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[2026] ZAGPJHC 164
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Property Park (Pty) Ltd and Others v Lesedi Local Municipality and Others (2025/048809) [2026] ZAGPJHC 164 (24 February 2026)
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
:
2025
- 048809
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO
OTHERS JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
24/02/2026
In
the matter between:
PROPERTY
PARK (PTY) LTD
1
ST
APPLICANT
REG
NO. 2009/006810/07
VERGIL
(PTY) LTD
2
ND
APPLICANT
REG
NO. 2012/094773/07
WAYABOVE
INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
3
RD
APPLICANT
JF
ROUX
4
TH
APPLICANT
CP
WIERSMA
5
TH
APPLICANT
MORGEN
UYS
6
TH
APPLICANT
and
LESEDI
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
1
ST
RESPONDENT
SIBUSISO
DLAMINI, N. O.
2
ND
RESPONDENT
GUGU
MCUBE, N.O.
3
RD
RESPONDENT
JUDAH
MBELE, N.O.
4
TH
RESPONDENT
COGTA
–
G
5
TH
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
BHOOLA
AJ,
Introduction
[1]
This application concerns the lawfulness of the first respondent’s
general valuation roll for the 2024- 2029 cycle,
adopted under the
Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 (“the MPRA”), and
the consequent levying of property rates.
[2]
Before turning to the facts in this matter, it is necessary to
distinguish between the valuation roll and the annual rates
tariff.
The valuation roll adopted under section 32 of the MPRA, establishes
property values for a multi year cycle, typically
four to five
years.
[3]
By contrast, the rates tariff is an annual decision taken by the
Municipality as part of its budget process for each financial
year
running from 1 July to 30 June. The 4,9% increase referred to in the
pleadings was the tariff applicable only to the 2024/2025
financial
year.
[4]
Each subsequent financial year requires the Municipality to adopt a
new tariff, which is then applied to the property
values contained in
the valuation roll.
[5]
Accordingly, while the tariff is an annual measure, its application
depends on the validity of the underlying valuation
roll. If the
valuation roll is unlawful, all tariffs applied to it are
contaminated, but the percentage increase itself is always
confined
to the financial year in which it was adopted.
[6]
For ease of reference, the term “applicants” refers
collectively to the first through sixth applicants, unless
otherwise
specified. Similarly, the term “respondents” in this
judgment refers collectively to the first through fourth
respondents,
unless otherwise indicated.
[7]
The fifth respondent, the Department of Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Affairs – Gauteng (COGTA G),
was cited in the
proceedings, was served with the application, but did not enter a
notice of intention to oppose and is not represented
before this
Court.
[8]
The respondents filed their answering affidavit outside the
prescribed time period and applied for condonation. The applicants
likewise filed their replying affidavit late and sought condonation.
Both applications for condonation were granted, and the affidavits
were admitted.
[9]
The applicants seek a declaratory order to review and set aside the
tariff for the 2024/2025 period. They contend that
the first
respondent failed to comply materially with section 49 of the MPRA
when bringing the valuation roll of 2024-2029 into
operation.
[10]
The respondents, in their answering affidavits, initially contended
that the matter falls to be determined under the
Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”). During
oral argument, however, Counsel for the respondents’
conceded
that the challenge is one grounded in the principle of legality.
[1]
[11]
The concession was correctly made. The adoption of a valuation roll
and the levying of rates are jurisdictional prerequisites
flowing
from statute. They are not “administrative actions”
within the meaning of PAJA, but rather exercises of public
power
subject to the constitutional principle of legality. As held in
Fedsure
Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan
Council
[2]
,
the exercise of public power must be authorised by law and rationally
connected to its purpose. The court must therefore determine
whether
the Municipality acted within the bounds of its empowering
legislation and whether its conduct was rationally connected
to the
statutory purpose.
Jurisdiction
and Locus Standi
[12]
Jurisdiction was admitted between the parties. The applicants are all
registered property owners within the Municipality’s
jurisdiction and/or the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction
of this Honourable Court.
[13]
Regarding standing, the court requested both Counsel to address
section 38 of the Constitution. This was because the
sixth applicant
alleged that she acted both in her personal capacity and in a
representative capacity and organiser of concerned
property owners
(the “CPO”) listed as persons in the community with an
interest in the matter. A list of 120 names
was submitted in support
of this claim, when the sixth applicant lodged a petition.
