REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2026-044468
DATE: 16 March 2026
In the matter between:
HENRIETTE CHRISTINE MARE Applicant
and
COMMUNITY SCHEMES OMBUD SERVICE First Respondent
AMANDA VILAKAZI Second Respondent
AKARANA HOME OWNERS' ASSOCIATION Third Respondent
INGRID HINDLE Fourth Respondent
GRAHAM HINDLE Fifth Respondent
LISE-ANN LIEBENBERG Sixth Respondent
JAN FREDERICK COETZEE Seventh Respondent
LIZELLE BRASLER Eighth Respondent
JOHAN BRÄSLER Ninth Respondent
Neutral Citation: Mare v CSOS and Others (2026-044468) [2026] ZAGPJHC -
-- (16 March 2026)
Coram: Adams J
Heard: 10 March 2026
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Delivered: 16 March 2026 – This judgment was handed down electronically
by circulation to the par ties' representatives by email , by being
uploaded to CaseLines and by release to SAFLII. The date and
time for hand-down is deemed to be 14:30 on 16 March 2026.
Summary: Civil procedure – urgent application – for an interim interdict,
pending review of a CSOS Order as contemplated in section 56(2) of the
Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the CSOS Act) – the order
was payment of about R745 000 by the applicant to a Homeowners’ Association
in respect of levies and related charges –
Urgent application opposed on three main grounds – point in limine of
jurisdiction (dismissed) – urgency (not upheld) – no prima facie right for the
purposes of interim relief (not accepted) - no irreparable harm and the balance
of convenience (both upheld) –
Application for interim interdictory relief dismissed with costs.
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ORDER
(1) The applicant’s urgent application is dismissed with costs.
(2) The applicant shall pay the third to ninth respondents’ costs of this
opposed urgent application, including Counsel’s charges on scale ‘C’ of
the tariff referred to in Uniform Rule of Court 67A(3), read with rule 69.
JUDGMENT
Adams J:
[1]. This – part ‘A’ of an application – is an opposed urgent application by the
applicant (‘Ms Mare’) for interim interdictory relief against the first to the ninth
respondents. Pending the determination of final relief sought in part ‘B’ of the
notice of motion, the applicant seeks an order, on an urgent basis, interdicting
the third to ninth respondents (‘the respondents’) from lodging in any division of
the High Court a copy of the Adjudication Order , with reference number CSOS -
15057/WC/23 (‘the CSOS Order’) , issued by the second respondent (‘the
adjudicator’) on 8 December 2025 . The CSOS Order is an order as
contemplated in section 56(2) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9
of 2011 (the CSOS Act).
[2]. In the alternative , and in the event that any of the third to ninth
respondents have already so lodged the CSOS Order with any division of the
High Court, the applicant applies for an order interdicting and restraining the
respondents from enforcing the CSOS Order as if it were a judgment of the
High Court.
[3]. In part ‘B’ of the application , the applicant applies for an order reviewing
and setting aside the CSOS Order and remitting the matter for reconsideration
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by CSOS with or without directions that such reconsideration shall not be
undertaken until the Court Order issued by the Western Cape High Court on 12
September 2024 under case number 11867/2020 is either amended or set
aside.
[4]. In sum, in this urgent application, the applicant appl ies for interim relief
against the respondents pending the final determination of a review application
(Part B). The applicant seeks to interdict the third to ninth respondents from
lodging with any division of the High Court, or enforcing, the CSOS Order
issued by the adjudicator on 8 December 2025 in terms of the CSOS Act. The
CSOS Order directs the applicant to pay the sum of R745 240.84 to the third
respondent ( ‘the Homeowners' Association’ or the ‘H OA’) in respect of arrear
levies and other charges. In terms of section 56 of the CSOS Act, once lodged
with the Registrar of the High Court, the CSOS Order may be enforced as if it
were a judgment of that court.
[5]. The applicant contends that the CSOS Order was unlawfully obtained
and falls to be reviewed and set aside in part B of these proceedings. She
alleges that she was denied a reasonable opportunity to make representations;
that the adjudicator acted in defiance of a Western Cape High Court order ,
which suspended litigation between the association and its members; that the
adjudicator breached section 50(a) of the CSOS Act; and that the adjudicator
failed to deliver the order to her as required by section 55(1).
[6]. The urgent relief sought in part A is intended to preserve the position
pending the review.
