S v Kibido (A1077/96) [1998] ZASCA 41; [1998] 3 All SA 72 (A) (27 May 1998)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Reckless driving — Appeal against sentence — Appellant convicted of reckless driving and sentenced to four years imprisonment, two years suspended — Appellant's conduct involved high-speed driving against a red traffic signal, resulting in a collision causing injuries to others — Appeal dismissed as the trial court properly exercised its discretion in imposing a severe sentence due to the appellant's continuous recklessness and disregard for the safety of others.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings were a criminal appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa concerning sentence only. The appellant, Victor Kibido, appealed against the sentence imposed following his conviction for reckless driving. The respondent was the State.


The matter originated in the Athlone Magistrate’s Court, where the appellant was convicted of contravening section 120(1) of the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989. The magistrate imposed a sentence of four years’ imprisonment in terms of section 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, with two years suspended for five years on certain conditions, and also ordered the suspension of the appellant’s driving licence for nine months from July 1996.


The appellant appealed unsuccessfully against sentence to the Cape High Court. The further appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal proceeded with the leave of the court a quo, and remained confined to whether the sentence was vitiated by misdirection or was otherwise so inappropriate as to justify appellate interference.


The subject matter of the dispute concerned the appropriateness and proportionality of a custodial sentence (albeit under section 276(1)(i)) for reckless driving where the conduct was found to be sustained and egregious, and where it caused serious harm and damage.


Material Facts


The facts giving rise to the charge were not placed in issue by the appellant and were treated by the court as essentially undisputed. The incident occurred at a major road interchange involving the N2 highway and Vanguard Drive, where Vanguard Drive crosses the N2 by a traffic bridge with off-ramps feeding into Vanguard Drive through robot-controlled intersections.


In the early hours of 7 May 1995, Mr Beukes drove his Toyota Corolla along Vanguard Drive from Goodwood towards Mitchell’s Plain (north to south), transporting his wife, six-year-old daughter, a cousin, and his mother-in-law. As he approached and traversed the bridge, the traffic lights at both ends were green in his favour, and he entered the southern intersection while the light remained green.


The appellant drove a Mazda Kombi (operating as a taxi) with two passengers, Ms Pamela Dyira and Ms Nosipho Nqonji. Approaching from the Somerset West direction, he took the southern off-ramp and entered the southern intersection where Mr Beukes’s vehicle was already present. A collision occurred between the two vehicles.


The court accepted that the appellant entered the intersection at high speed and against a red traffic light, a fact confirmed by his passengers. The evidence, as summarised in the judgment, described a pattern of continuous reckless driving from the time the appellant left Khayelitsha, including driving at excessive speed, ignoring speed humps, and nearly colliding with a vehicle ahead, avoided only by an abrupt swerve.


The passengers’ accounts further included an incident where the appellant demanded that one of the rear passengers move to the front passenger seat; when they refused, he stopped the vehicle until persuaded otherwise. Shortly before the collision, the passengers warned the appellant about his speed. The court recorded evidence that the appellant responded in terms amounting to an assertion that he could cause a collision so they could be killed, and (on one account) that he threatened to kill them. As the appellant entered the off-ramp and approached the intersection at high speed, one passenger observed Mr Beukes’s car in the intersection and screamed, but the appellant neither responded nor attempted to brake.


The consequences of the collision were severe. Both vehicles were extensively damaged; Mr Beukes’s vehicle was written off, and he suffered financial loss of R21 000 beyond insurance. Mr Beukes and his passengers suffered injuries, including the loss of consciousness by his wife and hospitalisation. Ms Dyira suffered cuts and ongoing pain. Ms Nqonji sustained more serious head and leg injuries, lost consciousness, suffered impaired vision at the time of trial, and lost her employment as a waitress.


The appellant did not testify on either merits or sentence. He was a 48-year-old first offender. His counsel informed the sentencing court that he was a chauffeur at the Botswana Embassy, a father of four children (three at school), and a responsible person. The judgment also noted that, from the passengers’ evidence, it appeared he had not previously driven recklessly.


Legal Issues


The central question was whether the sentence imposed for reckless driving was liable to be interfered with on appeal. This required the court to determine whether the magistrate had committed a material misdirection in the sentencing process, including by allegedly over-emphasising the seriousness of the offence and under-emphasising the appellant’s personal circumstances and the interests of society.


