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IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, GQEBERHA
Not Reportable
CASE NO: 2026-011825
In the matter between:
MAFUTHA DANIEL SKHOSANA Applicant
and
MEC FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS GAUTENG PROVINCE First Respondent
THE HEAD OF DEPARTMENT: GAUTENG
PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SETTLEMENT Second Respondent
Heard: 03 and 16 February 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
Applicant’s and the Respondents’ Legal Representatives by email,
publication on the Labour Court website and release to SAFLII. The
date and time for handing - down is deemed to be 1 2H00 on 20
February 2026.
JUDGMENT
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LALLIE J
[1] Courts of law play a significant role in the administration of justices. In
exercise the authority vested in them by the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa
1. Amongst the rights courts enforce is equality before the law.
The principle of equality ensures, inter alia , that no litigant receives
preferential treatment. The law, however, acknowledges the need for urgent
relief and catered for it. Rule 38(2) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the
Proceedings of the L abour Court (the Rules) enjoins a party applying for
urgent relief to give reasons for urgency and why urgent relief is necessary.
The purpose of the rule is to ensure that only those cases in which urgent
relief is necessary may be adjudicated in the urgent cour t and to prevent
litigants from jumping the queue.
[2] The applicant was employed by the Gauteng Provincial Department of Human
Settlements as the Chief Construction Project M anager; West Rand Region.
He was dismissed on 10 November 2022 by operation of the law as
contemplated in section 17(3)(a)(i) of the Public Service Act. He challenged,
on review, the decision taken by the respondent s to dismiss. In a court order
granted by this court in the absence of the respondents on 10 June 2025 and
issued on 3 September 2025, the decision to dismiss the applicant was
reviewed and set aside. The respondents were ordered to re- instate the
applicant to his former position with effect from 15 November 2022. They
were further order to pay his lost salaries and all the benefits he was entitled
to had they not been stopped on 15 November 2022 with interest a temporae
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
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morae from 15 November 2022. The respondents failed to comply with the
court order. The applicant’s efforts to persuade them to comply came to
naught.
[3] In an effort to compel the respondents to comply with the court order the
applicant filed this urgent application on 22 January 2026 seeking mainly the
following relief:
“2. Declaring that the Order of this Court granted by the Honourable
Acting Justice Djaje on 03 September 2025, reviewing and setting
aside the Applicant’s dismissal and reinstating him with retrospective
effect, is immediately operational and executable due to the absence
of an application for stay of execution of the order, notwithstanding the
pending rescission application or any other interlocutory applic ations
filed by the Respondents.
3. That the Respondents compliance with the Order granted by the
Honourable Acting Madam Justice Djaje on 03 September 2025, be
regulated pending the final determination of the Rescission
Application, and that the following interim relief be granted:
3.1 IMMEDIATE ARREAR PAYMENT: That the First and Second
Respondents (the Applicants in Rescission) be and are hereby
ordered and compelled to immediately comply with paragraph
3 of the Order dated 03 September 2025, by paying the
Applicant the accrued total amount of R4, 142, 310. 64 (Four
Million, One Hundred and Forty -Two Thousand, Three
Hundred and Ten Rands and Sixty -Four Cents), representing
lost salaries, benefits, 13 th cheque, and a temporae morae
interest up to 03 September 2025, into the Applicant’s
nominated trust account, within twenty -one (21) days of the
granting of this Order.
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3.2 INTERIM MONTHLY EXECUTION: That the First and Second
Respondents be and are hereby ordered and compelled to pay
the Applicant his full monthly remuneration package,
calculated to be no less than R110, 629. 02 (One Hundred and
Ten Thousand, Six Hundred and Twenty -Nine Rands and two
Cents) per month, comprising his basic salary, housing
allowance, pro-rata 13 th cheque accrual, and the employer’s
portion of GEPT contribution.
