IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
CASE NO: 2026-024184
In the matter between:
LIBERTY FIGHTERS NETWORK First applicant
REYNO DAWID DE BEER N.O. Second applicant
and
PREMIER OF THE WESTERN CAPE, First respondent
MR. ALAN WINDE N.O., OR HIS
SUCCESSOR IN TITLE
SPEAKER OF THE WESTERN CAPE Second respondent
PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT, MR.
DAYLIN MITCHELL N.O., OR HIS
SUCCESSOR IN TITLE
WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL Third respondent
MINISTER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, MR.
ANTON BREDELL N.O., OR HIS
2
SUCCESSOR IN TITLE
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE ENVIRONMENT
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF Fourth respondent
THE ENVIRONMENT
SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL PARKS Fifth respondent
CAPE NATURE Sixth respondent
CITY OF CAPE TOWN METROPOLITAN Seventh respondent
MUNICIPALITY
CHAIRPERSON OF CAPE PENINSULA Eighth respondent
BABOON MANAGEMENT JOINT TASK
TEAM, MR. ROBERT McGAFFIN N.O.,
OR HIS SUCCESSOR IN TITLE
JUDITH ANNE SOLE Ninth respondent
WILDLIFE ANIMAL PROTECTION Tenth respondent
FORUM OF SOUTH AFRICA
BABOON ADVISORY GROUP Eleventh respondent
Heard: 19 February 2026
Delivered: 25 February 2026
3
JUDGMENT
HOLDERNESS, J
[1] Litigation is not a game.
[2] The repeated admonishments by various courts, including the Supreme Court of
Appeal (“SCA”), have, however, not had any impact on Liberty Fighters Network ( “LFN”),
nor its alter ego, Mr. Reyno Dawid de Beer (Mr. R de Beer) , who appears intent on treating
our courts as a playground.
[3] The first applicant, described in the founding affidavit as ‘well-known voluntary
association, referred to as a common law universitas ’, specialising in advancing social justice
on the grassroots operating as a non-governmental organisation with perpetual succession and
without an eye on gain, existence separate from its members and ability to own property in its
own name with a common cause amongst its members clearly identified in its Constitution,
[4] The applicants seek relief in two parts. In Part A, it seeks the following urgent interim
relief:
(a) Confirmation of LFN’s representation by the second applicant, Mr. Reyno de Beer
N.O., and permission for the applicants to bring the application in their own
capacities, in the interests of LFN members and the public.
(b) An interim interdict restraining the third respondent, the Premier of the Western Cape
(“the Premier”), and the fifth to eighth respondents, from taking any steps to
implement the Final Cape Peninsula Baboon Management Action Plan dated 31
October 2025 (“the Action Plan”) insofar as such steps are permanent, irreversible, or
create a fait accompli, including, inter alia:
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(i) Capture, removal, relocation, or confinement of baboon troops.
(ii) Vasectomy or reproductive interventions.
(iii)Euthanasia or lethal control of baboons.
(iv) Conclusion of agreements concerning baboon sanctuaries or
enclosures.
(v) Construction or installation of infrastructure for sanctuary
confinement.
(c) Directing that the respondents, within ten court days, deliver affidavits and records
detailing every decision, the identity of each decision -maker, dates of each decision,
reasons, and/or authorisations related to the Action Plan.
(d) In terms of Part B, the applicant seeks final orders:
(i) Declaring that the failure of the Premier, and where applicable the second
respondent and the third respondents, to ‘operationalise’ the Office of the
Commissioner for the Environment constitutes conduct ‘ constitutes conduct
inconsistent with the constitutional obligation to perform constitutional
duties diligently and without delay.’
(ii) Directing the Premier to appoint a suitable man or woman, after a proper
public participation process, to fill the Fourth Respondent within ninety
(90) days of this order; alternatively, take all steps necessary to ensure the
lawful appointment of either a man or woman to fill the Fourth
Respondent by no later than 1 June 2026, and to file a report under oath
with this Court within thirty (30) days thereafter, setting out in detail:
(1) the steps taken to comply with this order;
(2) the applicable appointment process and timeline; and
(3) the reasons for any delay or inability to comply sooner.
(iii) Granting leave to the Applicants, upon filing of the report referred to in
paragraph 10 supra, alternatively on failure of the First Respondent to
comply with Item 10 supra, to re-enrol the matter on the same papers,
duly supplemented, if necessary, for this Court's consideration of the
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report and the granting of further and/or alternative relief, including
structural, supervisory, or compliance-directed orders.
(iv) Directing the Premier to appoint a suitable individual to the Office of the
Commissioner within 90 days or by 1 June 2026, with a report under oath
detailing compliance steps.
(v) Leave for the Applicants to re -enrol the matter for further relief if the First
Respondent fails to comply.
(vi) Declaring that the agreement establishing the Cape Peninsula Baboon
Management Joint Task Team (the JTT) and the Action Plan is invalid or
unlawful, with an alternative order for the Commissioner to investigate the
legality of the agreement once the office is operationalised.
(vii) Confirmation of the rule nisi issued under Part A.
[5] I am indebted to Ms. O’Sullivan SC and Ms de Villiers (who appeared on behalf of
the sixth and seventh respondents) and Mr. de Beer (who appeared for the fifth respondent)
for the detailed and well -researched heads of arguments which have been of great assistance
in adjudicating this urgent application and in drafting this judgment.
[6] Recent genetic assessments suggest that Chacma baboons have lived in the Cape
Peninsula for almost 2 million years.1
[7] Due to i ncreasing human population and urban sprawl , the Cape Peninsula baboon
population experiences high levels of human-baboon conflict.2
[8] Since 2023, three authorities from the three spheres of government, namely the fifth
respondent, South African National Parks (“SANParks”), the sixth respondent
(“CapeNature”) and the seventh respondent ( “the City of Cape T own or the City ”), have
collaborated through the JTT to manage the Cape Peninsula Chacma baboon (baboon)
population sustainably.
1 Dubay, S. (2018) “Behavioural and physiological responses of chacma baboons (Papio ursinus) to wildfire in
the Cape Peninsula of South Africa” FitzPatrick Institute of African Ornithology, Department of Biological
Sciences, University of Cape Town. Available at: https://ncc-group.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2022/10/thesis_sci_2018_dubay_shannon.pdf.