[14]
The applicants asserted that
locus
standi
was relied upon in terms of section 21 of the Superior Court Act
[3]
,
and not in section 38 of the Constitution as they did not rely on any
infringement of rights in the Bill of rights.
[15]
The respondents’ contended that they knew nothing of the
persons listed. They argued that all the parties seeking
declaratory
relief, must be before the Court and properly joined under section 21
of the Superior Court Act.
[4]
[16]
The respondents further argued that in terms of section 38, the
Constitutional Court, in the case of
Maluleke
v MEC for Health and Welfare, Northern Province
[5]
,
considered the prerequisites for standing in terms of section 38. It
was held that a right in the Bill of Rights
must be
infringed or threatened and this must be asserted in the papers.
Furthermore, if a class action is brought it must be certified.
[17]
Although the respondents did not dispute
locus
standi
in their papers, they later argued that Applicant 6 could not
represent 120 individuals without certification of a class action,
relying on
Maluleka
v MEC for Health and Welfare, Northern Province
.
[6]
Applicant 6 contended that she acted in her own interest and in the
interest of the CPO. This Court accepts that standing
is
established for Applicant 6 and the applicants properly before it.
However, the application was not brought as a certified class
action
under section 38 of the Constitution, nor were the procedural
safeguards for representative litigation satisfied. Accordingly,
locus
standi
is confined to the applicants before the Court, and retrospective
relief cannot extend to the 120 individuals listed.
Factual
Background.
[18]
On 23 May 2024, the Lesedi Local Municipality approved the final
rates tariff for the 2024-2025 financial year, which
was advertised
on 7 August 2024. The projected increase in property rates was
confirmed as 4,9% for the said financial year. Importantly,
the
tariff was approved before the purported objection period had
expired.
[19]
Despite this projection, the applicants experienced increases beyond
the 4,9% prompting objections and petitions. Internal
disputes were
lodged under section 102(2) of the Municipal Systems Act on 2
September 2024. However, the Municipality on 24 October
2024, advised
the applicants’ that the higher increases were due to the
implementation of the new 2024–2029 valuation
roll. The
applicants were advised that property owners were invited to lodge
objections but the period for lodging such objections
had lapsed and
remained meritless.
[20]
Given that the general valuation roll (GVR) was not adopted properly,
the applicants contend that the disputes raised
by them remain extant
and should be upheld in terms of section 102(2) of the Municipal
Systems Act.
[21]
On 14 February 2024, the Municipality published a public notice in
the local newspaper inviting the property owners to
inspect the
tariffs for 2024/2025 between 1 March 2024 and 31 March 2024. The
same notice also appeared in the Provincial Gazette
No.54 on 20
February 2024.
[22]
It is common cause that no consecutive notice for public inspection
was published in the week following the 14 February
2024, as
regulated by section 49(1)(a) of the MPRA.
[23]
On 10 April 2024, however, the Municipality published a further,
different notice in the local newspaper, purporting
to extend the
inspection period to 31 May 2024. The respondent relies on this
notice as the “purported ‘second
notice’”,
together with the publication in the Provincial Gazette, the
transmission of notices by email, delivery by
post box, and website
publication to assert compliance.
[24]
The applicants dispute that there was compliance with the empowering
provisions. They contend that the 10 April
2024 notice did not
comply with the enabling legislation and the promulgated
regulations.
[7]
They argue
that the purported extension notice, lacked particularity, that
no consecutive notice was published, that
individual notices
purportedly served under section 49(1)(c) were undated, and
not received by all applicants, and
that website publication occurred
belatedly on 8 November 2024. Consequently, the applicant’s
argue that the valuation roll
never validly commenced under section
32(1)(a) of MPRA.
Issues
for determination
[25]
The issues for determination are:
(1) Whether there
was substantial compliance with, and materiality under, section 49 of
the MPRA.
(2) Whether the
applicants were obliged to exhaust internal remedies under sections
50 -54 of MPRA.
(3) Whether
the lapse or expiry of the 2024/2025 financial year affects the
relief sought.
[4] The just and
equitable remedy to be granted under section 172 of the Constitution.
