SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case no 2024-127910
(1) REPORTABLE: Yes
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes
(3) REVISED: Yes
Date: 10 February 2026
In the matter between:
T[...] P[...] C[...] (BORN J[...]) Applicant
And
L[...] I[...] C[...] Respondent
Summary: Rule 43 – interim maintenance – adult dependent children – revival of
maintenance for major child after prior independence – failure to show involuntary
loss of self ‑support – marital standard of living – frugality versus lifestyle
expectations
JUDGMENT
DU PLESSIS J
2
Introduction
[1] Intimate relationships, by their very nature, carry within them the seeds of
grief. As Julian Barnes observes, "Every love story is a potential grief story. If not at
first, then later. If not for one, then for the other. Sometimes, for both ."1Grief, often
manifesting as anger, is frequently encountered in Rule 43 applications, where the
underlying loss arises from an impending divorce and the Court must determine
each party's interim entitlements and obligations on the strength of limited affidavits
and legal submissions. This exercise takes place under considerable emotional
strain, which can obscure the real issues the Court is required to decide in the Rule
43 context. The Court must sift through these emotions and allegations to chart a
way forward that minimises conflict and provides a workable interim regime until the
divorce is finalised. This case is no exception.
[2] The parties have been married since 2001 . There are three adult children:
J[...], adopted by the respondent in approximately 2002 and now in his late twenties;
S[...], aged approximately 22; and R[...], aged approximately 20. All three are
enrolled at the University of the Witwatersrand and, according to the applicant,
remain dependent on their parents for support . They all do au pair work and earn
between R2100 and R2700 per month.
[3] It is common cause that the marriage relationship has irretrievably broken
down. The applicant instituted divorce proceedings in November 2024, which the
respondent is defending, and the respondent has delivered a counterclaim.
[4] Following their separation, both parties continued to reside in what
respondent's counsel referred to as a "palatial" home, occupying separate areas of
the residence and conducting independent lives. After the applicant obtained an
interim protection order in September 2025, the respondent vacated the matrimonial
home and has since established residence elsewhere.
home and has since established residence elsewhere.
1 In Levels of Life (2013), Barnes writes this in the context of losing a loved one to death, the idea also applies to
divorce. It shows that the pain isn't caused by how the relationship ended, but by the fact that something once
united has now been separated.
3
[5] During the subsistence of the marriage, the respondent carried the bulk of the
fixed expenses: the costs associated with the immovable properties, the medical aid
premiums, school and later university fees for the children, and a debit card facility
used by the applicant for groceries and household necessities. The applicant met
other personal and incidental expenses from her own income.
[6] The applicant is a qualified educator but has never worked full-time in the field
and is currently a self ‑employed home baker operating a bespoke cake business
from the matrimonial home. Her financial disclosure form ("FDF") reflects variable net
income averaging R19 000 –R20 000 per month over a 12 –14-month period. The
applicant states that her income is in the region of R13 000 per month.
[7] The respondent is a businessman with interests in various motor industry
companies. He also derives income from various ancillary activities ("hobbies") and
from an annuity. His FDF discloses unbonded ownership of the matrimonial and
Plettenberg Bay properties, various vehicles, firearms, boats, watches and
investment accounts, as well as a claimed loan liability to the Family Trust.
The applicant's case
[8] The applicant seeks, pendente lite, maintenance for herself and all three adult
children, as well as a substantial contribution to her legal costs in the divorce action.
[9] In her Rule 43 notice and subsequent draft order, she claims, in essence:
a. Monthly maintenance for herself in the amount of R32 770.
b. Monthly maintenance for J[...], S[...] and R[...], each in the amount of
about R37 000.
c. That the respondent continues to pay, directly to the relevant service
providers, all rates, taxes, levies, water, electricity, refuse removal,
security and alarm charges, Wi ‑Fi, and insurance premiums for
household contents in respect of the Linksfield and Plettenberg Bay
properties.
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d. That the respondent bears the full monthly costs in respect of her
motor vehicle and those of S[...] and R[...], including insurance,
tracking, licence fees and fuel.
e. A payment of R285 171.25 is claimed, which is said to be money the
applicant’s father lent her, to cover counsel's fees for this application.
f. Payment of a contribution to her legal costs totalling R5 138 831.79,
comprising roughly R827 800 for costs already incurred, R2.99 million
up to trial certification, and R1.32 million up to and including the first
day of trial (the last component to stand over).
[10] Shortly before the hearing , a draft order combining the respondent's tender
with the applicant's claim was sent to the Court. This draft order will be discussed
after setting out the respective positions of the parties.
[11] The applicant avers that, as a home baker with a fluctuating and modest
income, she is unable to meet her own reasonable monthly needs and those of the
three adult dependent children. Her maintenance schedule and adjusted FA5 place
the combined reasonable monthly expenses of herself and the children at over R100
000, even after taking into account certain direct payments tendered by the
respondent.
[12] She alleges that, since the de facto separation around May 2024, the
respondent has failed properly to maintain her and the children. She states that from
September to November 2024 , the respondent ceased all cash maintenance
payments and unilaterally assumed responsibility for grocery purchases, and that he
only began paying her R26 000 per month in two instalments from around December
2024, which she characterises as arbitrarily fixed and often late.