[7]. The second respondent initially gave notice of intention to oppose but
has since withdrawn her opposition. The third to ninth respondents oppose the
application on the basis firstly that this Court does not have the necessary
jurisdiction to hear this matter . Secondly, it is contended by these respondents
that the matter is not urgent and, lastly, they submit that the applicant has not
that the matter is not urgent and, lastly, they submit that the applicant has not
met the requirements for an interim interdict.
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[8]. The issue to be decided in this urgent application is therefore whether
the applicant has demonstrated that she is entitled to an interdict on an urgent
basis. That issue is to be decided against the facts as set out in the paragraphs
which follow.
[9]. The applicant is the registered owner of a property situated within the
area of the third respondent, a homeowners' association. The fourth to ninth
respondents hold themselves out as the trustees of the HOA, although the
validity of their appointment is disputed by the applicant. There are long -
standing disputes between the applicant and the HOA concerning the validity of
its constitution and the levies purportedly due by members. In 2020, the
applicant and others instituted action in the Western Cape High Court under
case number 11867/2020 (the High Court Action) , challenging the validity of the
HOA's constitutions adopted in 2005, 2010 and 2021.
[10]. On 12 September 2024, the Western Cape High Court issued an order
by agreement between the parties (‘the suspension order’), which provided inter
alia as follows: -
‘All pending litigation between first defendant [the HOA], the thirty-fourth defendant and
any of their members and trustees be suspended.’
[11]. The applicant is a party to this action, which was during December 2024
postponed sine die. The suspension order, so it is contended on behalf of the
applicant, remains extant and in force. This is however disputed by the third to
ninth respondents.
[12]. On 29 February 2024, the Association lodged an application with the first
respondent (the Community Schemes Ombud Service ( ‘CSOS’)) in terms of
section 38 of the CSOS Act, seeking payment of arrear levies from the
applicant. Between March and April 2024, CSOS officials sent multiple
communications to the applicant inviting her to submit her response to the
Association's claim. Importantly, on 29 April 2024 an email was sent f rom the
Compliance and Enforcement Investigator of CSOS , affording the applicant a
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final opportunity to submit written submissions by 7 May 2024. The applicant did
not respond to any of these requests. She offers no explanation for her failure to
respond to the request of 29 April 2024, stating only that it ‘appears to have
escaped her attention’.
[13]. On 4 February 2025, the adjudicator emailed the applicant and the
Association's managing agent, requesting certain documents to aid in the
adjudication process. On 5 February 2025, the applicant's attorney, Mr
Barendse, responded directly to the adjudicator (without copying the
Association's managing agent), contending that the adjudication should be
placed on hold pending the High Court Action, and alleging that the Suspension
Order suspended all levy -related disputes. On 26 February 2025, the
adjudicator responded to Mr Barendse (again without copying the Association's
managing agent), stating:
‘We hereby acknowledge receipt of your email correspondence of 5 February 2025 and
note the contents thereof. In light of the information divulged in the aforementioned
email correspondence, we will pend the adjudication process indefinitely.’
[14]. On 31 March 2025, however, the adjudicator sent a further email to Mr
Barendse (on the same email chain) stating:
‘This email serves as a final follow -up on the request below. We urgently
request that you furnish us with the requested documents to enable the
finalisation of the adjudication order.’
[15]. On 1 April 2025, Mr Barendse re plied, stating that he assumed the email
had been sent in error, reminding the adjudicator of her undertaking to hold the
process over indefinitely, and requesting her to advise if her stance had
changed. The adjudicator did not respond, but the applicant's attorney took no
further steps.
[16]. On 8 December 2025, the adjudicator issued the CSOS Order in favour
of the Association. At paragraph 18, the order recorded the following:
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‘On the 29 th of March 2024, [Ms Mare] was sent a notice in terms of Section 43 of the
CSOS Act, in order to afford [her] an opportunity to submit their final written
submissions by the 29 th of March 2024. However, [Ms Mare] failed and/or neglected to
submit [her] final written submissions.’
[17]. The applicant first became aware of the CSOS Order on 18 December
2025, when the Association's erstwhile attorney informed her attorney of its
existence. Between December 2025 and February 2026, the applicant's
attorney engaged in correspondence with the HOA’s attorneys , seeking an
undertaking that the HOA would not enforce the CSOS Order pending a review.
