IN THE LAND COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT RANDBURG
CASE NO: LCC09/2024
Before:
Heard on:
Delivered on:
BishopAJ
5 March 2026
6 March 2026
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLI CABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: ~ I NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTH ER JUDGES: ~ I NO
(3) REVISED: i'E'S I NO
6 March 2026
DATE
In the matter between:
JAFTHA PEKEUR
MAGRIETHA PEKEUR
and
-SIGNATURE
THE FRUIT FARM GROUP (PTY) LTD
First Applicant
Second Applicant
Respondent
ORDER
1. The Applicants’ failure to file an application for condonation, and their late filing
of the application for leave to appeal are condoned.
2. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
3. There is no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT: APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
BISHOP, AJ
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment I delivered on 17
December 2025. In that judgment, I granted an application to evict the Applicants from
the farm Verlorenvlei.
CONDONATION
[2] A preliminary issue arises because the application is brought out of time. It was
filed on 16 February 2026. It ought to have been filed on 16 January 2026. Even if the
full period until 15 January 2026 is regarded as dies non, the application is still out of
time.
[3] The day before the hearing Mr Joubert, for the Respondent, filed a note drawing
the delay to the attention of the Court and the Applicants. At the hearing, I invited Mr
Jacobs, for the Applicants to explain the delay. He explained that Legal Aid South
Africa – who had previously represented the Applicants – had indicated they were not
able to represent them in seeking leave to appeal. The Applicants then had to find
alternative attorneys. They did so, and then the application for leave to appeal was
filed.
[4] This seems to me like a reasonable explanation. While it should have been
given in an application for condonation, Mr Joubert did not object to me considering
the representations from the Bar. He also indicated that his client had no interest in
postponing the application to allow an application for condonation to be brought.
[5] In my view, I have the power in terms of rule 32(7) to condone the failure to
bringing a condonation application, and to condone the delay in brining the application
for leave to appeal. I made that order at the hearing, and the parties then argued the
merits of the application.
THE MERITS
[6] An applicant for leave to appeal is confined to the grounds of appeal set out in
the application.1 Leave to appeal is granted on one or more of those grounds.
[7] The test is whether there are reasonable prospects that another court would
come to a different conclusion.2
[8] The Applicants advanced six grounds of appeal.
[9] First, they argue that I misinterpreted their rights under s 8(4)(b) of ESTA. But,
as I pointed out to Mr Jacobs, I made no finding on whether s 8(4)(b) applied or not. I
did not do so because: (a) the issue was not pleaded or argued; and (b) it did not make
a difference as I concluded that there was a fundamental breach as envisaged in
s 10(1)(c) of ESTA. The Applicants did not seek leave to appeal on the basis that I
was wrong to conclude that Mr Pekeur had committed a fundamental breach in terms
of s 10(1)(c). Whether s 8(4)(b) applied or not was, therefore, irrelevant.
[10] Second, the Applicant contended that I ignored the occupiers’ constitutional
rights to family life, dignity, housing, freedom and security of the person, and privacy.
The Applicants do not explain how I failed to consider those rights, or how a
consideration of those rights would have changed the outcome. ESTA was enacted to
give effect to the right to security of tenure, and the right to housing. It also protects
the rights to dignity, family life, freedom and security and privacy.
3 But ESTA must be
1 Songono v Minister of Law and Order 1996 (4) SA 384 (E) at 385I-J.
2 Land Court Act 6 of 2023 s 31, read with Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 s 17.
3 ESTA ss 5 and 6.
interpreted on its terms. It was open to the Applicants to argue that I misinterpreted or
misapplied ESTA because I did not have regard to a particular constitutional right. But
then they should have identified the relevant provision and explained why a
consideration of the right would have altered the meaning of the provision, or how it
should have been applied on the facts. They did not do so, and so there is no basis to
grant leave to appeal.
[11] Third, the Applicants point out that Mr Pekeur started his employment on
Verlorenvlei in 1996. That is so. That is why I found his eviction was governed by s 10
of ESTA. Mrs Pekeur began occupying Verlorenvlei in 2005. That is why her eviction
was covered by s 11.
[12] Fourth, the Applicants contend that I erred in concluding that there was a written
contract of employment linking Mr Pekeur’s residence to his employment, despite Mr
Pekeur’s denial that he signed one. But the Applicants do not explain why I erred in
reaching that conclusion on the evidence. They also do not explain why the existence
of a written agreement mattered in light of Mr Pekeur’s own evidence that his residence
on the farm flowed from his employment.
4
[13] Fifth, the Applicants argued that I wrongly concluded that they had alternative
accommodation because Mr Afrika – who they reside with on Driefontein – is not the
owner of that farm. But they do not explain why it cannot be regarded as alternative
accommodation given that it is currently their primary place of residence where they
spend the majority of their time. They also do not explain why they would not be able
4 See para 31 of the Judgment on the merits.
to secure other alternative accommodation with Mrs Pekeur’s salary of R13 000 per
month. And if my factual finding that the Applicants had access to alternative
accommodation was correct, there was no need for any further order to regulate the
provision of alternative accommodation post-eviction.
[14] Finally, they argue that I was wrong to conclude that the Labour Court
proceedings had been determined in terms of s 8(3) of ESTA as Mr Pekeur’s review
is still “pending” in that Court. But it isn’t pending. It has been “deemed to be
withdrawn” and it has “lapsed”. No argument was advanced for why I was wrong in my
conclusion on the effect of non- prosecution of the review in the Labour Court. And I
do not see how an application that has lapsed and been deemed to be withdrawn can
be said not to “determined” as envisaged in s 8(3) of ESTA.
[15] For all those reasons, there are no reasonable prospects that another Court will
reach a different conclusion on the grounds of appeal raised by the Applicants. The
application must be dismissed.
[16] Despite the failure of the application, I do not believe there is any reason to
depart from the ordinary practice in this Court that costs orders are not made. The
application was not abusive, it was just ill-founded.
[17] Accordingly, I make the following order:
[17.1] The Applicants’ failure to file an application for condonation, and their
late filing of the application for leave to appeal are condoned.
[17.2] The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
[17.3] There is no order as to costs.
M BISHOP
Acting Judge of the Land Court
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Adv C Joubert SC
Instructed by: Werksmans Attorneys
For the Respondents: Mr J Jacobs of J Jacobs and Associates