3 applied for his acquittal in terms of
section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act . He
argued that his right to a fair trial had been violated.
He argued further that the South African Police
Service is the only entity which was entrusted with
the function of investigatin g crimes.
36 . Section 205 (3) of the South African Constitution
provides that , I quote:
“T he object of the police service are to
prevent, combat and investigate crime, to 10
maintain public order, to protect and
secure the inhabitants of the Republic
and the ir property, and to uphold and
enforce the law .”
37. The Court in Botha en Andere ’s case (supra) held
that the Constitution does not prohibit persons who
are not members of the police service to investigate
crime. The Court acknowledged that modern society
is specialised and that the police service cannot on
its own investigate and prevent all forms of crime. 20
The Court further ack nowledged that private entities
now and then conduct investigations in matters
affecting their own interests, the results of which are
handed over to the South African Police Service .
38. The Court found on the fac ts that it cannot be said
that Eskom com mitted any irregularity during the
course of the investigation s, nor could any inference
be drawn that Eskom I nvestigation Service had acted
with prejudice.
39. Finally, the Court held that the accused ’s right to a
fair trial had not been infringed. The application for a
discharge in terms of section 1 74 of the Criminal
Procedure Act was refused.
40 . I am in agreement with Adv Meyer for the State that
the enquir y as to whether the investigation was 10
conducted by the State or by the Prudential A uthority
does not in law constitute a jurisdictional issue. The
question to be determined by this Court is whether
any evidence obtained during the investigation was
acquired unlawfully or irregularly. Closely akin
there to is whether the accused's constitutional r ight
to a fair trial has been violated.
41. I am also in agreement with counsel for the State that
this Court will only be in a position to make a
determination regarding the constitutionality of the 20
evidence obtained once all the relevant facts has
been placed before Court.
42. I find on the basis of Botha en Andere ( supra) that it
cannot be said that Prudential Authority committed
any irregularity during the course of the investigation ,
nor could any inference be drawn that Prudential
Authority had acted with prejudice.
43. In the case of National Director of Public
Prosecutions v King 2020 (2) SACR 146 (SCA ) 4, the
Court held that irregularities do not necessarily lead
to a failure of justice.
44. It is my considered view that even if there may have
been irregularities during the investigation s, that
does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that there
was a failure of justice. 10
45. In the case of S v Jaipal [spelt] , 2005 (4) SA 581
(CC ) the Constitutional Court is record as having said
the following , I quote:
“T he right of an accused to a fair trial
requires fairness to the accused , as well
as fairness to the public as represented
by the State. It has to instil confidence
in the criminal justice system with the
public, including those close to the
accused , as well as those distressed by 20
the audacity and horror of crime.”
46. The applicant implies that the investigation was done
in an unlawful manner and that the investigators had
no mandate to carry out the investigations. The
Court i n the case of King (supr a) warned of thi s
strategy when it held that, I quote :
“The fair trial right does not mean a
pred ilection for technical niceties and
ingenious legal stratagems, or to
encourage preliminary litigation , a
perv er sive feature of white -collar crimes
cases in this country. To the contrary,
courts should within the confines of
fairness actively discourage preliminary
litigation. Courts should further be aware 10
that persons facing serious charges , and
especially minimum sentences , have little
inclination to cooperate in a process that
may lead to their conviction and any new
procedure can offer opportunities
capable of exploitation to obstruct and
delay. One can add the tendenc y of such
an accused , instead of confronting the
charge , of attacking the prosecution. ”
48. I find on th e facts therefore that the applicant’s 20
assertion that the State did not conduct criminal
investigation in this matter and unlawfully authorised
Prudential Authority to do so, is without basis and it
displays her lack of knowledge of investigations of
cases of this magnitude.
49. The applicant argues further that the State relied on
false information to unlawfully seek and be granted a
search and seizure warrant on 14 February 2019, as
well as any and all further search and seizure
warrants granted to the DP CI. It is not in dispute that
a search and seizure was done at the premises of
Werksmans Attorneys in Sandton on 14 February.
The indictment reflects that the applicant is residing
at […] P[...] Street, M akh ado . The Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that Sandton is situated in 10
Gauteng p rovince and M akh ado is situated in the
Lim popo province , and both these two places are
miles apart .
50. It is of great significance to note that the search and
seizure oper ation did not occur at the accused ’s
place of residence or business . As a result, the
search and seizure operation did not implicate or
infringe upon the accused's right to privacy . It is also
not contended that the documents or some of the
items seized at Werksmans Attorneys constituted 20
privileged communication pertaining to the applicant.
