IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
CASE NO: 2026-020335
In the matter between:
K T D Applicant
And
Z K Respondent
Neutral citation: KTD v ZK (Case no 20206-020335) [2026] ZAWCHC…(25
February 2026)
Coram: LEKHULENI J
Heard: 18 February 2026
Delivered: Electronically on 25 February 2026
Summary: Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction . Two
minor children from the United Kingdom visiting the respondent in August 2025 - Parties
discussing possible relocation of applicant and children from United Kingdom to South Africa
– Relocation agreement not reached – Respondent asserting that applicant consented to the
relocation of children . Reliance on Article 13( a) and ( b). Acquiescence and grave risk of
harm in terms of Article 13(a) and (b) of the Convention not established. Application for the
immediate return of children to their habitual residence in the United Kingdom granted.
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
LEKHULENI J:
Introduction
[1] This is an urgent application in terms of art 12 of the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 (The Hague Convention), in
which the applicant seeks the immediate return of two minor children, namely SED
(7 years old boy) and RZD (3 years old boy), to the United Kingdom, which the
applicant asserts is their place of habitual residence. The applicant states that the
children travelled to Cape Town, South Africa, in August 2025 to visit the respondent
temporarily and are now being wrongfully retained there against the applicant's
express wishes. The respondent, on the other hand, denied that the minor children
were sent to South Africa temporarily. The respondent contended that the parties
agreed that the young boy, RZD, would reside permanently with the respondent in
South Africa. In support of this contention, the respondent asserted that discussions
were held be tween the parties regarding the children's schooling options in South
Africa. According to the respondent, RZD resided continuously with him since August
2025, during which time he exercised full parental responsibilities. In the
respondent’s view, the app licant knowingly and voluntarily consented to RZD
residing with him. This consent remained in effect until recently, when the applicant
unilaterally withdrew it.
The Parties
[2] The applicant, KTD, is an adult female tax administrator born in South Africa and
currently residing in Craydon, United Kingdom (UK). The applicant has indefinite
Leave to Remain (EU settlement Status) in the UK, granted after proving lawful
residence, tax contributor and continuous residence in the UK.
[3] The respondent, ZK, is an adult male residing in Woodstock, Cape Town. The
[3] The respondent, ZK, is an adult male residing in Woodstock, Cape Town. The
dispute between the parties involves two minor children, SED and RZD, who are
domiciled in the UK. The two minor children are British citizens and were born in the
UK. Prior to August 2025, the children lived their entire lives in the UK, where they
attended school and nursery and received all primary medical care.
[4] The applicant is the biological mother of two minor children. The respondent is the
biological father of the y oungest child, RZD . However, the respondent is not the
biological father of the eldest child, SED. According to the applicant, the biological
father of SED is not involved in his life. Since the start of her relationship with the
respondent, the respondent has assumed the role of a father figure for SED and has
taken on this responsibility with commitment.
[5] The applicant chose to keep the children together as siblings and did not want to
separate them. The respondent accepted this arrangement.
Background Facts
[6] The applicant and the respondent were friends for approximately 12 years before
entering a relationship during the COVID -19 pandemic in 2021. Pursuant to this
relationship, the youngest child, RZD, was born on 3 February 2022 in the U K. After
the child was born in 2022, the parties agreed that the respondent would exercise
contact with RZD at least once a year and that this contact would be either in South
Africa or in the UK.
[7] In 2023, the parties agreed that the applicant would take the children to Cape
Town to visit the respondent. The arrangement was that the applicant would fly back
home to the UK and return to South Africa to collect the children after a month or so.
This arrangement included the eldest child who visited the respondent in South
Africa. Indeed, the children visited the respondent and were later returned to the UK
by the respondent. In August 2024, the two children visited the respondent in Cape
Town. The respondent returned the children to the UK on 25 Septembe r 2024 and
stayed with the applicant and the children for a week.
[8] The applicant stated that she discussed with the respondent the possibility of
[8] The applicant stated that she discussed with the respondent the possibility of
relocating to and immigrating to South Africa. This included making enquiries about
schooling for the children, but, more importantly, about housing for them and
employment fo r her. The applicant stated that no final agreement was reached for
her and her children to move to South Africa. She stated that this is evidenced by the
fact that she has no home in South Africa, and she does not have a job to support
them.
