IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
CASE No: 2025-058552
In the matter between:
KEVIN WILLIAMS Respondent/Applicant
and
THOMSON WILKS INC / MR ELLIOT Applicant/First Respondent
THE S.A. LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL Second Respondent
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL SERVICES OMBUD Third Respondent
Heard: 5 March 2026
Judgment: 6 March 2026
Summary: Application for leave to appeal: in application for security for
costs and for declaration as a vexatious litigant in terms of the Vexatious
Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 and the common law.
ORDER
Application for Leave to Appeal
,;,~
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs on the scale as
between attorney and client.
JUDGMENT
Application for Leave to Appeal
Handed down by email to the parties on 6 March 2026
Judgment handed down electronically by circulation to th e parties’ legal
representatives by email and released to SAFLII.
KANTOR, AJ:
1. Mr Williams applies for leave to appeal against the Order and Judgment which
were handed down in this matter on 4 February 2026 (‘the Order’ and ‘the
Judgment’). The application which served before me which is the subject of this
application for leave to appeal shall be referred to as the ‘Application’.
2. The parties shall be referred to as they were in the Judgment and the defined
terms therein will be employed.
3. In t erms of section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (“the SC
Act”), “Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned
are of the opinion that –
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success;
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be
heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration;”
4. I have considered the application for leave to appeal and the submissions
made by Mr Williams and by Ms Samkange who acted for the TW
Respondents.
5. On a benevolent approach, the application for leave to appeal (‘the LTA’)
consisted of two documents running to a total of 109 pages (Ms Samkange
contended that the LTA ran to more than 200 pages). With the line spacing
required by practice directive 11 of this court, the LTA would likely have
exceeded 150 pages. I mention this not to criticise Mr Williams for his line
spacing (he is unrepresented which is given recognition in practice directive
11), but to p lace in perspective the extraordinary lengthy of the LTA. The one
LTA document was headed ‘Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal’ and
consists of 10 pages (‘the 10 Page LTA’). The second LTA document was
headed ‘Application for Leave to Appeal’ and con sists of 99 pages (‘the 99
Page LTA’). Together these shall be referred to as ‘the LTA Documents’.
6. Ms Samkange submitted that the LTA did not comply with Rule 49(1)(b) which
requires that an application for leave to appeal clearly sets out the grounds
upon which leave is sought. There is no question that Ms Samkange is correct
in her submission. She submitted that the applicant be dismissed on this basis
alone. Regard must be had to the fact that Mr Williams appears in person,
albeit that this has worn thi n with his extended involvement in litigation over
more than the past decade. I am almost certainly being far too lenient, but the
application will not be dismissed on this basis. It will, however, play a role as to
costs.
7. A leave to appeal index running to 340 pages was filed. It included the LTA
Documents, the Judgment and the heads of argument of the parties. This was
permissible. It included other documents containing evidence not before the
court in the Application which were impermissibly placed before the court.
8. The Application in respect of which the Judgment and Order were handed down
was brought by the TW Respondents in the context of the Main Application
under the above case number. In the Application, the TW Respondents sought
against Mr Willia ms (1) security for costs, (2) relief in terms of the Vexatious
Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 (‘the Act’) and (3) relief in respect of the Main
Application in terms of the common law as to vexatious litigation.
9. I declined to order security for costs (contrary to the assertion on more than five
5 occasions in the LTA that it was granted) and ordered both aspects of the
vexatious litigation relief.
10. I have considered the LTA Documents and am of the view that they do not
disclose a basis for leave to appeal. In m y view, the content thereof reinforces
compellingly the case for the relief which was granted and that Mr Williams is a
vexatious litigant. I will deal with certain limited examples in this regard below.
11. In regard to the merits of the vexatious litigation relief, there are two general
areas of focus: (1) the allegations of fraud and forgery against the TW
Respondents and (2) the persistent institution of legal proceedings by Mr
Williams without reasonable grounds.