(5) The appropriate
costs order
Legislative
Framework
[26]
Municipalities derive the power to levy rates from section 229 of the
Constitution.
[8]
[27]
In
Fedsure
Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan
Council
,
[9]
the Constitutional Court held that the exercise of the original
municipal fiscal power does not constitute administrative
action but
must comply with the Constitution and the principle of legality.
[28]
In
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex parte President
of the RSA
,
[10]
the court held the principle of legality requires that the exercise
of public power must be authorised by law and procedurally
compliant
with statutory prescripts.
[29]
The jurisdictional prerequisites for a valid valuation roll to take
effect in terms of section 32(1)(a) of the MPRA are
completion of the
public inspection and objection process envisaged section 49.
Compliance with section 49 is therefore a
condition precedent for the
roll’s validity.
[30]
Section 49(1)(a) requires the municipality to publish a notice in the
Provincial Gazette for once a week for two consecutive
weeks in the
local newspaper, stating that the roll is open for inspection and
inviting objections.
[31]
Section 49(1)(c) requires that every property owner be given notice
of the valuation of their property, together with
an extract from the
roll.
[32]
Section 49(2) requires publication of the roll and the notice on the
municipality’s official website.
[33]
Succinctly, without compliance with section 49, the valuation roll
cannot validly commence under section 32(1)(a) of
MPRA, and rates
levied pursuant to such a roll are unlawful.
Analysis
Whether
there was substantial compliance with, and materiality under, section
49 of the MPRA.
[34]
The respondents concede that no second consecutive notice was
published in the week following the first newspaper notice,
as
required by section 49(1)(a). They argue however, that there was
substantial compliance by the Municipality.
[35]
The respondents rely on the notice of 10 April 2024 which extended
the inspection period until 31 May 2024, the publication
of the April
notice in Provincial Gazette, email transmissions and post box
deliveries of the April 2024 notices to assert that
there was
substantial compliance with section 49 of the MPRA.
[36]
The first respondent, in its answering affidavit, provides detailed
explanations of how it complied substantially with
the provisions of
section 49 of MPRA. The respondents assert that the purpose of
section 49 was met.
[37]
The applicants contend that if section 49 of MPRA is not complied
with, then the public inspection period as required
by section
32(1)(a) cannot be completed. This would mean any decision to impose
property rates based on the valuation roll is consequently
unlawful.
They argue that the requirements, in section 49(1), 49(2) and
Regulation 4 are peremptory and unambiguous, and
therefore, should
strict compliance is required.
[38]
Where legislation refers to mandatory or peremptory provisions, the
courts enquire into substantial compliance by considering
the purpose
of the provision and whether that purpose was achieved. In
AllPay
Consolidated Investment Holdings v CEO, South African Social Security
Agency and Others (No2)
[11]
,
the Constitutional Court held that the test is whether a deviation is
material in light of the statutory purpose.
[39]
Section 49 of the MRPA is crafted to ensure transparency and
accountability. It affords property owners a meaningful
opportunity
to inspect the roll and lodge the necessary objections timeously
before implementation of the roll by the Municipality.
[40]
In
Weenen
Traditional Local Council v Van Dyk
,
[12]
the Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised that where a statutory
requirement is designed to protect rights and ensure public
participation, strict compliance is required.
[13]
[41]
The defects or non-compliance with the provisions of section 49 of
MPRA in this matter are material. The absence
of consecutive
publication in the week following the first consecutive notice, the
lack of particularity in the 10 April 2024 notice,
the failure to
provide proof of service of the disputed email transmissions and
post-box deliveries, and the belated website publication
on 8
November 2024 deprived the registered property owners of the
opportunity to exercise their statutory rights.
[42]
In
City
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v New Ventures Consulting &
Services (Pty) Ltd,
[14]
the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that Municipalities must
strictly comply with the MPRA before levying rates. Similarly, in
Astirshell
No. 14 CC and Others v Victor Khanye Local Municipality and Others,
[15]
the High Court held that
failure to comply with section 49 rendered the valuation roll
unlawful.
[43]
Applying these authorities, the defects and deviations, in this
matter are not minor or technical. They undermine the
statutory
purpose of section 49, which is to secure meaningful, and accessible
public participation. As affirmed in
Buffalo
City Metropolitan Municipality v Asla Construction (Pty) Ltd
[16]
,
legality review requires fidelity to statutory preconditions.