[9] The applicant further asserted that at this moment, the respondent is unemployed
and that, should they relocate to South Africa, they cannot look to him for
accommodation or support. Accordingly, the applicant contended that it is simply
impossible for her to hav e agreed to a permanent relocation to South Africa, given
that none of the formalities for such relocation has been complied with, particularly
because the applicant and the children do not have a home in South Africa. She
emphasised that she never consented to the permanent relocation or retention of the
two minor children, or to their independent relocation to South Africa without her. The
applicant further averred that o n 24 November 2025, she commenced new
employment with the UK Government at HM Revenue and Customs as an ad hoc
HMRC DRT customer service.
[10] The applicant stated that in August 2025, the parties agreed that the applicant
would bring the minor children to South Africa, with the intention that they would
spend at least one to two months with the respondent. The parties did not agree on
the date the applicant would collect the children, but, according to the applicant, they
were mindful that the children's stay in South Africa would not exceed December
2025. Accordingly, the applica nt was due to return in December 2025 to collect the
children and bring them back to the United Kingdom. However, at the respondent's
request, the applicant reluctantly agreed to remain in the UK to settle into h er new
employment and to allow the responden t to spend his first Christmas with the
children. The applicant emphasised that the decision was temporary, pragmatic and
made in good faith. It did not constitute consent to the children's permanent
made in good faith. It did not constitute consent to the children's permanent
relocation to South Africa. Subsequently, on 7 January 2 026, the respondent’s
position changed abruptly. For the first time, the respondent asserted that his son,
RZD, now permanently resided in South Africa and refused to give consent for him to
return to the UK.
[11] Subsequent thereto, the applicant arrive d in South Africa on 29 January 2026 to
fetch the children. The respondent refused the request, stating that the applicant had
given him full consent for the children to relocate to South Africa, which she refuted.
The applicant consulted attorneys on the same day, who addressed correspondence
to the respondent demanding the release of the children.
[12] On the other hand, t he respondent denied that the minor children were sent to
South Africa on a temporary basis. According to him, it was agreed that the applicant
would permanently relocate to South Africa. Furthermore, in anticipation of their
relocation, it was agreed that RZD will permanently reside with the respondent in
South Africa, and that the applicant will reside with the eldest son, close by. The
respondent emphasised that he is the biological father of RZD and that he has
resided continuously with him since August 2025, during which time he has
exercised full parental responsibility and rights on a day -to-day basis and is the
primary caregiver.
[13] The respondent further stated that the applicant voluntarily consented to RZD
residing with him in South Africa. According to him, it was agreed that his son, RZD,
would reside permanently with him in South Africa. On 12 January 2026, he
requested that t he applicant to provide a firm parenting plan as regards his son. To
his surprise, the applicant then abruptly reversed her position and advised him that
she would be relocating the children to the UK as the current arrangement isn't
working. The respondent then advised the applicant that he would not consent until a
mutually agreed parenting plan was in place. The respondent suggested mediation
to reach an agreement. According to him, he does not refuse RZD’s relocation but
asks for clarity. Through his at torneys, the respondent denied that the children were
in South Africa temporarily. In support of this contention, he asserted that he and the
in South Africa temporarily. In support of this contention, he asserted that he and the
applicant discussed the children's schooling options in South Africa.
[14] In addition, the respondent challenge d the urgency of this application and
applied that it be dismissed with costs.
Relevant legal principles
[15] The applicant brought this application in terms of art 3 of the Hague Convention.
The relevant part of art 3 provides that ‘the removal or the retention of a child is to be
considered wrongful where it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person,
an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in
which the child was habitually r esident immediately before the removal or retention.
The principles underlying the Hague Convention are clearly set out in its preamble ,
which provides:
'The States signatory to the present Convention –
Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in
matters relating to their custody , desiring to protect children internationally from the
harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to
ensure their prompt return to the State o f their habitual residence, as well as to
secure protection for rights of access.'