2 Id.
6
[9] On 6 July 2023, a Memorandum of Agreement (“the MOA”) was signed. This marked
a historical milestone in cooperative governance among the three authorities , allowing for
collaborative governance in baboon management in the Cape Peninsula.
[10] In September 2023 , after extensive public and stakeholder participation, including
expert reviews, the Baboon Strategic Management Plan (“the BSMP”) was finalised.
[11] The BSMP aims to sustainably manage the baboon population and includes a Baboon
Advisory Group for stakeholder engagement.
[12] The Action Plan was adopted on 20 November 2025, detailing practical
implementation measures for the BSMP, including population control methods such as
translocation, contraception and sterilisation, and, as a last resort, euthanasia.
[13] The applicants seek to halt the implementation of the Final Baboon Management
Action Plan and to interdict inter alia the capture, relocation, and euthanasia of baboons.
[14] The Baboon Advisory Group ( “BAG”) was created to facilitate stakeholder
engagement and support the implementation of the BSMP. Its inaugural meeting was held on
12 February 2025 . Members include representatives from communities, academic
institutions, and animal welfare organisations.
The Action Plan
[15] The Action Plan , which was finali sed by the JTT after extensive stakeholder
engagement and expert review , outlines management actions for baboon populations from
November 2025 to November 2030, based on scientific principles.
[16] As elaborated in t he Action Plan , there are thirteen baboon troops on the Cape
Peninsula. The Action Plan sets out management measures to be implemented and measures
to manage the baboon population at sustainable levels, with upper limits set for the south and
north subpopulations based on population capacity figures.
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[17] Appended to the Action Plan is the implementation schedule, which includes a budget
for action items, with significant financial allocations , and includes critical measures to
manage baboon populations and to mitigate human-baboon conflict. The LFN failed to place
this highly relevant appendix for the purposes of Part A. I agree with Ms. O’ Sullivan, who
appeared for Cape Nature and the City of Cape Town, that this failure constitutes a serious
omission on the part of the applicants.
[18] Key measures in the Action Plan include the e stablishment of a northern fence (from
Zwaanswyk to Constantia Nek) to prevent baboons from accessing urban areas, with a budget
of R17 million, and the relocation of Constantia Nek troops into the Table Mountain National
Park, which is planned for May 2026. These are the aspects of the Action Plan which appear
to be the most implicated in terms of the urgent interdictory relief sought.
[19] A baboon sanctuary is to be constructed near Cape Point Reserve, with a budget of
R10 million for infrastructure and operational costs.
[20] The legal authority of Cape Nature and other stakeholders in the management of
baboons is outlined in the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004
(the “Biodiversity Act”), which provides for biodiversity conservation and management.
The applicants’ case for interim relief
[21] The applicants are seeking to stop what they describe as a ‘permanent and irreversible
shift in how baboons are managed on the Cape Peninsula.
[22] The applicants raise the following three primary legal arguments to contest the plan:
(a) The JTT lacks the legal standing and statutory authority to make these decisions.
(b) No ‘identifiable, lawful administrative decisions’ have been taken by the proper
authorities to authorise such ‘extreme measures.’
(c) The executive’s failure to ‘operationalise’ the office of the Environmental
Commissioner, a position mandated by the provincial constitution but currently
Commissioner, a position mandated by the provincial constitution but currently
vacant or non-functional, is a breach of its constitutional mandate
8
Urgency
[23] The principles governing urgency are well-established3:
a. An applicant must set out explicitly the circumstances which render the
application urgent.
b. Urgency must not be self-created or subjectively perceived.
c. The prejudice to the respondent caused by the abridged time limits is relevant.
d. Prompt action by an applicant favours a finding of urgency.
[24] The alleged urgency in this matter , according to the applicants, is that, the JTT has
explicitly stated it will proceed with implementation regardless of the pending legal
complaints and has refused to pro vide an undertaking that they w ill not take ‘ irreversible
steps’ in the interim.
[25] The applicants contend that w ithout a n interdict, baboons may be sterili sed or
euthanised before the adjudication of the applicant’s case , rendering any future final order
nugatory.
[26] The applicants state they are not acting as ‘armchair conservationists’, nor seeking to
dictate policy choices, but are raising procedural issues, namely that these weighty decisions
must be made by lawfully empowered bodies using proper administrative channels with
appropriate oversight.
[27] SANParks, Cape Nature and the City of Cape Town, unsurprisingly, deny that the
matter is urgent and contend that any alleged urgency is manifestly of the applicants’ own
making. They submit that the matter should accordingly be struck from the roll, with costs.
[28] The respondents highlight the fact that the applicants have unduly delayed, since
2023, in bringing their application against the MOA and BMSP, and should have done so
after the adoption of the BSMP more than two and a half years ago. The BSMP and 2019
3 See e.g., East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZAGPJHC 196, IL &
B Marcow Caterers (Pty) Ltd v Greatermans SA Ltd and another 1981 (4) SA 108 (C) at 112H-113A.
9
guidelines contain the very management tools which the applicants seek to interdict under the
Action Plan.
[29] In this regard, it bears emphasising that there is no direct attack in the application on
the Action Plan. As Cape Nature and the City point out, LFN has not pleaded any basis for
the implicated steps in the Action Plan to be halted in light of its complaint.
[30] The Action Plan is dated 31 October 2025 . T he joint statement was issued on 20
November 2025. The management actions are to be implemented in terms thereof between
November 2025 and November 2030. Material steps under the Action Plan have already been
implemented in the three months since November 2025 and are ongoing.
[31] In a letter to the respondents dated 28 November 2025 and marked ‘very urgent’, LFN
sought a ‘moratorium’.
[32] Importantly, in a response dated 8 December 2025, the JTT declined to agree thereto,
but provided LFN with a copy of the MOA and indicated that the JTT was available to meet
with LFN. Yet LFN still did not approach the Court, nor did it meet with the JTT.
[33] I agree with the respondents that there is no answer for LFN to rely on the submission
of the complaint on 9 December 2025, and the JTT not agreeing to halt implementation
pending the appointment of the Environment Commissioner , and the investigation by such
commissioner of its complaint. One of the grounds of LFN’s complaint is that there has been
no Environment Commissioner since 1997.