[44]
Similarly, in
City
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Uniqon Wonings
[17]
,
the court emphasised that Municipalities must strictly comply with
the MPRA before levying rates.
[45]
The court finds that the respondent accordingly lacked authority to
levy rates pursuant to the impugned roll. The 2024
-2029 valuation
roll is therefore unlawful and invalid under the principle of
legality.
Whether
the internal remedies ought to have been exhausted
[46]
The respondents concede that the first to fifth applicants lodged
disputes in terms of section 102(2) of The Municipal
Systems Act
[18]
,
read with the Credit Control and Debt Collection Policy, in relation
to what they considered as “exorbitant tariff increases”
on their properties.
[47]
In response, the applicants were informed by the first respondent
that such higher percentage increases were a result
of the
commencement and implementation of the Municipality’s 2024
general valuation roll (“GVR”).
[48]
The applicants’ contend that this is not a PAJA application and
they were not obliged to exhaust internal remedies.
They argue
that sections 50-54 of MPRA. presuppose a validly commenced valuation
roll. Where the roll itself is unlawful due to
non compliance
with section 49, the valuation roll cannot be said to have taken
effect in terms of section 32(1)(a).
[49]
The applicants further argue that they exhausted the remedies that
were open to them, including lodging disputes under
section 102(2) of
the Municipal Systems Act
[19]
and referring the matter to G COGTA, but that these steps were
taken out of caution and did not cure the underlying jurisdictional
defect.
[50]
The principle is well established that where a legality review is
applicable and not a PAJA review, there is no requirement
to exhaust
internal remedies.
[51]
In
Mapholisa
NO v Phetoe NO and Others
[20]
,
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that “… in fact, the
common-law approach to the exhaustion of internal remedies
is to the
exact opposite effect – there is no duty to exhaust internal
remedies, unless a statute places an obligation on
a person to do
so.” The duty to exhaust remedies applies only where such
remedies are effective and available.
The court further
explained that the mere creation of an internal remedy does not
impose a duty to use it and where the remedies
are illusory or
incapable of addressing the complaint, a court may be approached
directly.
[52]
In
Nichol
and Another v Registrar of Pension Funds and Others,
[21]
the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that internal remedies cannot
cure a jurisdictional defect. If the empowering statute has
not been
complied with, the defect is not one that can be corrected through
internal appeal processes.
[53]
Applying these principles, the applicants were not obliged to pursue
internal remedies in terms of section 50 -54 of
MPRA.
[22]
Those remedies presuppose a valid valuation roll. Where the roll
never validly commenced due to non compliance with section
49,
the matter triggers a legality review. It remains the prerogative of
the applicants to determine whether to pursue internal
remedies, but
in this case, they were entitled to approach the Court directly.
The
effect of the lapse of the 2024/2025 financial year
[54]
The respondents contend that the matter has become moot because the
2024/2025 financial year has lapsed, and the current
roll remains
extant.
[55]
The applicants contend that the relief remains live, as the 2024–2029
general valuation roll support rates for
multiple financial years.
The lawfulness of the roll affects not only the 2024/2025 period but
also subsequent years until the
roll is lawfully replaced.
[56]
The Constitutional Court has emphasised that mootness does not arise
where the dispute has continuing practical effect.
In
JT
Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security
[23]
,
the Court held that a matter is not moot if the order will have a
practical impact on the parties or on future conduct.
[57]
Similarly, in
President
of the Republic of South Africa v Democratic Alliance
[24]
,
the Court confirmed that legality review serves to vindicate the rule
of law, even where the immediate decision has lapsed, because
unlawful exercises of public power cannot be insulated from judicial
scrutiny.
[58]
In
Normandien
Farms (Pty) Ltd v South African Agency for Promotion of Petroleum
Exploration and Exploitation SOC Ltd
[25]
the court held that ‘mootness is not an absolute bar to the
justiciability of an issue …. where the interests
of
justice so require.’
[59]
Considering these principles, the lapse of the 2024/2025 financial
year tariff does not render the matter
moot. The
2024–2029 GVR continues to regulate rates for the subsequent
years, and a declaration of invalidity will have practical
effect by
preventing ongoing reliance on an unlawful roll and ensuring
compliance with the MPRA.