[16] The Hague Abduction Convention has two objects, which are set out in art 1 as
follows:
(a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any
contracting state, and
(b) to ensure that rights of custody and access under the law of one contracting state are
effectively respected in the other contracting states.1
[17] The Convention seeks to prevent international abduction while ensuring that
children retain the right to regular and meaningful contact with both parents .2 The
emphasis is placed on restoring the pre -abduction status quo. The return is to the
jurisdiction of the place of habitual residence of the abducted child. The Convention
aims to ensure the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed or
retained in any contracting state, typically to their country of habitual residence. This
is founded on the belief that the courts of the state of the child's habitual residence
are best suited to determine disputes regarding the residence and welfare of the
child.3
are best suited to determine disputes regarding the residence and welfare of the
child.3
1 Chief Family Advocate v G 2003 (2) SA 599 (W) at 606C–D.
2 Senior Family Advocate, Cape Town, And Another V Houtman 2004 (6) SA 274 (C) Para
3 Pennello v Pennello (Chief Family Advocate as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (3) SA 117 (SCA) at para 25.
[18] In terms of art 8, a ny person, institution or other body claiming that a child has
been removed or retained in breach of custody rights may apply either to the Central
Authority of the chil d's habitual residence or to the central authority of any other
contracting state for assistance in securing the return of the child. In th e present
matter, the applicant brought the application in her personal capacity and did not
apply to the Central Aut hority. Such an application though unusual is permissible in
terms of the Convention as art 29 of the Convention mandates that this Convention
shall not preclude any person, institution or body who claims that there has been a
breach of custody or access rights within the meaning of art 3 or 21 from applying
directly to the judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State, whether or
not under the provisions of this Convention . Art 12, which is crucial to the
achievement of the Convention's objectives, provides for the remedy of a return, if
there has been a wrongful removal or retention.
[19] Art 12 provides as follows:
'Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of art 3 and, at the
date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative
authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year
has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority
concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.'
[20] In Smith v Smith,4 the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that a party seeking
the return of a child under the Convention is obliged to establish that the child was
habitually resident in the country from which it was removed immediately before the
removal or retention and that the removal or retention was o therwise wrongful in
terms of art 3. Once this has been established, the onus is upon a party resisting the
order to establish one or other of the defences referred to in art 13 (a) and (b) or that
order to establish one or other of the defences referred to in art 13 (a) and (b) or that
the circumstances are such that the refusal would be justif ied having regard to the
provisions of art 20.
4 2001 (3) SA 845 (SCA) at 850J.
[21] Following the above discussion, the requirements that an applicant must
establish in this case to secure the return of SED and RZD to the UK in terms of art
12 of the Hague Convention are:
(a) that the two minor children were habitually residing in the UK immediately before the
removal or retention (art 3(a));
(b) that the retention was wrongful in that it constituted a breach of custody rights by
operation of law of the requesting state (art 3);
(c) that the applicant was actually exercising those rights at the time of the wrongful
removal or retention and would have so exercised such rights but for the removal or
retention (art 3(b)).
Discussion
[22] Mindful of the legal principles discussed above, I turn to consider the merits of
this application. As foreshadowed above, the first question is whether the child
habitually resided in the UK immediately before the alleged retention. The term
'habitual residence' is not defined by the Hague Abduction Convention . The courts
have been left with a considerable degree of flexibility in translating the concept into
practice.5 Erasmus J, in Senior Family Advocate, Cape Town, and Another v
Houtman,6 had an opp ortunity to deal with the concept of habitual residence. The
learned Judge sets out in para 11 of his judgment that ' it is clear that habitual
residence must be determined by reference to the circumstances of each case'.
The learned Judge also state d that in determining the habitual residence , it is
necessary to analyse the parents' shared intention regarding the child's residence .
Where there is contrary expressed parental intent, it then becomes necessary to
determine whether the child has a factual connection to the state, and knows
something of it, culturally, socially and linguistically.7
[23] In this case, it is not in dispute that the applicant and the minor children reside in
the UK. The two children were born in the UK and are British citizens. They have
the UK. The two children were born in the UK and are British citizens. They have
attended school and nursery in the UK and received all primary medical care there
since birth. It is common cause that the applicant is the biological parent of the two
5 Central Authority (South Africa) v A 2007 (5) SA 501 (W) para 17.
6 2004 (6) SA 274 (C) para 11.
7 At para 10.
minor children. The children have been in her care in the UK since birth. The
respondent is the biological father of RZD. From the respective affidavits filed of
record, in principle, the respondent has no objection to the eldest son, SED,
returning to the applicant in the UK. He only objects to the return of his biologi cal
son, RZD.