[34] The application in casu was filed electronically on 5 February 2026, more than three
months after the date of the final Action Plan. The respondents were afforded approximately
two days to prepare their answering papers. The applicants have failed to explain the delay,
the basis for the greatly truncated and highly prejudicial timetable, given the far-reaching
interdictory relief sought.
[35] Adv de Beer, who appeared on behalf of SANParks, contended that the urgent court
[35] Adv de Beer, who appeared on behalf of SANParks, contended that the urgent court
must not be abused (a trend which is becoming all too common, of late ), and emphasised that
it is not for litigants who delay, craft impossible timelines and then demand interdictory
relief.
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[36] I would pause to note that it is more s o when litigation involves state functionaries
and the use of public funds.
[37] Fisher J recently examined the issue of self-created urgency4:
‘[32] Self-created urgency implies more than mere delay. It often involves a
degree of contrivance and abuse of process.
[33] When a party fails to approach a court at the earliest possible opportunity and then delays
unduly to approach court, he risks not affording a party’s opposition sufficient time to place its case
before the court. This may cause prejudice to a respondent and will necessarily impact upon the
urgent court’s ability to properly manage its roll which in turn undermines the proper administration
of justice.
[34] It is expected of litigants to react immediately to remedy or prevent harm
and/or prejudice, rather than standing back and doing nothing until it is too late.
[35] This is why our Courts have, in appropriate circumstances, held that a party who creates his
own urgency is not entitled to urgent relief.’
[38] SANParks submits, correctly in my view, that the present application is a classi c case
of self-created urgency.
[39] The applicants failed to provide an adequate explanation for their delay.
[40] In the founding affidavit, the applicants rely on a letter written by the JTT dated 21
January 2026. I agree with SANParks that this is contrived. The applicants knew in
November 2025 that the Action Plan would be adopted.
[41] For the first time in reply, the applicants claim that as the signature page of the Action
Plan reflects that it was signed in January 2026 , this is the start of the ‘operative approval’ of
the Action Plan.
[42] The applicants are not permitted to make out their case for urgency in reply.
Moreover, what they fail to take into account is that the Joint Statement to the Action Plan
itself, published on 20 November 2025, records it was ‘finalised and adopted’ by the three
itself, published on 20 November 2025, records it was ‘finalised and adopted’ by the three
organs of state, and the version under oath of SANParks, Cape Nature and the City that it was
4 Carrim v Madlanga N.O (2026/017082) [2026] ZAGPJHC 83 (5 February 2026).
11
adopted earlier, in October 2025, notwithstanding the fact that it was formally signed in
January 2026. This evidence of the respondents cannot be gainsaid by the applicants.
[43] The applicants are not ordinary lay litigants. They have litigated in our courts in
numerous matters over several years. They are serial litigants and are well-versed in the rules
regarding urgency.
[44] A mere month before this application was launched , the Gauteng High Court5
criticised them for creating their own urgency and admonished them to revisit the well -
established legal principles regarding urgency. It seems that this (and several pr evious
warnings and criticisms by our courts) fell on deaf ears.
[45] Lastly, SANParks submits that the manner in which the applicants have approached
the urgent court, their delays and the impossible timelines which they unilaterally imposed on
the respondents, is an abuse that warrants censure.
[46] In Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd;
Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Hawker Aviation Services Partnership
and Others6 the SCA held that:
‘Urgency is a reason that may justify deviation from the times and forms the rules prescribe.
It relates to form, not substance, and is not a prerequisite to a claim for substantive relief.
Where an application is brought on the basis of urgency, the rules of court permit a court (or a
judge in chambers) to dispense with the forms and service usually required, and to dispose of
it ‘as to it seems meet’ (Rule 6(12)(a)). This in effect permits an urgent applicant, subject to
the court’s control, to forge its own rules 3 (which must ‘as far as practicable be in accordance
with’ the rules). Where the application lacks the requisite element or degree of urgency, the
court can for that reason decline to exercise its powers under Rule 6(12)(a). The matter is then
not properly on the court’s roll, and it declines to hear it. The appropriate order is generally to
strike the application from the roll. This enables the applicant to set the matter down again, on
proper notice and compliance.’
5 Liberty Fighters Network and Another v Registrar of the High Court, Gauteng Division, Pretoria and
Another (2022/030165; 2022/30280; 2022/030165) [2026] ZAGPPHC 4 (2 January 2026) para 13.
6 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner for South
African Revenue Service v Hawker Aviation Services Partnership and Others (379/05) [2006] ZASCA 51; 2006
(4) SA 292 (SCA); [2006] 2 All SA 565 (SCA); 68 SATC 141 (31 March 2006) at para 9.
12
[47] Having considered the parties’ submissions , whilst I am persuaded that any urgency
which may exist is indeed self -created, to strike the matter from the roll is likely to result in
the applicants re -enrolling it on a semi -urgent basis or on the ordinary opposed roll, unduly
burdening another court with having to revisit the same facts and entertain the same
arguments. This is clearly not in the interests of justice, in the particular circumstances of this
case.
[48] This tension is apparent in several urgent applications which are presented in this
division, and Judges hearing such matters are frequently confronted with the re -enrolment
conundrum. If, however, courts hear such matters in the fast lane , as the merits have been
considered and the affidavits filed under considerable time pressure, it may create an
environment where litigants ‘take their chances’ and effectively jump the queue ahead of
more deserving and genuinely urgent matters . Courts find themselves in an unenviable
position in deciding how best to deal with these matters in the interests of justice and to
prevent the abuse of process and the burdening of our already overburdened court system.
[49] In the present matter, the record exceeds 1000 pages. It would be a patent waste of
judicial resources and public funds (in respect of legal fees incurred by the state functionary
respondents) if this matter were to be struck, as it properly ought to be, only to be re -enrolled
a month or two later before another judge.
[50] A court may choose to express its displeasure with this unacceptable approach to
litigation is by proceeding to adjudicate the merits and awarding punitive costs against an
applicant. This will hopefully have a deterrent effect on other litigants who approach the
urgent court in such a manner . This practice, which seems to be growing every day, is to be
deprecated in the strongest possible terms.
deprecated in the strongest possible terms.
[51] In my view, the applicant has failed to establish grounds for urgency, and any urgency
which may exist is of its own making. For the reasons which will appear below, in the
circumstances of this case , I am , however, of the view that , in the interests of justice , the
matter should be fully adjudicated on the merits. I will revert to the issue of costs below.
