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Marajh v National Debt Intervention (Pty) Ltd (187667/2025) [2026] ZAGPPHC 161 (24 February 2026)

75 Reportability
Consumer Law
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Brief Summary

Debt Review — Consent — Unlawful placement under debt review — Applicant challenging debt review initiated without her consent or statutory application — Court finding that debt review process requires consumer's consent and judicial oversight as per National Credit Act — Respondent's actions deemed unlawful and infringing applicant's constitutional rights — Court ordering removal from debt review and referral to National Credit Regulator for further action.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings took the form of an unopposed application enrolled on the High Court’s unopposed roll. The applicant sought relief effectively undoing a debt review process that had been initiated and recorded against her (and her late husband) under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (“the NCA”), on the basis that she had never consented to, authorised, or completed the prescribed statutory application for debt review.


The applicant was Denise Sheridon Marajh, an adult female trainer. The respondent was National Debt Intervention (Pty) Ltd (Registration number 2022/580262/07), a registered debt counsellor.


From a procedural perspective, the respondent was served with the notice of motion, founding affidavit, and notice of set down on 11 November 2025, but did not enter an appearance to defend. The court approached the matter as one in which default relief could be considered, while emphasising that default relief is not granted as a matter of course where statutory and constitutional rights are implicated, and that the court must satisfy itself as to the lawfulness of the relief sought.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned whether a consumer can be placed under debt review (and listed with credit bureaux as such) without a signed application in the prescribed form, without informed and continuing consent, and without the judicial or consent-order oversight contemplated by the NCA; and, further, whether the respondent could “withdraw” or “suspend” the process administratively and charge a cancellation/withdrawal fee.


Material Facts


The applicant was married in community of property to her late husband. Her husband died on 22 February 2025, and the relief sought necessarily implicated his share of the joint estate because the impugned debt review steps had been taken in relation to both spouses.


On 24 January 2025, the applicant received a call from a person identifying herself as “Roxy”, who said she acted on behalf of the respondent and indicated that the respondent could provide financial assistance. Acting on the understanding that the respondent would evaluate her financial situation and potentially assist with debt consolidation, the applicant provided personal and financial information relating to herself and her husband.


The applicant then realised that the process being pursued was debt review, not debt consolidation. She informed the respondent that she did not wish to be placed under debt review and she declined to complete or submit the prescribed application contemplated by section 86(1) of the NCA (which the court described as requiring completion and signature of Form 16).


Despite the applicant not completing an application, she received an email from the respondent requesting particulars of her husband. She responded on the same day providing his details, while expressly stating that he did not want to be placed under debt review and requesting confirmation that he would not be placed under debt review.


Notwithstanding that objection, the respondent proceeded to list both the applicant and her husband as being under debt review, including reflecting that status with credit bureaux.


After her husband’s death, the applicant contacted the respondent again on 31 March 2025 to request removal from debt review. The respondent provided the applicant with a document referred to as Form 17 (withdrawal from debt review), framed as suspending services due to alleged non-cooperation. The applicant paid a cancellation/withdrawal fee recorded in the judgment as R8 350.00, but the court understood the “withdrawal/suspension” mechanism as leaving the respondent “on record” and the status effectively unresolved unless corrected.


The court treated as material that the applicant had never signed the prescribed statutory application for debt review, had expressly objected to debt review, and that there was no court order (or valid written consent order accepted by all credit providers) authorising a binding debt review arrangement or the continuation of a debt review status.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine concerned the nature and lawful initiation of debt review under the NCA, and the legality and consequences of recording and maintaining a debt review status.


The issues were identified in the judgment as including the nature and scope of debt review under the NCA; whether a consumer may be placed under debt review without a court order or consent order; whether a debt review “flag” may be withdrawn administratively; and the constitutional implications under section 34 (access to courts) and section 33 (just administrative action) of the Constitution.


The dispute turned primarily on questions of law (the statutory structure of debt review; the authority of a debt counsellor; the need for judicial oversight or consent orders; and the constitutional characterisation of the impugned conduct), and on the application of law to essentially common-cause facts in the unopposed setting (including the absence of a signed Form 16 application and the absence of judicial or consent-order authorisation).