[24] From a careful reading of the affidavits and the various correspondence
exchanged, it is very clear that the children were sent to South Africa for a limited
visitation period intended to end in December 2025. The applicant wanted the
respondent to bond with the children and to spend Christmas with them. Ostensibly,
the respondent enjoyed spending time with the children and found it difficult to let
them go. The consent the respondent signed on 08 August 2025, when the children
visited him in South Africa in August 2025, clearly attests that the children were
visiting him and were not permanently relocating to South Africa. In his letter of
consent, the respondent specifically stated that he has no objection to his son's
travel plans to South Africa, as he is visiting him in Cape Town.
[25] From the objective facts, it is incontestable that the children’s habitual residence
is in the UK. The applicant continues to hold a lease in the UK, which remains hers
and the children’s primary residence. At all material times prior to and during the
children’s stay in South Africa, the applicant remained solely responsible for
maintaining the children’s primary home in the UK. This included ongoing rental
obligations for a two-bedroom family residence, utilities, food, clothing, transport, and
all chil d-related expenses ordinarily associated with primary care. Importantly, the
presence of the children in South Africa did not extinguish or materially reduce the
applicant’s financial obligations in the UK in respect of the children. The children's
beds, furniture, clothing, toys, personal belongings, and living arrangements have at
beds, furniture, clothing, toys, personal belongings, and living arrangements have at
all times remained in the UK while the children visited the respondent in Cape Town,
South Africa. No immigration, residence, or deregistration applications were made in
respect of the children. The children entered South Africa only on their British
passports, with no change in immigration status. These objective facts are
inconsistent with any intention to relocate the children to South Africa permanently.
[26] I am mindful that the parties discussed the question of relocation of the applicant
and the children to South Africa. This discussion included enquiries regarding
schooling, housing for them, and employment for the applicant. However, this
discussion was not finalised o r never came to fruition. The applicant’s relocation to
South Africa was, amongst other things, dependent upon her securing employment
there. The applicant does not have a home in South Africa. Instead, on 24 November
2025, she commenced employment with th e UK Government at HM Revenue and
Customs as an Ad Hoc HMRC customer service. On the evidence in this case, I am
not persuaded that the parents ever formed a settled or shared intention for the
children, particularly RZD, to remain in South Africa. When th e children first travelled
to South Africa in August 2025, they did so with the intention of returning to the UK at
the end of December or on a date mutually agreed by the parties. Undoubtedly, the
first step towards acquiring a new habitual residence is t o form a settled intention to
abandon the one left behind. 8 In my view, it was not established in this case that the
applicant and the children abandoned their habitual residence in the UK.
[27] As set out above, the suggestion that the parties agreed to permanently relocate
the children to South Africa is not supported by the objective facts. The children's
visit to South Africa does not mean that South Africa is now their habitual residence. I
must also add that the WhatsApp messages exchanged by the pa rties in January
2026 contradict the respondent’s assertion that the parties agreed to a permanent
relocation of the children to South Africa. The respondent specifically asked the
applicant whether she would confirm whether RZD would remain in South Afric a with
him while the eldest child’s schooling arrangements are being made.
[28] In response, the applicant informed the respondent that the current arrangement
[28] In response, the applicant informed the respondent that the current arrangement
isn’t working in practice and is creating unnecessary pressure for everyone. The
applicant stressed that the two minor children are UK -based as she has not
relocated. The applicant also informed the respondent that she will be coming at the
beginning of February 2026 to fetch the children. In my opinion, the respondent
would not have raised the question above if the parties had indeed definitively
agreed that the children relo cated to South Africa. The fact that there was a
discussion about relocation does not mean an agreement was reached. Clearly, on
8 Mozes v Mozes 239 F 3d 1067 (9th Cir, 2001) at 1081 - 2.
the facts, such an agreement was mooted but was not reached. On a conspectus of
all the facts, it is evident that the children are habitually resident in the UK.