The grounds of opposition and evaluation
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[52] The respondents contend that the applicants have overlooked the constitutional and
statutory mandate for the three organs of state , which are obliged to adhere to principles of
co-operative government, to work together.
[53] In both the Biodiversity Act and the National Environmental Management Act 107 of
1998 (“NEMA”) the Legislature emphasises that environmental decisions should involve
intergovernmental co-ordination.
[54] Section 2 of the NEMA principles requires intergovernmental harmoni sation of
policies and actions when those actions significantly affect the environment.
[55] The fifth, sixth and seventh respondents ( “the respondents”) assert that they have the
necessary legal standing and authority to enter into the 2023 MOA, the BSMP, and the
associated Action Plan. This cannot be disputed by the applicants.
[56] The City’s duties and obligations, including baboon management, are anchored in
specific legislation. In terms of Sections 152 & 153 of the Constitution, the City must provide
services sustainably and promote a safe and healthy environment, subject to its financial and
administrative capacity.
[57] In its answering papers , the City emphasised that the applicants are effectively
seeking to strip the City of its executive discretion regarding how to order and spend public
resources, and that the 2023 MOA is fully sanctioned by the Constitution and relevant
environmental legislation.
Community and financial impact of unmanaged troops
[58] Cape Nature and the City argued that g ranting the interdict would have significant
negative consequences for both baboons and human communities , as key actions such as the
construction of the northern fence and relocation of troops would be indefinitely delayed, and
human-baboon conflict is likely to increase , as past data shows higher mortality rates when
management measures are not implemented.
14
[59] Significantly, the Action Plan aims to exhaust non -lethal management options before
considering culling, which would be a last resort.
[60] The respondents emphasised that the unmanaged baboon troops pose significant
welfare harms to both the animals and local communities.
[61] Moreover, the interdict sought would result in unaffordable and ineffective
management alternatives for the baboon population , such as fencing in Simon’s Town, which
is estimated to cost over R40 million and take a minimum of four years to implement.
According to the respondents , the likelihood of poor outcomes from fencing in this area
makes it a non-viable option.
[62] An insurmountable obsta cle for the applicants is their failure to plead or prove the
requirements for an interim interdict, which do not require repeating, and of which the
applicants have been informed.
[63] The applicants have failed to set out, in either their founding or their replying
affidavits, what right or rights they seek to protect with an interdict.
[64] Their application must fail on this ground alone. For the reasons set forth below, I
nevertheless intend adjudicating the further issues raised in respect of Part A.
[65] Turning now to the requirement of irreparable harm, a s SANParks points out, at best,
the applicants contend that there may be irreparable harm if the respondents implement the
Action Plan, pending the complaint to the non -existent provincial official. But the applicants
do not show how the non -existent official could offer relief to them , undoing the Action Plan
in due course. In addition to the fact that the office of the Environment Commissioner
appears never to have been given effect to, or at the very least not for the past 30 years.
[66] Furthermore, the applicants have failed to show that they are left with no alternative
remedy but to approach this court for urgent interdictory relief. They could have become
remedy but to approach this court for urgent interdictory relief. They could have become
involved in the public participation and consultation process , which was undertaken in the
development and adoption of the Action Plan , but failed to do so. Nor did they meet with the
JTT when they were expressly invited to do so in December 2025. There were alternative,
satisfactory remedies available to the applicants. They, for reasons they have failed to
15
disclose, chose not to avail themselves of such remedies. They have accordingly failed to
satisfy this further requirement for interim interdictory relief.
Is the interdict final in effect?
[67] The respondents contend that the interdict sought is in effect a final interdict, as:
(a) There are negligible prospects of success in respect of any of the relief sought in
Part B.
(b) The Part B relief will take a lengthy, and possibly indeterminate time to be
determined.
(c) If the relief aimed at the appointment of an Environment Commissioner does
not succeed, the interdict will remain in place indefinitely as the LFN complaint
will never be finalised. Even if that component of the Part B relief succeeds,
there will still be considerable delay in the LFN complaint actually being
determined, and there is no certainty that the Environment Commissioner, if
ultimately appointed, would investigate the complaint.
[68] Even if the applicants had pleaded a case which supported interdictory relief, the
further hurdle they face is that , on the objective evidence of SANParks, Cape Nature and the
City, an interdict would halt essential aspects necessary for the effective management of
baboons in the Cape Peninsula.
[69] The BMSP sets out how baboon -human conflict has escalated over the years. Proper
intervention and careful management are required. This is being undertaken in terms of the
MOA, BSMP and Action Plan, with consultation and expert input. This is what the applicants
seek to interdict, in circumstances where they have failed to lay any basis entitling them to
intervene.
16
[70] Due to the time constraints under which this judgment has been prepared, it is n ot
practicable to set out the evidence set forth by the three authorities regarding their statutory
obligations and standing to take such steps. I am , however, satisfied that they have shown, in
the clearest terms , their respective statutory mandates to manage fauna and , in particular ,
baboons in the Cape Peninsula.
[71] I agree that the interdict is properly characterised as one for final relief. It is intended
to operate immediately and seeks to interdict conduct pending an indeterminate process
outside the court (and not pending final Rule 53 review relief as ordinarily would be the
case). It will therefore not be reconsidered by the Court under Part B.
[72] I am persuaded that significant harm will result if the interdict is granted. It will
effectively halt the construction of the northern fence and the relocation of the Constantia
troop, the establishment of the sanctuary, lethal culling (where absolutely necessary and as a
very last resort), and sterilisation.
[73] The evidence of the respondents makes it clear that the Constantia Troops and the
Seaforth and Waterfall Troops, which are highly habituated 7, no longer respond to non -lethal
deterrents. In areas where fencing cannot be feasibly implemented within an acceptable time
frame, removals are considered essentia l. When lethal management is reduced, the mortality
of baboons in urban areas increases.
[74] The inescapable and heartrending reality is that urban causes of death ( such as irate
residents shooting at baboons, motor vehicles and pets) are associated with suffering . Not
removing baboons humanely often results in their removal inhumanely.
[75] Moreover, what the applicants appear to have lost sight of is that the MOA and Acton
Plans do not confer on the JTT powers which the statutory body or bodies did not hold prior
thereto.
thereto.