[13] The applicant's narrative is that the respondent is a man of substantial means
who is seeking to understate his income and obscure the true extent of his assets
through business entities, offshore investments, and cash transactions , in a "catch
me if you can " manner. The applicant states that she is not aware of the
me if you can " manner. The applicant states that she is not aware of the
respondent's gross or net income because he has always been secretive about it.
5
[14] The applicant relies on extensive bank and investment statements,
foreign‑account records , and other financial documentation to demonstrate, inter
alia, significant movements of funds through Barclays, Investec, and Nedbank, and
through various other accounts, large deposits and withdrawals, and the
maintenance of offshore balances in British Pounds (“GBP”) and US Dollars (“USD”).
[15] She further alleges that the respondent has historically dealt in cash, kept
cash and valuables in safes at the matrimonial home and in safety deposit boxes,
and that CCTV footage and the discovery of cash in a safe when the interim
protection order was executed contradict his denials in this regard.
[16] On the strength of this documentation, she submits that the respondent 's
disclosed net asset value in his FDF is understated, that he is living beyond the
means he avers, and that he plainly has the capacity to maintain her and all three
adult children at the marital standard of living and to make the costs contribution
claimed. The applicant calculates the respondent’s assets at R14 million, excluding
the substantial amounts of cash she avers he keeps.
[17] The applicant denies that the Rule 43 application is abusive, contending that
the volume of annexures is necessitated by the complexity of the respondent 's
financial affairs and by his failure to make full and frank disclosure. She says the
financial documents obtained during settlement discussions are admissible as
objective evidence of his means and that their deployment accords with recent
authority on full financial disclosure in Rule 43 proceedings.
The respondent's case
[18] The respondent opposes the application in its entirety and tenders to continue
paying a wide range of expenses directly, coupled with limited cash allowances.
[19] The respondent raises, as a preliminary contention, that the applicant 's
papers are impermissibly long and contain extensive material irrelevant to the narrow
papers are impermissibly long and contain extensive material irrelevant to the narrow
interim enquiry, including documents furnished on a without ‑prejudice basis during
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settlement discussions. He submits that the size and content of the record constitute
an abuse of process and justify the dismissal of the application with costs.
[20] On the merits, the respondent denies that the applicant has established any
bona fide financial need for spousal maintenance. He emphasises that she is
economically active, runs what he describes as a successful bespoke cake business,
and, on his reconstruction of her own FDF spreadsheets and cash receipts, earns
net income of at least R25 000 per month and likely between R35 000 and R45 000
per month as she receives cash payments for many of the orders.
[21] The respondent contends that many of the applicant’s claimed expenses are
overstated, duplicated, or inconsistent with her historical spending patterns and that,
once items he already pays directly are stripped out, her residual personal needs are
modest and can be comfortably met from her income. He relies on an expenses
comparison schedule , which, on his analysis, shows the applicant 's reasonable
residual needs at approximately R11 800 per month. His narrative is that the
applicant is seeking a "meal tick et" through her inflated expenses – in other words,
not because of genuine need, but as an easy, ongoing source of income.
[22] The respondent sets out his own financial position as follows:
a. Prior to being required to move out of the marital home, his monthly
earnings were R96 700. This included his salary from M[...] L[...] , as
well as income from watch trading, fishing activities, cartridge servicing,
hunting logistics commissions, and an annuity.
b. As a result of losing access to equipment stored at the matrimonial
home, certain side-line income streams have fallen away , and he now
earns about R61 700 per month.
c. His monthly expenses, including the costs of supporting the applicant
and the children, and the two properties, total R168 000, generating a
substantial monthly deficit that he funds from capital and investment
accounts.
substantial monthly deficit that he funds from capital and investment
accounts.
d. His FDF shows a net asset value of R10.6 million, which he says is
steadily eroding due to the need to meet these shortfalls.
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[23] The respondent accepts that he bears a duty of support towards S[...] and
R[...] as adult ‑dependent children and that he is already discharging this obligation
by paying, inter alia, all their reasonable tuition costs, medical aid, uncovered
medical expenses (excluding R[...]'s ADD medication), fuel, and their share of
household accommodation and groceries, as well as cash allowances of R1 500 per
month each as tendered.
[24] The respondent refuses to pay maintenance for J[...]. J[...] lived abroad for
about 5 years and has not received financial support from the respondent since
2019. He was enrolled to study at the University of Johannesburg in 2019, but was
not allowed to write exams as he did not attend lectures. He re-enrolled at the
University of the Witwatersrand in 2025. Not being self -supporting, he resides in the
matrimonial home and receives food there. The respondent contends that any
renewed dependency is attributable to J[...]'s own choices rather than incapacity. He
notes that, notwithstanding this stance, J[...] continues to benefit indirectly from the
respondent's payment of household expenses at the matrimonial home.
[25] In relation to the applicant 's reliance on the volume of financial
documentation, the respondent maintains that Rule 43 is not the forum to resolve
disputes about the ultimate value of his estate. He submits that he cannot
reasonably be required, on a sustainable basis, to fund the level of interim
maintenance and costs contribution claimed.
