THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case No: 2025 – 075712
As Consolidated with CASE NO: J2896/18
In the matter between:
THE REGISTRAR OF LABOUR RELATIONS Applicant
and
SIPHO ERIC SONO N.O. First Respondent
(Administrator of the Chemical, Energy Paper, Printing,
Wood and Allied Workers' Union)
CHEMICAL, ENERGY, PAPER, PRINTING, WOOD AND
ALLIED WORKERS' UNION
(Under Administration) Second Respondent
GERHARD VOSLOO Third Respondent
CEPPWAWU INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Fourth Respondent
Heard: 30 July 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by uploading on
Caselines; and circulation to the parties' legal representatives by
email; and publication on the Labour Court’s website and SAFLII .
The date for hand-down is deemed to be on 28 January 2026
(1) Reportable Yes/No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised
____________ ______________
Signature Date
2
JUDGMENT
TLHOTLHALEMAJE, J
Introduction:
[1] The Second Respondent, Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied
Workers' Union (CEPPWAWU) (The Union), has been unable to manage its
own affairs since 2018. It was placed under administration following an
application by the Applicant (Registrar) in terms of section 103A(1)(c) of the
Labour Relations Act (The LRA)
1. Such an order was granted by Rabkin-
Naicker J on 4 June 2020 2, and Ms Thulisile Mashanda was appointed as the
Administrator.
[2] The detailed order of Rabkin- Naicker J set out the mandate inclusive of the
powers and responsibilities of the Administrator 3. Effectively, Mashanda was
authorised to take immediate control of the Union in the place of its National
Office Bearers and the N ational Executive Committee (NEC). The
Administrator’s powers included inter alia, the management of the affairs of the
Union, inclusive of all its contracts, legal proceedings, professional services,
meetings, remuneration, finances, assets and interests relat ed to its business
and affairs.
[3] In December 2021, individual members of the Union who were aggrieved with
Mashanda’s administration brought an application before this Court. That
application resulted with Mashanda’s removal by agreement with the Registrar
on 24 March 2022.
[4] Mashanda was replaced by the First Respondent (Mr Sono) , who was
appointed on an interim basis for 180 days as Administrator . Sono was to
assume the role on the same terms as applicable to Mashanda flowing from the
Rabkin-Naicker J’s Order. In addition, he was mandated to within the interim
1 Act 66 of 1995.
2 Registrar of Labour Relations v Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union.
Case no: J2896/18 (Delivered on 4 June 2020)
3 At pages 8 – 11 of the Order
3
period, ensure the facilitation of a National Congress and handing over to the
elected leadership.
The main applications before the Court:
[5] Before this Court are two consolidated applications brought under the provisions
of section 103A of the LRA. In the first application (‘Removal Application’)
launched on 21 May 2025, t he Registrar , seeks inter alia , orders that the
administration of the Union be extended from 30 June 2025 until 30 September
2026; that Sono be removed and replaced by the Third Respondent (Vosloo) as
the Administrator until June 2026, or until Vosloo has finalised and concluded
(i) all the outstanding audited financial statem ents (‘AFS’) of 2018 - 2025
financial years, (ii) convened a National Congress for the election of the Union
national leadership, and (iii), handed over the Union to such elected leadership,
whichever comes first.
[6] The second application (counter -application)(‘Extension Application’), was
launched on 26 May 2025 by Sono. He brought the application in his official
capacity as Administrator , and in his own personal capacity . Other than
opposing the Removal Application, Sono seeks a variety of order including,
extending the term of the administration of the Union from 30 June 2025 to an
indeterminate period, and to be terminated within a period of 6 (six) months from
the date of receiving funds from the CEPPWAWU Development Trust (CDT) to
settle the creditors ; securing of the balance of AFS, and the holding of the
national congress.
[7] Although the Union is cited as the second respondent, on the approach followed
by Snyman AJ in Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood, and Allied Workers
Union and Others v Mashanda N.O and Others (Mashanda)
4, it cannot however
be an independent respondent in circumstances where it is under Sono’s
administration. The latter fully represents it as he squarely stands in its shoes
as administrator.