Court’s Reasoning


The court began from the procedural stance that, although the application was unopposed and could proceed on default, the court still had to be satisfied that the relief sought was lawful and supported by the evidence, particularly given the constitutional and statutory rights implicated. In this context, the judgment referred to the principle that default judgment is not granted automatically and that the court retains a duty to scrutinise the relief.


On the merits, the court described debt review as a formal statutory process aimed at assisting consumers who are over-indebted, and it emphasised that the process is consumer-initiated and consent-based, grounded in section 86(1) of the NCA. The judgment treated the prescribed method as requiring completion and signature of Form 16, after which notifications to credit providers and credit bureaux follow through the prescribed forms, and an investigation and recommendation process proceeds under section 86(7).


The court further reasoned that a debt counsellor’s role under the NCA is investigatory and advisory, not adjudicative. Binding consequences—particularly the imposition of a debt rearrangement or a determination that affects enforceability and consumer status—require either judicial oversight under section 87 (a Magistrates’ Court hearing and order) or a written agreement accepted by the consumer and all relevant credit providers as contemplated (in the judgment’s description) by section 86(8)(a). The court held that the respondent’s conduct in listing the applicant as under debt review without compliance with these statutory steps, and without a court or consent order, was unlawful.


In addressing constitutional implications, the court characterised the unilateral placement of the applicant under debt review, and the recording of that status with credit bureaux, as conduct producing external and binding legal consequences. On that basis, the judgment treated the conduct as implicating constitutional protections. The court reasoned that determining or materially affecting the applicant’s rights and obligations without access to a proper court process infringed the section 34 right of access to courts, because a debt counsellor is not a judicial officer and may not effectively impose a binding debt review status absent the judicial/consent mechanisms contemplated by the NCA. The court also reasoned that the submission of a debt review status to credit bureaux is administrative conduct that must be lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair in terms of section 33 of the Constitution, and that the respondent’s conduct did not meet those standards.


On the question of “termination” or “withdrawal” of debt review, the court held that the respondent’s provision of a “withdrawal/suspension” Form 17 mechanism, coupled with charging a cancellation/withdrawal fee, was inconsistent with the statutory scheme as described in the judgment. The court stated that neither the NCA nor its regulations provide for unilateral administrative withdrawal or suspension of debt review by a debt counsellor, and that exiting debt review requires court involvement and proof that the consumer is no longer over-indebted and can resume obligations under the original agreements. In the court’s assessment, an administrative “suspension” risked leaving the debt review flag effectively in place on the consumer’s credit profile, with continuing restrictive consequences.


The judgment also expressed concern about a broader regulatory risk in implementation: a practical gap arising from administrative recording of debt review statuses without adequate verification of a valid legal basis such as a signed application and a court/consent order, thereby shifting the burden (and costs) onto consumers—particularly indigent and unrepresented consumers—to approach courts to correct unlawful entries. The court directed that the judgment be forwarded to the National Credit Regulator for consideration and possible action within its powers.


Outcome and Relief


The court declared that the debt review proceedings instituted by the respondent against the applicant and her late husband were unlawful and set them aside.


The applicant was declared not to be over-indebted for purposes of section 87(1)(a) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005.


The respondent was ordered to remove the applicant’s debt review listing from all credit bureaus.


The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant R8 350.00 in respect of the cancellation fee.


The Registrar was directed to forward a copy of the judgment to the National Credit Regulator for its consideration and any action it deemed appropriate.


No order as to costs was made.


Cases Cited


Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A).


Stander v Bates and Another (NTC/367710/2024/141(1)(b) [2025] ZANCT 33 (13 May 2025)).


More v Eugene Cilliers and Others (NTC/252500/2022/165 (10 March 2023)).


Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 (3) SA 581 (SCA).


Ferris v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2014 (3) SA 39 (CC).


Van Vuuren v Roets 2019 (6) SA 506 (GJ).


Pheko v Lamara and Another (NCT/312494/2024/141(1)(b) [2024] ZANCT 42 (3 October 2024)).


Legislation Cited


National Credit Act 34 of 2005.


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.


Companies Act of South Africa (as referenced in the description of the respondent).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 31(2)(a).


