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[2026] ZALCPE 9
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Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union v Motorvia (1993) Pty Ltd - Uitenhage (PS16/2021) [2026] ZALCPE 9 (4 March 2026)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
AT GQEBERHA
Of
interest to other judges
case
no: PS16/2021
(1)
Reportable: YES
(2)
Of interest to other Judges: Yes
04/03/2026
In
the matter between:
ASSOCIATION
OF MINEWORKERS AND
CONSTRUCTION
UNION
First
Plaintiff
SIMPHIWE.
T. HELESI & 31 OTHERS
AS
PER ANNEXURE “A”
Second
to Thirty-Second Plaintiffs
and
MOTORVIA
(1993) PTY LTD-UITENHAGE
Defendant
Heard:
17 November 2025
Delivered: 04 March
2026
Summary:
(Special plea - Settlement agreement –
settlement agreement precluding prosecution of dismissal dispute –
special plea
upheld)
JUDGMENT
LAGRANGE, J
Nature of the application
[1]
This matter deals with a special plea raised by the defendant
(‘Motorvia’ or ‘ the company’) to
a referral
of an unfair dismissal claim for alleged participation in strike
action.
Background
[2]
The events giving rise to this dispute and another dispute over an
alleged unfair labour practice occurred during March
and April 2020
when various ‘lockdown’ regulations prevailed under the
different phases of the Covid 19 pandemic.
[3]
The company contends that employees had embarked on an unprotected
strike action on the eve of the implementation of the
first severe
lockdown regulations at the end of March 2020. At a later stage when
work was to resume, the 32 plaintiffs claimed
that they were
prevented from returning to work when work resumed at the end of May
2020. Initially they treated their exclusion
from work as a dismissal
and they referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. When that
dispute was conciliated at the CCMA,
the company advised them they
had not been dismissed. Accordingly, they withdrew that dispute and
referred a fresh dispute over
an unfair suspension to the CCMA under
case number ECPE 3145-20 on 18 June 2020 (‘the suspension
dispute’). Their suspension
was formally confirmed by the
employer. The suspension dispute was unsuccessfully conciliated on 13
July 2020.
[4]
It was only on or about 5 October 2020, after protracted disciplinary
proceedings, that the plaintiffs were dismissed
for the alleged
strike action in March. This prompted them to refer an unfair
dismissal dispute to the CCMA the following day,
under case number
ECPE 5425-20, which was referred to arbitration on 23 October 2020.
[5]
When the unfair suspension dispute was due to be arbitrated on 20
October 2020, the parties reverted to conciliation.
[6]
On 26 November 2020, the company disputed the jurisdiction of the
CCMA to arbitrate the dismissal dispute and on 10 December
a
jurisdictional ruling was issued upholding the company’s
objection, which meant that the dispute would have to be referred
to
this court.
[7]
On 2 March 2021, when the unfair suspension proceedings at the CCMA
reconvened, the parties signed a settlement agreement.
In terms of
the settlement agreement the unfair suspension dispute was resolved.
However, the company claims that, at the same
time, the agreement
also settled the unfair dismissal claim, which by then had not yet
been referred to the court. It is this claim
that gives rise to the
special plea it has raised.
[8]
Whether the agreement also settled the unfair dismissal claim must be
determined on a proper interpretation of the settlement
document.
The
settlement agreement
[9]
Save for identifying the forum as the CCMA, the settlement agreement
(‘the agreement’) was drafted in the
format of a typical
court order commencing with the case number, citation of parties and
the heading “Settlement Agreement”
in the tramlines.
[10]
The case number appearing on the settlement agreement (ECPE 3145-20)
concerned the unfair labour practice dispute over
suspension without
pay. The preamble to the agreement read:
“
WHEREAS
the
Union, on behalf of the listed Employees has referred a dispute under
case number:
ECPE 3145-20.
WHEREAS
the
parties have amicably agreed to settle
the dispute
between
them.
WHEREFORE
the
parties agree as follows: ….”
