Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Ledwaba and Others (2026/015150) [2026] ZAGPJHC 240 (6 March 2026)

45 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Property Law — Interdict — Urgency — Applicant seeking interdict against transfer of property sold at auction — Court finding applicant failed to demonstrate urgency and merits of application — No imminent transfer to bona fide purchaser — Application struck from the roll with costs.

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THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS, PRETORIA 7th Respondent
RICHARDS F ATTORNEYS INC 8th Respondent


JUDGMENT
MODIBA, J

[1] The applicant seeks an order interdicting the registration of transfer of an
immovable property bought by the 4th respondent on the 10th of April 2025 at a
sale in execution . The application is opposed by the 4 th and 8 th respondents.
They oppose its urgency and merits.
[2] The applicant holds security over the immovable property by virtue of a mortgage
bond registered in its name. The 1st and 2nd respondents are the current owners
of the property. The 4 th respondent is the party who purchased the property at
the auction. The 8 th respondent is the conveyancer tasked with the registration
of the property from the 1 st and 2nd respondents to the 4th respondent. The 5th
and 6th respondent have signed an offer to purchase the property from the 4 th
respondent.
[3] In this court, urgent applications are regulated by uniform rule 6(12). It provides
that an applicant in an urgent application is obliged to explain clearly, in the
founding affidavit, the circumstances which render the application urgent and the
reason why he or she claims that he or she cannot be afforded substantial relief
at a hearing in due course. The applicant failed to meet the second requirement.
[4] The basis on which the applicant sought to be heard on an extremely urgent
basis is that the transfer of the property is eminent and if it is transferred to a
bona fide purchaser, it will not have recourse in subsequent legal proceedings .
However, the applicant’s apprehension about the transfer of the property is not
born out of the common cause facts. There is no eminent transfer of the property
to a bona fide third-party purchaser. The 4th respondent to whom the property is

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about to be transferred is not a bona fide third-party purchaser. The bona fide
third-party purchasers are the 5th and 6th respondents.
[5] The 4th respondent contends that he would have lodged simultaneous transfer of
the property to the 5th and 6th respondents but did not do so because it is aware
that the applicant intends to rescind an order granted on 3 September 2024 and
to set aside the sale of the property to the 4 th respondent. The 4 th and 8 th
respondents are persisting with the transfer of the property into the name of the
4th respondent simply to avoid the 4 th respondent having to incur more costs in
the event that the applicant is unsuccessful in its intended application. Therefore,
the applicant has not shown that if the matter is heard on the basis of urgency, it
will not have substantive redress in due course.1 It thus fails to meet the test for
urgency. As contended on behalf of the 4th respondent, on this ground alone, the
application fell to be struck from the roll with costs.
[6] However, since I could not hand down this judgment promptly due to extremely
busy court rolls and given that the merits were fully ventilated before me, I
consider it expedient to determine them.
[7] The requirements for the granting of a temporary interdict are trite. T o succeed
on the merits, the appellant had to establish a prima facie right to the interdict, a
reasonable apprehension that its rights will be harmed, the balance of
convenience in its favour, and the absence of any other satisfactory remedy.
[8] The application fails on the merits on the same basis as it failed on urgency,
namely, the fact that the causa relied on, being the eminent transfer of the
property to the 4 th respondent does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension
of harm to its security over the property , the balance of convenience does not
favour the applicant and the applicant does have a suitable alternative remedy

favour the applicant and the applicant does have a suitable alternative remedy
which it intends seeking in an application referenced above. On the other hand,
if the interdict is granted and the contract is not set aside, the 4th respondent will
suffer inconvenience as it will have to incur further costs associated with the
transfer. Some of the costs are related to the 1 st and 2 nd respondents’
indebtedness as owners of the property as they failed to pay them. If it succeeds

1 Knox v Mofokeng and Others (2011/33437) [2012] ZAGPJHC 23; 2013 (4) SA 46 (GSJ) (30 January 2012)

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Appearances
For the Applicant: Adv Amojee
Instructed by: Strauss Daly Inc

For the 4th Respondent: Ms Shumbambini
Instructed by: Madamombe-Shumbamhinilaw Attorneys

For the 8th Respondent: Mr Frank Richards
Instructed by: Richards F Attorneys Inc

For 1st,2nd 3rd, No Appearance
5th 6th and 7th
Respondents :

Date of hearing: 28 January 2026
Date of Judgment: 4 March 2026

This judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties ’ legal
representatives by email and publication on Case Lines and SAFLII. The date for the
handing down is deemed 10am.