[8] The above applications were consolidated by the Court (per Prinsloo J) on 04
[8] The above applications were consolidated by the Court (per Prinsloo J) on 04
June 2025 when the Extension Application was before the Court on the urgent
roll. The Court had further ordered that the period of administration be extended
4 (J 2896 (2018) [2022] ZALCJHB 350; (2023) 44 ILJ 520 (LC) at para 50
4
to 30 September 2026, and that Sono’s tenure be interim , pending the
determination of the consolidated applications.
Litigation history:
[9] Before and since the appointment of Sono, there has been persistent litigation
between various parties with interest s in the affairs of the Union. In the
meantime, after four administration orders since the Rabkin- Naicker J’s Order
of June 2020, the Union is nowhere near achieving self-governance. The parties
in the continuous litigation involved Sono as Administrator, the Registrar,
individual or group members of the Union, and the Fourth Respondent
(CEPPWAWU Investments Pty Ltd (CI), which is the Union’s investment arm.
[10] Those numerous disputes played themselves out in this Court, the High Court,
the Labour Appeal Court and the Constitutional Court into July 2025. Other
disputes at the High Court involved CEPPWAWU Development Trust (CDT),
Sono, the Union, CI and the Registrar. The CDT was established as a vehicle
to hold investments for the benefit of the Union. As at February 2019, it was
valued at R1.5b. The CDT is also CI’s 100% shareholder, with the Union being
its sole beneficiary.
[11] Resulting from these various disputes, t here are no less than 19 Orders and
Judgments issued by various Courts between June 2020 and July 2025 as per
the schedule
5 prepared on behalf of Sono. For context, t he consolidated
applications are before the Court against the following prior litigation:
11.1 Sono’s initial term of appointment was due to expire on 12 December
2022. The Registrar had obtained an order on 7 December 2022 extending
Sono’s term.
11.2 During August 2022, individual members of the Union had approached the
Court, leading to an order being issued on 25 August 2022 (Per Snyman
AJ). The order interdicted a Union National Congress sought to be
convened by Sono. The interdict was granted pendi ng an order in Part B,
in which the removal of Sono was sought.
5 Caselines 011-01-2
5
11.3 Pending the determination of Part B as above, the Registrar had in
September 2022, brought a counter -application and sought the extension
of Sono’s appointment as Administrator.
11.4 On 7 December 2022, Snyman AJ dismissed the application brought by
the individual members of the Union, and extended Sono’s term for a further
12 months, with a specific order that the latter must convene a national
congress by 30 September 2023 and hand over the Union to its elected
leadership.
11.5 It is however common cause that flowing from Snyman AJ’s order,
applications for leave to appeal; applications under section 18(3) of the
Superior Courts Act; and Petitions for leave to Appeal to the LAC followed.
An unsuccessful petition to the Constitutional Court put an end to that
dispute on 5 July 2023.
11.6 On 3 November 2023, Sono obtained an order (Per Mahosi J), condoning
the failure to convene a National Congress before 30 September 2023.
11.7 Lallie J on 4 December 2023 issued an order and extended Sono’s tenure
until 30 June 2025, or in the alternative, until the Union had elected a
leadership at a National Congress. The main reason for the extension
according to the Registrar, was to enable Sono to file the AFS and convene
a National Congress by 12 December 2023.
11.8 On 20 March 2024, following yet another application, Sono obtained an
order varying the initial terms and powers of the Administrator as
determined by Rabkin- Naicker J on 4 June 2020. A similar order was
obtained by agreement between Sono and the Registrar on 14 May 2024,
which effectively empowered Sono to appoint and remove the trustees
appointed by the Union to the CI.
11.9 On 9 July 2024, the Registrar brought an application to set aside the
appointment of a Union’s National Organiser (Mr Ntseki) made by Sono.
The application was dismissed (per Prinsloo J) on 14 August 2024.