12. It is to be born in mind that the impact of the Order in regard to the relief in the
Main Application is limited to 8 out of the 23 prayers in the Notice of Motion
(prayers 1, 2, 3, 7 and 10 – 13). The relief sought in the other 15 prayers relate
to either the LPC and/or the Ombud only or to one or both of them and the TW
Respondents. The Main Application for the extremely wide -ranging relief in
those 15 paragraphs against the LPC and the Ombud is not covered by the
Order and the litigation in respect thereof may be proceeded with by Mr
Williams at will. He seem ed to think that the effect of the Order is that the TW
Respondents are no longer respondents in the Main Application which is plainly
incorrect (this is dealt with briefly below).
The allegations against the TW Respondents
13. In an attempt to bring some focus and discipline to the proceedings, the parties
were requested to identify the allegations against the TW Respondents. In this
regard, in paragraph 40 of the Judgment it is recorded that “ I requested Ms
Samkange, who appeared for the TW respondents, and Mr Williams, who
appeared personally, to identify the core factual aspects underpinning Mr
Williams’s contentions in the Main Application insofar as they pertain to the TW
Respondents. The four core aspects raised by them are considered below.”
14. That paragraph of the Judgment is not attacked by Mr Williams. In argument,
the four areas raised were addressed and canvassed in detail with Mr Williams
and the TW Respondents over two days of argument.
15. The Judgment addressed in detail wh y it was considered that the tests for the
purposes of the relief sought by the TW Respondents in terms of the common
law and the Act had been satisfied in respect of each of these four areas. In
oral argument Mr Williams indicated that he did wish to addr ess those merits. It
suffices for present purposes to refer to the Judgment in these four respects
(paragraphs 41 to 68) and there is no need to repeat what is said there. I have
considered the LTA Documents and am of the view that they do not disclose a
basis for leave to appeal (in my view, as mentioned, the content thereof
reinforces compellingly that the relief should have been sought and granted). In
my view an appeal would not have a reasonable prospect of success.
16. That being said, Mr Williams did subsequently in oral argument aver that the
LPC was obliged to provide a hearing. He referred repeatedly to section 37 of
the LPA, as he had also done in the LTA Documents. For example, at page 10
of the 99 Page LTA he states in paragraph 6.16 that “… section 37(3) requires
hearings before findings can be made …” This is incorrect in law. There is no
obligation for a hearing to be held if the investigating committee dismisses the
complaint, as provided for in Rule 40.6 of the LPC Rules which is quoted in
paragraph 41 of the Judgment. The opposite actually applies in that in law the
investigating committee ‘must’ dismiss a complaint if it does not necessarily
warrant misconduct proceedings. This is mirrored in section 37(3) of the LPA.
17. Mr Williams argued that the Order and Judgment disposes of his review in the
Main Application and remaining complaint to the LPC on a final basis. He
averred that the Judgment expresses views (on the evidence before the court)
on the relief sought in the Main Appli cation and thereby ‘pre-judged’ the review,
and ‘The Court simultaneously made final findings disposing of the Applicant’s
claims’ and that ‘the presiding judge simultaneously disposes of claims ’. This is
repeated time and again in the LTA Documents.
18. I e xplained to him that this loses sight of what has to be decided in an
application of the kind brought by the TW Respondents in terms of the common
law and the Act. The court perforce must consider the merits of the case of the
party against whom the vexati ous litigation is contended and the relief sought
and make findings as to whether the legal tests for vexatious litigation are
satisfied (‘the Tests’). This is what was done in the Judgment. It had to be done
therein in order to determine the Application. No claims were pre -judged or
disposed of. The Judgment and Order do not purport to do that, and nor could
they do so. The claims can only be finally determined in the Main Application.
The Main Application remains pending before the Court and Mr Williams m ay
pursue at will the relief in the fifteen prayers which are not covered by the
Order. Even the eight prayers covered by the Order have not been disposed of.
