IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
In the matter between:
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL
and
THANDUXOLO THEOPHILUS MAFANYA
Not reportable
Case no: 3502/2025
APPLICANT
RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: The South African Legal Practice Council v Mafanya (3502/2025)
[2026] ZAFSHC 68 (20 February 2026)
Coram: DAFFUE et CHESIWE JJ
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives by email and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand
down is deemed to be 16h00 on 20 February 2026.
Summary: Application for leave to appeal by the South African Legal Practice
Council (the Council) against the dismissal of its application for the interim suspension of
an attorney from practice in terms of s 43 of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 - the
Council's application for leave to appeal dismissed.
2
ORDER
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed, each party to pay their own costs.
LEAVE TO APPEAL JUDGMENT
Daffue J (Chesiwe J concurring)
[1] On 5 November 2025 we dismissed the applicant's application in terms of s 43 of
Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (the LPA) for the suspension of the respondent from
practice pending finalisation of a disciplinary hearing to be instituted against him,
alternatively pending an application to have his name struck from the roll of legal
practitioners.
[2] The applicant seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The test for
leave to appeal has recently been reinstated as follows in Ramakatsa and Others v
African National Congress and Another.1 I quote:
'Turning the focus to the relevant provisions of the Superior Courts Act (the SC Act), leave to
appeal may only be granted where the judges concerned are of the opinion that the appeal would
have a reasonable prospect of success or there are compelling reasons which exist why the
appeal should be heard such as the interests of justice . This Court in Caratco, concerning the
provisions of s 17(1 )(aJ(ii) of the SC Act pointed out that if the court is unpersuaded that there are
prospects of success, it must still enquire into whether there is a compelling reason to entertain
the appeal. Compelling reason would of course include an important question of law or a discreet
issue of public importance that will have an effect on future disputes. However, this Court correctly
added that 'but here too the merits remain vitally important and are often decisive'. I am mindful
of the decisions at high court level debating whether the use of the word "would" as opposed to
"could" possibly means that the threshold for granting the appeal has been raised. If a reasonable
prospect of success is established, leave to appeal should be granted. Similarly, if there are some
other compelling reasons why the appeal should be heard, leave to appeal should be granted.
other compelling reasons why the appeal should be heard, leave to appeal should be granted.
1 Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another[2021] ZASCA 31 para 10.
3
The test of reasonable prospects of success postulates a dispassionate decision based on the
facts and the law that a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of
the trial court. In other words, the appellants in this matter need to convince this Court on proper
grounds that they have prospects of success on appeal. Those prospects of success must not be
remote, but there must exist a reasonable chance of succeeding. A sound rational basis for the
conclusion that there are prospects of success must be shown to exist.'
[3] By agreement, the parties filed heads of argument whereupon we considered the
application for leave to appeal in chambers.
In Limpopo Provincial Council of the South African Legal Practice Council v Chueu
Incorporated Attorneys and Others2 (Chueu) the Supreme Court of Appeal accepted that
the requirements for an interim interdict are applicable to applications in terms of s 43 of
the LPA. As held in Chueu, such applications are brought 'for the protection of the general
public against malfeasance of legal practitioners.' In paragraph 32 of the judgment the
Court stated the following:
'Such applications should be launched only where there is no other means of safeguarding the
public from the alleged malfeasance of a legal practitioner. An interim order for suspension has a
very grave impact on the professional life of a legal practitioner, who would nonetheless be
severely prejudiced if exonerated at the end of an investigation by the LPC.'
[4] In South African Legal Practice Council v Kgaphola and Another3 the Supreme
Court of Appeal referred to the applicant's statutory duty to approach the court to protect
the public and emphasised the general rule that it is entitled to its costs on an attorney
and client scale, even if unsuccessful.4 In Chueu, the court stated: 'Of all litigants, one
would have expected assiduous compliance with the rules of this Court . . .'.5
would have expected assiduous compliance with the rules of this Court . . .'.5
Notwithstanding a successful appeal by the LPC in Chueu, no order as to costs was made
in respect of the appeal.
[5) I am satisfied that the Supreme Court of Appeal would not reasonably arrive at a
conclusion different to ours. There is no sound rational basis to conclude that there are
2 Limpopo Provincial Council of the South African Legal Practice Council v Chueu Incorporated Attorneys
and Others (2023] ZASCA 112 paras 30 and 31.
3 South African Legal Practice Council v Kgaphola and Anofher[20 25] ZASCA 66; 2026 (1) SA 84 (SCA).
4 Ibid paras 44 and 45.
5 Chueu para 38.
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prospects of success on appeal. I refer to our judgment dismissing the application for
suspension and do not intend to deal with the reasons for my conclusion in any detail. I
limit the reasons to the following.
a. Based on the specific facts of the matter at hand, we were satisfied that insufficient
facts have been pleaded to justify an interim suspension. The respondent conducts his
practice in the Eastern Cape but tried to expand it by opening a branch office in
Bloemfontein which was closed within a few weeks. His alleged misconduct relates to the
period when he conducted a practice in Bloemfontein. But this is done business. If the
applicant intends to proceed with further investigations and a disciplinary hearing, it shall
continue to do so. When the application was brought and eventually heard, there was no
threat to the public at large relating to the aborted Bloemfontein practice.
b. The Bloemfontein branch of the applicant did not even consider the damage that
would be caused to the respondent's practice in the Eastern Cape if an interim order of
suspension was granted. It did not even try to explain how much time it would need to
finalise a possible disciplinary hearing. It did not liaise with the applicant's Eastern Cape
branch on the respondent's standing but rushed off to court in an endeavour to obtain
urgent relief.
c. We are of the view that there is no basis that another court would reasonably
conclude that the respondent's practice, based in the Eastern Cape, shall be closed
pending investigations and a possible disciplinary hearing in Bloemfontein. Our decision
to dismiss the application for an interim order of suspension was not lightly taken but was
based on the specific circumstances.
d. The application for leave to appeal is also directed at the costs orders. We
accepted that the applicant, as the guardian of morals of the legal profession, is generally
entitled to its costs on an attorney and client scale, even if unsuccessful. However, as
entitled to its costs on an attorney and client scale, even if unsuccessful. However, as
indicated, there was sufficient reason to grant the costs orders. The applicant is the
regulator of the profession. It unsuccessfully insisted that the application be heard on an
urgent basis and thereafter, its attorney caused, in his own words, 'an administrative
nightmare'. The costs issue has been dealt with in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment.
Bearing in mind the specific circumstances and the example that should be set by the
applicant as the regulator of the profession, the costs orders were explained. I am
satisfied that, notwithstanding the general rule, another court shall not interfere with the
discretion exercised.
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[6] The applicant also submitted that there is a compelling reason why leave to appeal
shall be granted. It inter a/ia relied on the Supreme Court of Appeal's dictum in South
African Legal Practice Council v Mokhele6 (Mokhele) that there was a need for a proper
interpretation of s 43 of the LPA. In my view this is not a suitable set of facts to warrant
that court's attention. In any event, a few months prior to the Mokhele judgment , the same
court dealt in sufficient detail with the requirements of s 43.
[7] Consequently, the following order is made:
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed, each party to pay their own costs.
I concur.
JP DAFFUE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
S CHESIWE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
6 South African Legal Practice Council v Mokhele [2023] ZASCA 177 par 9.
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Appearances
For the Applicant: MS Mazibuko
Instructed by: Moruri Attorneys Inc, Bloemfontein.
For the Respondent: Z Nyezi
Instructed by: LM Attorneys & Partners, Bloemfontein.