No such undertaking was provided.
[18]. On 26 February 2026, the applicant launched the present application.
[19]. The third to ninth respondents raise two preliminary objections to the
urgent application : that this court lacks jurisdiction, and that the application
lacks urgency. I deal with each in turn.
[20]. As regards jurisdiction, the respondents contend that only the Western
Cape Division of the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application.
They argue that the dispute was lodged with CSOS's Western Cape Regional
Office, concerns immovable property in the Western Cape and involves
respondents resident in the Western Cape. Enforcement of the CSOS Order,
they submit, would necessarily occur in the Western Cape.
[21]. This objection is without merit. Section 6(1) of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 ( ‘PAJA’) permits any person to institute
proceedings for judicial review in a court. ‘Court’ is defined in section 1 of PAJA
to include a High Court: -
‘… … … within whose area of jurisdiction the administrative action occurred or the
administrator has his or her or its principal place of administration or the party whose
rights have been affected is domiciled or ordinarily resident or the adverse effect of the
administrative action was, is or will be experienced;’
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[22]. In this matter the administrative action (the CSOS Order) is recorded as
having been made in Randburg, which falls within the jurisdiction of this court .
The first respondent (CSOS) has its principal place of administration in
Centurion, also within this court's jurisdiction . The applicant is domiciled and
ordinarily resident in Pretoria, again within this court's jurisdiction.
[23]. Any one of these factors is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court.
The respondents' reliance on the fact that the dispute originated in the Western
Cape is misplaced. The definition of ‘court in PAJA is deliberately broad, and a
party affected by administrative action is entitled to choose a forum that falls
within any of the specified categories.
[24]. The jurisdictional objection is accordingly dismissed.
[25]. As for u rgency, the respondents contend that the applicant has failed to
act expeditiously, having known of the CSOS Order since 18 December 2025
but only launching this application on 26 February 2026. They point to the
extremely truncated time periods afforded to them to respond, and to the
applicant's filing of supplementary affidavits at the last minute, as evidence of
self-created urgency.
[26]. Rule 6(12)(b) requires an applicant to set forth explicitly the
circumstances rendering the matter urgent and why substantial redress cannot
be obtained at a hearing in due course.
[27]. The applicant has , in my view, satisfied this requirement. The CSOS
Order is immediately enforceable under section 56 of the CSOS Act. Once
lodged with the Registrar, it may be executed upon without further notice to the
applicant, exposing her to the risk of attachment of her bank accounts or other
assets. A hearing in due course would come too late to prevent this harm.
[28]. The period between December 2025 and February 2026 is explained by
the applicant's attempts to engage with the respondents to secure an
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undertaking not to enforce the order, thereby avoiding the need for urgent
litigation. The correspondence reveals that the applicant's attorney repeatedly
sought clarity on the respondents' intentions, and was met with equivocal
responses. It was only on 23 February 2026 that the HOA’s attorneys confirmed
that they did not hold instructions to hold over enforcement, prompting the
launch of this application on 26 February 2026.
[29]. The urgency objection is accordingly dismissed.
[30]. That brings me to the applicant’s application for interim interdictory relief.
In that regard, t he requirements for an interim interdict are well established. An
applicant must show: (a) a prima facie right, even if open to some doubt; (b) a
well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not
granted and the ultimate relief is eventually granted; (c) that the balance of
convenience favours the granting of interim relief; and (d) that the applicant has
no other satisfactory remedy. See Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1; Webster v Mitchell 2.
The applicant bears the onus of satisfying all four requirements. Failure to
establish any one of them is fatal to the application.
[31]. In National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance
and Others3, the Constitutional Court affirmed the continued applicability of the
Setlogelo test, albeit with due regard to constitutional principles, including the
separation of powers and the principle of legality.
[32]. The correct approach to follow in determining whether a prima facie right
is established was set out in Webster v Mitchell4 as follows:
‘[T]he right to be set up by an applicant for a temporary interdict need not be shown by a
balance of probabilities. If it is "prima facie established though open to some doubt" that is
enough. … …
1 See Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221.
2 Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W) at 1189.
1 See Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221.
2 Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W) at 1189.
3 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC).
4 Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W).