7 Highly habituated baboo ns, particularly the Chacma baboon ( Papio ursinus) of the Cape Peninsula, are wild
primates that ha ve lost their fear of humans due to regular, close -proximity interaction and the constant
availability of anthropogenic food sources (garbage, gardens, houses). These animals have adapted to urban
environments, often abandoning natural foraging behaviours to raid homes, cars, and bins for high -calorie
human food. (ncbi.nlm.nih.gov).
17
[76] In terms of s 55(2) (d) and (e) of the National Environmental Managed Protected
Areas Act 57 of 2003 , SANParks may, in managing national parks (including the Table
Mountain National Park), or any other kind of protected area assigned to it by the Minister
has the control, ‘remove or eradicate any species or specimens of species which it considers
undesirable to protect and conserve in a park or that may negatively impact on the
biodiversity of the park , and to ‘ carry out any development and construct or erect any works
necessary for the management of a park, including roads, bridges, buildings, dams, fences,
breakwaters, seawalls, boathouses, landing stages, mooring places, swimming pools,
oceanariums and underwater tunnels.’
[77] As highlighted by the respondents, management of baboons on the Cape Peninsula is
a complex and polycentric matter requiring co-operation between the three authorities, which
have constitutional and statutory obligations within their competencies. In terms of the
Constitution, NEMA and the Biodiversity Act, t hey are obliged to cooperate to protect the
environment.
[78] The City and Cape Nature argue that the management of baboon populations is a
collaborative, holistic effort governed by a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).
[79] Under t he BSMP and the Action Plan, the three distinct authorities work
cooperatively, in collaboration with local communities via BAG.
[80] A primary concern is that the interdict suspending the implementation of the Action
Plan (for a protracted and indefinite period) would prevent the authorities from fulfilling their
respective constitutional and statutory duties and would intrude into their budgetary and
policy functions.
[81] The stark reality is that without the BSMP and the Action Plan , baboon management
by the authorities would be reduced to "limited, ineffectual and unaffordable means" . The
interdict, if granted, will lock baboons and people into ongoing conflict, with poor outcomes
interdict, if granted, will lock baboons and people into ongoing conflict, with poor outcomes
for the human and baboon populations in affected communities.
18
[82] In National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 8 the
Constitutional Court held that in applying the test for an interim interdict , the court must be
applied cognisant of the normative scheme and democratic principles that underpin the
Constitution. In respect of the balance of convenience, the Court may not fail to consider the
probable impact of the restraining order on the constitutional and statutory powers and duties
of the state functionary or organ of state against which the interim order is sought.9
[83] The Apex Court held10:
‘The balance of convenience enquiry must now carefully probe whether and to which extent
the restraining order will probably intrude into the exclusive terrain of another branch of
government. The enquiry must, alongside other relevant harm, have proper regard to what
may be called separation of powers harm. A court must keep in mind that a temporary
restraint against the exercise of statutory power well ahead of the final adjudication of a
claimant’s case may be granted only in the clearest of cases and after a careful consideration
of separation of powers harm.’
[84] The case advanced by the applicants is the antithesis of the ‘clearest of cases.’ To
grant an interdict in the terms sought would most certainly intrude into the exclusive terrain
of the three authorities, for all the reasons set forth above.
Legal standing of the applicants
[85] The test for legal standing or locus standi is governed by Section 38 of the
Constitution, which provides that anyone listed in the section has the right to approach a
competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been threatened or infringed.
[86] The persons listed in section 38 include:
86.1 Section 38 1(a): Anyone acting in their own interest (s 38 1(a)).
86.2 Section 38 1(d): Anyone acting in the public interest.
8 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) (OUTA), para 46
9 Id at para 46.
10 Para 47.
19
86.3 Section 38 1(e): An association acting in the interest of its members.
[87] Mr. R de Beer contends that both he and LFN hold a direct and substantial interest in
the relief sought, not only on behalf of themselves and their members, but also in the public
interest at large.
[88] The respondents deny that the applicants have any standing.
Section 38(a) - Own interest standing
[89] In Giant Concerts v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 11 the Constitutional
Court confirmed that ‘there is no broad or unqualified capacity to litigate against illegalities.
Something more must be shown.’
[90] While broader than the common law test for standing, under section 38(a) of the
Constitution, a party must ‘nevertheless show that his or her rights or interests are directly
affected by the challenged law or conduct.’12
[91] The applicants are based in Gauteng .13 As was pointed out in the answering affidavit
SANParks, they do not show how any of their rights or interests are impacted by the
implementation of the Action Plan in the Cape Peninsula. The only member of the applicant
whom we know lives in the Cape is Ms Judith Sole, who was cited as a respondent by the
applicants and who , in notices filed , aligned herself with the applicants’ cause. This is
addressed briefly below.
[92] LFN does not state how this case is consistent with its objectives. They do not plead
that any of the MOA, the BSMP or the Action Plan or any actions taken in terms thereof ,
directly and personally affects them. Mr. R de Beer does not allege that he owns property in
any of the baboon-affected areas. He resides in Gauteng.
11 Giant Concerts v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (3) BCLR 251 (CC) para 35 (“Giant
Concerts”).
12 Id para 41.
13 They even requested a virtual hearing for the matter.
20
[93] In Giant Concerts, the Constitutional Court emphasised that a n own-interest litigant
does not acquire standing from the invalidity of the challenged decision or law , but from the
effect it will have on his or her potential interests.14
[94] The applicants’ sole claim to standing is that the application ‘raises material
constitutional issues.’ The applicants fail to plead the source of the constitutional duty , nor
the breach or threatened breach of the Constitution or of a constitutional duty imposed on any
of the parties under NEMA or the Biodiversity Act.
[95] The applicants limited their ‘constitutional’ challenge to the failure to appoint an
Environment Commissioner. As submitted by Ms. O’Sullivan, the applicants’ belated attempt
to rely on section 32 (1) of NEMA 15 in the replying affidavit does not avail them. I have
disregarded any such averments made for the first time in reply.16
[96] The applicants are, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, prohibited from
placing direct reliance on the Constitution where specific and detailed legislation giving
effect to a right sought to be enforced has been enacted, in casu, NEMA and the Biodiversity
Act.