[26] As to the contribution to costs, the respondent accepts the general principle
that a spouse may be ordered to contribute towards the other 's reasonable litigation
costs but contends that, in the present matter, the amount sought is exorbitant,
disproportionate to the value and complexity of the issues in dispute, and premature
in circumstances where the parties have not yet meaningfully engaged in mediation.
in circumstances where the parties have not yet meaningfully engaged in mediation.
On his version, granting the contribution sought would risk dissipating a substantial
portion of the very estate fought over in legal fees alone.
[27] The respondent accordingly seeks an order dismissing the Rule 43
application with attorney‑and‑client (or at least Scale C) costs, and an order in terms
of his draft counter ‑application, in which he tenders to continue meeting the bulk of
8
the household and tertiary ‑education expenses by direct payment, together with
limited allowances for the two younger sons.
Expenses of the parties
[28] It is not immediately clear what the parties' shared standard of living was
during the marriage. What is striking is that the averments made by the applicant are
that the respondent is keeping her and the children in the dark about his finances ,
and that the respondent has maintained them "albeit inadequately in certain
aspects". In short, the papers indicate that the respondent was parsimonious, which
caused great unhappiness in the marriage . The applicant states that the respondent
would become angry and verbally abusive if she requested additional funds, and that
her cake business was an attempt to avoid such irate outbursts.
[29] The applicant states that, prior to the separation, she used the respondent's
debit card to purchase groceries (R7000 –R9000 per week). He paid the property
taxes, insurance, and maintenance, and covered household expenses. She travelled
locally and internationally, often with about R10 000 in birthday money she would
receive from the respondent.
[30] The children all have part -time jobs as university students, making between
R2100 and R2700 per month. They attended private schools and participated in
extra lessons and extramural activities.
[31] The matrimonial home is, in the words of counsel for the applica nt, "palatial",
and valued at around R20 million. It has an industrial generator, a full solar system, a
borehole, and a fully equipped gym, and is set on an acre of land . All this suggests a
high-end urban lifestyle.
[32] The respondent indicates that during happier days, he paid for all immovable
property expenses, medical aid for the applicant and the children, and school and
university fees, and, towards the end, gave her a card with R26 000 for groceries,
detergents, toiletries, and household items. He states that these are the family's
reasonable needs.
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[33] From the above , the following points of stark disagreement emerge. Firstly,
the applicant seeks maintenance for herself of R32 770 per month and for each child
of about R37 000 per month. The respondent only tenders cash amounts of R1 500
per month for S[...] and R[...] (including education, medical aid, and fuel costs), and
nothing in cash for the applicant or J[...], although he agrees to continue paying the
R26 000 per month for food and household expenses.
[34] The respondent tenders to pay the fixed costs associated with the property
(e.g. rates, taxes, levies, security, insurance, Wi -Fi, TV licence, staff, property
maintenance).
The draft order "tendered" by the applicant
[35] The day before the hearing, the applicant tendered the following "with
prejudice" order:
“1.1 The Respondent shall pay _____ per month as maintenance for the applicant
into her Standard Bank account […]. The first payment shall be made on or before
the first day of the month following the granting of this order, and thereafter on or
before the first day of each succeeding month, pro rata for the month in which this
order is granted.
1.2 The Applicant shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of the motor vehicle
being a Volkswagen T Cross, registration number […] (the "Applicant's motor
vehicle"), which is registered in the respondent's name.
1.3 S[...] A[...] C[...] ("S[...]") shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of the
motor vehicle being a Kia Rio, registration number […] ( "S[...]'s motor vehicle "),
which is registered in the respondent's name.
1.4 R[...] L[...] C[...] ("R[...]") shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of the
motor vehicle being a Toyota Yaris, registration number […] ( "R[...]'s motor vehicle"),
which is registered in the respondent's name.
10
1.5 The Respondent shall pay the monthly costs in respect of the applicant's motor
vehicle, including insurance, tracking, licence fees and fuel.
1.6 The Respondent shall pay the monthly costs in respect of S[...] and R[...]'s motor
vehicles that are registered in the respondent's name, including insurance, tracking,
licence fees and fuel.
1.7 The Respondent shall pay _____ per month as maintenance into the aforesaid
account in respect of S[...], a dependent major son, on the same terms as set out in
paragraph 1.1.
1.8 The Respondent shall pay ______ per month as maintenance into the aforesaid
account in respect of R[...], a dependent major son, on the same terms as set out in
paragraph 1.1.
1.9 The amounts payable in terms of paragraphs 1.1, 1.7 and 1.8 above shall
increase annually on the anniversary of the date of the granting of this order in
accordance with the average increase in the Consumer Price Index during the
preceding year, as published by the Department of Statistics.
1.10 The Respondent shall pay the following costs in respect of 3[...] F[...] Avenue,
Linksfield North ( "the matrimonial home ") and 5[...] S[...] Estate, Keurbooms ( "the
Plettenberg Bay property ") (collectively "the properties ") directly to third parties to
whom such costs are owed, within 7 days of presentation of an invoice:
1.10.1 Rates and taxes
1.10.2 electricity, water and refuse removal charges
1.10.3 Levies
1.10.4 Security and alarm
1.10.5 Insurance premiums for household contents at the properties
1.10.6 Wi Fi
1.10.7 TV licence
1.10.8 The replacement and repairs of household appliances
1.10.9 The costs of household, garden and swimming pool maintenance and repairs
1.10.10 The costs of pet food and veterinary expenses
1.10.11 The Respondent shall pay the food and salaries of the two domestic
assistants employed by the applicant, instead of Mbuso and Prince.