(Emphasis added by
underlining, bold typeface in the original)
[11]
Clauses 1 and 2 of the agreement require the employer to pay amounts
set out in Schedule A to the agreement, subject
to the deduction of
income tax. Clause 4 provided for the payments to be made in two
tranches, a month apart, as reflected in Schedule
A. Clause 5
provided for the payments to be made by means of electronic funds
transfers.
[12]
Clause 6 provided for payment due to a deceased applicant to be made
to his widow on provision of her bank details.
[13]
Owing to a numbering error, there were two clause 7’s. The
first one (hereafter referred to as ‘clause 7a’)
stated
that:
“
The Applicant
hereby unconditionally withdraws
the dispute
, which has been
lodged with the CCMA
under case number ECPE 3145-20
.”
This was a reference to
the suspension dispute.
(Emphasis added)
[14]
The second clause 7 (hereafter referred to as ‘clause 7b’),
reads:
“
This settlement
agreement and/or any payment in terms thereof does not constitute an
admission of liability by the Respondent or
Applicant and is
in
full and final settlement
of any claims that the
Applicant may have against the Respondent arising out of their
services with the Respondent or the termination
thereof
.
(Emphasis
added)
[15]
Clause 8 states:
“
The Applicant
acknowledges that it fully understands the consequences of this
full and final settlement
, that the same has been explained to it
and that it enters into this full and final settlement freely and
voluntarily. The applicant
furthermore agrees it was not forced
and/or coerced into signing this agreement.”
(Emphasis
added)
[16]
Clause 9 states:
“
This settlement
agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and
any amendments, variations and/or additions to
the terms here of will
only be valid if reduced to writing and signed by both parties.”
[17]
Clause 10 stipulates requirements that the parties keep the agreement
confidential and sets out remedies in the event
the confidentiality
undertaking is breached.
Interpretation of
agreements
[18]
In the
seminal judgment in
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[1]
, a new approach to
interpreting the meaning of documents was established:
[18] The present state of
the law can be expressed as follows: Interpretation is the process of
attributing meaning to the words
used in a document, be it
legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having
regard to the context provided by reading
the particular provision or
provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the
circumstances attendant upon its coming
into existence. Whatever the
nature of the document, consideration must be given to the language
used in the light of the ordinary
rules of grammar and syntax; the
context in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to which
it is directed and the material
known to those responsible for its
production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility
must be weighed in the
light of all these factors. The process
is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred
to one that leads
to insensible or unbusinesslike results or
undermines the apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert
to, and guard
against, the temptation to substitute what they regard
as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually used.
To
do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to
cross the divide between interpretation and legislation;
in a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties
other than the one they in fact made. The 'inevitable point of
departure is the language of the provision itself’, read in
context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and
the
background to the preparation and production of the
document.
[19] All this is
consistent with the 'emerging trend in statutory construction'.
It clearly adopts as the proper approach
to the interpretation of
documents the second of the two possible approaches mentioned by
Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges NO
and Another; Bhana v Dönges
NO and Another, namely that from the outset one considers the
context and the language together,
with neither predominating over
the other. This is the approach that courts in South Africa should
now follow, without the need
to cite authorities from an earlier era
that are not necessarily consistent and frequently reflect an
approach to interpretation
that is no longer appropriate. The path
that Schreiner JA pointed to is now received wisdom elsewhere.”
(emphasis added)
[19]
The
reference to Schreiner JA’s characterisation of the two
approaches is a reference to the following extract from the judgment
in
Jaga
v Dönges
and
Another
[2]
:
“
Certainly no
less important than the oft repeated statement that the words and
expressions used in a statute must be interpreted
according to their
ordinary meaning is the statement that they must be interpreted in
the light of their context. But it may be
useful to stress two points
in relation to the application of this principle.
The
first is that 'the context', as here used, is not limited to the
language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light
of a
dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted
.
Often of
more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and
purpose, and, within limits, its background
.
The second point is that the approach to the work of interpreting may
be along either of two lines. Either one may split the inquiry
into
two parts and concentrate, in the first instance, on finding out
whether the language to be interpreted has or appears to
have one
clear ordinary meaning, confining a consideration of the context only
to cases where the language appears to admit of
more than one
meaning;
or
one may from the beginning consider the context and the language to
be interpreted together
.”