Held


The court held that debt review under the NCA is consumer-initiated and consent-based, requiring a valid application in the prescribed manner and form, and that a debt counsellor does not have authority to impose a binding debt review status absent compliance with the NCA’s prescribed process.


It was held that the respondent acted unlawfully by placing the applicant (and her late husband) under debt review and listing them with credit bureaux without a signed prescribed application, without informed consent, and without a court order under section 87 or a valid written consent order accepted by all relevant credit providers.


The court held that recording and maintaining a debt review status in these circumstances infringed constitutional protections, including the right of access to courts (section 34) and the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action (section 33), given the significant legal consequences of such listing.


It was further held that the respondent’s purported administrative “withdrawal/suspension” mechanism and associated cancellation/withdrawal fee were inconsistent with the NCA as described in the judgment, and that corrective steps were required to remove the unlawful listing and restore the applicant’s status.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Debt review under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 is a structured statutory process which, as applied in the judgment, is initiated by the consumer in the prescribed manner and form under section 86(1), and is dependent on consent reflected through the prescribed application process (including the use of the prescribed forms described by the court).


A debt counsellor’s powers are not adjudicative. The judgment applied the principle that binding determinations and rearrangements affecting a consumer’s credit obligations require judicial oversight through a Magistrates’ Court process under section 87, or a properly constituted written consent order mechanism as contemplated within the statutory scheme described in the judgment.


The recording of a consumer’s debt review status with credit bureaux has significant external legal consequences and constitutes administrative conduct that must comply with constitutional standards of lawfulness, reasonableness, and procedural fairness under section 33 of the Constitution.


Conduct that conclusively affects a consumer’s legal position without the availability of the court process contemplated by the NCA implicates and may infringe the section 34 constitutional right of access to courts, because statutory administrative actors may not usurp judicial functions.


The judgment applied the principle that the court retains a supervisory duty even in unopposed proceedings for default relief to ensure that any order granted is lawful and supported by the evidence, particularly where statutory and constitutional rights are implicated.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy


IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA


Case Number:187667/2025
(1) REPORTABLE: YES
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED
DATE 24 FEBRUARY 2026
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:


DENISE SHERIDON MARAJH APPLICANT

and

NATIONAL DEBT INTERVENTION (PTY) LTD RESPONDENT
(REG NO: 2022/580262/07)




SUMMARY: The applicant approached the Court after discovering that she and her late
husband had been placed under debt review without her consent, without completing or
signing the prescribed statutory application (Form 16), and without any court or consent
order as required by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA). Despite her express
objection and refusal to proceed with debt review, the respondent listed her with credit
bureaus as being under debt review and later required payment of a cancellation fee to
“withdraw” the process.
The Court emphasized that debt review is a process initiated by the consumer and
based on their consent, in accordance with section 86(1) of the NCA. A debt counsellor
does not possess adjudicative authority and may not impose a binding debt review

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without either an order from the Magistrate’s Court pursuant to section 87 or a written
consent order approved by all relevant credit providers.
The Court found that the respondent acted unlawfully by placing the applicant under
debt review without complying with the statutory process and without judicial oversight.
Such conduct was held to infringe the applicant’s constitutional rights, including the right
of access to courts (section 34 of the Constitution) and the right to lawful, reasonable
and procedurally fair administrative action (section 33).
The judgment highlighted a broader regulatory risk in the debt review system, where the
administrative documentation of debt review statuses might be conducted without an
appropriate legal underpinning. This could lead consumers, particularly indigent and
unrepresented ones, to incur legal costs to correct unlawful entries. The Court ordered
that the judgment be sent to the National Credit Regulator for consideration and to take
any action it may deem appropriate.
The judgment reaffirms that debt counsellors must operate strictly within the boundaries
of the NCA and that judicial oversight is essential when consumers’ rights and credit
status are significantly impacted.

3


JUDGMENT


MOGALE AJ

Introduction
[1] This application was presented before this Court on the unopposed roll of 13
January 202 6. The applicant requests that this court set aside the debt review
proceedings instituted by the respondent on behalf of the applicant and her late
husband on the basis that they are void ab initio, as the applicant never consented to or
authorised the respondent to institute such proceedings on her behalf.