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1.11 The Respondent shall pay R285 171.25 to the applicant in respect of monies
lent and advanced to the applicant by her father in respect of counsel's fees.
2. The Applicant, J[...] D[...] C[...] ("J[...]"), S[...] and R[...] shall be entitled to use the
Plettenberg Bay property, free of charge, for holiday purposes.
3. The Respondent shall pay the following expenses within 7 days of receipt of
invoice:
3.1 The tertiary educational costs for S[...] and R[...].
3.2 The premiums required to retain the Applicant, S[...] and R[...] as dependants on
the respondent's hospital plan.
3.3 The medical and related expenses incurred by the Applicant, S[...] and R[...],
which are not covered by the respondent's medical aid/hospital plan.
3.4 The monthly costs of fuel for S[...] and R[...] on presentation of an invoice.
3.5 Uber transportation costs in the amounts of R1 000.00 for J[...], R250.00 for the
Applicant, R250.00 for S[...] and R250.00 for R[...].
4. The Respondent shall pay _____ maintenance in respect of J[...] as follows:
4.1 Maintenance per month on the same terms as paragraphs 1.1, 1.7 and 1.8
above.
4.2 The tertiary educational costs for J[...] on the same terms as provided for in
paragraph 3 and 3.1.
4.3 The medical and related expenses incurred by J[...] which are not covered by the
medical aid/hospital plan, on the same terms as provided in paragraphs 3, 3.2 and
3.3.
5. The Respondent shall pay a contribution towards the applicant's legal costs as
follows:
5.1 R827 799.19 in respect of legal costs already incurred.
5.2 R2 988 008.20 up to the stage of trial certification.
5.3 R1 323 024.40 up to and including the first day of trial, such relief to be
postponed sine die.
6. In the event of the main action being settled before the trial certification stage, any
unexpended funds shall be refunded to the respondent.”
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[36] This was a helpful starting point to frame the reasons for my order.
The law
Maintenance pendente lite
[37] This Rule 43 consisted of almost 3,000 pages and is a far cry from what this
rule provides: a sworn statement from the applicant, with the respondent replying
within 10 days, to be heard expeditiously. From the volume of the record, including
the supplementary affidavits filed, it is evident that the parties view the outcome of
Rule 43 as a precursor to the divorce proceedings. If I am correct in this
understanding, the parties should be warned that this cannot be the case . The
purpose of Rule 43 is clear: interim and temporary relie f, based on the information
before the Court, which may not be as detailed as the evidence that will be led in the
divorce action.
[38] Rule 43 is designed to secure temporary maintenance and ancillary relief
pending divorce, not to refashion the parties' financial relationship or to confer a level
of support markedly more generous than that enjoyed during the marriage. The
usual point of departure remains the manner and extent in which the financially
stronger spouse historically maintained the household , with reference to the parties'
marital standard of living . Interim relief should, so far as reasonably possible,
preserve that standard of living, subject always to demonstrated need and the other
spouse's ability to pay from their income, rather than elevate it.
[39] It is important to state expressly that this is not final maintenance and that it
rests on different principles and evidence that will be considered in the divorce
proceedings. What the Court is required to do is, on the available evidence,
determine the applicant's needs against the respondent 's means. In this particular
case, it is important to stress that the object is not to upgrade or punish, but to
maintain the marital standard of living until the divorce is finalised.
[40] This means that the applicant is not entitled, pendente lite, to a standard of
[40] This means that the applicant is not entitled, pendente lite, to a standard of
living better than what she enjoyed during the marriage, merely because the
13
respondent has money but is frugal. The Rule 43 cannot be used to correct a
perceived historic parsimony.
[41] This brings me to the maintenance claimed by the applicant for herself. The
anticipated expenses schedule includes payments the respondent tendered directly
to service providers (rates, levies, medical aid, etc. ). Counsel for the applicant
usefully removed those expenses from the table and deducted her income and the
children's income from their claims. The amounts inserted then were R11 325 pm for
the applicant, R8 625 pm for S[...] and R8 925 pm for R[...].
[42] I am satisfied with the information at hand that these amounts are reasonable.
It is also not far from the respondent's R26 000 per month cash payment, which he
regarded as reasonable expenses.
[43] This brings us to the question of whether the claim for the adult children
should succeed.2 The duty to support a child does not automatically end at the age
of majority (18 years of age)3 but continues until the child becomes self-supporting or
financially independent.4 An adult child can remain dependent, for instance, because
they are engaged in tertiary studies, are unemployed or underemployed in
circumstances where economic or personal factors prevent self ‑support, or suffer
from a disability or health barrier that limits earning capacity.5
[44] [44] It is common cause that S[...] and R[...] remain dependants. The only
concern is that the respondent is not kept informed about their progress, but is still
expected to pay. The respondent is entitled to receive proof of the tuition fees and
reasonable confirmation that S[...] and R[...] are indeed pursuing their studies.