[97] By failing to demonstrate a failure of the Constitution or any applicable statutory
prohibitions that have caused them damage, the applicants have failed to establish standing
under section 38(a) of the Constitution.
Section 38(e) – Standing in the interests of the members of an association
[98] The applicants do not claim that the application is brought to advance the objectives
of LFN as set forth in its Constitution. The sole mention of the environment in the objectives
of LFN is in section 2(h), namely:
14 Giant Concerts at para 43.
15 32. Legal standing to enforce environmental laws (1) Any person or group of persons may seek appropriate
relief in respect of any breach or threatened breach of any provision of this Act, including a principle contained
in Chapter 1, or of any provision of a specific environmental management Act, or of any other statutory
provision concerned with the protection of the environment or the use of natural resources- (a) in that person's or
group of person's own interest; (b) in the interest of, or on behalf of, a person who is, for practical reasons,
unable to institute such proceedings; (c) in the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of persons whose
interests are affected; (d) in the public interest; and (e) in the interest of protecting the environment.
16 Pilane and Another v Pilane and Another 2013 (4) BCLR 431 (CC) at para 49.
21
‘to promote the aims of the LFN as promised in its Constitution and Manifesto: (i) to develop
and implement ecological policies consistent with the philosophical basis of the Organisation
as expressed in the policies for a sustainable society (ii) to that end to win seats at all levels of
government (iii) to organise any non-violent activity which will further these aims.’
[99] The relief sought does not constitute the development and implementation of
ecological policies and therefore does not fall within the ambit of LFN’s stated objectives.
[100] The applicants have accordingly failed to establish standing under section 38(e) of the
Constitution.
Section 38(d) – Standing in the interests of the public
[101] The final string to LFN’s l egal standing bow is that they are acting in the public
interest.
[102] When asked by the court on what basis the LFN claimed standing in the public
interest, Mr. R de Beer responded : ‘We represent the interests of the public of SA – whether
the matter takes place in Kruger National Park or in CT – it is my country, and I can approach
the court.’ If only, for the sake of the argument advanced by the applicants, this was the legal
position.
[103] In Lawyers for Human Rights and Other v Minister of Home Affairs and Other17 the
Constitutional Court set out the following18:
(a) Courts should be circumspect in affording public interest standing and require a
party to demonstrate they are genuinely acting in the public interest.
(b) A distinction must be made between the subjective position of a person or
organisation claiming to act in the public interest on the one hand, and whether it
is objectively speaking in the public interest for the particular proceedings to be
brought.
17 Lawyers for Human Rights and Other v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC).
18 At paras 16 – 18.
22
(c) Factors relevant to determining whether a person is genuinely acting in the public
interest will include:
(i) Whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which the
challenge can be brought.
(ii) The nature of the relief sought, and the extent to which it is of general and
prospective application.
(iii) The range and vulnerability of persons or groups who may be directly or
indirectly affected by any order made by the Court and the opportunity
that those persons or groups have had to present evidence and argument
to the Court.
[104] The high-water mark of the applicants’ case in their heads of argument regarding
standing in terms of s 38(e) is that ‘LFN’s Constitution, as pleaded, encompasses public -
interest protection including environmental governance, and LFN’s membership includes
directly affected persons and entities (including Monkey Valley and Ms Sole).’ Ms Sole’s
unusual role in these proceedings will be addressed briefly below.
[105] In the founding affidavit, LFN claims standing based on acting in the public interest
based primarily on various previous litigation in which it was involved (none of which are
remotely related to the present issues) and secondly on its ‘genuine and established record as
human rights activists, consistently acting in the interests of their members and the broader
public’.
[106] LFN cannot rely on previous cases for standing in this case. In each case, an applicant
must establish their locus standi in their founding papers, on the facts, and along
‘conventional lines’.19
[107] The applicants fail the test set out a bove. They have failed to plead and prove that no
other party could bring proceedings in relation to the lawfulness of the M OA, BSMP and the
Action Plan. SANParks points out that the applicants themselves identify a number of
persons who signed a letter by the Wildlife Animal Protection Forum South Africa
(“WAPFSA”), who could so act, as well as the ninth respondent (“Ms Sole”).
(“WAPFSA”), who could so act, as well as the ninth respondent (“Ms Sole”).
19 Tavakoli v Bantry Hills 2019 (3) SA 163 (SCA) para 26.
23
[108] I thus conclude that the applicants do not have legal standing to apply for the Part A
relief in terms of section 38(d) of the Constitution, nor in terms of section 38(a) or (e) thereof.
On this basis alone, the application for interim relief falls to be dismissed.
[109] Notwithstanding the fact that my finding that the applicants lack legal standing is
dispositive of the application before me, I have decided to deal with the various other issues
raised, which were addressed comprehensively in both oral and written submissions, as our
appeal courts have expressed the view20 that, even if a single issue may dispose of a matter, it
is desirable for a court to determine all of the issues before it.
Lack of authority of Mr. R de Beer to represent LFN
[110] A further order sought by the applicants is that it be confirmed that LFN be
represented by ‘the second applicant, its nominated official, Mr. Reyno de Beer N.O.’
[111] Authority to represent a juristic entity, such as a company or a voluntary association,
appears to be conflated with legal standing from time to time by practitioners and courts
alike.
[112] The institution of proceedings on behalf of a voluntary association must be properly
authorised by the members of such association. This is different from standing , which has
been dealt with exhaustively above.
[113] Mr. R de Beer relies on section 38(1)(e) of LFN’s Constitution as authorising him to
lodge the application in that he is ‘the head and chief directing officer of LFN, in consultation
with the NWC, and the leader of the Organisation who may also at any reasonable time
institute or defence legal proceedings.’
[114] On 9 February 2026 , the City and Cape Nature delivered a Rule 7(1) Notice in terms
of which the applicants were ‘required to file authority to prove that they have authority to
initiate these proceedings on behalf of the applicants.’
initiate these proceedings on behalf of the applicants.’
20 S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae) 2002
(6) SA 642 (CC) para 21; Maharaj and Others v Mandag Centre of Investigative Journalism NPC and Others
2018 (1) SA 471 (SCA) para 26; Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Somali Association of South Africa and
Another 2015 (3) SA 545 (SCA) para 18 , as recently cited by Saller AJ in Community Upliftment Projects v
Goodfind Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (2026/013973) [2026] ZAWCHC 47 (11 February 2026) para 25.