11.10 Pending an application for leave to appeal against the judgment of
Prinsloo J , the Registrar brought a semi -urgent application on 27
Prinsloo J , the Registrar brought a semi -urgent application on 27
September 2024 to remove Sono as an Administrator. It is this application
6
that triggered other applications leading to the ultimate consolidation as
ordered by Prinsloo J.
11.11 It is further common cause that on 27 March 2025, this Court, (per
Mahomed AJ), had issued an order following an urgent application by the
Registrar. Following undertakings by Sono, a N ational Congress that was
planned to convene in June 2025 or in the future, was interdicted until the
filing of the AFS was up to date.
11.12 Prior to the hearing of the consolidated applications, there was a further
application by individual members of the Union seeking intervention. The
application was dismissed on 10 June 2025 by Phakedi AJ, who in line with
the interpretation of section 103A (1) of the LRA as espoused in
Mashanda6, had however allowed their submissions to be placed before
the Court for consideration in the removal application.
11.13 Equally filed after the consolidation order were other applications by both
the Registrar and Sono, with each seeking leave to file further
supplementary affidavits. The Court will however despite objections by both
parties to each other’s application, admit them to the extent that they are
relevant to the issues for consideration.
CI’s intervention in the consolidated applications, the interlocutory applications
and evaluation:
[12] Vosloo and CI had not filed any papers in the consolidated applications . This
was so since no specific relief was sought against it by the Registrar . CI was
however not cited in the Extension Application.
[13] CI, whose attorneys of record have been involved in representing it in all legal
proceedings since 2004, had not at any stage participated in these proceedings
other than maintaining a watching brief . This was CI’s position until the matter
was heard on 30 July 2025.
[14] At the hearing of the matter, and at a stage where argument for the other parties
was about to be completed, the Court had afforded the CI an opportunity to
make any oral submissions in regards to issues pertaining to it s involvement,
make any oral submissions in regards to issues pertaining to it s involvement,
6At paras 46 - 47
7
and more particularly issues raised by the Registrar concerning the disputes
surrounding a conditional loan from the CI, which Sono had rejected. I will deal
in detail at a later stage of this judgment on these crucial issues.
[15] The Court’s invitation to CI appears to have placed a spanner in the wheels of
these proceedings. The submissions made by Counsel for the CI were clearly
in support of the R emoval Application, and by implication, opposed to the
Extension Application. To the extent that the issues raised from the bar by
Counsel for the CI in the Court’s view required proper ventilation, the
proceedings were then adjourned. An order was issued setting out the
timeframes within which the parties were required to deliver further papers. CI
was to deliver an affidavit and short heads of argument in respect of issues it
needed to raise by 8 August 2025. Sono was to deliver any response whilst the
Registrar was afforded until 20 August 2025 to file any submissions.
[16] Arising from the Court order on 30 July 2025, and after the CI had delivered its
Answering Affidavit to the main application and further submissions, Sono in
turn delivered various interlocutory applications. Primary was an objection in
terms of Rule 36(2) of the Rules, to the late filing of the answering affidavit and
the submissions, and a further application in terms of Rule 57 of the Rules to
set aside CI’s irregular steps.
Preliminary issues and evaluation:
(i) Sono’s locus standi:
[17] A preliminary point was raised by both the Registrar and the CI to the effect that
Sono lacked locus standi to bring the extension application, on the grounds that
in a previous judgment of Snyman AJ of 7 December 2022, it was held that in
the instance where the Registrar, and not the Union itself, had brought the
original Section 103A(1) application, only the Registrar could bring a further
Section 103A(1) application. It was submitted that both Registrar and Sono were
Section 103A(1) application. It was submitted that both Registrar and Sono were
parties in the Section 103A(1)(c) application by the Registrar and in accordance
with the res judicata principle, this matter has accordingly been finally
determined and c ould not be re- litigated by the same parties . It was further
submitted that since Sono’s term ended on 30 June 2025, Sono had no locus
standi to oppose the application for extension of administration and appointment
8
of Vosloo, since the application for removal has been overtaken by events and
became irrelevant . It was contended that Sono after 30 June 2025, only
remained on as administrator in a temporary capacity, pending the handing
down of judgment in the latest section 103A(1) application.