However, it is neither necessary nor suitable to make payment conditional on
academic performance. In my view, it is sufficient for the applicant to provide the
respondent with the invoices issued by the university, along with the official results
respondent with the invoices issued by the university, along with the official results
2 Z v Z 2022 (5) SA 451 (SCA) allows parents to claim maintenance on behalf of adult dependent children.
3 Bursey v Bursey 1999 (3) SA 33 (SCA).
4 Vermaak v Vermaak 1945 CPD 89; In re Estate Visser 1948 (3) SA 1129 (C).
5 Z v Z 2022 (5) SA 451 (SCA) para 16 lists a few examples. TL Da Silva Pfafferott, The Maintenance of Adult
but Dependent Offspring (LLM dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2019) at Chapter 2.
14
as they become available, without establishing a “no pass, no pay” scheme at the
Rule 43 stage.
[45] The real dispute concerns J[...]. The applicant claims R13 725 pm cash for
J[...], as well as the tertiary educational costs. J[...] is currently employed as an au
pair, earning around R2 700 per month. He lived independently in Israel for
approximately five years and now resides in the matrimonial home with the applicant.
His relationship with the respondent is strained, as evidenced by allegations that he
scratched the respondent's car with keys.
[46] Although it is not immediately clear from the documents that he can meet all
his reasonable needs, he currently has no expenses for necessities such as food
and lodging. He is enrolled to study at the University of the Witwatersrand, which the
respondent refuses to fund, pointing to J[...]'s lack of prior commitment to his studies.
[47] The difficulty the applicant faces in relation to J[...] is that he was once
dependent, then moved to Israel , where he was independent and self ‑supporting for
a considerable time, only to return and now claim dependency again, without placing
clear evidence before the Court as to why he cannot resume self ‑support or what
efforts he has made to do so. The papers do not disclose any mental or physical
disability that would preclude him from becoming self‑sufficient.
[48] I accept that, in certain circumstances, parents' maintenance obligations may
be revived, as some adult children might later be unable to earn an income due to
supervening ill -health, disability, or other involuntary changes in circumstances.
However, I am not persuaded that this case justifies such a revival. The difficulty lies
in the fact that J[...] made specific choices, including deciding to leave his
independent lifestyle in Israel after a period of independence to pursue his studies in
South Africa, without evidence of involuntary incapacity or circumstances beyond his
control that compelled him to do so.
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[49] Comparative law is instructive in this regard . The German Federal Court of
Justice held 6 that while a maintenance obligation may arise where an adult child
involuntarily loses independence, "parents can generally assume that their children
will maintain this independence" once achieved. The Italian Supreme Court 7 has
stressed that maintenance for an adult child is justified only to support a serious,
diligently pursued path to independence (through study or training) and is confined
by the principle of self ‑responsibility. The child must actively seek to free themselves
from the family nest, and parental support cannot continue indefinitely, or at any level
the child prefers . In that case, a 33 -year-old employed individual was denied
continued maintenance because he had not demonstrated diligent efforts toward full
independence.
[50] Even in jurisdictions that recognise "transitional support" for delayed
adulthood,8 courts refuse d relief where the adult child makes no real effort . The
Alberta Court (Canada) in KMR v IWR 9 held that while contemporary economic
conditions may justify a reasonable transitional period (between finishing education
and finding employment), "[t]his is not a situation where an adult child tried to find a
full-time job, but it took him or her several months to do so. [The child] has not tried
at all."10
[51] It might thus be that where an adult child, after a period of dependency, elects
to return to studies and shows a genuine, renewed commitment to completing a
realistic course of study with a view to becoming self ‑sufficient, a case may be made
out for some (likely limited and time ‑bound) support. Foreign courts have allowed
transitional or educational support in such circumstances, but only where the
evidence clearly establishes genuine commitment and progress. The German
6 In BGH XII ZR 91/10 (18 July 2012). The case does not directly concern interim maintenance, but the principles
are similar and address the parents' duty to maintain.
7 in Judgment No. 17183/2020 (28 July 2020) . I relied on Google Translate to translate this judgment into
English.
8 Gamache v. Gamache, 1999 ABQB 313 para 3.
9 2020 ABQB 77.
10 Paragraph 44.
16
Federal Court of Justice11 held that an adult child has a duty to start education within
a reasonable time, considering the position of the person paying. The older and
more independent they are, the more responsibility shifts from their parents to them.
If they delay too long in pursuing further education, they may lose their right to
maintenance for education and may have to support themselves during their studies.
The Court there also held that there is no fixed age cut-off. Rather, in each case, the
question is whether , given all the circumstances and the parents ' means, it is still
reasonable to expect the parents to fund further training.
[52] This is where things become complicated for J[...]. The papers indicate that
J[...] failed to complete his first year at university due to non ‑attendance, left for a
considerable amount of time and lived independently in Israel, and upon returning ,
enrolled at the University of Pretoria (with registration fees paid by the respondent),
only to change his mind a month or so later and register at Wits. This pattern is not
indicative of a focused, credible plan to attain self ‑sufficiency through study.
Furthermore, the applicant has placed no medical evidence of incapacity before the
Court, no evidence of renewed commitment to make work of J[...]’s studies, and no
evidence of diligent job ‑seeking efforts in South Africa since his return. There simply
is no indication that J[...] is otherwise unable to provide for himself.