24
[115] The applicants’ response merely refers to the statement made under oath in the
founding affidavit that Mr. R de Beer consulted with the LFN’s National Working
Committee, and took a decision in terms of section 38(1)(e) of the Constitution to institute the
application. Mr. R d e Beer has not provided any details or documentary proof of that
consultation. He has also failed to produce a minute or resolution of LFN’s National Working
Committee authorising the proceedings.
[116] LFN has moreover failed to provide any information with respect to its membership.
There is no proof before me to establish that the application is being brought with the support
of its members, after consultation with the National Working Committee of LFN.
[117] The challenge to its authority w ould not have come as a surprise to the applicants. In
Liberty Fighters Network and Another v Registrar of the High Court, Gauteng Division,
Pretoria and Another 21 (“LFN Registrar case ”), similar relief was sought and denied .22 The
Court found that LFN failed to prove that it was authorised to represent LFN members in the
application. There were no minutes of meetings authorising Mr. R de Beer to act on behalf of
LFN’s members.
[118] In the Equality Court decision of Liberty Fighters Network v Core Computer Business
(Pty) Ltd and Others 23 (the “LFN Core Computer case”) the Court found that Mr. R de Beer
had not provided any discernible evidence to found and support his authority to institute and
prosecute the complaint on behalf of LFN, and that while the Constitution of the LFN in
section 38(1)(e) may afford the President the power ‘at any reasonable time [to] institute or
defend legal proceedings’ this does not inherently prove authority.
[119] The Court further found24 that this provision can never have the effect of empowering
the president of the LFN with unfettered power to act on behalf of its members and the
the president of the LFN with unfettered power to act on behalf of its members and the
general public interest, and that Mr. R De Beer had no legal authority to represent the public
interest.
21 Liberty Fighters Network and Another v Registrar of the High Court, Gauteng Division, Pretoria and Another
(2022/030165; 2022/30280; 2022/030165) [2026] ZAGPPHC 4 (2 January 2026).
22 Id para 13.
23 Liberty Fighters Network v Core Computer Business (Pty) Ltd and Others [24942+3/2022) [2024] ZAEGC 5
(12 August 2024).
24 Id at paras 14 to 16.
25
[120] In the LFN Registrar case, Mr. R de Beer also sought an order that he was authorised
to litigate on behalf of LFN on the basis that he was the President of LFN and that the
Constitution of LFN authorises him to litigate. 25 The Court found that Mr. R de Beer had not
provided any supporting proof that he is the president of LFN and that he was authorised to
litigate that specific application on behalf of LFN.26
[121] In the replying affidavit, Mr. R de Beer attempts to cure his lack of authority, stating
that ‘I have reduced my formal decision to institute this application to writing on the official
LFN letterhead” and annexes what he refers to as a written record of his decision, duly
signed, allegedly confirming that the institution of the application was authorised in his
capacity as President and executive official of LFN. This letter does not prove authority. The
applicants have still failed to produce any proof of consultation with the National Working
Committee, or indeed of who such committee is comprised of.
[122] Ms. Sole was cited in these proceedings as the ninth respondent, notwithstanding the
fact that she is the owner of Monkey Valley Resort , whom Mr. R de Beer purported to
represent in correspondence regarding the complaint against , inter alia, the implementation
of the Action Plan that preceded the litigation. The applicants also use her address (Monkey
Valley Resort) as the service address in the notice of motion.
[123] According to the applicants, Ms. Sole was cited in her personal capacity to ‘provide
further information to the court enabling it to reach a decision which is in the interest of the
public and justice’.
[124] Ms. Sole delivered a notice of intention to oppose in which she supported the relief
sought in Part A and a notice in terms of Rule 6(5)(d)(iii), in which she records she supports
the relief and wishes to make oral submissions.
[125] SANParks avers that it is inappropriate to cite friendly parties as respondents in
[125] SANParks avers that it is inappropriate to cite friendly parties as respondents in
litigation, who , in turn , deliver documents to support the relief sought. I agree. SANParks
also set out the following in the answer:
25 LFN Registrar para12.
26 Id.
26
‘Ms Sole appears to be self -represented. SANParks assumes she has been advised by the
applicants to participate in this manner. I call on the applicants to disclose to the Court their
interactions with Ms Sole in relation to the litigation and the notice she filed.’
[126] The applicants failed to respond.
[127] Ms. O’Sullivan submitted that proceeding in this manner has obvious procedural
disadvantages for the Cit y and CapeNature, with reference to the following observation by
De Waal AJ in Goldstar Finance (Pty) Ltd and Others v Capitec Bank (Pty) Ltd and
Another27:
‘To the above I want to add that if a respondent could “support” an applicant, it would
wreak havoc with the established basis on which factual disputes in motion proceedings are
determined, Plascon-Evans, in particular. Even in applications for interim relief, such as the
present one, where Plascon-Evans does not apply, the fundamental difficulty with considering
a supporting answering affidavit is that it allows an applicant to establish its case based on the
answering affidavit (instead of the founding affidavit). This is impermissible.’
[128] In motion proceedings, the practice of citing a party who supports the applicant as a
respondent may be a ploy to gain a tactical evidentiary advantage or to avoid being exposed
to an adverse costs order is to be deprecated.
[129] If Ms. Sole wishes to join forces with the applicants, she ought to have been properly
cited as a co -applicant. Her joinder as a respondent was clearly a stratagem to obtain an
unfair advantage over the other respondents. It remains unexplained and plainly amounts to
an abuse of the ordinary court process.
[130] Ms. Sole appeared in person at the hearing , and the distinct impression from the brief
submissions which she made is that she was not cognisant of her role in the proceedings or
why she had been cited as a respondent. Her repeated refrain was that the relief sought in Part
A would result in an ‘ environmental catastrophe.’ He could not take the matter further than
that and indicated that she wishes to be afforded an opportunity to file an affidavit.
27 Goldstar Finance (Pty) Ltd and Others v Capitec Bank (Pty) Ltd and Another (16589/23) [2023] ZAWCHC
336; [2024] 1 All SA 727 (WCC) (31 December 2023) (“Goldstar”) at para 52 and the authorities there cited.