[18] The judgment of Snyman AJ heavily relied on by CI dealt with a removal
application brought by individual members of the Union, and not the Union itself.
It is not clear on what basis its can be said the judgment precluded Sono from
acting in both capacities in either opposing the removal application or extension
of the administration in the light of the provisions of section 103A(5), more
specifically given his mandate arising from the Rabkin-Naicker J’s Order that he
had authority to litigate for and on behalf of the Union, and to also seek an
amendment or variation to the administration order.
[19] In my view, the fact that Sono’s tenure had come to an end on 30 June 2025 is
neither here nor there. This is so in that but for the belated determination of the
removal application which he had opposed and the extension application which
was brought before the end of his tenure, the matter ought to have been heard
prior to 30 June 2025. Further in view of the extension orders granted by
Prinsloo J on 4 June 2025 and by this Court on 23 July 2025, in the absence of
the Union being in the position to act on its own or where as things stand Sono
remains the Administrator, I am satisfied that he has the necessary locus standi
for the purposes of the consolidated applications.
(ii) Sono’s application to supplement the founding affidavit in the Extension
Application:
[20] Despite the clear directives and timeframes for filing of further documents as set
out by the Court in its Order of 30 July 2025, filing had continued into 2
December 2025, when Sono filed an application seeking leave to supplement
the founding affidavit in the Extension Application. This is the second such
the founding affidavit in the Extension Application. This is the second such
application, with the first having been filed in July 2025 prior to the hearing of
the matter.
[21] To compound matters, as late as 17 December 2025, the CI had filed an
answering affidavit to Sono’s application for leave to supplement his papers in
9
the Removal Application. In response, as late as 19 January 2026, Sono had
filed a Notice of Irregular Step in respect of the CI’s answering affidavit
[22] From the chain of events since the Order of the Court on 30 July 2025, it is my
view that the indulgence granted by the Court has clearly been gratuitously
abused by both the CI and Sono, for purposes other than those intended by the
Court when the matter was adjourned.
[23] Sono’s latest application of 2 December 2025 for leave to supplement the
papers in the Extension Application ought to be swiftly disposed of. This is so in
that arguments had already been heard and the matter was properly ventilated
but for the submissions still to be made by CI resulting from the Court’s
indulgence and any other responses thereto. It is not clear why Sono would
want to essentially re- open his case and seek to supplement evidence and
arguments already heard and finalised.
[24] Accordingly, inasmuch as Sono complained of abuse of the Court’s indulgence
by CI, he is equally guilty of the same abuse. For reasons already stated, the
Court should refuse to consider that application and strike it out . It would
therefore not be necessary to consider the CI’s answer nor Sono’s latest Notice
of Irregular Step in that regard.
(iii) CI’s standing, answering Affidavit and objections thereto:
[25] It needs to be reiterated that CI had throughout the delivery of the Removal and
Extension applications and the consolidation order, only maintained a watching
brief. It is not necessary to point out the purpose of a watching brief, other than
to point out that its main objective is inter alia, to ensure that the interests of a
client are protected. Where a client has not filed any papers in the proceedings,
counsel on a watching brief can only intervene or interfere with proceedings with
the Court’s permission. Even then, it would only be for the purposes of making
submissions if an issue arose that affected a client’s interests, or where certain
submissions if an issue arose that affected a client’s interests, or where certain
pertinent points of law were to be raised. Thus, the extent of the involvement of
the watching brief counsel is not to provide more than assistance to the Court,
or to overstep by interference in the proceedings.
10
[26] The question that arises as correctly pointed out on behalf of Sono, is whether
despite being cited and having held a watching brief, CI has a right to be heard
through its answering affidavit, more specifically in relation to the merits of the
consolidated applications.
[27] CI’s argument was that being cited as a party to the proceedings , and without
more, gave it an automatic right to participate in the proceedings 7. It further
submitted that the objection by Sono based on a misjoinder was misplaced as
it was for Sono to seek a misjoinder as an in limine point, which he had not8. CI
further submitted that it could have been joined under the common law on the
grounds of, inter alia, equity, and/or in accordance with the provisions of Section
173 of the Constitution, to allow it to participate in the proceedings since it had
a valuable contribution to make and assist the Court.