[53] Based on this information, I have to conclude that one sadly does not remain
in childhood forever. Reliance on maintenance cannot serve as insurance for the
choices one makes. One also needs to distinguish between a legal duty and any
moral duty that might rest on parents.
[54] On the evidence before the Court, J[...]'s situation is not one of involuntary
loss of capacity due to ill ‑health, disability, retrenchment, or economic hardship
loss of capacity due to ill ‑health, disability, retrenchment, or economic hardship
beyond his control. The authorities , both South African and comparative , which
permit the revival of (a right to) maintenance all presuppose an involuntary loss of
capacity or a genuine transitional need, coupled with diligent effort and credible
11 In BGH XII ZB 192/16 (8 March 2017) . The case does not directly concern interim maintenance, but the
principles are similar and address the parents' duty to maintain.
17
commitment. This is not such a case. On this record, J[...] has not established any of
those elements, and his claim to ongoing maintenance should therefore be refused.
[55] The draft order submitted by the applicant specifies the use of motor vehicles,
along with the monthly costs associated with them and fuel. The respondent
indicates that, in principle, he does not have an issue with paying these amounts but
wishes traffic fines to be paid by the offender and the “cost of fuel” to be reasonable.
It is always a risk to include a word like “reasonable” in an order where the acrimony
during a divorce clouds reasonableness. And based on the information before me, it
is impossibl e to set a hard cap on fuel. In this context, “reasonable” should be
understood as broadly corresponding to the average monthly fuel expenditure over
the 12 months preceding this order.
[56] As for the property -related expenses, the respondent has tendered payment
of those, and they will be so recorded in the order. Similarly, there seem s to be
agreement on the medical aid and related expenses.
[57] Initially, the respondent tendered the use of the holiday home in Plettenberg
Bay for holidays, rather than paying R10 000 per month for holiday expenses. During
the trial, he withdrew the tender out of fear that the applicant and the children w ould
trash the home due to the acrimony between the parties. Instead, he tendered
R24 000 per annum toward holidays, reimbursable upon proof of payment for
accommodation and flights.
[58] I accept that holidays are not essential. However, given that the family
previously used the Plettenberg Bay holiday home at no cost and must now pay for
their holidays, a reasonable amount would cover transport for the applicant, S[...]
and R[...], as well as accommodation for two weeks. To continue this lifestyle, and in
light of the respondent's position, a fair balance between the parties is R60 000 per
annum, payable upon submission of invoices.
18
Contribution to costs.
[59] In h er draft order, the applicant seeks R827 799,19 for legal costs already
incurred, almost R3 million to the state of trial certification and R1,3 million up to and
including the first day of trial (to be postponed sine die). The respondent regards the
legal costs already incurred as inflated and, in his draft order, offers R500 000. He
offers R200 000 to the state of trial certification. This was not raised during the trial,
where he requested that she should receive the equivalent of what he had spent so
far, which was in the region of R300 000.
[60] The claim for contribution towards costs is regarded as an incident of the duty
of support.12 The applicant is not entitled to payment in full of the costs that will be
incurred, but must be enabled to present her case adequately .13 This must be
understood in the constitutional framework of the right to equality (section 9 of the
Constitution), in that an applicant is entitled to a contribution towards costs to ensure
equality of arms, which, in some instances, may include the power to investigate the
respondent's financial affairs.14
[61] Of course, a party that must approach the other spouse in an acrimonious
divorce to ask for such a contribution also risks having their right to dignity (section
10 of the Constitution ) infringed. Dignity also comes into play whe n such a spouse
has already had to borrow money from family to litigate. Lastly, Rule 43 also impacts
the right of access to courts, in that an applicant who cannot afford to litigate on the
same footing as the respondent might not be able to exercise this right.15
[62] It should be noted that the principles underpinning contributions to costs differ
from those applicable to interim maintenance. Interim maintenance aims to preserve,
as far as reasonably possible, the parties' standard of living during the divorce
process. In contrast, a contribution to costs is intended to ensure equality of arms in
process. In contrast, a contribution to costs is intended to ensure equality of arms in
litigation. The focus is not on the historically imposed household lifestyle but on
12 Van Rippen v Van Rippen 1949 (4) SA 634 (C) at 637.
13 Dodo v Dodo 1990 (2) SA 77 (W).
14 AF v MF 2019 (6) SA 422 (WCC) para 40.
15 SH v MH 2023 (6) SA 279 (GJ) para 90.
19
whether the financially stronger spouse can and should fund the other's ability to
litigate effectively. In this case, the frugal lifestyle the respondent allegedly sought to
impose, despite having substantial means, is therefore not the relevant benchmark.
[63] The real questions are what level of legal representation the respondent can
afford and what contribution is required to enable the applicant to match it , at least to
a reasonable extent. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the main
dispute revolves around the composition and value of the accrual, as well as the
applicant's entitlement to it. These issues, if the conduct of the litigation so far is a
guide, are complex enough to necessitate the services of a skilled forensic
accountant.