51. I find on the facts therefore that the assertion by the
applicant that the State relied on false information to
unlawfully seek a search and seizure warrant, whi ch
was granted on 14 February 2019, is baseless,
without merit and bound to be rejected.
52. The applicant argues further that the P rudential
Authorit y is both the complainant and the investigator
in this matter, t herefore the Prudential Authority is
conf licted in providing information or statements
pursuant to the criminal justice system .
53. The question is whether the Prudential Authority
conducted itself , in an unlawful or irregular manner .
There is no evidence before me to make a
determination on t his issue . It is of cardinal 10
importance to mention that this issue raised by the
applicant does not constitute an attack on the
jurisdiction of the Court. These assertions by the
applicant are to be determined after the evidence has
been tendered, bearin g in mind the principles laid
down in Botha en Andere (supra) .
54. It is my considered view that there is nothing
prohibiting the South African Police Service from
seeking experts to assist in the investigations of
cases of this nature. 20
55. The applica nt argues further that the case against her
was manipulated , with mala fides , and she is not
offered a fair trial .
56. Fair trial rights enshrined in section 35 (3) of the
Constitution , South African Constitutes, guarantees
that every accused person has the right to a fair
public hearing before an impartial tribunal .
57. In the case of S v Zuma and others , 1995 (2) SA 642
(CC) the Constitutional Court held that the right to a
fair trial is not limite d to the specific rights in
section 35 of the Constitution, but that it is a broader
substantive right that requires courts to act as
guardians of fundamental f airness.
58. In the case of S v Dzuduka [spelt] and others , S v
Tshilo [spelt] 2000 (4) SA 1078 (CC) the 10
Constitutional Court emphasised that a trial must be
fair to both the accused and the public interest.
59. No evidence has been tendered. The allegation by
the applicant that the case against her was
manipulated, that she is not offered a fair trial, is
baseless and without merit. This assertion by the
applicant has absolutely no bearing on the issue of
jurisdiction. It relates to the aspect whether the
evidence was unconstitutionally obtained or not, and
whether such evidence is admissible o r not. 20
60. In the case of Savoi [spelt] & Others v The National
Prosecuting Authority , case number 5867/2013,
judgment delivered on 29 January 2021, Steyn, J,
with whom Kruger, J and Henriques, J concurred,
stated at paragraph 53, and I quote:
“In a criminal matter jurisdiction is
determined by the area in which the
offences have been comm itted (territorial
jurisdiction), the nature of the offence
(substantive jurisdiction), and also the
nature of the penalty that should be
imposed (punitive jurisdiction). Of
course jurisdiction may also be obtained
in terms of a consolidation of multiple
offences committed in various provinces 10
if the National Director of Public
Prosecutions issues a certificate to have
all of the offences be heard in one
province.”
See also section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977, and section 22(3) of the Nati onal
Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998.
61. In conclusion, and at the risk of repetition, the
applicant argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain this matter, and that a trial -within -a-trial 20
should be conducted to determine if the evidence
obtained was constitutionally obtained or not.
62. According to the case of S v Zikhali (CC15/2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1751, a trial -within -a-trial is a
procedure or a mini trial conducted to determine the
admissibility of disputed evidence, such as a
confe ssion or evidence obtained via a search,
separate from the main trial’s merits. It ensures
evidence is voluntary, lawful and constitutional before
being admitted.
63. It is unclear and difficult to fathom on what basis
does the applicant aver that this Co urt lacks
jurisdiction to entertain this matter. I find on the
facts therefore that the assertion by the applicant that
this Court lacks jurisdiction and that a trial -within -a-10
trial be conducted to determine the admissibility of
the evidence is misplaced, without merit, baseless
and bound to be rejected.
64. Having carefully considered the application, I am not
persuaded that the applicant has made out a special
case that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this
matter. It follows that the applic ation be dismissed.
65. In the results, I make the following order:
The application is dismissed.
--------------- 20
…………………………..
MATLAPENG , AJ
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE : 26/02/2026
TRANSCRIBER’S CERTIFICATE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that so far as it is audible to
me, the aforegoing is a true and correct transcript of the
proceedings recorded by means of a digital recorder in the matter
bet ween:
TSAKANI CHARLOTTE NGOBENI // THE STATE
CASE NUMBER : CC08/2022
RECORDED AT : PALM RIDGE
DATE HELD : 26-02-2026
NUMBER OF PAGES : 22
DATE COMPLETED : 06-03-2026
TRANSCRIBER :
FY AUCAMP
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