[2] In the alternative, the applicant seeks an order declaring that she is not over -
indebted as contemplated in section 87(1)(a) of the National Credit Act 1 (“the NCA”) 2,
and directing that the debt review process be set aside.

[3] The applicant was married in community of property to her late husband. The relief
sought necessarily extends to his share of the joint estate. The applicant’s husband
passed away on 22 February 2025.

The parties
[4] The applicant is an adult female trainer residing in No 4[...] F[...], 2[...] C[...] Road,
Constantia Kloof, Johannesburg.

[5] The respondent is National Debt Intervention (Pty) Ltd, (Registration number
2022/580262/07), a company registered in terms of the Companies Act of South Africa,
with its registered address at 4[...] W[...] Road, Plumstead, Cape Town. The respondent
is a registered debt counsellor.


1 Act 34 of 2005.
2 Referred to as (“the Act).

4
Applicable law
[6] Rule 31(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court 3 empowers the plaintiff to apply for a
default judgment when the time period within which the defendant could serve and file
his notice of intention to defend has passed without the respondent notifying the plaintiff
of his intention to defend the matter. In this matter, the respondent was served with the
applicant’s notice of motion, founding affidavit, and notice of set down by the sheriff on
11 November 2025. The respondents failed to enter an appearance to defend within the
prescribed period; therefore, the applicant is entitled to apply for an order to be granted
on default.

[7] Regarding the application for a default judgment, I am of the opinion that this court
is enjoined to satisfy itself that the relief sought is lawful and supported by the evidence.
It is my view that a default judgment is not granted as a matter of course, particularly
where constitutional and statutory rights are implicated.4

[8] To properly consider the matter before me, I have requested that the applicant’s
legal representative submit a concise summary of the arguments concerning the
relevant law and the legal principles supporting the application. On 16 January 2026,
the applicant duly complied with this request, and I commend the efforts and assistance
rendered in this regard.

Factual background
[9] On 24 January 2025, the applicant received a telephone call from an individual
who identified herself as “Roxy” and stated that she was acting on behalf of the
respondent. The applicant was informed that the respondent could provide financial
assistance.


3 Rule 31(2)(a) provides that: “Whenever in an action the claim or, if there is more than one claim, any of the claims is
not for a debt or liquidated demand and a defendant is in default of delivery of notice of intention to defend or of a
plea, the plaintiff may set the action down as provided in subrule (4) for default judgment and the court may, after

hearing evidence, grant judgment against the defendant or make such order as it deems fit.”.
4 Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976(1) SA 418 (A).

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[10] Based on the understanding that the respondent would evaluate her financial
situation and potentially provide assistance with debt consolidation, the applicant
furnished personal and financial information regarding herself and her husband.

[11] The applicant subsequently recognized that the procedure initiated was not debt
consolidation but rather debt review. She promptly notified the respondent of her
decision not to be subjected to debt review and declined to complete or submit the
prescribed application as contemplated in section 86(1) of the NCA.

[12] Although the applicant did not complete or submit any application to the
respondent, the applicant received an email dated 30 January 2026 from the
respondent requesting the particulars of the applicant’s late husband5.

[13] The applicant replied to the email on the same day and stated as follows:

“I am only providing my husband’s details which are Aubrey Marajh, id number 7[...]
because you have requested it. Please note carefully that he does not want to be placed
under debt review. He does not have debt attached to his name; his credit score is
excellent. Please confirm that you will not place Aubrey Marajh under debt review6.”

[14] Notwithstanding this, the respondent proceeded to list both the applicant and her
husband as under debt review and to include their names with the credit bureau7.

[15] The applicant contacted the respondent again on 31 March 2025, following her
husband's death, to request her removal from debt review. The respondent provided the
applicant with Form 17 (a withdrawal from debt review8), which states as follows:

“The notice serves to notify you that the debt counsellor has suspended provision of
service due to non -cooperation by the Consumer. The Debt counsellor remains on record

5 Caselines 1-5 Annexure DM3.
6 Caselines 1-6 Annexure DM4.
7 Annexures DM5 and DM6.
8 Annexure DM9.

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as a debt counsellor. The applicant paid a withdrawal or cancellation fee of R8 350 000.”