[64] The Court must therefore decide whether the applicant has shown that she is
entitled to be placed in a position to effectively present her case, justified the extent
of litigation based on her financial circumstances, and then evaluate whether the
respondent is capable of paying such maintenance. Once this is established, the
Court must determine the amount to be awarded.16 The respondent did not appear to
object to paying for past costs, which is possible in certain circumstances under Rule
43,17 though he considers the bill of costs inflated. It is therefore for this Court to
determine the amounts
[65] In Senior v Senior 18 the following principles are summarised that courts must
take into account when determining an amount [references omitted]:
"(i) 'The test to be applied in considering the amount is that the plaintiff should be
placed in a position adequately to present her case.'
(ii) 'The fact that respondent may be wealthy does not entitle the wife to unlimited
spending, there being a difference between what she wants and what she needs.'
(iii) What is 'adequate' would depend on the nature of the litigation, the scale on
(iii) What is 'adequate' would depend on the nature of the litigation, the scale on
which the husband is litigating and the scale upon which she intends to litigate, with
due regard being had to the husband's financial position.
16 See IR v HR [2020] ZAGPJHC 52 from para 8 onwards.
17 Z G v J G (77979/2018) [2024] ZAGPPHC 7.
18 Senior v Senior 1999 (4) SA 955 (W) para 9.
20
(iv) The applicant is not entitled to all her costs of the trial but merely a 'contribution
towards' her costs up to, as previously stated, the first day of the trial.
(v) There appears to me to be no reason in logic or equity that such a contribution
should be limited to disbursements only and to exclude therefrom the attorney's
reasonable fees."
[66] While the matter may require further investigation to establish the true extent
of the respondent's accrual and to resolve the disputes concerning the Linksfield
house, it should also be noted that this dispute, despite the hostility, is capable of
resolution through mediation. However, this does not mean that the applicant is
disqualified from receiving a contribution towards costs until mediation has been
attempted. Rule 43 exists to provide effective interim relief, not to leave a financially
weaker spouse without means while awaiting a process that may or may not
succeed. Therefore, a contribution must be set on a rough ‑and‑ready basis. If the
matter is settled at or before trial certification, or if less is reasonably spent than the
amount currently ordered, any remaining balance can be considered or reimbursed
as part of the final costs or settlement arrangements.
[67] This is similar to the approach by Wilson AJ (as he then was) in MC v JC.19 A
Rule 43 court cannot be expected to scrutinise every line item, effectively conducting
a detailed assessment to determine what a party is entitled to or not. Instead, it must
make a pragmatic judgement of the contribution reasonably required to prevent
substantial prejudice and to secure a measure of equality of arms pending trial.
[68] The applicant's demand for R827 799,19 in respect of costs already incurred,
together with a further amount approaching R4,3 million to trial certification and the
first day of trial, plainly overshoots what can be justified at this stage. The
respondent, for his part, tenders R500 000 towards arrear costs and R 300 000
towards future costs.
towards future costs.
[69] Bearing in mind both the complexity of the accrual dispute (and the likely need
for a forensic accountant and counsel) and the respondent 's obligation also to fund
19 ZAGPJHC 373.
21
his own representation, I regard a contribution of R500 000 towards the applicant 's
costs already incurred as reasonable , especially because his bill thus far was
substantially less. Rule 43 refers to contribution s, not the full payment of costs. In
addition, and to ensure that the applicant can adequately challenge the issues in
dispute, I direct the respondent to pay a further R 400 000 as a contribution towards
the applicant's future legal costs up to the stage of trial certification. This is intended,
on a rough -and-ready basis, to allow her to retain appropriate representation and
necessary expert assistance to bring the matter to that point ; it is not a licence to
litigate without regard to cost.
[70] If the main action is settled before the trial certification stage, or if the
applicant's reasonable legal costs up to that stage are in fact less than the
contribution now ordered, any unexpended funds must be repaid to the respondent.
Any question whether the applicant 's attorneys have overcharged is best left for
determination, if necessary, on taxation after the main action has been finalised. To
ensure that this can be done, t he costs of this Rule 43 application shall be costs in
the cause.
[71] The prayers for any contribution to costs between trial certification and the
first day of trial, and for a contribution to the costs of the trial itself, are postponed
sine die.
[72] The applicant also seeks repayment of R285 171,25 said to have been
borrowed from her father to fund counsel’s fees in this application. In light of the
contribution I grant here below in respect of past legal costs, that amount is
subsumed within the broader contribution order and does not warrant separate,
itemised relief at this stage. Any residual indebtedness between the applicant and
her father is a matter to be regulated inter partes or addressed when the parties’
patrimonial claims are finally settled or determined.
patrimonial claims are finally settled or determined.
[73] It has already been stated that the costs of this Rule 43 application will be
costs in the cause of the main action. The allocation of those costs will be for the trial
court to determine. In making this determination, the trial judge may consider that
both parties retained senior and junior counsel, and that neither can be categorised
22
as entirely successful in the interlocutory application. This consideration serves
merely as guidance; the trial court retains full discretion regarding the allocation of
costs.
Order
[74] Accordingly, the following order is made:
1. Maintenance Pendente Lite:
1.1. The respondent shall pay R11,325.00 per month as maintenance for the
applicant into her Standard Bank account, number 4[...]. The first payment
shall be made on or before the first day of the month following the granting
of this order, and thereafter on or before the first day of each succeeding
month, pro rata for the month in which this order is granted.