They remain before the court. The effect of the order (paragraph 4 thereof) is
that it “… is stayed until this court, on application to it, may order otherwise.”
19. In oral argument, Mr Williams then repeatedly emphasised paragraph 66 of the
Judgment, averring that it disposed of his last remaining complaint to the LPC
against the TW Respondents. Paragr aph 66 does not do so. It is simply part of
an example of the application of the Tests , in this instance to his allegation
against the TW Respondents of fraud and forgery in respect of the writ of
execution under case number 3267/2017 (the fourth aspect de alt with in
paragraphs 61 to 68 of the Judgment). That aspect is the subject matter of his
last remaining complaint against the TW Respondents. In oral argument, I
pointed out paragraph 44 of the Judgment to Mr Williams which specifically
recorded that thi s complaint “ is still pending. ” I asked Mr Williams to read the
first sentence of paragraph 44. When he got to the words “ is still pending ” he
stopped reading, which speaks volumes. What was pointed out in paragraph 66
of the Judgment was that I did not kn ow what evidence was before the appeal
panel of the LPC, but it was plainly not the vast papers before me. On those
papers, as I have indicated above, and explained in the Judgment, the
allegations on the merits had perforce to be considered by the court f or it to
apply the Tests for vexatious litigation. That, however, does not dispose of any
pending complaint to the LPC against the TW Respondents. That is still to be
determined by the LPC.
The relief in the Notice of Motion against the TW Respondents alone
20. As mentioned, this is limited to prayers 1, 2, 3, 7 and 10 to 13, while the other
15 prayers relate to either the LPC and/or the Ombud only or to one or both of
them and the TW Respondents. The Main Application for the extremely wide -
ranging relief in those 15 paragraphs against the LPC and the Ombud is not
covered by the Order and the litigation in respect thereof may be proceeded
with by Mr Williams at will. He seems to think that the effect of the Order is that
the TW Respondents are no longer respondents in the Main Application which
is plainly incorrect.
21. The Judgment (in paragraphs 82, 83, 84, 86 and 87) considers each of these
prayers directed against the TW Respondents. Briefly:
21.1. Prayer 1 is for a direction that Mr Williams appears i n person and his
rights have been compromised. A court does not give recognition in
orders to the fact that a person is appearing in person in an order. As
dealt with above and in the Judgment, no case is made out for a
compromise of any of his rights.
21.2. Prayer 2 is for a direction against filing any interlocutory motions which
are extraneous to the pursuit of justice and the spirit of the LPA. The
relief sought is vague. No case is made out for any of the respondents
to be declared vexatious litigants, wheth er in terms of the common law
or the Act. No case is made out for abuse of court process by the
Respondents.
21.3. Prayer 3 is to review and set aside cost orders made in other matters
by other Judges and to have those cost orders estopped. The relief
sought is wholly misconceived. It is reminiscent of Mr Williams’s
shotgun approach. A Judge cannot review a costs order granted by
another Judge. The remedy is to appeal the cost order (which is very
rarely granted) or to apply for its rescission, as applicable. Num erous
other intractable problems with this relief are set out in the Judgment.
21.4. Prayer 7 seeks a direction that Thomson Wilks is guilty of fraud, theft of
trust funds, forging a writ or execution, forging an allocatur and
fraudulently acquiring an order und er case number 3267/2017, and all
in motion proceedings which is a most tall order even in the best of
circumstances. As dealt with above and in the Judgment, no case is
made out for this on any level.
21.5. Prayers 10 to 13 are further examples of seeking this court to declare
the cost orders granted by other Judges to be estopped or invalidated
and is another attempt to set aside the Order and the writ in respect of
case number 3267/2017. The same considerations in paragraph 22.3
above apply.
22. As mentioned, the other 15 prayers for wide -ranging relief sought against the
LPC and/or Ombud only or one or both of them and the TW Respondents are
not covered by the Order and Mr Williams can pursue that relief at will, in
respect of which the TW Respondents remain respondents.