[3]
(emphasis added)
In
Endumeni
the last-mentioned approach was adopted.
The Special Plea
[20]
The crux of the special plea is that the unfair dismissal dispute was
also settled in the agreement by virtue of clause
7b, which on one
reading of the clause settled not only the unfair labour practice
dispute but any dispute the plaintiffs may have
had against the
company including any claim arising from the termination of their
employment. Reading clause 7b as a standalone
provision, the
settlement would include the unfair dismissal claim arising from the
termination of the plaintiffs’ employment.
The central question
is whether this is a correct interpretation of the agreement.
Background
[21]
The parties had agreed to lead oral evidence to establish the context
in which the agreement was reached. Each party’s
evidence was
given by a single witness, who had represented it in the CCMA
proceedings and the conclusion of the agreement.
Evidence of Mr T Andrews
[22]
Andrews is an official of the employer organisation NEASA. He acted
as the authorised representative for the respondent
throughout all
CCMA processes relevant to the dispute. He stated that his
involvement included dealing with the unfair suspension
dispute, the
unfair dismissal referral, and representing the employer on the day
the settlement agreement was concluded. He further
testified that he
had known Mr Nguntze for approximately five years and had engaged
with him in several labour matters during that
period. Nguntze
disputed this though it was not put to Andrews under
cross-examination.
[23]
He explained the chronological development of the disputes. The first
unfair dismissal dispute was referred and later
withdrawn. A second
dispute concerning an alleged unfair suspension was then referred and
progressed to arbitration. A later referral
for unfair dismissal was
also made, which proceeded to arbitration where he raised a
jurisdictional objection. The CCMA issued
a ruling on 10 December
2020, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the dismissal dispute
because the dismissal arose from participation
in an unprotected
strike. According to Andrews, the applicants took no steps to refer
that dismissal dispute to the Labour Court
during the three months
that followed.
[24]
Turning to the events of 2 March 2021, he testified that the
arbitration commenced in the ordinary manner. The commissioner
suggested that the parties explore settlement, and both sides agreed.
He stated that negotiations took place through separate consultations
with the commissioner. He explained that he informed the commissioner
that he had a mandate to settle every dispute arising from
employment, which included any dismissal related claims. It was put
to him that only the settlement of the suspension dispute was
discussed according to Nguntze.
[25]
Once the parties reached agreement in principle, he drafted the
settlement agreement using the commissioner’s laptop.
The
document was printed by the commissioner. When he returned to
the arbitration room he presented it to both parties. Andrews
claimed
he read each clause aloud while standing beside the union
representative, Mr Nguntze (‘Nguntze’), which the
latter
denied. After reading each clause, he claims placed his initials in
the margin to confirm what had been read. He asserted
that Mr Nguntze
showed no confusion, raised no objection, and signed the agreement
first. Mr Andrews then signed on behalf of the
employer, and the
document was witnessed by two individuals, including the
commissioner. Nguntze disputed the commissioner was
present when they
signed the agreement.
[26]
He further explained the employer’s interpretation of the
settlement agreement. He emphasised that the clause referring
to full
and final settlement was deliberately inserted because the intention
was to settle every possible claim arising from employment,
including
termination. He also emphasised that no allegation of mistake,
coercion, misrepresentation, or fraud had been pleaded
in response to
the employer’s special plea.
[27]
During cross examination he was challenged on several issues. It was
put to him that the commissioner was absent when
the agreement was
signed, but he denied this and insisted that the commissioner
witnessed the signing. He was also challenged with
the suggestion
that he did not read the document to Mr Nguntze. He rejected this and
affirmed that he read the entire document
aloud. It was put to him
that the agreement was intended to settle only the unfair suspension
dispute because the heading only
referred to that dispute’s
case number. He responded that the heading did not limit the scope of
the terms contained in the
body of the agreement and that the full
and final settlement clause clearly extended beyond the suspension
issue. These points
were reiterated in re-examination where he
insisted that the union representative had the opportunity to read
the document and
appeared to understand its contents.