[29] In Smith v Smith (supra), the SCA found that o nce the question of habitual
residence has been established , the persons resisting the order bears the onus to
establish one or other of the defences referred to in art 13(a) and (b) or that the
circumstances are such that the refusal would be justified having regard to the
provisions of art 20. In other words, the person opposing an application for the return
of a child must 'establish' circumstances falling within art 13(a) or (b) of the
Convention. In terms of art 13, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested state is not bound to
order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its
return establishes that:
'(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child
was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or
had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child
if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree
of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this article, the judicial and
administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social
background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent
authority of the child's habitual residence.' (my underlining)
[30] In the present matter, the respondent relied on both art 13( a) and ( b)
[30] In the present matter, the respondent relied on both art 13( a) and ( b)
respectively. The respondent asserted that he has been caring for the children for six
months and that the applicant’s conduct in this regard created the expectation of
permanence. The respondent stre ssed that RZD has resided with him continuously
since August 2025. During that time, he had exercised full parental responsibilities
and rights on a day -to-day basis, and he is the child's primary caregiver. The
respondent believes the applicant clearly in dicated her intention to relocate to South
Africa and build a life with him. In simple terms, the respondent contends that the
applicant acquiesced to the respondent's permanent stay with the children in Cape
Town, South Africa.
[31] On the question of a cquiescence, the courts in Australia have held that for a
parent to acquiesce in the unlawful removal or retention of a child, within art 13, the
evidence of the acquiescence must be clear and unqualified. 9 In the United States,
the leading case is Friedrich v. Friedrich , 78 F. 3d 1060 (6th Cir 1996) at 1064, in
which the United States Court of Appeals set out a similarly strict and narrow test,
stating:
‘Acquiescence under the Convention requires either an act or statement with the
requisite formalities such as testimony in a judicial proceeding, a convincing written
renunciation of rights or a consistent attitude of acquiescence over a significant
period of time.’
[32] Meanwhile, the House of Lords in England has held that the burden is strongly
on the parent who has removed a child to establish consent by the other parent. 10
The Court held that where the words or actions of the wronged parent clearly and
unequivocally show and have led the other parent to believe that the wronged parent
is not asserting or going to assert his right to the summary return of the child and are
inconsistent with such return, justice requires that the wronged parent be held to
have acquiesced.
[33] In the present matter, the applicant has consistently expressed her inten tion that
the children should return to the UK. The respondent was allowed time to spend with
his son to ensure that he bonded with the children. The applicant also allowed the
respondent to spend his first Christmas with them. The applicant did not
unequivocally renounced or hand the children over to the respondent to permanently
stay with them. The discussion that the parties had about the applicant relocating to
South Africa was mooted but not finalised. The applicants’ conditions for relocating to
South Africa were that she obtains employment in South Africa and a house for her
South Africa were that she obtains employment in South Africa and a house for her
and the children. This did not materialise. Instead, on 24 November 2025, she
commenced employment with the UK Government at HM Revenue and Customs as
9 Police Commissioner of South Australia v Temple (No.1) (1993) FLC 92-365.
10 H v H (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1997] 1 FLR 872.
an Ad Hoc HMRC customer service. As discussed above, she made her intention
known to the respondent that she would come and fetch the children in February
2026. On a conspectus of all the facts, I do not agree with the respondent that the
applicant created the expectation that the children would remain with the respondent
in South Africa.
[34] Finally, the respondent also raised the second exception to the mandatory return
of a child in terms of art 13(b) of the Convention. In Ad Hoc Central Authority, South
Africa and Another v Koch No and Another,11 the Constitutional Court observed that
the first step in an art 13(b) enquiry is whether the evidence of the person who
invokes the article in defence establishes the risk of harm or an otherwise intolerable
situation. Meanwhile in Sonderup v Tondelli and Another,12 the Constitutional Court
stated that an art 13 (b) enquiry is directed to the risk that the child may be harmed
by a Court-ordered return. The risk must be a grave one. It must expose the child to
'physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation'. Significantly, the Court noted that the words 'otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation' indicate that the harm that is contemplated by the section is
harm of a serious nature.
[35] The respondent alleges that the applicant has a pattern of neglectful conduct i n
the UK, including leaving the children with unsuitable caregivers. The respondent
also points to a UK police investigation regarding the alleged abuse of SED by a
neighbour and a mental breakdown suffered by the applicant as reasons why the
children shou ld not return to the UK. The applicant refuted these allegations and
asserted that she was the one who reported the neighbour’s conduct to the police
and social services in the UK, acting as a proactive safeguarding parent. The
investigation resulted in no finding of neglect against her. The applicant asserted that
investigation resulted in no finding of neglect against her. The applicant asserted that
the respondent was informed of the incident contemporaneously and that the
respondent expressed support at the time. The respondent also attended meetings
regarding the matter and raised no allegations of fault, negligence, or risk against the
applicant at that time.
