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in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 241863/25
1. REPORTABLE: NO
2. OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
3. REVISED: YES/NO
DATE 23 FEBRUARY 2026
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
M[...]: S[...] Applicant
and
M[...]: N[...] R[...] First Respondent
FIRST NATIONAL BANK Second respondent
ABSA BANK LIMITED Third respondent
NEDBANK LIMITED Fourth respondent
TYME BANK Fifth respondent
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CAPITEC BANK LIMITED Sixth respondent
INVESTEC BANK Seventh respondent
Delivered: this judgment was prepared and authored by the judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically and by circulation to the parties/their
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of his matter
on Caselines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 23 FEBRUARY 2026.
JUDGMENT
NDLOKOVANE AJ
Introduction
[1] This is an opposed urgent application brought in terms of Rule 6(12) of the
Uniform Rules of Court. The applicant seeks, inter alia:
(a) Condonation for non-compliance with the rules relating to form, service,
and time periods, and that the matter be enrolled and heard as one of
urgency;
(b) An interdict safeguarding the joint estate of the applicant and the first
respondent pending finalisation of the divorce action;
(c) An order directing the second to seventh respondents to freeze the first
respondent’s bank accounts;
(d) Alternatively, an order directing the second to seventh respondents to
pay 50% of the first respondent’s pension interest, allegedly held in her
bank accounts, into the trust account of Mashitisho Attorneys Inc, to be
held pending finalisation of the divorce action; and
(e) Costs on an attorney-and-client scale in the event of opposition.
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[2] When the matter was called, argument was confined to the issue of urgency. I
reserved judgment to determine whether the matter warranted enrolment on the
urgent roll and indicated that, depending on that finding, I would consider the merits
if necessary.
[3] The notice of motion is dated 9 February 2026. The founding affidavit was
commissioned on the same day.
[4] The applicant required the respondents to file a notice of intention to oppose
by 10 February 2026 and an answering affidavit by 13 February 2026. The applicant
indicated an intention to file a replying affidavit by 16 February 2026. The matter was
set down for hearing on 17 February 2026 at 10h00.
[5] The papers reflect that the application was electronically served on the first
respondent on 10 February 2026 at 13h56.
[6] The first respondent’s notice of intention to oppose was delivered
electronically on 11 February 2026. The answering affidavit was commissioned on
12 February 2026, delivered by email, and uploaded to CaseLines on the same day.
There was no opposition from the remaining respondents. The applicant’s replying
affidavit was delivered electronically on 13 February 2026.
Urgency
[7] It is common cause that the matter was launched on an extremely truncated
timeframe. Counsel for the applicant properly conceded that the papers do not
provide a satisfactory explanation for this. He further conceded that the matter was
brought on an exceptionally urgent basis.
[8] On urgency, Uniform Rule 6(12) permits a court to dispense with the forms
and service provided for in the Rules and to dispose of a matter at such time and in
such manner as it deems fit. An applicant must, however, explicitly set out the
circumstances rendering the matter urgent and the reasons why substantial redress
cannot be obtained at a hearing in due course.
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[9] The applicable test is well established: whether the applicant will be afforded
substantial redress in due course if the matter is not heard urgently.
[10] It is equally trite that self -created urgency will not suffice. Where an applicant
delays in bringing proceedings, such delay must be satisfactorily explained.
[11] In East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd ,1 the Court
emphasised that the critical enquiry is whether substantial redress will be available in
due course. A mere desire for expeditious relief does not render a matter urgent. It
was held that urgency is determined contextually and on a case-by-case basis.
[12] The Consolidated Practice Directive 1 of 2023: Court Operations in the
Gauteng Division, effective from 1 October 2023 , provides the following in respect of
urgent family law cases:
“An urgent family law case is one where a cogent case can be made
out that the relief is required before the prescribed procedure has run
its course. Such matters may be set down before noon on a Thursday
for the following Tuesday, in accordance with standard urgent motion
court practice. All other standard factors pertinent to urgent matters
shall continue to apply.”
I hasten to mention that in the present matter, as demonstrated above, this was not
the case.
[13] A brief factual basis advanced for urgency in the papers is that the parties are
married in a community of property , and d ivorce proceedings are pending. The
applicant contends that , during the subsistence of the marriage and the divorce
proceedings, the first respondent withdrew her pension fund benefits and dealt with
the proceeds unilaterally, allegedly to the prejudice of the joint estate.
1East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others, unreported
judgment of the Gauteng Division of High Court, Johannesburg, Case No 11/33767 (23 September
2011).
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[14] The applicant avers that on or about 28 January 2026, the respondent’s
attorneys demanded spousal and child maintenance pendente lite. He contends that
shortly thereafter, on 3 February 2026, he became aware that the respondent had
withdrawn her pension benefits and was utilising the proceeds not for the benefit of
the joint estate.
[15] Correspondence was addressed to the respondent , demanding that she
desist from dissipating the pension proceeds and provide full financial disclosure.
The applicant states that no satisfactory undertaking was forthcoming, hence , the
present urgent application.
[16] The respondent contends that the alleged urgency is self -created. It is
submitted that the applicant was aware as early as September 2025 of the
respondent’s resignation and the likelihood that pension benefits would become
payable.
[17] The respondent further contends that the applicant has alternative remedies
available within the divorce action, including appropriate interlocutory relief, and that
no case has been made out demonstrating that substantial redress cannot be
obtained in due course. Even though the respondent raised point s in limine, some
were forgone , and only the lack of urgency was pursued . T his judgment is
accordingly confined to that issue.
Conclusion
[18] On a proper reading of the founding affidavit, the gravamen of the complaint is
the alleged dissipation of pension proceeds forming part of the joint estate. While
potentially serious, that complaint does not in itself establish that substantial redress
cannot be obtained in due course.
[19] The applicant does not allege that the funds are about to be irretrievably
transferred beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, nor that they will be rendered
untraceable. The relief sought is essentially preservatory in nature and concerns
patrimonial consequences which may be addressed within the pending divorce
proceedings.
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[20] Moreover, the applicant was aware of the respondent’s resignation several
months prior to launching this application. No satisfactory explanation is provided for
the delay between acquiring that knowledge and the institution of these urgent
proceedings.
[21] In matrimonial disputes concerning joint estates, courts are slow to permit
truncated procedures absent compelling evidence of imminent and irreparable harm.
On the facts before me, such compelling circumstances have not been
demonstrated.
[22] I am accordingly not persuaded that the applicant will be deprived of
substantial redress if the matter proceeds in the ordinary course.
Costs
[23] Given the matrimonial context and the ongoing divorce proceedings, I
consider it appropriate that each party bears their own costs.
Order
[24] As a result, the following order is made:
1. The application is struck from the roll for lack of urgency.
2. Each party shall pay their own costs.
N NDLOKOVANE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
APPEARANCES
FOR THE APPLICANT: ADV. Z OLIVIER
INSTRUCTED BY: MASHITISHO ATTORNEYS INC.
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FOR THE RESPONDENTS: ADV K KHATLE
INSTRUCTED BY: NHLAPO MOKHOSI INC.ATTORNEYS
HEARD ON: 17 FEBRUARY 2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23 FEBRUARY 2026