[60]
The expiry of the financial year is, however, relevant in crafting a
just and equitable remedy, as it reduces potential
disruption to the
Municipal administration.
[61]
The court therefore finds that the matter retains practical
significance and that the declaratory relief remains appropriate
to
vindicate the rule of law.
Just
and equitable Remedy
[62]
Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that when a court
finds conduct inconsistent with the Constitution, it
must declare
such conduct invalid.
[63]
Section 172(1)(b) empowers the court to make any order that is just
and equitable, including limiting the retrospective
effect of a
declaration of invalidity or suspending its operation to allow
corrective action.
[64]
The Constitutional Court has consistently emphasised that remedies in
legality review must balance application
to the rule of law
with the practical consequences of invalidity. In
AllPay
Consolidated Investment Holdings v CEO, South African Social Security
Agency and Others (No2)
[26]
,
the Court held that once unlawfulness is established, the default
position is invalidity, but the court must then craft a just
and
equitable remedy.
[65]
In
Minister
of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd
[27]
,
the Court recognised that suspension of invalidity may be appropriate
to avoid administrative chaos. Similarly, in
Mvumvu
v Minister of Transport
[28]
,
the Court suspended invalidity to allow Parliament to cure defects in
legislation.
[66]
More recently, in
Buffalo
City Metropolitan Municipality v Asla Construction (Pty) Ltd
[29]
,
the Court reaffirmed that the principle of legality requires
invalidity, but section 172(1)(b) allows the court to temper its
order to protect the public interest.
[67]
Applying these principles, the defects in compliance with section 49
of the MPRA render the 2024–2029 valuation
roll unlawful.
However, immediate invalidity would disrupt Municipal finances and
prejudice service delivery. A suspension of invalidity
for six months
is therefore just and equitable, affording the Municipality time to
rectify defects while vindicating the rule of
law.
The
appropriate costs order
[68]
The general rule is that costs follow the result. In
Ferreira
v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO
[30]
,
the Constitutional Court held that costs orders are discretionary but
must be exercised judicially, considering fairness and the
circumstances of the case.
[69]
The applicants have succeeded in establishing that the respondent
Municipality acted unlawfully in implementing the 2024–2029
valuation roll without complying with section 49 of the MPRA. The
defects were material and jurisdictional, depriving property
owners
of their statutory rights.
[70]
The respondent persisted in its defence of substantial compliance
despite conceding non compliance with the statutory
requirements. In these circumstances, fairness dictates that the
applicants should be awarded their costs.
[71]
Both parties employed senior and junior council. The issues raised
were constitutional and statutory in nature and justified
the
employment of two counsel.
[72]
The appropriate cost order is that the first respondent must pay the
applicants’ costs on scale C, including the
costs consequent
upon the employment of two counsel.
Conclusion
[73]
The respondents have throughout characterised the levying of rates as
an administrative action. This Court does not adopt
that
classification. The relief granted in respect of the applicant’s
rates is not premised on a finding that the levying
of rates
constitutes administrative action under PAJA. Rather, it flows
directly and consequentially from the declaration of invalidity
of
the valuation roll under section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.
[74]
Once the roll is unlawful, any rates levied pursuant to it cannot
stand. The setting aside of the applicant’s rates
is therefore
a derivative remedy, necessary to give effect to the declaration of
invalidity, and does not depend on whether the
levying of rates is
properly classified as administrative action.
[75]
In framing the relief, it is necessary to distinguish between the
remedies appropriate to the valuation roll and those
appropriate to
the levying of rates.
[76]
The adoption of a general valuation roll is a statutory act under the
MPRA. Where it fails to comply with section 49,
the proper
constitutional remedy under section 172(1)(a) is a declaration that
the roll is unlawful and invalid.
[77]
By contrast, the levying of property rates against the applicants
pursuant to the unlawful valuation roll is a consequence
of that
invalidity, and must therefore be set aside
Order
[78]
In the result, I make the following order:
(1) The
respondents’ valuation roll for the period 2024–2029 is
declared unlawful and invalid for failure to materially
comply with
section 49
of the
Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of
2004
, in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.
(2) The levying of
property rates against the applicant pursuant to the unlawful
valuation roll is reviewed and set aside
for the 2024/2025 financial
year.