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… The proper manner of approach I consider is to take the facts as set out by the applicant,
together with any facts set out by the respondent which the applicant cannot dispute, and to
consider whether, having regard to the inherent probabilities, the applicant could on those facts
obtain final relief at the trial. The facts set up in contradiction by the respondent should then be
considered. If serious doubt is thrown upon the case of the applicant, he could not succeed in
obtaining temporary relief, for his right, prima facie established, may only be open to "some
doubt". But if there is mere contradiction, or unconvincing explanation, the matter should be left
to trial and the right be protected in the meanwhile, subject of course to the respective prejudice
in the grant or refusal of interim relief.’
[33]. Where an applicant establishes a clear right, the requirement of
irreparable harm may be relaxed. However, the first requirement – a prima facie
right – remains foundational.
[34]. The applicant contends that she has a prima facie right to lawful and
procedurally fair administrative action as guaranteed by section 33 of the
Constitution, read with section 6 of PAJA and the principle of ‘legality’. She
relies on four specific grounds , namely: (a) She was not afforded a reasonable
opportunity to make representations ; (b) The adjudicator acted in defiance of
the suspension order; (c) The adjudicator breached section 50(a) of the CSOS
Act (due process); and (d) The adjudicator failed to deliver the CSOS Order to
her as required by section 55(1).
[35]. Applying the test in Webster v Mitchell 5, I find that the applicant has
demonstrated a prima facie right entitling her to interim interdictory relief. The
simple point is that, by all accounts, the applicant was blissfully unaware of the
fact that the adjudicator intended proceeding with the adjudication of the
dispute. She was accordingly not afford ed an opportunity to present her case
dispute. She was accordingly not afford ed an opportunity to present her case
before the adjudicator. The applicant’s case, in that regard, is that she would
have placed before the adjudicator the fact that there is an existing dispute
between her and the HOA, which dispute is still being litigated in the Western
Cape High Court. This defence, I understand the applicant to argue, would have
been a complete defence in the CSOS proceedings.
5 Footnote 2 supra.
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[36]. I do not, however, believe that there is merit in the applicant’s argument
that the suspension order of the High Court in the Western Cape means that the
adjudicator ought not to have proceeded with the adjudication. The said order
was granted on 12 September 2024 in the context of settlement negotiations in
the High Court Action. The matter stood down to enable the parties to pursue
settlement negotiations, and the parties agreed to a postponement to continue
those negotiations. The order suspending pendin g litigation, must be read in
this context. It was a temporary measure to facilitate settlement, not an
indefinite bar on all proceedings.
[37]. By December 2025, when the CSOS Order was issued, the settlement
negotiations had long since failed. The parties to the High Court Action have
since agreed on trial dates for August 2026. The applicant's interpretation of the
Suspension Order would lead to the absurd consequence that, while the parties
to the High Court Action press ahead with that matter, completely separate
proceedings would be barred indefinitely. This cannot be what the order
intended.
[38]. For the reasons mentioned above, I am nevertheless in agreement that
the applicant may have been deprived of her right to due process of law as
required by s 50(a) of the CSOS Act . Whatever the reasons for such may be,
the simple fact of the matter is that she was not given an opportunity to present
her case before the adjudicator.
[39]. I therefore concluded that the applicant has established a prima facie
right entitling her to interim interdictory relief.
[40]. The same cannot, however, be said of the requirements relating to
irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.
[41]. The applicant contends that she will suffer irreparable harm if the
interdict is not granted, as the CSOS Order may be enforced against her,
resulting in the attachment of her assets. The respondents, on the other hand,
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submit that the a pplicant has not paid a single cent towards her share of the
communal expenses , relating to the administration of the association and the
running of the communal properties, since February 2020. The amount, which is
presently owing, due and payable by the applicants, so the contention on behalf
the respondents goes, totals the significant sum of R1 429 666,53. This is whilst
the applicant has enjoyed, and continues to enjoy, the full benefits and services
provided by the estate (including security, road maintenance, common property
upkeep and amenities) and water, while refusing to make any payment towards
her share thereof.
[42]. This means, so the argument on behalf of the respondents is concluded,
that the balance of convenience favours a refusal of the interim interdictory
relief. I agree with this submission. The simple fact of this matter is that the
applicant does not explain anywhere why she does not pay her share of such
expenses that she is undoubtedly liable for. Why does she not at least make
payment of the amount that she considers to be her true share of the communal
expenses? It is therefore so, as contended by the respondents, that the
applicant is quite content for all the other paying members to finance and
support her lifestyle and her share of the expenses, which is a most convenient
way of protest action.