A further interrelated question was whether, even absent a demonstrable misdirection, the sentence was so excessive that it could properly be characterised as “startlingly inappropriate”, thereby justifying appellate interference with the trial court’s sentencing discretion.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of established sentencing and appellate-review principles to the facts. It involved evaluative judgment on the seriousness of the offending conduct, the weight to be attached to personal circumstances, and the threshold for appellate intervention.


Court’s Reasoning


The court accepted that the sentence was severe, but emphasised that direct imprisonment can be an appropriate sentence for reckless driving depending on the circumstances, particularly where recklessness amounts to gross negligence or a wilful disregard for the rights and safety of other road users. In this connection the judgment relied on authority recognising that the gravity of road traffic misconduct may justify substantial custodial punishment in suitably serious cases.


The court then reaffirmed the established principle that sentencing is pre-eminently within the discretion of the trial court. It highlighted that the trial court enjoys a wide discretion both in identifying relevant factors and in assigning weight to each. Within this framework, an appellate court may interfere only where there has been a misdirection of sufficient seriousness to show that the discretion was not exercised judicially, or where the sentence is so disproportionate that it induces a sense of shock.


Applying these principles, the court scrutinised the magistrate’s sentencing judgment and found that the magistrate had fully and properly considered both the circumstances of the offence and the appellant’s personal circumstances. The appeal court was not persuaded that the magistrate had ignored relevant considerations, misapplied them, or attached weight to them in a manner amounting to a material misdirection.


In evaluating the gravity of the offence, the court placed substantial emphasis on the continuous and sustained nature of the appellant’s reckless conduct, the deliberate disregard of a red traffic light at high speed, and the appellant’s callous disregard for human life, reflected in the reported threatening remarks to his passengers about causing a fatal collision. The court treated the consequences of the collision—serious injuries and financial loss—as reinforcing the seriousness of the conduct, while the core focus remained on the egregiousness of the driving itself and the attendant attitude to the safety of others.


The appellant’s submissions concerning the harsh practical consequences of the sentence (including likely loss of employment and hardship to family, as well as the structured nature of section 276(1)(i) imprisonment involving incarceration followed by correctional supervision conditions) were not accepted as outweighing the seriousness of the crime and the need for a strong penal response. The court considered that the interests of society, in the context of escalating road fatalities and injuries, supported the sentence imposed.


On the ultimate proportionality enquiry, the court rejected the contention that the sentence was startlingly inappropriate. It concluded that the sentence was properly justified given the combination of sustained dangerous driving, defiance of traffic control, and expressed indifference to (or threatened violation of) the lives of passengers and other road users.


Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.


The effect of the order was that the sentence imposed by the Athlone Magistrate’s Court, as confirmed on appeal by the Cape High Court, remained in force, including the term of imprisonment in terms of section 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the partial suspension of the sentence, and the nine-month suspension of the driving licence.


No separate or additional order as to costs was recorded in the judgment.


Cases Cited


R v Mahametsa 1941 AD 83.


S v Potgieter 1991 (2) SACR 135 (A).


S v Ngcobo 1990 (2) SACR 213 (T).


S v Fazzie and Others 1964 (4) SA 673 (A).


S v Pillay 1977 (4) SA 531 (A).


Legislation Cited


Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989 (section 120(1)).


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (section 276(1)(i)).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, although severe, the sentence for reckless driving was within the proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion. The magistrate had taken account of all relevant considerations, including the appellant’s personal circumstances, but was entitled to accord decisive weight to the seriousness of the offence and the appellant’s sustained and dangerous conduct.


The court further held that there was no material misdirection warranting appellate interference, and that the sentence could not be characterised as startlingly inappropriate in light of the continuous recklessness, the deliberate disregard of a red traffic light, the threatening statements evidencing disregard for life, and the serious harm caused.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A sentence in a criminal matter falls primarily within the discretion of the trial court, which has a wide remit both to determine which factors are relevant to sentence and to decide the weight to attach to each factor.


An appellate court may interfere with sentence only where there has been a material misdirection demonstrating that the sentencing discretion was not exercised judicially, or where the sentence is so disproportionate that it is startlingly inappropriate.


For the offence of reckless driving, direct imprisonment may be an appropriate sentence where the conduct amounts to gross negligence or a wilful disregard for the safety and rights of other road users, particularly where the offending is sustained and accompanied by aggravating features such as deliberate defiance of traffic controls and indifference to human life.