The persistent institution of legal proceedings by Mr Williams without
reasonable grounds
23. As to whether Mr Williams has persistently instituted litigation, the table at
paragraph 69 of the Judgment sets out 19 instances of litigation commenced by
Mr Williams, 17 of which have been unsuccessful (and none of which have
been successful on the merits). The two others are the Main Application which
is pending and the application under case number 19055/2107 (item 6 on the
table) in which he was successful but that, as pointed out in paragraph 43.8 of
the Judgment, I considered this “… to be a technical success for Mr Williams in
the sense that it did not involve any success on any issues of substance in
relation to the merits of any of his assertions and allegations.”
24. Accordingly, he has failed 17 out of 18 times where a result has been
forthcoming and not once has he been successful on any issues of substance
in relation to the merits of any of his assertions and allegations.
25. Mr Williams tries to defend this in paragraph 12 on page 23 of the 99 Page LTA
by saying he was acting defensively in instituting the litigation. Even if that were
to be so (which it plainly is not), it is of no moment, the persistent lack of
success and absence of rea sonable grounds for the litigation being what is
relevant.
26. He also resorts to an unambiguous attack on the court, alleging that it
abdicated its judicial function by accepting the content of the table produced by
the TW Respondents and attached to their heads of argument. He knows that
to be false:
26.1. On the first day of the hearing (27 November 2025), I pointed out to Ms
Samkange that, on my consideration of that table of litigation against the
papers, it contained errors. She undertook to correct those er rors. A
corrected table was later handed up.
26.2. In the table in the Judgment (at paragraph 69), the court made over 40
changes to this corrected table which had been handed up. These were
in the main involved correcting dates and inserting unabbreviated
references to the Constitutional Court and months of the year , but also
some changes of substance. Those arose from my consideration of the
table handed up against the papers (as mentioned in paragraph 69 of
the Judgment). Anyone who may have perused and compar ed the two
documents would have picked up that there were these numerous
changes. It seems that Mr Williams did not do so and was rather content
to simply make wild and reckless allegations against the court . This is
symptomatic of a vexatious litigant.
27. The Judgment also sets out in detail the extensive complaints to the LPC
arising from Mr Williams’s allegations against the TW Respondents and others.
28. I have considered what is contained in the LTA Documents in these respects.
For the reasons set out in t he Judgment and herein, I do not consider that an
appeal on this aspect would have a reasonable prospect of success. Nor is
there any other compelling reason as contemplated in section 17(1)(a)(ii) of the
SC Act simply because the relief sought against the LPC and the Ombud is not
covered by the Order. This aspect need not be considered further.
29. The LTA Documents are lengthy in the extreme but, in my view do not raise
anything which satisfies the tests for leave to appeal.
30. There are many aspects in the LT A Documents which further indicate
vexatiousness and that the Order should have been granted. Limited examples
will be mentioned.
The TW Respondents remain respondents and the relief against the LPC and
the Ombud is not covered by the Order
31. The relief granted in the Application relating to the relief in the Main Application
was limited to the relief sought against the TW Respondents. The very wide
and varied relief against the LPC and the Ombud, contended by Mr Williams to
be of public import ance, was not covered by the Order and the Judgment. The
Main Application continues in that respect and the TW Respondents remain
respondents in the Main Application.
32. Vast swathes of what is contended in the prolix LTA Documents concern that
case against the LPC and the Ombud. The TW Respondents remain
respondents therein.
33. Mr Williams’s contentions in the LTA Documents that the TW Respondents are
not respondents in the main application is incorrect. Similarly, his contention
that in 2022 it was insisted ( by the LPC) that the TW Respondents be
respondents and now it is insisted otherwise, is incorrect. This is because it
confuses joinder with relief against a vexatious litigant. The Order does not
terminate the status of the TW Respondents as respondents in the Main
Application.
