IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: ¥ESf NO
(2} OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: ¥€-SINO
(3} REVISED
DATE: 3 MARCH 2026
SIGNATURE
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Case No. 134420/2024
In the matter between :
DUNGA, NOLWANDO & 5 OTHERS APPLICANTS
And
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND RESPONDENT
Coram: Millar J
Heard on: Review in Chambers
Deli vered:
MILLAR J
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3 March 2026 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLII. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 14H00 on 3 March
2026.
JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application brought in terms of rule 48 of the Uniform Rules of court for
the review of a taxation .1
[2] The applicant filed a notice of review on 30 October 2025. The Taxing Master
then filed a stated case as provided for in rule 48(3) on 8 December 2025. After
receiving the stated case, the applicant then filed submissions in terms of rule
48(5)(a) on 23 January 2026 and the respondent its reply on 9 February 2026.
The application for review was then placed before me on 24 February 2026.
[3] The review turns on a single legal issue as appears below and for that reason, I
decided in terms of rule 48(6)(a)(i) that it is appropriate that this review be decided
on the papers submitted.
1 The rule provides that: "(1 )Any party dissatisfied with the ruling of the Taxing Master as to any item or part
of an item which was objected to or disallowed mero motu by the Taxing Master, may within 15 days after
the a/locatur by notice require the Taxing Master to state a case for the decision of a judge. "
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[4] This review engages the interpretation of Rule 67A(4)(a) read together with Rule
700(6) of the Uniform Rules of Court in regard to a bill of costs drawn and
presented for taxation pursuant to an order of this court on 30 April 2024. The
order was made in the Urgent Court and was that the "Matter is struck from the roll,
applicant ordered to pay costs."
[5] In other words, the applicants brought the respondents to court as a matter of
urgency and on this aspect, they were unsuccessful and ordered to pay the
respondents costs.2 This review is brought with the purpose of reducing the
amount of those costs which are to be paid.
[6] The terms of the costs order fall squarely within the provisions of Rule 67 A(1 )(a).
This provides:
"(1) Subject to any order of the court awarding costs, the fees and disbursements as
between party and party, which may be included in a bill of costs submitted for taxation,
shall be -
(a) For attorneys in accordance with the tariff in rule 70"
[7] Rule 67 A(4 )(a) provides:
"(4) A costs order may upon application by any party indicate
(a) Which portions of the proceedings are deemed urgent;"
[8] The fees referred to in Rule 70 relate to the "Tariff of Fees of Attorneys". Rule
700(6) provides:
2 The order is clear and unambiguous. See Administrator Cape, and Another v Ntshwaqela and Others
1990 (1) SA 705 (A).
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"The fees in sections A, B, C and D shall be increased by 15% in accordance with
any costs order made in terms of rule 67 A(4)(a) and as allowed at taxation.
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[9] When the bill of costs was presented for taxation, the Taxing Master ruled that
the provisions of Rule 700(6) were applicable and that the surcharge ought to be
allowed. The applicant asserts that having regard to Rule 67A(4)(a), it does not
follow as a matter of course that the surcharge provided for in Rule 700(6) is
applicable.
[10] This assertion is predicated upon the use of the word "may'' in Rule 67A(4)(a).
The use of "may" which is permissive, as opposed to "shall" (in Rule 700(6))
which is peremptory means that it is only upon "an application to be made for that
specific costs order before it can either be allowed by the court or not." Following
on from this, so the assertion goes, is that Rule 67 A(4)(a) "gives the court a
discretion to allow the surcharge on application by the party who has been
awarded costs.
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[11] In furnishing reasons for the ruling made the Taxing Master stated pertinently that
"The matter was one of urgency and thus we relied on rule 700(6) ." This is in my
view the nub of the matter.
[12] In considering this review, the starting point is the nature of the proceedings
themselves. The application was brought by way of urgency. This was done at
the election of the applicant.
[13] The urgency was self-evidently successfully opposed and hence the order.
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[14] The respondents contend that the phrase "upon application by any party" "does not
necessarily demand a separate formal application (in the narrow sense) for the costs
order to specify urgency, as per the Applicant's interpretation. It can also refer to a
request in the final prayers in the papers and/or in argument (in the broader sense) by
the relevant parties.".
[15] In opposing urgency and seeking the striking of the matter from the roll on that
basis alone, the respondent satisfied the requirements of Rule 67A(4)(a). To hold
otherwise would have the consequence that every urgent application that is
struck from the roll with costs may beget a further application to court for an order
in terms of Rule 67 A(4)(a) so that Rule 700(6) would find application. This would
be an absurdity.3
[16] It is eminently sensible and practical for the interpretation of the provisions of Rule
67A(4)(a) read together with Rule 700(6) as set out in paragraph [14] above to
be preferred.
[17] However, in any event, given that the Applicant was the one who brought the
Respondent to court by way of urgency, the Taxing Master was quite entitled to
adopt this approach as Rule 70(5)(a) entitles the Taxing Master to "in his discretion,
at any time to depart from the provisions of this tariff in extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances where strict adherence to such provisions would be inequitable."
[18] A failure to apply the surcharge in the present circumstances would subvert the
purpose of the costs award if, in circumstances where even if successful, a party
would be required to litigate further just to recover reasonably incurred costs that
had been awarded by court.
3 Cobb v Levy 1978 (4) SA 459 (T) at 464H and 465A.
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[19] For the reasons set out above I find no reason to interfere with the either the
interpretation afforded by the Taxing Master to the application of Rule 67A(4)(a)
read together with Rule 700(6) or the exercise of her discretion in respect thereof.
[20] Since this review was dealt with on the papers, I do not intend to make any order
for the costs.
[21] In the circumstances, it is ordered: -
[21.1] The review is dismissed.
[21.2] There is no order as to costs.
REFERRED ON:
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
FOR THE APPLICANTS:
REFERENCE:
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA
24 FEBRUARY 2026
3 MARCH 2026
MDUZULWANA ATTORNEYS INC.
MR. V MDUZULWANA
FOR THE RESPONDENT : MALAT JI & CO. ATTORNEYS
MS. P FERNIE
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