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[1998] ZASCA 41
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S v Kibido (A1077/96) [1998] ZASCA 41; [1998] 3 All SA 72 (A) (27 May 1998)

REPORTABLE
Case no: A 1077/96 245/97
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
In the matter between :
VICTOR KIBIDO
Appellant
and
THE STATE
Respondent
Coram : Olivier, Scott and Stretcher JJA
Date of hearing :
22 May 1998
Date of delivery : 27 May 1998
JUDGMENT
2
OLIVIER JA
The appellant was convicted in the Athlone Magistrate's Court of contravening s 120(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 29 of 1989, ie reckless
driving. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment in terms of
s 276(1)(i)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977
, two years of which was suspended for five years on certain conditions. In addition his licence was suspended for a period of nine
months as from July 1996. He appealed unsuccessfully against the sentence to the Cape High Court. The present appeal, which is against
the sentence only, is before us with the leave of the court a quo.
The facts from which the charge arose were not placed in issue by the appellant and can be summarised as follows. (i) Between Somerset
West and Cape Town, the N2 highway is intersected by
Vanguard Drive, which connects Goodwood in the north and Mitchell's
3 Plain in the south. Vanguard Drive crosses the multiple lanes of the N2
highway by means of a traffic bridge. On both the southern and the
northern ends of this traffic bridge are off-ramps connecting the N2 to
Vanguard Drive. The off-ramps cross over Vanguard Drive at robot
controlled intersections.
(ii) In the early hours of 7 May 1995 Mr Beukes, accompanied by his wife, his daughter aged six, a cousin and his mother-in-law, was
driving his car, a Toyota Corolla, along Vanguard Drive from Goodwood to Mitchell's Plain, ie from north to south. As he approached
the said traffic bridge, the robots at the intersections on both ends of the bridge were in his favour, ie green. He proceeded across
the bridge and entered the intersection at the southern side with the robot still in his favour.
(iii) The appellant was the driver of a Mazda Kombi. He was accompanied by two passengers, Miss Pamela Dyira and Miss Nosipho Nqonji.
He
4
approached the traffic bridge from the direction of Somerset West, took the
southern off-ramp, and entered the southern intersection which had also
been entered by Mr Beukes. A collision occurred between the two vehicles.
(iv) The appellant entered the intersection at a high speed and with the robots against him, ie red.
(v) The appellant was acting as a taxi-driver at the time. He had been driving at a high speed, ignoring speed humps in the road since
leaving Kyayelitsha with the said two passengers. They protested in vain against his driving in this fashion. Miss Dyira once had
to warn him against colliding with the rear of a vehicle travelling in front of the appellant's vehicle, and he only avoided a collision
by an abrupt swerve past it.
(vi) At one stage the appellant demanded that either of two passengers, who were seated at the back of the Kombi, should come and
sit in the front passenger's seat. When they refused, he brought the Kombi to a stop,
5 apparently in a fit of pique. Miss Dyira persuaded Miss Nqonji to comply
with the appellant's demand, and they then proceeded on their way.
(vii) At one stage, Miss Dyira warned the appellant that he was driving too fast
and asked him to be careful. His reply, in Miss Dyira's words (corroborated by Miss Nqonji) was that "... if he likes then he
can cause a collision so that we can be killed." Miss Nqonji places this incident as immediately prior to the collision, ie
as the Kombi was approaching the intersection. According to her he threatened to kill them.
(viii) The appellant entered the off-ramp under discussion at a high speed. Despite the robot being red for the appellant, as confirmed
by his passengers, he entered the intersection without reducing speed or braking. Miss Dyira saw that a car in Vanguard Drive (Mr
Beukes's vehicle) had also entered the intersection and she screamed and drew the appellant's attention to the other car. He did
not reply or endeavour to apply the brakes
6 of the Kombi.
(ix) As a result of the collision, both vehicles were extensively damaged. The Toyota Corolla of Mr Beukes was written off and in
spite of an insurance payment he suffered damage to the sum of R21 000. Mr Beukes and his passengers suffered various injuries. His
wife lost consciousness and was removed to hospital by an ambulance. Miss Dyira sustained cuts on the right cheek and thumb, and
was, at the time of the trial still suffering from a painful left shoulder and left knee. Miss Nqonji was yet more seriously injured.
She lost consciousness as a result of head and leg injuries. At the time of the trial she still suffered from impaired vision. Because