34. Mr Williams alleges aspects involving the LPC and the Ombud which he claims
to be of great public importance. What he loses sight of is that the relief in the
Main Application sought against the LPC and the Ombud is not the subject of
the Order and the Judgment. In other words, Mr Williams is not prevented from
proceeding with the Main Application against the LPC and the Ombud to raise
therein what he considers to be of public importance.
Misrepresentation of content of the Judgment
The order for security for costs
35. Mr Williams repeatedly alleged that the Order security for costs had been
ordered to be furnished by him in the amount of R250 000 (for example,
paragraph 3 of the 10 Page LTA and Ground 9 on page 22 of the 99 Page LTA).
This is incorrect. No order for se curity for costs to be furnished was made,
whether for R250 000 or any other amount.
36. An error of this nature strikes one as being typically symptomatic of Mr
Williams’s approach to litigation in general as identified in the Judgment and by
other Judges of this Court, an approach which is indicative of vexatiousness.
Recordal of findings of other Judges
37. In relation to what other Judges have held in his respect as recorded in the
Judgment, Mr Willams contends for some form of ‘AI’ component in the
Judgment. This too is incorrect. What other Judges said in judgments was
quoted directly from their judgments (all were part of the papers) with reference
to the paragraphs thereof and the case numbers (paragraphs 78 and 79 of the
Judgment). Had Mr Williams checked this he would have seen so – it was easy
to do so because the references were provided in the mentioned paragraphs of
the Judgment.
38. It is yet another reckless throw -away allegation made with no concern for
whether it is true or not, a hallmark of a vexatious litigant.
39. If one compares the quoted portions in the Judgment with those in the TW
Respondent’s heads of argument, one would note that the Judgment in fact, in
most instances, quotes extracts from the judgments verbatim in different
extents, which could only be taken from the judgments themselves.
Misquoting the Judgment
40. Paragraph 43 on page 81 of the 99 Page LTA misquotes the Judgment at
paragraph 49.7, contending that it reads “ a mere technical victory because the
order of Magistrate Visagie wa s in place which had rendered the decision by
Magistrate Page unnecessary”.
41. Paragraph 49.7 actually reads: “ The review succeeded because the order
made by Magistrate Visagie was already in place which rendered the decision
by Magistrate Page unnecessary and on the basis of that order Thomson Wilks
should have challenged individual items taxed by the Taxing Master. Again,
while Mr Williams was successful in this review, this was due to a largely
procedural aspect and did not involve any success on any issu es of substance
in relation to the merits and had nothing to do with the merits of the costs. On
the contrary, the review of the taxation of the costs on the incorrect scale
remained in place and of effect.”
42. This is not a matter of a typographical error. It is another instance of a reckless
approach to litigation in making allegations with no concern for whether they
are true or not, and in crudely misrepresenting what is said, even in a judgment
of the High Court, all of which are hallmarks of a vexatious litigant.
43. Another example is that Mr Williams argues (see, for example, page 5 of the 10
page LTA) that the court’s “ central finding ” is “ that the allocatur figures were
‘identical’”. This is plainly wrong and crudely misrepresents t he Judgment
(which he actually quotes some 88 pages further into a different time zone of
the LTA, on page 83 of the 99 Page LTA) which in fact records the exact
opposite, namely that the items on the allocaturs were the same, but it was the
figures which changed because of the incorrect scale which had been applied.
This was explained in the simplest terms in paragraph 49.14 of the Judgment
(this is what was quoted 88 pages later in the LTA Documents): “ On my
inspection thereof, the items are the same. Wh at changed was the amounts for
each of these items being adjusted from what had previously been on the
party/party scale, which I consider to be the precise basis of the findings of
Magistrate Rousseau, as confirmed by Sher J on review.”
Technical success in sense of no finding on the merits
44. Mr Williams contends that the Judgment regards the success he had in the
application under case number 19055/2017 to be technical.