Issues for determination
[16] The court must consider the following:

a. The nature and scope of debt review under the NCA;
b. Whether a consumer may be placed under debt review without a court or
consent order;
c. Whether the debt review flag may be withdrawn administratively ; and
d. The constitutional implications, including rights of access to court (section 34)
and just administration action (section 33).

The Debt Review Scheme under the NCA
[17] Debt review, or debt counselling, is a formal, legal process initiated by the NCA to
assist over-indebted consumers in managing their debt obligations. Its aim is to provide
a structured, legal pathway for consumers struggling to make ends meet to repay their
debts in a manageable manner without defaulting or losing their assets9.

[18] The process takes place when the consumer takes the initiative to approach a
debt counsellor for debt review, as highlighted by section 86(1), providing that:

“A consumer may apply to a debt counsellor in the prescribed manner and form to have
the consumer declared over -indebted”. This process is consumer -initiated and consent -
based.”

[19] The applicant must apply to a debt counsellor for placement under debt review by
completing and signing Form 16. The form includes providing the consumer with the
written request to be placed under debt review. The consumer is also requested to
provide the debt counsellor with personal and financial information. Upon the
consumer’s completion and submission of Form 16, the debt counsellor notifies the
consumer’s credit providers and credit bureaus that the consumer has applied for debt

9 Section 3 of National Credit Act 34 of 2005.

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review by submitting Form 17.1.

[20] The debt counsellor is then obliged to undertake an investigation into the
consumers’ financial means by utilizing Form 17.2. Upon the completion of the
investigation, the debt counsellor is required to make the following recommendation as
envisaged by section 86(7) of the Act,

a. That the consumer is not over -indebted. Upon such finding, the debt review
process is rejected.
b. The consumer is not over -indebted but is experiencing financial difficulties
that could easily lead to over-indebtedness. In such circumstances, the consumer
may proceed with the debt review process.
c. In the event that the consumer is over -indebted, the debt counsellor may
issue a recommendation to the Magistrate’s Court for an order declaring the
consumer over -indebted and for an order re -arranging the consumer’s credit
obligations.

[21] Section 87 provides that the Magistrate’s Court may make an obligation that-
(1) if a debt counsellor makes a proposal to the Magistrate’s Court in terms of
section 86(8)(b), or a consumer applies to the Magistrate’s Court in terms of
section 86(9), the Magistrate Court must conduct a hearing and, having regard to
the proposal and information before it and the consumer’s financial means,
prospects and obligations, may-
(a) Reject the recommendation or application as the case may be; or
(b) Make-
(i) An order declaring any credit agreement to be reckless, and an order
contemplated in section 83(2) or (3), if the Magistrate’s Court concludes
that the agreement is reckless;
(ii) An order re -arranging the consumer’s obligations in any manner
contemplated in section 86(7) (C) (ii); or
(iii) Both orders contemplated in subparagraph (i) and (ii)

8

(1) The National Credit Regulator may not intervene before the Magistrate’s
Court in a matter referred to it in terms of this section.

[22] In the matter of Stander v Bates and Another 10, the National Tribunal Consumer
court held that:

“The first respondent did not clearly explain the various steps in the process and the legal
consequences of applying for debt review. She was also not afforded the opportunity to
review and understand all documents provided to her prior to signing. Therefore, her initial
consent does not constitute informed consent, and the process should not have
proceeded. When approaching the first respondent, she did so in good faith, trusting that
she would receive honest, transparent and professional assistance tailored to her
situation. She relied on the first respondent to guide her through the process with the
necessary clarity and integrity that the law requires of a registered debt counsellor”

[23] This process deviates from the debt consolidation procedure as retained by the
applicant during a telephonic discussion with an individual referred to as “Roxy”. The
applicant’s founding affidavit explicitly states that the procedure for placing her under
debt review was not adhered to, nor was an order issued by the Magistrate’s Court to
initiate debt review. Several procedural steps and the legal implications of applying for
debt review were not adequately explained to her. When the applicant engaged with the
respondent, she did so in good faith, trusting that professional assistance would be
provided for debt consolidation.
The subsequent question is how the applicant was placed under debt review without
complying with the NCA’s provisions.