Evidence of Mr R Nguntze
[28]
Mr R Nguntze (‘Nguntze’) is a regional organiser of the
union AMCU. He has been an official since 2017 and
became involved
with the Motovia workplace after being transferred to the Eastern
Cape. He testified that he first met Mr Andrews
in 2020,
contradicting Andrews’ claim to have known him for five years.
[29]
He described the background to the disputes. The employees had
returned from the national lockdown and were refused access
to the
workplace. Initially the union referred an unfair dismissal dispute
to the CCMA, but this was withdrawn after the employer
stated that
the employees had not been dismissed but were merely not allowed onto
the premises. The union then reformulated the
dispute as an unfair
suspension and referred that to the CCMA. Nguntze stated that the
unfair suspension claim was arose from the
failure of Motovia to pay
employees their full remuneration during the period in question. The
union believed the employees were
still employed and therefore
entitled to payment. According to him, the monetary amounts listed in
annexure A of the settlement
agreement represented the shortfall that
should have been paid.
[30]
After the CCMA ruled in December 2020 that it had no jurisdiction to
arbitrate the unfair dismissal dispute, he said
he referred the
matter to the union’s head office for legal advice. The union
instructed attorneys to pursue the claim, and
he described the
dismissal dispute as still alive and in progress at the time of the
settlement agreement was concluded on 2 March
2021.
[31]
His description of the settlement events differed markedly from that
of Mr Andrews. He claimed that the negotiations
did not take place
through separate consultations but occurred jointly in the same room.
According to him, once agreement was reached
on the monetary amounts
of the unfair suspension claim, Mr Andrews borrowed the
commissioner’s laptop and typed the agreement.
He said the
commissioner left the room. However, this is at odds with clause 5.9
of the pre-trial minute the parties concluded,
which stated that the
agreement was concluded in the presence of the arbitrator.
[32]
Nguntze asserted that when the document was returned, none of the
clauses were read out aloud. He conceded that he did
not read the
agreement himself. He relied on the fact that the case number on the
document related only to the unfair suspension
dispute. He believed
that the agreement covered only that dispute and that the figures
corresponded only to those claims. He saw
no need to read it because
he was satisfied with the terms which had been discussed and assumed
the agreement simply recorded those
terms. He also claimed that all
the members were so elated about settling the suspension dispute on
the terms discussed that he
just wanted to sign the agreement. He
maintained that there was no discussion whatsoever regarding the
unfair dismissal claim on
that day.
[33]
When confronted with clause 7b of the agreement, which refers to full
and final settlement of any claims arising out
of employment or its
termination, he insisted that termination had never been discussed
and had no connection to the settlement
negotiations. He repeatedly
stated that he did not know why the word termination appeared in the
agreement. He suggested that if
this clause referred to dismissal, it
must have been inserted without it ever being mentioned to him,
although he avoided directly
accusing the employer of wrongdoing. He
maintained that the union was present for the unfair suspension
matter only, and that the
wording of clause 7b did not reflect the
discussions and intention of the union.
[34]
As mentioned, he admitted that he did not read the agreement before
signing it. When asked whether he was negligent,
he did not dispute
that it may appear so, but he insisted that he relied on discussions
and on the presence of the case number
relating only to the
suspension dispute. He acknowledged that by signing the document he
represented that he agreed to its terms.
However, he emphasised that
the agreement did not include the case number for the dismissal
matter and therefore could not be interpreted
as covering it. He also
disputed the suggestion in cross-examination that he had not raised
challenges to Andrews’ version,
stating that he had informed
his attorney of the correct facts.
[35]
He concluded by confirming that the employer did in fact pay the
amounts listed in annexure A, and that no further complaints
were
received from members in relation to that payment. He remained firm
that the settlement was intended to resolve only the unfair
suspension dispute and not the unfair dismissal dispute. It was put
to him that the amounts reflected the negotiated conclusion
of both
disputes, but no attempt was made to break down the figures to show
that they did not simply reflect the payment for the
suspension
period.
