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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 2024-104499
In the matter between:
UNIGRO FINANCIAL SERVICES (PTY) LTD Excipient
and
CASPER JAN HENDRIK ERASMUS First Respondent
CASPER JAN HENDRIK ERASMUS N.O. Second Respondent
HENRIËTTE JACOMINA ERASMUS N.O. Third Respondent
THE LAND AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT Fourth Respondent
BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
In re the matter between:
CASPER JAN HENDRIK ERASMUS First Plaintiff
CASPER JAN HENDRIK ERASMUS N.O. Second Plaintiff
HENRIËTTE JACOMINA ERASMUS N.O. Third Plaintiff
and
UNIGRO FINANCIAL SERVICES (PTY) LTD First Defendant
THE LAND AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT Second Defendant
BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) NOT REVISED.
…………..…………............. ……………………
SIGNATURE DATE
S GNATUR
27 February 2026
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Heard: 24 November 2025
Delivered: 27 February 2026
J U D G M E N T
YACOOB, J:
[1] The plaintiffs (the first to third respondents in the exception, to whom I refer
simply as the respondents) instituted action for a declaratory order that their
debts in terms of a loan agreement, production agreement and suretyship have
prescribed, and for the cancellation of the security they had provided to secure
those loans. The agreements were with the first defendant (the excipient), and
there is a dispute about whether the debts were ceded to the second defendant/
fourth respondent (the Land Bank ). The Land Bank did not participate in the
exception proceedings and, in fact, has already filed its plea.
[2] The first respondent is the principal debtor to the excipient. The second and third
respondents are the trustees of the Jocah Trust, which bound itself as surety and
co-principal debtor for the debt. According to the particul ars of claim, the Land
Bank claims , in circumstances undisclosed, that it procured all right, title and
interest in and to the debts th rough a suite of agreements with the excipient
including a written agreement in which the excipient sold its existing and future
book debt to the Land Bank on 27 September 2012. It is not clear in what
circumstances this claim was made, but one assumes it is in steps that the Land
Bank has taken to recover the debts. The Land Bank ’s plea refers to an
application it launched against the respondents in the Polokwane High Court,
although it does not disclose the relief sought in that application. It also confirms
that agreements annexed to the Particulars “form part of the suite of agreements”
by which the Land Bank obtained its rights in the debts.
[3] The particulars assert further that the Land Bank claims that the security held by
the excipient for the respondents’ debt was ceded to the Land Bank. They deny
that there was a cession because “the suit (sic) of agreements relied upon by the
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Defendants do not contain a cession of rights ”. Again it is not clear w here the
suite of agreements was relied upon by the Defendants.
[4] It is averred in the Particulars that the debts which are the subject of this action
did not exist at the time of the cession and delegation of the debts and security,
and therefore that they could not have been ceded. The respondents claim that
since the security was ceded, the debt s were not secured and therefore have
prescribed.
[5] The excipient takes exception on the basis that the contention that the debt could
not have been ceded because it did not exist at the time of the cession is bad in
law, as our law permits cession of future book debts. It contends therefore that
the particulars do not sustain a valid cause of action.
[6] The respondents contend that, since they have denied that there was a cession
in the suite of agreements relied on by the defendants in undisclosed
circumstances, this means that the future book debts could not have been ceded
because there was no cession. However, that is not what is pleaded in the
particulars. What is pleaded is that the debts could not have been ceded because
they did not exist at the time of the alleged cession.
[7] The question before me is not whether there was actually a cession, but whether
the particulars of claim, in their current form, disclose a cause of action. The
respondents’ whole response to the exception is based on the contention that
there was no cession and therefore the debts could not have been ceded. They
rely on the Land Bank’s heads of argument in a different case, with a different
but “similar” agreement, for the contention that there was no cession. Again, that
is not the question currently befo re me, and in any event , there is no evidence
that the alleged agreements are identical in the two cases, or even that the
pleadings are similar.
[8] The respondents also refer to a judgment in which the Land Bank was found to
[8] The respondents also refer to a judgment in which the Land Bank was found to
have no locus standi , again, al legedly, on the basis of similar agreements. 1
Again, I have no reason to believe that the agreements were identical, and in any
1 Trakman N.O. and Others v The Master of the Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg [2012] ZAGP JHC
168.
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event, that case is distinguishable. In this case, the respondents are dominus
litis, and as plaintiffs must plead and prove the ir case. That the Land Bank did
not prove its locus standi as creditor in another case does not relieve them of this
obligation.
[9] The particulars of claim must be read on their own terms, and without reference
to extraneous facts and claims. The respondents do not deny that it is possible
to cede future book debts, nor can they. They are correct that the particulars
must be read as a whole. However, that does not help them. There is, in my view,
no interpretation of the particulars as a whole in which they c an mean what the
respondents contend they mean. On the particulars of claim in their current form,
then, the claim is bad in law.
[10] For these reasons, the exception must be upheld.
[11] I make the following order:
(a) The exception is upheld.
(b) The first to third respondents (plaintiffs) are granted leave to amend their
particulars of claim, the amendment to be delivered within 15 days of this
order.
(c) The first to third respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the exception on
scale C, including the costs of two counsel, one of whom is senior counsel.
________________________
S. YACOOB
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties ’
representatives by email, and by uploading on the relevant electronic platform. The
date of this judgment is 27 February 2026.
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APPEARANCES
For the excipients: J G Cilliers SC and H R Fourie SC
Instructed by: Strydom & Bredenkamp Attorneys
For the Respondent: F G Janse van Rensburg
Instructed by: Eugene Geyser Attorneys, Viljoenskroon