Placement under debt review without the order of the court?

10 (NTC/ 367710/2024/141(1)(b) [2025] ZANCT 33 (13 May 2025) at para 11.

9
[24] In terms of section 86(7), a court order can place the applicant under debt review.
Section 86(8)(a) allows debt rearrangement without a court order only if the consumer
and all the credit providers accept the proposal in writing as a consent order. The debt
counsellor failed to comply with these provisions when placing the applicant under debt
review.
In More v Eugene Cilliers and Others 11, it was emphasised that jurisdiction to impose
binding debt relief does not vest in administrative bodies acting unilaterally.

[25] Initiating a binding debt review without a court order or consent order constitutes a
significant constitutional violation. Section 34 of the Constitution affirms the right to
resolve disputes through courts or independent tribunals. A debt counsellor is an
administrative body, not a judicial officer; therefore, they have no power to impose debt
review12. In my view, the debt counsellor's failure to involve judicial oversight
undermines the constitutional objectives.

[26] This was also dealt with in Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 13, the
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that debt counsellors have no adjudicative powers
and that binding debt rearrangements require judicial oversight.

Constitutional Analysis
[27] Section 34 of the Constitution entrenches the right of every person to have legal
disputes adjudicated by a court or an independent and impartial tribunal. By acting in a
manner that conclusively affected the applicant’s legal position without recourse to a
court process, the respondent effectively usurped this constitutional safeguard.

[28] The listing of a consumer under debt review constitutes administrative conduct that
produces immediate and binding legal consequences beyond the internal processes of
the administrator. As such, this conduct is subject to the requirements of section 33 of
the Constitution and must meet the standards of legality, rationality, and procedural

11 NTC/252500/2022/165 (10 March 2023).

11 NTC/252500/2022/165 (10 March 2023).
12 Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011(3) SA 581 (SCA)
13 2011(3) SA 581 (SCA).

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fairness.

[29] The respondent’s unilateral decision to place the applicant under debt review
amounted to a substantive infringement of the applicant’s right of access to courts 14. By
determining the applicant’s rights and obligations without judicial involvement or
oversight, the respondent acted in a manner inconsistent with constitutional principles.

[30] The submission of a debt review status to credit bureaus is an administrative act
with significant external legal consequences. This action is required to be lawful,
reasonable, and procedurally fair 15. The respondent’s conduct falls short of these
constitutional and administrative law requirements and is therefore unlawful.

[31] Applying the proportionality analysis articulated in Ferris v FirstRand Bank Ltd 16,
the Constitutional Court confirmed that measures under the NCA must be proportionate
and consistent with constitutional protections. The rule of law mandates that statutory
powers be exercised within explicitly defined boundaries. Allowing debt counsellors to
impose debt review solely through administrative recording , which undermines the
separation between administrative assistance and judicial determination , and is
therefore constitutionally unacceptable.

Termination of Debt Review
[32] The respondent provided the applicant with Form 17 ( a withdrawal from debt
review)17, which states as follows to complete:

“The notice serves to notify you that the debt counsellor has suspended provision of
service due to non-cooperation by the Consumer. The Debt counsellor remains on record
as a debt counsellor. The applicant paid a withdrawal or cancellation fee of R8 350 000.”

[33] Section 88(3) states as follows:

14 Section 34 of the Constitution.
15 Section 33 of the Constitution.
16 2014 (3) SA 39 (CC).
17 Caselines Annexure DM9.

11

“(3) subject to section 86(9) and (10), a credit provider who receives notice of court
proceedings contemplated in section 83 of 85, or notice in terms of section 86(4)(b)(i),
may not exercise or enforce by litigation or other judicial process any right or security
under that credit agreement until-
(a) The consumer is in default under the credit agreement; and
(b) One of the following has occurred;
(i) An event contemplated in subsection (1)(a) through (c)18;
(ii) The consumer defaults on any obligation in terms of a re -arrangement
agreed between the consumer and credit provider or ordered by a court or the
Tribunal.”