[28] The Registrar in support of CI’s intervention submitted that CI’s intervention and
answering affidavit was consistent with the Court’s order. The Registrar also
opposed the application to strike out, and viewed it as delaying tactic. The Court
was implored to look beyond the procedural technicalities raised by Sono, and
evaluate the merits of CI’s intervention. It was submitted that the CI had an
interest in the main application, which granted it the right to be heard in the
manner it has proposed. The Registrar reiterated the CI’s contentions that Sono
did not object to the misjoin der of the CI in the first instance, and there was
therefore no reason not to allow its answering affidavit.
[29] Other than these submissions, the Registrar in similar fashion as Sono, sought
to add evidential material which had already been ventilated when the matter
was argued on 30 July 2025, to which of course an objection was raised.
[30] Sono’s counter-arguments were that the CI despite being cited had elected not
to participate in the proceedings , and it was therefore unnecessary to bring a
to participate in the proceedings , and it was therefore unnecessary to bring a
misjoinder application. It was disputed that a mere citation conferred locus
standi on CI, and that what was required was a direct and substantial interest in
the subject matter of the litigation, i.e., an interest in the O rder the Court may
7 In reference to Van Staden NO v Pro-Wiz Group (Pty) Ltd 2019(4) SA 532 (SCA) at para [13].
8 In reference to Rabinowitz and Another NNO v Ned-Equity Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (3) SA 415 (W) at
419E -F:
11
make, which could prejudice the party’s rights if granted, and that interest alone
or convenience was not sufficient9.
[31] The objection was that the mere citation of CI as a party did not confer upon it
a right to actively prosecute or support the Registrar’s case in the absence of a
lis between it and Sono. It was further submitted that no relief was sought
against the CI, nor had it applied to intervene as a co- applicant in the
proceedings. Its citation was viewed as material misjoinder, and it was in any
event, regarded as a procedural formality which did not however confer
substantive locus standi on CI, specifically since no specific relief was sought
against it.
[32] In the circumstances it was submitted that CI had no interest in the proceedings,
and that its attempt to participate in the proceedings was procedurally irregular
and prejudicial to the orderly conduct of the proceedings, with the consequence
of causing procedural chaos and additional costs to the other parties. CI was
accused of taking advantage of the Court’s indulgence by introducing new
impermissible grounds supporting the removal application, and which grounds
the Registrar had not relied upon in support of Sono’s removal.
[33] It might be argued on behalf of the CI , that the Court Order in terms of which
the matter was postponed on 30 July 2025 may have by implication granted it
leave to file an affidavit r egarding the issues to be addressed in the main
applications before the Court. CI clearly misunderstood the intentions behind
the Court’s indulgence. Even if its understanding was correct, the indulgence
could not have been an open invitation to CI to file a substantive answering
application either for or against either of the main applications. The invitation
was issued in the light of its involvement to the extent that disputes arose
regarding the nature and conditions of the loan that Sono sought in the course
of the administration of the Union. This issue was material to the determination
of the administration of the Union. This issue was material to the determination
of whether the failure to accept the loans impacted on the completion of the
9 In reference to Murray and Roberts (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
[2019] 11 BLLR 1224 (LAC); (2019) 40 ILJ 2510 (LAC) at paras 24 – 25; Municipal & Essential Services
Civil Union (MECSU) v City of Ekurhuleni [2025] ZALCJHB 230 (20 June 2025) at paras 36 - 37.
12
administration and whether it pointed to just and equitable grounds for a
removal.
[34] It was however correctly pointed out on behalf of Sono that whether the CI was
permitted to intervene in the manner it sought was an issue that arose and was
answered by the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in Kruger and others v Aciel
Geomatics (Pty) Ltd (Kruger)10. The issue before the LAC as an in limine point
was whether a co- respondent that remained a respondent could support an
applicant by raising facts and allegations in its affidavit in support of the latter,
and also seek the same relief.