[43]. In Olympic Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan 6, the Court held
that:
‘In such cases, upon proof of a well -grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, and there
being no adequate ordinary remedy the court may grant an interdict – it has a discretion, to be
exercised judicially upon a consideration of all the facts. Usually this will resolve itself into a nice
consideration of the prospects of success and the balance of convenience – the stronger the
prospects of success, the less need for such balance to favour the applicant: the weaker the
prospects of success, the greater the need for the balance of convenience to favour him .’
prospects of success, the greater the need for the balance of convenience to favour him .’
[44]. On the basis of this case authority, I conclude that, in this matter, the
balance of convenience favours the respondents.
6 Olympic Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan 1957 (2) SA 382 (D) at 383E–F.
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[45]. On the one hand, t he applicant has not paid any levies since February
2020 – a period exceeding six years. She has accumulated arrears in excess of
R1.4 million. She continues to enjoy the benefits of living in a managed estate –
security, road maintenance, common area upkeep – while refusing to contribute
to their cost. If the interim interdict is not granted, the applicant will be
compelled to pay a debt, which she is in all probability liable to pay. This, in
turn, means that t he HOA would be receiving levy income on which it relies to
fund its operations. The applicant's ongoing non -payment prejudices not only
the Association but also the other members who bear the burden of her unpaid
share. If the interdict were granted, the Association would be precluded from
enforcing a Court order, while the applicant would continue to enjoy the benefits
of the estate without contributing to its upkeep.
[46]. On the flipside, the applicant will pay what is due by her. But, in the
unlikely event that she is ultimately held not to be liable, she would be able to
claim back any amounts she would have paid pursuant to the CSOS Order.
[47]. I reiterate that, in my view, the balance of convenience favours a refusal
of the application for the interim interdict.
[48]. The same applies to the requirement relating to irreparable harm to be
suffered by the applicant in the event of the application not being granted. The
harm the applicant fears – enforcement of a money judgment – is not
irreparable. If she is ultimately successful in the review application, she may
seek to recover any amounts paid. While recovery may not be guaranteed, this
is a risk inherent in all money judgments. It does not justify the grant of interim
relief. Importantly, and this deserves particular e mphasis, whatever the
applicant pays in terms of and pursuant to the CSOS Order will, in all
probability, ultimately prove to by due and payable by her. This means that it
probability, ultimately prove to by due and payable by her. This means that it
cannot be said with any conviction that the applicant has ‘ a well -grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted and the
ultimate relief is eventually granted’.
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[49]. In sum , I conclude that the applican t has failed to demonstrate a well -
grounded apprehension of irreparable harm. Moreover, the balance of
convenience does not favour the granting of the application for interim
interdictory relief, as sought by the applicant in casu.
[50]. Accordingly, the applicant has, in my judgment, failed to make out a case
for the interim relief sought. The applicant ’s urgent application for interim
interdictory falls to be dismissed.
Costs
[51]. The general rule in matters of costs is that the successful party should be
given his costs, and this rule should not be departed from except where there
are good grounds for doing so , such as misconduct on the part of the
successful party or other exceptional circumstances. See: Myers v Abramson7.
[52]. I can think of no reason why I should deviate from this general rule. The
applicant should therefore be ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the
opposed urgent application.
Order
[53]. In the result, I make the following order:
(1) The applicant’s urgent application is dismissed with costs.
(2) The applicant shall pay the third to ninth respondents’ costs of this
opposed urgent application, including Counsel’s charges on scale ‘C’ of
the tariff referred to in Uniform Rule of Court 67A(3), read with rule 69.
7 Myers v Abrahamson 1951(3) SA 438 (C) at 455
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HEARD ON: 10 March 2026
JUDGMENT DATE: 16 March 2026 – Judgment handed
down electronically
FOR THE APPLICANT: (Ms) C M Rogers
INSTRUCTED BY: Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Incorporated,
Cape Town
FOR THE FIRST AND
SECOND RESPONDENTS: No appearance
INSTRUCTED BY: No appearance
FOR THE THIRD TO
NINTH RESPONDENTS: T Ossin
INSTRUCTED BY: Maurice Phillips | Wisenberg,
Cape Town