(3) The
declaration of invalidity shall operate prospectively, save insofar
as it applies to the applicants, who are entitled
to retrospective
relief.
(4) The respondent
is directed, within 60 days of this order, to:
(i) recalculate the rates
lawfully payable by the applicants for the 2024/2025 financial year;
(ii) credit the
applicant’s municipal account with any overpayment; and
(iii) issue an adjusted
municipal statement reflecting the reconciliation.
(5) Pending
compliance with paragraph 4, the first respondent is interdicted from
instituting or continuing debt recovery
proceedings against the
applicants in respect of rates levied pursuant to the impugned
valuation roll.
(6) The interdict
in paragraph 5 shall lapse upon issuance of the adjusted statement
referred to in paragraph 4(iii).
(7) This order
concerns the 2024/2025 financial year only and does not invalidate
rates levied in subsequent financial years
unless such rates are
shown to have been levied pursuant to the same unlawful valuation
roll.
(8) The respondent
is ordered to pay the applicants’ costs on scale “C”,
including the costs consequent
upon the employment of two
counsel.
CB.
BHOOLA
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division of the High Court, Johannesburg
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected on 24 February 2026 and is handed
down electronically by
circulation to the parties/their legal representatives by e- mail and
by uploading it to the electronic
file of this matter on CaseLines.
The date for hand-down is deemed to be 24 February 2026
APPEARANCES
Date
of hearing:
Date
of judgment:
27
November 2025
24
February 2026
For
the Applicants:
Adv.
L Hollander
(Tel:
082 889 2770,
email
lhollander@maisels3.co.za
,
cstock@maisels3.co.za
)
Adv
V Qithi
(Tel.
065 800 9572, email
vuyo@adcqithi.co.za
)
Instructed
by
LVD
Attorneys
C/o
Swanepoel Attorneys
(Tel:
011 333 1715, email:
info@propertypark.co.za
)
For
the Respondents:
Instructed
by
Adv
L Kotze
(Tel:
083 657 4403, email:
liakotze@clubadvocates.co.za
)
MB
Mabunda Inc. Attorneys
(Tel:
011 394 4212, email: akani@mbmabunda.co.za)
[1]
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Lombardy Development
(Pty) Ltd and Others
[2018] 3 All SA
605
(SCA) para 2 -3
[2]
[1998]
ZACC 17, 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC)
[3]
Act
10 of 2013
[4]
10 of 2013
[5]
1999(4)
SA 367(T)
[6]
1999(4) SA 367(T)
[7]
Regulations
4(1)(b) and (c)
[8]
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
[9]
[1998]
ZACC 17
,
1999 (1) SA 374
(CC)
[10]
[2000]
ZACC 1, 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC)
[11]
2014(1)
ZACC 12
[12]
2002
ZASCA 6, 2002 (4) SA 653 (SCA)
[13]
City
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Lombardy Development (Pty)
Ltd and Others
[2018] 3 All SA
605
(SCA) para 20-21. This case is distinguished from Lombardy to the
extent that it dealt with
Recatergorisation
of the property and PAJA was applicable it is relevant when dealing
with the purpose of
the
publication and notice as required by section 49.
[14]
[2018]
ZASCA 166
[15]
[2004]
ZAMPMHC 13
[16]
2019
(4) SA 331 (CC)
[17]
[2015]
ZASCA, 162
[18]
Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000
[19]
Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000
[20]
2023
(3) SA 149(SCA)
[21]
2005
SA 383
(SCA),
[2006] 1 All SA 589
(C)
[22]
City
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Lombardy Development (Pty)
Ltd and Others [2018] 3 All SA
605
(SCA)
[23]
[1996] ZACC 23, 1997 (3) SA 514 (CC)
[24]
2020 (1) SA 428 (CC)
[25]
Normandien
Farms (Pty) Limited v South African Agency for Promotion of
Petroleum Exportation and
Exploitation
SOC Limited and Others [2020] ZACC 5
[26]
2014(1)
ZACC 12
[27]
[2005]
ZACC 14, 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC)
[28]
[2011]
ZACC 1, 2011 (2) SA 473 (CC)
[29]
[2019]
ZACC 15, 2019 (4) SA 331 (CC)
[30]
[1996] ZACC 27
;
1996
(2) SA 621
(CC)