[35] The LAC had held that a respondent in a motion application c ould not simply
decide to be another applicant 11. It had supported the view that in such
circumstances, a co -respondent such as CI in this case, had various options ,
including being joined as a second applicant in order to make out its own case.
Such a co-respondent, which had elected not to join issue with the applicant in
the first place, was however not permitted to file an answering affidavit the sole
purpose of which was to build the case for the relief sought by the primary
applicant.
[36] In this case as was in Kruger , once the CI in its belated answering affidavit
essentially sought the same relief as the Registrar, it obviously pinned its
colours to the mast , and made itself an applicant in the proceedings . It further
went beyond the Court’s narrow leave to file an affidavit and the intentions
behind the indulgence of the Court. CI as a co -respondent resulting from the
Court’s indulgence, cannot buttress the Registrar’s case post the closing of
pleadings in the consolidated applications, and without due regard to proper
procedural requirements in motion proceedings.
[37] The approach adopted by CI cannot be countenanced by the fundamental
principle in our law, which is that it is the founding affidavit filed in support of a
motion that made the case which the respondent must meet, and it is therefore
motion that made the case which the respondent must meet, and it is therefore
not open to a Court to allow such procedure on any grounds. These procedural
10 (JA87/2014) [2016] ZALAC 92 (14 June 2016)
11 At para 10
13
requirements cannot simply be dismissed as mere technicalities as argued on
behalf of the Registrar. The approach of the CI clearly placed Sono in an
invidious position, where he had to file answering affidavits to a co-respondent’s
answering affidavit. The rules of engagement in litigation cannot clearly be
countenanced by such an approach, more specifically where in the end, the
Court would have to determine the factual and disputed material from the papers
on the application of the principles in Plascon-Evans12. Equally important in
such cases were issues surrounding any adverse cost13. In the end, reliance by
CI on Children’s Institute v Presiding Officer 14 for the proposition that the
interests of justice should permit its answering affidavit in its form and manner,
cannot come to its assistance, given the prejudice to Sono.
[38] Other than the above irregularity, t o the extent that CI filed that answering
affidavit in circumstances where on the facts there was no lis between it and
Sono or where no relief was sought against it, on the approach in Kruger, Sono
had no obligation to answer to the CI’s affidavit. Equally so, and in the absence
of a lis, it would be superfluous for the Court to consider other objections raised
by Sono pertaining to whether CI’s affidavit was in compliance with the
provisions of Rule 35(7) of the rules of Court . On account of the irregularities
regarding the CI’s answering affidavit, it follows it ought to be struck out.
(iv) CI’s written submissions:
[39] CI’s written submissions were delivered on 12 August 2025 and contrary to the
Court order which required such filing by 8 August 2025. It was submitted that
12 Plascon-Evans Paints (TVL) Ltd v Van Riebeck Paints (Pty) Ltd (53/84) [1984] ZASCA 51; [1984] 2
All SA 366 (A); 1984 (3) SA 623; 1984 (3) SA 620
13 See also Kruger at para 10; James Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd (previously named Gilbert Hamer & Co
Ltd) v Simmons NO 1963 (4) SA 656 (A) at 660D-H, where it was held;
Ltd) v Simmons NO 1963 (4) SA 656 (A) at 660D-H, where it was held;
“It is in the interests of the administration of justice that the well -known and well-established
general rules regarding the number of sets and the proper sequence of affidavits in motion
proceedings should ordinarily be observed. That is not to say that t hose general rules must
always be rigidly applied: some flexibility, controlled by the presiding Judge exercising his
discretion in relation to the facts of the case before him, must necessarily also be permitted.
Where, as in the present case, an affidavi t is tendered in motion proceedings both late and
out of its ordinary sequence, the party tendering it is seeking, not a right, but an indulgence
from the Court: he must both advance his explanation of why the affidavit is out of time and
satisfy the Court that, although the affidavit is late, it should, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case, nevertheless be received.”