4. Ordering the First and Second Respondents to take all necessary
administrative steps to reinstate the Applicant onto the PERSAL
system within 3 (three) days of the granting of this order.
5. COMMENCEMENT AND DURATION OF INTERIM PAYMENT: The
monthly payment referred to in paragraph 3.2 above to commence
immediately, covering the period from 04 September 2025, and shall
continue to be paid monthly on the 15 th day of every calendar month
until the date upon which the First and Second Respondents’
Application for Rescission is finally adjudicated and disposed of by this
Honourable Court.”
[4] The application is opposed by the respondent who also challenged the
urgency of the application. Based on the challenge the question of urgency
must be determined first.
[5] The respondents submitted that the urgency the applicant seeks to rely on is
self-created. They added that the applicant failed to set out circumstances
that render his application urgent and reasons for his application to be heard
urgently. The urgent application was filed 5 months after the order was
issued. They further submitted that the applicant can obtain substantial relief
in due course.
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[6] The reasons proffered by the applicant in support of his contention that he will
not obtain substantial redress in due course are that the respondents have
launched an application to have the order of the review court rescinded. The
rescission application has stalled owing to the respondents ’ failure to file an
application for condonation of the late filing of the replying affidavit. The
replying affidavit was filed on 3 November 2025, 17 days late. The applicant
submitted that it is likely that the rescission application will be heard 18 to 36
months from January 2026 owing to the severe backlog of cases at the
Labour Court.
[7] The respondents’ denied that the delay in the prosecution of the rescission
application constitutes grounds for absence of substantial redress in due
course. They submitted that a final decision in the applicant’s favour in due
course will constitute substantial redress. They denied that the delay in filing
their replying affidavit signaled a long delay in the finalization of the rescission
application. In support of their argument that the rescission application will be
heard earlier they relied on the directive issued by the Registrar of the Labour
Court. In th e directive the intention to set the matter down for hearing is
expressed and the parties are directed to file heads of argument.
[8] I must accept the respondents’ version that the applicant can obtain
substantial relief in due course. In his founding affidavit the applicant
submitted, correctly so, that the mere filing of the rescission application by the
respondents does not suspend the operation and execution of the court order
issued on 3 September 2025. The applicant further correctly submitted that in
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the absence of a court order staying the execution of the order issued on 3
September 2025 the order remains operative and executable. He added that
he is entitled to proceed with the execution of the order without any
hinderance of the respondents’ filing of the rescission application. The
applicant’s right to enforce the order issued on 3 September 2025 is clear. It
constitutes substantial redress which became available to him immediately
the respondents express their intention not to comply with the order. He gave
no cogent reason for not exercising it. The requirement for the absence of
substantial redress in due course is expressed as follows in Ma qubela v SA
Graduates Development Association and Others (2014) 35 ILJ 2479 (LC) at
para 32:
‘Whether a matter is urgent involves two considerations. The first is
whether the reasons that make the matter urgent have been set out
and secondly whether the applicant seeking relief will not obtain
substantial relief at a later stage. In all instances where urgency is
alleged, the applicant must satisfy the Court that indeed the
application is urgent. Thus, it is required of the applicant adequately to
set out in his or her founding affidavit the reasons for urgency, and to
give cogent reasons why urgent relief is necessary…..’
[9] The respondents sought a costs order against the applicant based on their
success in this application. Success on its own does not entitle a party to
costs. Section 162 of the Labour Relations Act
2 (The LRA) sets out the
requirements for a costs order . In the absence of reasons based on the
provisions of section 162 of the LRA the costs order may not be granted.
2 Act 66 of 1995, as amended
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[10] In the premises the following order is made:
Order:
1. The application is struck from the roll for lack of urgency.
2. There is no order as to costs.
MZN Lallie
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
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Appearances
For the Applicant: Adv. SI Ngwetjana
Instructed by Makgoba Attorneys
For the Respondent: Adv. MC Setlhako
Instructed by: The State Attorney