THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case no: 196583/2025
In the matter between:
FREESTONE PROPERTY
INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
Plaintiff
and
JELIV ANALYTICS (PTY) LTD Defendant
JUDGMENT
DU PLESSIS J
Introduction
[1] This matter came before me in the unopposed motion court on 29 January 2026
as an application for default judgment in terms of the Uniform rule 31(2)(a).1 Freestone
Property Investments (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “the p laintiff”) sought
judgment for arrear rental, damages flowing from the early termination of a commercial
lease, ejectment, and costs on the attorney and own client scale.
1 Uniform Rules of Court 31(2)(a), hereafter “the rule(s)”.
(1) REPORTABLE: Yes☐/ No ☒
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes☐ / No ☒
(3) REVISED: Yes ☒ / No ☐
Date: 13 February 2026
2
[2] The default process assumes that a defendant who has been properly and
effectively served with summons and particulars of claim and is warned in the
summons that judgment may be granted in its absence, will take the opportunity to
defend if it wishes to do so. Where the defendant does nothing, the plaintiff is entitled
to approach the court for judgment, but the court must still be satisfied that service met
the standard required by the rules and by fairness.
[3] The Plaintiff sues JELIV Analytics (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “the
defendant”), its former commercial tenant, under a written lease for office premises at
Grosvenor Gate in Hyde Park. It claims ejectment, arrear rental, damages arising from
the early termination of the lease for the balance of the lease term, and costs on an
attorney-and-own-client scale.
[4] The defendant chose the leased premises as its domicilium citandi et
executandi in the lease. The plaintiff states that there was proper service, and refers
to the sheriff’s return, which records that on 4 November 2025 the deputy sheriff
attended at the defendant’s chosen domicilium and “served” the combined summons
by leaving a copy “at the main door” of the premises, which were “locked and
occupied”. No person was found at the address , and no further steps were taken at
that stage.
[5] Rule 4(1)(a)(iv), in its current form, provides that where a person has chosen a
domicilium citandi, service of process is to be effected by delivering a copy to a person
apparently not less than sixteen years of age at the domicilium. Only if no person is
present may the sheriff leave a copy at the domicilium.
2 This wording reflects a
two‑step structure: personal delivery at the domicilium as the primary method, and
“leaving a copy” as a fall‑back where that is not possible. The purpose of both is to
achieve effective service, in the sense that the documents are reasonably likely to
come to the attention of the defendant.
come to the attention of the defendant.
2 Nebank Limited v Conco [2026] ZAWCHC 38.
3
[6] Historically, as explained in Amcoal Collieries Ltd v Truter,3 service at a chosen
domicilium has been generally regarded as good even where the defendant is absent
or has left the property. However , in Absa Bank Ltd v Mare, 4 the court added that it
must be satisfied as to the effectiveness of service. In other words that the manner of
service is reasonably calculated to notify the defendant of the proceedings and their
contents. Similarly, in Gamede v Wesbank,5 the court held that “delivering or leaving
a copy” at the domicilium must be understood to mean doing so in a way that will, in
the ordinary course, bring the process to the defendant’s attention.
[7] The principles underlying rule 4 are not merely formal. The purpose of service
is, first, to notify the person or juristic person to be served of the nature, contents and
exigency of the court process, and secondly, to return to the court proof that this has
been done in the manner prescribed by law. The r ule is designed to provide a
mechanism by which a degree of certainty can be obtained that service was effected
in such a way that it ought to have reached the defendant’s attention. Mere formalistic
adherence to the text of the r ule, where other obvious and practical means exist to
bring proceedings to the attention of the counterparty, will not suffice in a constitutional
democracy that takes seriously the right of access to courts (section 34 of the
Constitution)
6 and the audi alteram partem principle.
[8] These considerations apply with particular force in default matters where only
the summons and particulars of claim are served. Under the rules it is not necessary,
in some instances, to serve a separate notice of set down on a defendant who has
failed to enter an appearance. In such cases the combined summons is, in practical
terms, the only notice the d efendant will ever receive that judgment may be taken
against it in its absence. It is therefore especially important that the court be satisfied
against it in its absence. It is therefore especially important that the court be satisfied
that the summons was served in a manner reasonably calculated to bring it to the
defendant’s attention, and not merely in a way that is formally reconcilable with the
wording of rule 4.
3 Amcoal Collieries Ltd v Truter (128/88) [1989] ZASCA 99; [1990] 1 All SA 248 (A) para 15.
4 Absa Bank Ltd v Mare and Others (A56/2019) [2020] ZAGPPHC 372; 2021 (2) SA 151 (GP) para 26.
5 Gamede v Wesbank, A Division of FirstRand Bank Ltd (24707/2020) [2023] ZAGPJHC 804 (20 July 2023) para 25.
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
4
[9] Rule 4(10) reinforces this by providing that, whenever the court is not satisfied
as to the effectiveness of service, it may order such further steps to be taken as it
deems fit. The court, therefore, retains a discretion, even in a default judgment setting,
to insist on service that is not merely formally compliant but substantively effective.
[10] In the unopposed motion court , I raised with counsel that the return is sparse.
During the hearing, I also drew counsel’s attention to a letter on the defendant’s
letterhead in the papers, which reflects a telephone number, an email address and an
alternative address for the defendant. I indicated that, in the face of a bare return
stating that the summons was “left at the main door”, nothing prevented the plaintiff’s
attorneys from taking additional, practical and collegial steps, such as telephoning that
number and sending the summons and particulars of claim to the email address on
the letterhead, and then coming to court to say that, even though the sh eriff’s return
reflects service at the domicilium, they have also made these further efforts to bring
the proceedings to the defendant’s attention. Such steps would have gone some way
towards reassuring the court that the defendant had a fair opportunity to know of and
respond to the claim, and that the defendant elected not to do so.
[11] The fact that the premises were recorded as “occupied” is important. This is not
a case where the defendant has abandoned the address , as is sometimes the case.
There is no indication that further practical alternatives were unavailable.
[12] Having considered the sheriff’s return, the nature of the premises, the relief
sought, the contact details available in the papers, and the principles underlying Rule
4 as developed in the case law, I was not satisfied that service by “leaving [the
summons] at the main door” of locked, occupied commercial premises, without more,
summons] at the main door” of locked, occupied commercial premises, without more,
met the requirement of effective service. In those circumstances, I considered it
inappropriate to grant default judgment and therefore ordered that the matter be
removed from the roll for want of effective service.
[13] These are then the reasons for my order of removal in the unopposed court.
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_ ____________
WJ du Plessis
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
Date of hearing:
29 January 2026
Date of request for written reasons:
12 February 2026
Date of judgment:
13 February 2026
For the applicant:
Mr ST Mosomane instructed by
Reaan Swanepoel Inc.