14 2013 (2) SA 620 (CC)
14
in the absence of an application for condonation, the submissions were not
properly before the Court. Of course the Court had invited the submissions, and
in view of the purpose of the indulgence granted to CI and its interests in
ensuring that its loans to the administration are accounted for , the interests of
justice dictate that those submissions be admitted.
The merits of the consolidated applications.
[40] Although the matters were consolidated, it follows that once the Court
establishes that a case was made out for the relief that the Registrar seeks in
the Removal Application, that would be the end of the matter, and without the
need to consider the Extension Application.
The legal frame-work:
[41] It is not necessary to deal with the provisions of Section 103A(1) of the LRA, to
the extent that these have been invoked and the Union is under administration
since 2020. The only consensus in this matter is that both the Registrar and
Sono agree that the period of administration must be extended. The relevant
sub-sections of section 103A of the LRA for the purpose of the determination of
the issues before the Court are;
(2) “Without limiting the generality of subsection (1)(a), it may be just and
equitable to make an order in terms of subsection (1) if-
(a) the trade union or employers’ organisation fails materially to perform its
functions; or
(b) there is serious mismanagement of the finances of the trade union or
employers’ organisation.
(3) If there are any persons not represented before the Labour Court whose
interests may be affected by an order in terms of subsection (1), the
Court must consider their interests before deciding whether or not to
grant the order.
…
(5) The Labour Court may, on the application by the trade union, employer’s
organisation or registrar-
(a) vary or amend any prior order made in terms of this section; or
15
(b) if it is satisfied that an administrator is no longer required, terminate the
appointment of the administrator, on appropriate conditions.”
[42] It is apparent from the above that the primary objective of s ection 103A of the
LRA other than regulating the appointment of an administrator of a union, is to
enable it to regain its viability and the fulfilment of the purpose for which it was
established, and to further restore its lawful and democratic functioning. In
effect, the appointment of an administrator is compared to that of a business
rescue practitioner in the case of an ailing company, with the objective of placing
a trade union that is in financial distress on the road to a healthy recovery as
the last step, before a winding- up application or in the case of a Union, its
deregistration by the Registrar15.
[43] Section 103A of the LRA therefore acknowledges the extraordinary
circumstances and nature of administration where a Union is ultimately placed
under administration, and the Court’s supervisory role where such a measure is
deemed appropriate. At the core of the reason for appointment or continuation
of administration is substantive dysfunction of a Union, rather than mere
irregularities in the management of its affairs.
[44] Section 103A(5), which is the operative provision in the consolidated
applications, regulates the removal, variation or termination of administration,
and permits the Registrar or the Union to seek termination of administrator’s
appointment or variation of administration orders already issued, if in the view
of the Court, it is just and equitable. The Registrar is a creature of statute, and
fulfils an important regulatory and custodial function in terms of the LRA. The
powers of the Registrar are therefore not unfettered in the light of an obligation
to act within the confines of the powers afforded in terms of the LRA
16.
The grounds for removal and opposition thereto:
16.
The grounds for removal and opposition thereto:
[45] Given the Registrar’s powers under section 103A(5) of the LRA, it can be
accepted that those powers extend to seeking a removal of an administrator
15Minister of Labour and Another v Public Servants Association of SA and Another (2017) 38 ILJ 1075
(LAC); Vosloo NO and Another v South African Medical Association NPC and Another (2020) 41 ILJ
2482 (LC) at para 17; See Mashanda at paras 56 - 59
16 Registrar of Labour Relations v Sono N.O. and Others (J 2896/18) [2024] ZALCJHB 310 (14 August
2024) at para 32
16
and replacement with another of the Registrar’s choosing. The administrator’s
mandate in most instances will derive from Court O rders when a Union was
placed under administration, or statutorily under the provisions of sections 98 –
100 of the LRA.
[46] By all accounts, and such as in this case, the removal shall have as its basis ,
amongst other things, the failure to meet the mandate, any factor such as
incompetence, mismanagement of funds , acting contrary to the mandate, not
acting in good faith, exercise of powers for nefarious reasons , and acting in a
manner that is prejudicial to the interests of the Union and its members.