11 2024 (3) SA 249 (CC) para 118.
12 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC) para 44.
[36] It seems to me the respondent is raising this concern belatedly to support his
quest to have the minor child RZD remain in South Africa. What compounds the
difficulty in the respondent’s version is that in 2023 and 2024, the children visited him
in South Africa. He returned them to the applicant in the UK in accordance with their
agreement, without any apprehension. The respondent never complained that the
applicant was an unsuitable parent or that she was leaving the children with
strangers. The respondent returned the children to the applicant and even spent time
with them in the UK. The issues of concern raised by the respondent in his opposing
and supplementary affidavit do not constitute the grave risk of harm envisaged in art
13(b). Moreover, the applicant has been living with the children in the UK since their
birth. The eldest child is now 7 years old. In my opinion, if there have been child
neglect tendencies on the part of the applicant, that would have long been
investigated in the UK.
[37] In conclusion, I hold that, on a consideration of the totality of the evidence, the
respondent has not proved the art 13( b) defence. I am not satisfied on a balance of
probabilities that, if RZD is ordered to be returned to the UK, the state of his habitu al
residence, he would be faced with the risk of grave psychological and physical harm
or that he may otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation. In any event, I am of
the opinion that there are adequate support services and systems in place in the UK
to address any concerns the respondent raised in the papers.
[38] The respondent’s counsel argued that it would not be in the children's best
interests to be returned immediately to the UK, as they need to be psychologically
prepared for their departure . Counsel also argued that this matter was not urgent
and that the urgency with which the applicant was brought was self -created. I do not
agree. Matters involving the Hague Convention are urgent in nature. They must be
agree. Matters involving the Hague Convention are urgent in nature. They must be
addressed urgently, in keeping with the objectives of the Convention. Furthermore, a
further delay in the return of the children cannot be permitted, as that would impede
the objectives of the Convention. The applicant is the mother of both children and
raised them in the UK. The children wi ll not suffer trauma if they are immediately
returned to the UK.
[39] The objective of prompt return envisaged by the Convention is based on the
premise that the welfare of the children is best promoted by reversing the effect
of abduction as quickly as possible, for three reasons. 13 First, this will negate the
harm often caused to children who are suddenly removed from their environment.
Secondly, the knowledge that return will be ordered is likely to deter potential
abductors. Thirdly, the child's interests can best be protected by litigation in the
forum of convenience, which will usually be the place of the child's habitual
residence.
Order
[40] In the result, given all these considerations, the following order is granted:
40.1 the minor children, SED born on 03 May 2019 and RZD born on 3 February
2022, are to be returned forthwith to the applicant for her to return them to the
jurisdiction of the Central Authority, of the United Kingdom in accordance with the
provisions of art 12 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of I nternational
Child Abduction.
40.2 The respondent is hereby directed and ordered to hand over all the travel
documents of the minor children to the applicant forthwith.
40.3 The Sheriff of this Court or his/her deputy, is directed to forthwith search for and
seize all the travel documents (passport) of the minor children, whenever they may
be found, and hand same over to the applicant, in the event the respondent fails to
comply with the order in paragraph 40.2 above.
40.4 The applicant shall be entitled to forthwith remove the minor children from the
borders of South Africa and travel with them to the United Kingdom , their habitual
residence without the co -operation and consent of the respondent in respect of the
minor child, RZD, insofar as such consent or co -operation of the respondent may be
necessary.
13 Central Authority (South Africa) v A 2007 (5) SA 501 (W) para 18.
40.5 The respondent shall pay the cost s of this application on a party and party
scale, including the costs that stood over on 11 February 2026.
40.6 A copy of this judgment is to be served on the office o f the Family Advocate ,
Cape Town.
________________________
LEKHULENI JD
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant: Adv M Filton
Instructed by: Abrahams Kiewitz Inc
For the Respondents: Adv M Garces
Instructed by: Mariam Cassim & Associates Inc