27
[131] As she had by then had ample opportunity to do so , and in view of the urgency with
which these proceedings had been launched, and the irregular manner in which she had been
joined, I declined to afford her further time to do so.
[132] On the last procedural point, it appears from the affidavits of the City and Cape
Nature that he provided text argues that the Cape Baboon Partnership, a branch of Shark
Spotters, is a necessary party to the litigation whose absence constitutes non-joinder.
[133] The partnership is currently operating under an existing agreement with the City of
Cape Town that commenced on 1 January 2025 to assist in implementing the Baboon
Strategic Management Plan. According to the Action Plan and its implementation schedule,
the partnership is assigned specific, material operational roles, including the construction and
management of the northern fence, the relocation of the Constantia Troops, and the
management of the sanctuary. Because the City has budgeted substantial funds for these tasks
and is currently finalising an addendum to their agreement, the partnership holds a clear
financial and operational stake in the continuity of the plan.
[134] It appears from the foregoing that the Cape Baboon Partnership has a direct and
substantial interest in the relief sought in Part A , which seeks to interdict steps under the
Action Plan, and should properly have been joined as a party to these proceedings.28
[135] In prayer 7 of the Notice of Motion , LFN seeks an order directing the Environment
MEC, the City, CapeNature and SANParks to deliver , within ten court days , separate
affidavits under oath disclosing inter alia their records pertaining to decisions relied upon as
lawful authority to implement the Final Action Plan and permits and authorisations, including
any CapeNature permitting process.
[136] Ms. O’Sullivan emphasised that LFN has not brought a direct challenge against the
[136] Ms. O’Sullivan emphasised that LFN has not brought a direct challenge against the
Action Plan , nor the BSMP or the existing guidelines , despite having access to all these
documents, and in circumstances where the BSMP and existing guidelines are appended to
the Action Plan, and their purpose and content are fully explained.
28 For the test as to whether there has been a non -joinder see Moshewu and Others v Department of Land
Reform and Rural Development and Another (660/2025) [2025] ZANWHC 260 (4 December 2025) at para’s 32
to 39, citing Absa Bank Ltd v Naude NO (20264/2014) [2015] ZASCA 97 (1 June 2015) and Judicial Service
Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council and another 2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA) at para12.
28
[137] It was incumbent on the applicants to have identified the impugned decisions which
they should have sought to chall enge by way of review proceedings. The attempt by the
applicants to address these shortcomings in reply is impermissible.
[138] No cause of action has been pleaded for such relief, which is plainly not competent.
[139] Based on the findings above, it is apparent that this application is fatally flawed. It has
been brought by applicants wh o have no standing in terms of section 38 of the Constitution
and who have failed to prove that they have been authorised by the voluntary association they
purport to represent to bring these urgent proceedings for interim interdictory relief.
[140] The three organs of state, SANParks, Cape Nature and the City of Cape Town have
had to incur significant legal fees to defend the commendable collaborative work they have
undertaken to manage a vexing issue facing both residents and baboons alike.
[141] The applicants did not even attempt to make out a case for interdictory relief in their
founding papers. When questioned by the court in this regard and asked to direct the court’s
attention to the allegations in the founding papers in support of the requirements for
interdictory relief, Mr. R de Beer, who, as a serial litigant, is aware of the difference between
evidence and argument, could only point to the applicants’ heads of argument.
[142] For all the reasons set out above, the application falls to be dismissed.
[143] The court deemed it in the interests of justice not to simply strike the matter for want
of urgency, for the reasons set out above, however the abuse of process in bringing this
application in the urgent court in the manner in which it did, and on unfairly oppressive
timelines, is an issue which will weigh heavily against the applicant when the issue of costs is
determined.
Costs
[144] Turning now to costs. The respondents contend that vexatious litigation of this nature
[144] Turning now to costs. The respondents contend that vexatious litigation of this nature
falls within the exceptions to the Biowatch principle.29
29 Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources and others 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC) at para 25 citing Affordable
Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) (2005 (6) BCLR 529) para’s
138 para 18, para 24, and at para 35: ‘Merely labelling the litigation as constitutional and dragging in specious
references to sections of the Constitution would, of course, not be enough in itself to invoke the general rule .
29
[145] In the event that this Court concludes that de Beer lacked the necessary authority, the
City and Cape Nature seek costs against him in his representative capacity de boniis propriis.
Mr de Beer sought a similar order on behalf of SANParks.
[146] Before deciding whether to order punitive costs or costs de bonis propriis, the court
will need to conduct an independent enquiry into each form of costs order sough t, as o ur
highest courts have repeatedly warned that, because personal ( de bonis propriis ) and
attorney-client cost orders are both punitive and extraordinary in nature, they should not be
granted lightly, but only in exceptional circumstances.30
[147] In view of the serious implications for the applicants where punitive costs or costs de
bonis propriis are sought, I directed the parties to, upon delivery of this judgment, file brief
written submissions dealing only with this aspect. The use of costs shall accordingly stand
over for later determination.
Order
[148] In the circumstances, the following order shall issue:
1. The application in terms of Part A is dismissed.
2. All issues of costs shall stand over for later determination.
3. The parties are directed to file written submissions, not exceeding 10 pages,
addressing the following issues:
3.1. Whether costs should be awarded on a punitive scale as between attorney and
client; and/or
3.2. Whether such costs should be paid by the applicants de bonis propriis.
“The issues must be genuine and substantive, and truly raise constitutional considerations relevant to the
adjudication.”
30 Public Protector v SA Reserve Bank (‘Public Protector I ’) [2019] ZACC 29 ; 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) para
220; Road Accident Fund v Hlatshwayo & Ors [2025] ZASCA 17 para 2.
30
4. The applicants shall file their submissions by no later than 6 March 2026.
5. The fifth, sixth and seventh r espondents shall file their responding submissions by no
later than 13 March 2026.
6. Thereafter, the Court will determine the issue of costs in chambers, unless the parties
are notified that oral argument is required.
____________________
Holderness J
Judge of the Western
Cape High Court
Appearances
Applicants: Mr. Reyno Dawid de Beer
Fifth respondent: Adv M de Beer
Instructed by: Mkhabela Attorneys
Sixth and seventh
respondents: Adv M O’ Sullivan SC and Adv C de Villiers
Instructed by: Fairbridges Attorneys