[34] For the respondent to provide the applicant with Form 17, which is purported to be
a form to be completed to withdraw from debt review, contravenes NCA. Neither the
NCA nor its Regulations provide for the withdrawal or suspension of a consumer’s debt
review process. To exit debt review, NCA provides that the application must be made to
a Court, and the applicant must prove that the y are no longer over -indebted and can
afford to repay the debt in terms of the original agreement19.

[35] In my view, the respondents’ failure to obtain a court order authorizing the
applicant to exit debt review results in the debt review flag remaining permanently on
the applicant’s credit record. This omission, in my opinion, compromises and
undermines the objectives of the NCA, which was enacted to establish a balance
between safeguarding consumers from reckless credit and over -indebtedness, and

18 S88(1) A consumer who has filed an application in terms of sec 86(1), or who has alleged in court that
the consumer is over-indebted, must not incur any further charges under a credit facility or enter into any
further credit agreement, other than a consolidation agreement, with any credit provider until one of the
following events has occurred:
(a) The debt counsellor rejects the application, and the prescribed time period for direct filing in terms

of s86(9) has expired without the consumer having so applied;
(b) The court has determined that the consumer is not over-indebted, or has rejected a debt counsellor’s
proposal or the consumer’s application; or
(c) The court having made an order, or the consumer and credit providers having made an agreement re-
arranging the consumer’s obligation, all the consumer’s obligations under the credit agreement as re-
arranged are fulfilled, unless the consumer fulfilled the obligations by way of a consolidation agreement.
19 Van Vuuren v Roets No 2019 (6) SA 506 (GJ).

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ensuring the effective operation of the credit market and enforcement of credit
agreements.

[36] In Pheko v Lamara and Another 20, the Tribunal held that without a proper
authorized application for debt review by the applicant, any determination of over -
indebtedness is null and void. Similarly, the subsequent flagging of the applicant’s
status as “being in debt review” is without force and effect. The Tribunal, therefore,
finds that the applicant’s status is incorrectly reflected on the credit bureau reports and
stands to be corrected.

[37] According to Form 17, completed by the applicant and the payment of fees
amounting to R8,350.00, the debt review was merely suspended and not withdrawn.
This record shall remain permanently on the applicant’s credit record. I find that the
flagging of the applicant’s status as in debt review is inaccurately reflected on the credit
bureau report and must be corrected without delay, as it constitutes a violation of
section 86(1).

Systematic Regulatory Concern
[38] I find it unlawful for the respondent to place the applicant under debt review
without a proper assessment, a court order, or the applicant's written consent, and
without complying with the legal steps required by the NCA. As a result, this unlawful
conduct prompted this court to determine whether there is a material legal gap and
regulatory risk in the debt review system that debt counsellors exploit, thereby allowing
them to place consumers into debt review without a proper legal basis.

[39] The evidence is clear that the legal gap arises from the manner in which the
statutory process is implemented and enforced, particularly when debt review status is
recorded administratively. When the respondent entered the applicant’s name into the
debt review system without the court order or the applicant’s consent, they contravened
the statutory processes set out by section 86(1) of the NCA. It is clear that the credit

the statutory processes set out by section 86(1) of the NCA. It is clear that the credit

20 (NCT/312494/2024/141(1)(b) [2024] ZANCT 42 (3 October 2024).

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bureau unlawfully disregarded the procedures and enrolled the applicant without a
court order or the applicant’s court order confirming that over -indebtedness had been
established.

[41] It is my view that this places the responsibility on indigent and unrepresented
consumers to seek redress in court at their own expense to remedy unlawful
administrative actions. Such practices undermine the NCA's objectives and distort the
balance it seeks to strike between consumer protection and credit market integrity.

Evaluation
[42] This matter exposes a troubling and recurring practice within the debt review
system: the placement of consumers under debt review through purely administrative
action, without a valid application, without informed consent, and without the judicial
oversight expressly contemplated by the NCA. Such conduct is inconsistent with both
the text and the purpose of the Act.

[43] The evidence before this Court demonstrates that the applicant never completed
or signed Form 16, never applied to be placed under debt review, and expressly
objected to both herself and her late husband being subjected to debt review.
Notwithstanding this, the respondent proceeded to list the applicant with credit bureaux
as being under debt review, thereby materially impairing her contractual, proprietary,
and economic rights.