Evaluation
[36]
Andrew’s and Nguntze’s versions of the circumstances in
which the settlement agreement came to be concluded
are at odds in
several respects. They disagreed on the content of the
discussions and how the Annexure detailing payments
was derived. Both
versions are not inherently implausible but Andrew’s claim that
he stood next to Ngunze reading and initialling
every provision as
they went through it does have an air of contrivance about it.
Ngunze’s claim that he did not read the
agreement for the
reasons he gave, is also remarkable, but perhaps a little less
difficult to believe.
[37]
Be that as it may, the oral evidence did not assist as much as it
could have to elucidate the context in which the discussions
took
place. However, there are some objective factors from which the
context can be derived.
[38]
Firstly, the CCMA hearing was only convened to arbitrate the unfair
suspension dispute.
[39]
Secondly, the case number in the headnote of the agreement only
referred to the suspension dispute, even though Andrews
drew it up.
[40]
Thirdly, there was no express reference to the dismissal dispute in
any of the provisions of the agreement.
[41]
Fourthly, the union had handed the dismissal dispute over to the
union’s attorneys and Nguntze had not come to
the CCMA with a
view to settling the dismissal dispute, even if Andrews claims he had
a mandate to settle both.
[42]
Fifthly, the potential relief the employees might obtain, if
successful with their unfair dismissal claim, compared to
the relief
in the unfair suspension dispute would plainly outweigh the
significance of the latter. It does seem less probable that
the
unfair dismissal claim was intended to be referred to only by
implication, rather than by express reference, if it was the
parties’
intention to settle it in the same agreement.
[43]
Against these factors is the express wording of clause 7b which on
its own would ordinarily encompass any dispute, including
the
dismissal dispute. The dismissal dispute had occurred and had been
unsuccessfully conciliated. It is true the company might
not have
known if that dispute would proceed, but Andrews claimed he came with
a mandate to settle that dispute as well. It was
an identifiable
dispute with a designated CCMA case number, yet in drafting the
settlement which Andrews intended to settle both
disputes with, he
supposedly consciously chose not to identify it, but rather to
capture it under a generic ‘full and final’
settlement
provision.
[44]
It seems somewhat improbable the parties would not have specifically
referred to that dispute, if they intended to settle
it, rather than
using the general phrasing in paragraph 7b, which is typically
intended by one party to ensure they are not exposed
to potential but
unknown claims which might still be launched. The dismissal dispute
was known, identifiable and unresolved.
[45]
The
defendant argues that the case is akin to that of
of
Wheelwright
v CP De Leeuw Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd
[4]
,
summarised by the defendant in the following terms.
[46]
Wheelright
concerned
an employment relationship
governed
by a contract which provided for a restraint of trade following the
termination of the employee
[5]
.
The employee was retrenched and subsequently referred an unfair
dismissal dispute to the CCMA
[6]
.
Conciliation failed, and at the subsequent arbitration proceedings,
the parties settled the dispute between them by way of a written
settlement agreement in terms of which the employee would be paid
certain monetary amounts. The agreement was constituted by two
documents, a standard form CCMA settlement agreement, and an annexure
to the standard form agreement
[7]
.
[47]
The standard form
agreement recorded that the settlement was in full and final
settlement of the CCMA dispute and of all statutory
payments due to
the employee, viz:
‘
The
settlement agreement was contained in two separate documents. The
first was in the form of a standard settlement agreement prepared
by
the CCMA. In this document, the parties
“
record
the settlement of their dispute in the following terms. By signing
this agreement the parties acknowledge that the agreement
was read to
them and interpreted (where necessary) and that they understand the
content hereof.
This agreement is in
full and final settlement of the dispute referred to the CCMA as well
as in full settlement of all statutory
payment due to the applicant
as reflected at paragraph 5 of this agreement
...”
(emphasis added)
[48]
The
second agreement set out in the Annexure stipulated: ‘
This
agreement is in full and final settlement of all and any claims which
the parties may have against each other whether such
claim arise from
contract, delict, operation of law, equity, fairness or
otherwise’
[8]
.