45. This, too, misrepresents the Judgment which expressly stated that it was using
the word technical in the specific sense of there having been no success on the
merits of his assertions and allegations: in paragraph 43.8 of the Judgment it
was stated that there were two instances “ … which I consider to be a technical
success for Mr Williams in the sense that it did not involve any success on any
issues of substance in relation to the merits of any of his assertions and
allegations.”
46. The point that was made is that in all of the 19 instances of litigation
commenced by him, a nd in all his numerous complainants to the LPC, there
was never a decision which involved any ‘ success on any issues of substance
in relation to the merits of any of his assertions and allegations’.
The litigation narrative
47. In paragraph 57.7 of the 99 Pa ge LTA it is alleged that “ The court simply
adopted the TW/LPC consolidated narrative because it “appeared” accurate.
This is abdication of judicial function ... This is no longer judicial assessment
but prosecutorial collaboration.” This misrepresents the Judgment, in paragraph
69 of which what was actually stated in this regard was that the chronology “…
is copied, with adjustments I consider appropriate on my consideration of the
papers, into this judgment below (on my consideration thereof against the
papers it appeared to me to be accurate) …”
48. As mentioned, on the first day of the hearing I had pointed out to Ms Samkange
that I had picked up errors in the table prepared by the TW Respondents
setting out instances of litigation. A further corrected table has handed up in
court by them on the second day of the hearing. That table, too, was not
accepted at face value by the court. A comparison of it with that which appears
in the Judgment reveals at least 40 differences between the two. These were
the ‘ adjustments I consider appropriate on my consideration of the papers’
being a function of my ‘ consideration thereof [the chronology handed up]
against the papers’.
49. Had anyone perused and compared the two documents they would have
picked up that there were many changes. Plainly, Mr Williams did not do so and
was rather content to simply make wild, reckless and scandalous allegations
against the court, in this instance of the “ abdication of judicial function ” and
“prosecutorial collaboration ”. His tory has shown this to be his want. This is
symptomatic of a vexatious litigant.
Marking the judgment reportable
50. Much is made of the fact that the Judgment was marked ‘ reportable, thereby
creating national precedent ’. Marking a judgment reportable makes no
difference to its status as a judgment and a precedent. Judges (including
myself as an acting Judge) have written judgments which have been marked
reportable which have not been reported and vice versa. They remain
judgments either way and for that reason alone – their status as judgments –
they are precedents.
Knights of Da Gama
51. Much was made by the parties of the subsequent ‘ Knights of da Gama ’ matter
(case number 2026 – 024042 of this court) and why it is not subject to the
Order in this matter (ground 29 at page 59 of the 99 Page LTA Document). This
can have no relevance to the application for leave to appeal.
Request for consolidation
52. Mr Williams asked for this application for leave to appeal to be consolidated
with the Knights of Da Gama matter. That unorthodox request cannot even be
considered without the five respondents in that matter being given notice
thereof.
Costs
53. There is no reason why the TW Respondents, having been successful in
opposing the application for leave to appeal, should not be awarded their costs
in respect thereof.
54. Bearing in mind the unsubstantiated and serious allegations made by Mr
Williams on a serial basis as well as the absence of any basis for the substance
of the allegations made against the TW Respondents, costs on the scale as
between attorney and client fa ll to be awarded. Added to this is the non -
compliance with Rule 49(1)(b) referred to above. Further, the considerations in
Alluvial Creek, quoted in paragraphs 8 and 111 of the Judgment, apply perforce
to this matter. As this punitive scale is to be awarde d, a scale in terms of
section 67A does not apply.
Order
55. In the premise, the following order is granted:
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs on the scale
as between attorney and client.
_________________
A Kantor
Acting Judge of the High Court
APPEARANCES
Applicant: In person
kevwilliams231@gmail.com
Counsel for the Respondent: Adv Gugulethu Samkange
gugz@capebar.co.za
Instructed by: Thomson Wilks Inc.