[44] In the absence of a court order granted in terms of section 87, or a valid consent
order as contemplated in section 86(8)(a), a debt counsellor has no authority to impose
a binding debt review. Any such placement is unlawful and void ab initio. The debt
counsellor’s role is investigatory and advisory; it is not adjudicative. Judicial power
remains vested in the courts.

[45] I consider this conduct to constitute an unlawful infringement of the applicant’s
right of access to courts as stipulated in section 34 of the Constitution, as well as her

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right to just administrative action under section 33. The designation of a consumer as
being under debt review carries significant implications and must not be carried out
without lawful authority and appropriate procedural compliance.

[46] This Court is further concerned by the practice of purporting to “withdraw” or
“suspend” debt review through the use of Form 17, accompanied by the charging of
cancellation or withdrawal fees. The NCA makes no provision for a debt counsellor to
unilaterally terminate debt review. Absent a court order declaring that a consumer is no
longer over -indebted, the debt review flag remains operative, thereby trapping
consumers, particularly indigent and legally unrepresented consumers, in a n indefinite
state of restriction.

[47] The facts of this case illustrate a material regulatory gap, not in the wording of the
NCA, but in its implementation and enforcement. That gap allows debt counsellors to
exploit administrative processes, record debt review statuses with credit bureaux, and
shift the burden onto consumers, often those least able to afford legal representation, to
approach courts to undo an unlawful act they never consented to in the first place.

[48] The objectives of the NCA, as set out in section 3, require a balance between
consumer protection and the integrity of the credit market. That balance is fatally
undermined when disadvantaged consumers are placed under debt review without due
process and are thereafter required to incur legal costs to restore their status.

[49] In order to give proper effect to the constitutional and statutory scheme, this Court
is of the view that the following measures are necessary to protect vulnerable
consumers:
a. The National Credit Regulator must strengthen oversight and enforcement
against debt counsellors who place consumers under debt review without a signed
application, proper assessment, or court or consent order;

15
b. Credit bureaux must be required to verify the existence of a valid court order
or consent order before recording or maintaining a debt review flag against a
consumer’s profile;
c. The NCR should issue binding guidelines clarifying that a debt review status
may not be recorded solely on the basis of a debt counsellor’s unilateral
notification;
d. Mechanisms must be developed to enable indigent and unrepresented
consumers to challenge unlawful debt review listings without the necessity of
instituting costly court proceedings, including expedited Tribunal or regulatory
intervention;
e. Consideration should be given to legislative or regulatory reform to prevent
the indefinite persistence of debt review listings where no valid court process has
occurred.

[50] This Court accordingly finds that the respondent acted unlawfully and in
contravention of the NCA by placing the applicant and her late husband under debt
review without compliance with the prescribed statutory process, without consent, and
without judicial oversight. Therefore, the debt review proceedings instituted by the
respondent should be set aside, and the applicant is declared not to be over -indebted
for purposes of section 87(1)(a) of the National Credit Act.

[51] I have decided that it will be appropriate to instruct the Registrar to forward a copy
of this judgment to the National Credit Regulator for their review and any necessary
action within their legal powers.


Order
[52] The following order is made:

1. The debt review proceedings instituted by the respondent against the applicant and
her late husband are declared unlawful and are hereby set aside.

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2. The applicant is declared not to be over-indebted for purposes of section 87(1)(a) of
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005.
3. The respondent is ordered to remove the applicant’s debt review listing from all
credit bureaus.
4. The respondent is ordered to pay the Applicant R8 350 00 in respect of the
cancellation fee.
5. The Registrar is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the National Credit
Regulator for its consideration and any action it deems appropriate.
6. No order as to costs.




_______________________________________
K J MOGALE
Acting Judge of the High Court, Pretoria,
Gauteng Division

Delivered: This Judgment was prepared and authored by the Judges whose names are
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties/their legal
representatives by email and uploading to the electronic file of this matter on Case
Lines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 24 February 2026.

Date of hearing: 13 January 2026
Date of the judgment: 24 February 2026



Appearances

For the Applicant: Adv J A VAN WYK

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Instructed by Nixon and Collins
Attorneys
advjavanwyk@gmail.com

For the Respondent: No appearance

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