1.2. The applicant shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of the motor
vehicle, being a Volkswagen T -Cross, registration number J[...] ("the
applicant's motor vehicle"), which vehicle is registered in the respondent's
name.
1.3. S[...] A[...] C[...] ("S[...]") shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of the
motor vehicle , being a Kia Rio, registration number C[...] ("S[...]'s motor
vehicle"), which vehicle is registered in the respondent's name.
1.4. R[...] L[...] C[...] ("R[...]") shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of the
motor vehicle , being a Toyota Yaris, registration number H[...] ("R[...]'s
motor vehicle"), which vehicle is registered in the respondent's name.
1.5. The respondent shall pay the monthly costs in respect of the applicant's
motor vehicle, including insurance, tracking, licence fees and the
reasonable cost of fuel. "Reasonable" in this context means corresponding
to the average monthly fuel expenditure over the 12 months preceding this
order.
23
1.6. The respondent shall pay the monthly costs in respect of S[...] and R[...]'s
motor vehicles that are registered in the respondent's name, including
insurance, tracking, licence fees and the reasonable cost of fuel.
"Reasonable" in this context means corresponding, in broad terms, to the
average monthly fuel expenditure over the 12 months preceding this order.
1.7. Traffic fines incurred in respect of the applicant’s/S[...]’s/R[...]’s motor
vehicle shall be for the account of the driver at the time of the offence and
shall be paid within 30 days of notification of the fine. Any arrears of fines
must be paid by the driver at the time of the offence, within 30 days of this
order.
1.8. The respondent shall pay R8,625.00 per month as maintenance into the
aforesaid account in respect of S[...], a dependent major son, on the same
terms as set out in paragraph 1.
1.9. The respondent shall pay R8,925.00 per month as maintenance into the
aforesaid account in respect of R[...], a dependent major son, on the same
terms as set out in paragraph 1 above.
1.10. The amounts payable in terms of paragraphs 1, 8 and 9 above shall
increase annually on the anniversary of the date of the granting of this order
in accordance with the average increase in the Consumer Price Index
during the preceding year, as published by Statistics South Africa.
1.11. The respondent shall pay the following costs in respect of 3[...] F[...]
Avenue, Linksfield North ("the matrimonial home") directly to third parties to
whom such costs are owed, within 7 days of presentation of an invoice:
1.11.1. Rates and taxes;
1.11.2. Electricity, water and refuse removal charges provided that such
charges fall within 10% of the average charges for the past 12
months;
1.11.3. Levies;
1.11.4. Security and alarm;
24
1.11.5. Insurance premiums for household contents at the properties;
1.11.6. Wi-Fi;
1.11.7. TV licence;
1.11.8. The reasonable costs of replacement and repairs of household
appliances, limited to R500, unless agreed with, and arranged by
the respondent;
1.11.9. The reasonable costs of household, garden and swimming pool
maintenance and repairs as agreed with, and arranged by the
respondent;
1.11.10. The reasonable costs of pet food and veterinary expenses of all the
pets; and
1.11.11. The food and salaries of two domestic assistants employed by the
applicant.
1.12. The respondent shall pay the following expenses within 7 days of receipt of
invoice:
1.12.1. The tertiary educational costs for S[...] and R[...] until they complete
their degrees;
1.12.2. The premiums required to retain the applicant, S[...] and R[...] as
dependants on the respondent's hospital plan;
1.12.3. The medical and related expenses incurred by the applicant, S[...]
and R[...], which are not covered by the respondent's medical
aid/hospital plan, save for R[...]'s ADD medication, which shall
remain the applicant's responsibility;
1.12.4. The monthly costs of fuel for S[...] and R[...] on presentation of
invoice; and
1.12.5. Uber transportation costs in the amounts of R250.00 per month for
the applicant, R250.00 per month for S[...], and R250.00 per month
for R[...].
1.12.6. The tuition costs and necessary prescribed course material for
S[...] and R[...], upon presentation to the respondent of the invoices
issued by the relevant university, together with the official
examination results for each semester as they become available.
25
1.13. The respondent shall contribute R60,000.00 per annum towards the holiday
costs of the applicant, S[...], and R[...], payable within 7 days of the
applicant submitting invoices for accommodation, airfare, or other travel
expenses.
2. The respondent shall pay a contribution towards the applicant's legal costs as
follows:
2.1. R500,000.00 in respect of legal costs already incurred;
2.2. R400,000.00 up to the stage of trial certification.
2.3. In the event of the main action being settled before the trial certification
stage, or if the applicant's reasonable legal costs up to that stage are in fact
less than the contribution ordered in paragraph 14.2, any unexpended funds
shall be repaid to the respondent.
2.4. The applicant's claims for a contribution to costs between trial certification
and the first day of trial, and for a contribution to the costs of the trial itself,
are postponed sine die.
3. The costs of this Rule 43 application , including the costs of two counsel so
employed, shall be costs in the cause.
____________________________
WJ du Plessis
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
Date of hearing:
21 and 22 January 2026
Date of judgment:
10 February 2026
For the applicant:
RR Rosenberg SC and D Block,
instructed by Ian Levitt Attorneys
For the respondent:
L Segal SC and T Lipshitz, instructed by
Deanne Kahn Attorneys