[49]
After
the conclusion of the settlement agreement the employer attempted to
enforce the restraint of trade agreement stemming from
the original
employment contract, to which the employee responded that the
settlement agreement had settled any disputes arising
from the
original employment contract
[9]
.
[50]
On appeal, and in
interpreting the agreement the Labour Appeal Court held as
follows:
‘
[29]
In the present case, the wording employed in annexure A went beyond a
mere repetition of the words
used in the standard form. In
particular, as set out in clause 5, the wording referred to “all
and any claims which the parties
may have against each other whether
such claims arise from contract, delict, operation of law, equity,
fairness or otherwise”.
Manifestly,
this clause extends beyond the specific referral
to the CCMA which is expressly
covered in the standard clause
.
How else can one explain the reference in annexure A to claims based
on delict, operation of law, equity, fairness or otherwise?
None
of these
causes
of action were relevant to the specific issues which have been
referred to the CCMA and which
were covered expressly in the standard
form
.’
(emphasis
added)
[51]
Unlike this matter, there was not an existing unresolved dispute
which had already come to light. It was only later that
the restraint
enforcement arose. The most practical way to bar an action in
restraint of trade which did not exist was to prohibit
it under a
general blanket exclusion. What does not make sense in this instance
is why the parties would not have stipulated the
existing unresolved
dismissal dispute which was identifiable in terms of the CCMA case
number assigned to it and why it would not
have been reflected in the
headnote of the agreement.
[52]
In
Toerien
v University of Witwatersrand Johannesburg
[10]
,
another authority relied on by the defendant, the court was dealing
with a case involving a settlement of an unfair dismissal
claim,
which also provided that the payment made under the settlement to the
employee was ‘…
in
full and final settlement of any claim of whatsoever nature against
the University arising out of the abovementioned matter and
the
employment of Marcus Toerien whether now or in the future
’.
At the time of concluding the agreement, the applicant had three
disputes pending before the CCMA and had brought two applications
to
the Labour Court pertaining to his disciplinary enquiry.
[53]
The
Labour Court held that a discrimination claim which the applicant
subsequently launched against the university fell within the
ambit of
the settlement agreement
[11]
.
When the settlement agreement was concluded no identifiable
discrimination dispute existed.
[54]
It
is true that in
Toerien
the
court noted that even though the preamble of the settlement agreement
referred to the dismissal dispute, the parties ‘
had
agreed to settle more than that dispute. They intended to settle all
disputes of whatever nature arising from the employment
relationship.’
[12]
In both cases, the courts were dealing with the application of the
settlement clause to a dispute which had not arisen at the time
the
settlement was concluded.
[55]
By contrast, in this matter, the settlement
was concluded at a time when the existence of the dismissal dispute
was known and Andrews
in fact claimed he came with a mandate to
settle that dispute as well as the suspension dispute. This does give
rise to the question
why he would not have taken the trouble to
clearly specify that dispute was also withdrawn in terms similar to
those used to describe
the withdrawal of the suspension in clause 7a,
but he was not interrogated about this.
[56]
He had testified the payments agreed upon
in the annexure attached to the agreement were the negotiated
settlement sums without
providing any explanation of how they were
arrived at. Nguntze gave a very plausible account that the sums
represented 75% of the
amount of suspension pay claim. Unfortunately,
his explanation for the figures was not put to Andrews, so I cannot
attach weight
to it.
[57]
Despite all these considerations, it remains extremely difficult to
explain why clause 7b appeared in the settlement
agreement at all.
[58]
In
Wellworths
Bazaars Ltd v Chandler's Ltd
[13]
,
the Appellate Division held that:
‘
But a Court should
be slow to come to the conclusion that the words are tautologous or
superfluous. It was said by the Privy Council
in Ditcher v Denison
(11 moore P.C. 325, at p. 357): -
'It is a
good general rule in jurisprudence that one who reads a legal
document whether public or private, should not be prompt
to ascribe -
should not, without necessity or some sound reason, impute - to its
language tautology or superfluity, and should
be rather at the outset
inclined to suppose every word intended to have some effect or be of
some use.'