of this and the leg injuries she lost her job as a waitress and was, at the time of the trial, unemployed.
(x) The appellant did not testify either on the merits or the sentence. He is a first offender and is 48 years old. His counsel informed
the magistrate that
7 the appellant was a chauffeur with the Botswana Embassy, the father of four
children of whom three were at school, and a responsible person. From the
evidence of his two passengers it appears that he had never before driven
in a reckless manner.
The magistrate, after a commendably full judgment, concluded that
the appellant's recklessness was continuous and that it resulted in severe
consequences to his passengers and to Mr Beukes and his passengers. He
considered a sentence of direct imprisonment to be appropriate.
Before us it was argued that
(a) the practical consequences of the sentences are very severe - inter alia, the
appellant will have to serve at least four months imprisonment; after his
release he will be under house arrest and will have to perform community
service; he will probably lose his work, and his home and his family will
lose his support and maintenance;
8
(b)
the magistrate committed a misdirection by over-emphasising the
seriousness of the offence and under-emphasising the personal
circumstances of the appellant and the interests of society; and
(c)
the sentence is excessive, severe and startlingly inappropriate;
On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the continuous reckless and dangerous behaviour of the appellant was a severely aggravating
factor, particularly as it was accompanied by a disregard for the lives of others, an arrogant attitude that he could kill them if
he wished, and the still more blameworthy expressed threat to kill his passengers.
It must be stated at the outset that the sentence imposed on the appellant is
a severe one. But depending on the circumstances, direct imprisonment for the
offence of reckless driving can be an appropriate sentence
"... if by 'recklessness' is meant gross negligence or a wilful disregard of the rights of other road users, as for example in
the case of numbers of accidents which are
9
caused by the dangerous practice of 'cutting in' or driving round a blind comer on the wrong side of the road, or passing another
car on the crest of a hill." (Centlivres JA in R v Mahametsa
1941 AD 83
at 86. See also S v Potgieter 1991(2) SACR 135(A)at 138 b-f; S v Ngcobo 1990(2) SACK 213(T)).
Now, it is trite law that the determination of a sentence in a criminal matter
is pre-eminently a matter for the discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of this
function the trial court has a wide discretion in (a) deciding which factors should
be allowed to influence the court in determining the measure of punishment and
(b) in determining the value to attach to each factor taken into account (see S v
Fazzie and Others 1964(4)SA 673(A)at684A-B; S v Pillay 1977(4) SA 531(A)
at 535 A-B). A failure to take certain factors into account or an improper
determination of the value of such factors amounts to a misdirection, but only
when the dictates of justice carry clear conviction that an error has been
committed in this regard (S v Fazzie and Others, supra, at 684 B-C; S v Pillay,
10 supra, at 535 E).
Furthermore, a mere misdirection is not by itself sufficient to entitle a court of appeal to interfere with the sentence; it must
be of such a nature, degree, or seriousness that it shows, directly or inferential!/, that the court did not exercise its discretion
at all or exercised it improperly or unreasonably (see Trollip JA in S v Pillay, supra, at 535 E-G).
A close scrutiny of the magistrate's judgment on sentence shows that he took all the relevant factors pertaining to the circumstances
under which the offence was committed and the appellant's personal circumstances fully and properly into account. In deciding on
the appropriate sentence, he gave weight to all these factors. I am not convinced that he misdirected himself at all, nor that he
did not properly or reasonably exercise his discretion. The personal circumstances of the appellant and the direct consequences of
the sentence imposed can not and should not be allowed to outweigh the seriousness of the crime and the appellant's
11
callous disregard for the safety of others. He drove at an excessive speed; he ignored the protestations of his passengers; he deliberately
disregarded a red robot, and he arrogantly threatened to kill his passengers by causing a collision -something in which he nearly
succeeded.
For the same reasons, it can also not be said that the sentence is startlingly inappropriate. On the contrary, the sentence was a
proper one. The criminal conduct in question was of a very serious nature. The sentence is clearly justified by the interests of
a society that is faced with escalating carnage on the roads caused in large measure by people driving like the appellant with reckless
arrogance.
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur:
Scott JA Streicher JA