Cf. also per KOTZE, J.A.,
in Attorney-General, Transvaal v Additional Magistrate
(1924 AD 421
,
at p. 436); Minister of Justice and Another v Breytenbach
(1942 AD
175
, at p. 183); Craies, Statute Law (4th ed. pp. 99, 100). Here I
can find no reason cogent enough to lead me to do so.’
[14]
[59]
The
principle has been endorsed many times by other courts and by the
Constitutional Court most recently in
Minister
of Finance v Afribusiness NPC
2022 (4) SA 362
(CC) viz: ‘
On
first principles, our jurisprudence on interpretation requires that
each word must — as far as possible — be given
meaning
.’
[15]
In
a footnote to this dictum the court noted:
‘
In Wellworths
Bazaars Ltd v Chandler's Ltd and Another
1947 (2) SA 37
(A) at 43 the
Appellate Division held that 'a Court should be slow to come to the
conclusion that words [in a statute] are tautologous
or superfluous'.
In similar vein, in a minority judgment in National Credit Regulator
v Opperman and Others
2013 (2) SA 1
(CC)
(2013 (2) BCLR 170
;
[2012]
ZACC 29)
, Cameron J said in para 99 that '(a) longstanding precept of
interpretation is that every word must be given a meaning. Words in
an enactment should not be treated as tautologous or superfluous.'
Although the majority and minority judgments differed on the
meaning
of the provisions at issue, there was no disagreement on this
established principle.’
[60]
It is true
that the Constitutional Court was dealing with statutory provisions,
but the principle has been applied in a contractual
context as
well.
[16]
[61]
The highlights the principal difficulty AMCU has. Its argument
necessarily entails relegating the impugned clause 7b
to complete
irrelevance. Unavoidably, this flies in the face of the principle of
eschewing superfluity in documents. The argument
is also at odds with
the way this court and the Labour Appeal Court have interpreted ‘full
and final’ settlement provisions.
[62]
In my view, what this brings to light is AMCU’s real underlying
contention about clause 7b, namely that it should
not have been part
of the settlement agreement and a correct rendering of the agreement
would exclude it altogether. However,
the remedy for that lies
in rectification, and cannot be ‘cured’ by discerning the
correct meaning of the agreement
as it presently stands.
[63]
In the circumstances, as the settlement agreement stands, the special
plea must succeed. The court must accept that the
agreement did
settle not only the suspension dispute but the unfair dismissal
dispute, which was a claim the applicants had against
Motovia arising
‘
out of
their services
with the
Respondent or the termination thereof
’
.
[64]
The defendant did ask for costs on the basis that the special plea
was obviously well founded in its view. On the other
hand there is an
ongoing relationship between the AMCU and Motovia and
Order
1. The special plea
is upheld.
2. In terms of
clause 7b of the settlement agreement concluded on 2 March 2021,
attached as Annexure “A” to the
Defendant’s
Statement of Response, the Plaintiffs’ unfair dismissal claim
was settled, and this court has no jurisdiction
to adjudicate
that claim.
3. No order is made
as to costs.
R Lagrange
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances
For
the Applicant:
M
Futcher from Futcher & Poppesquo Attorneys
For
the Respondents:
S
Grobler instructed by MF De Beer Attorneys
[1]
2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)
[2]
1950 (4) SA 653
(A)
[3]
A
t 662G
– 663A
[4]
(2023)
44 ILJ 767 (LAC); [2023] 5 BLLR 393 (LAC)
[5]
Para
[1]
[6]
Para
[7] - [8]
[7]
Para
[9]
[8]
Para
[10]
[9]
Para
[15]
[10]
(2021)
42
ILJ
2010
(LC)
[11]
Paragraphs 22-24
[12]
Paragraph
28.
[13]
1947 (2) SA 37
(A)
[14]
At
page 43.
[15]
At paragraph 109
[16]
As in
Wellworths
and
s
ee
also
B
& E International (Pty) Ltd and Another v Enviroserv Waste
Management(Pty) Ltd And Others
2000 (4) SA 152
(SE) at 159B-C.