[47] In my view the same grounds that are applicable under section 103A(2) when a
union is placed under administration, ought equally apply where an
administrator’s removal is sought. This is so in that at the core of those statutory
grounds, and where proven, is a state of dysfunctionality, coupled with material
failures to place the Union in a position where it can run its own affairs
independently.
[48] Ultimately, it is the Court in its supervisory role and discretionary powers, to
determine on the grounds advanced, whether it would under the circumstances
be deemed just and equitable to permit the removal. As correctly pointed out on
behalf of the Registrar and in reference to Knoop and Another NNO v Gupta
(Tayob Intervening)(Knoop)
17, (within the context of an application to remove
business rescue practitioners), a removal is not something to be ordered lightly.
The primary reason justifying removal will be actual or potential prejudice or
harm to the interests of the estate, trust or company, and those in whose
interests the administration was established. It was added that the nature of the
grounds of removal is based on factual conclusions or inferences drawn from
other proven facts and not speculation. It was for the applicant seeking a
removal to specify and establish by evidence, the conduct that justified an order
for removal
removal to specify and establish by evidence, the conduct that justified an order
for removal
18. These principles are apposite to the facts of this case within the
context of section 103A of the LRA, where the removal of an administrator is
sought.
17 (116/2020) [2020] ZASCA 163; [2021] 1 All SA 726 (SCA); 2021 (3) SA 88 (SCA) (9 December 2020)
18 At para 18 - 19
17
[49] Against these considerations, the Registrar seeks the removal of Sono on three
main grounds which are interrelated. For the sake of convenience, these
grounds of removal and opposition thereto will be outlined and evaluated jointly.
(i) Failure to file Audited Financial Statements (AFS):
[50] It is not in dispute that there have been considerable delays in the filing of AFS
since the first administration order. Equally not disputed is that delays had
persisted since Sono’s appointment in 2022. The Registrar contends that Sono
had not filed the AFS for the period 2018 to date. I t was contended that Sono
had reported in August 2024 that the AFS for 2018 were audited albeit not
signed, and that the remaining statements had been prepared. The Registrar
however complained that Sono’s report was not supported by any
documentation to demonstrate that indeed the 2018 financial statement s had
been audited, nor did he provide a plan in regard to when the AFS would be
completed.
[51] The Registrar contended that the AFS for 2014 to 2024 as submitted were non-
compliant with the LRA, and auditing and accounting standards. In this regard,
it was averred that Sono had not complied with the six monthly reporting to the
Registrar; the AFS did not consolidate the assets and liabilities of the Union’s
investments structures being the CI and CDT; did not account for Agency Shop
levies; and were accompanied by disclaimers and qualified opinions.
[52] Sono according to the Registrar, only cited financial constraints as the reason
the audited statements could not be finalised. This was however in
circumstances where he had refused to accept advanced funding from the CI
as Union’s investment arm, on the basis that it was conditional upon him being
made accountable in regard to the use and management of those loans. Sono
had however viewed the conditions as compromising his independence.
[53] The Registrar had added that the available financial resources to attend to the
[53] The Registrar had added that the available financial resources to attend to the
AFS, were used by Sono for other purposes, such as the payment of salaries of
unnecessary appointments he had made. To the extent that the Registrar in this
regard was referring to the appointment of Ntseki as National Organiser, this
issue as was correctly pointed out on behalf of Sono, was adjudicated and
determined by Prinsloo J, and it need not detain this judgment.
18
[54] The CI in its written submissions confirmed that indeed Sono had consistently
refused its offer of conditional funding towards the completion of AFS,
settlement of creditors and convening congress. It had submitted that the refusal
was irrational, unreasonable and inconsistent with his fiduciary obligations as
an Administrator. CI submitted that Sono’s refusal to accept the conditional
funding on the basis that his independence would be compromised was
misconceived, as such funding was tied to governance and accountability,
which was compatible with the objectives of section 103A of the LRA . These
provisions demanded proper utilisation of Union assets, transparent accounting,
accountability to Union members, and lawful reporting to the Registrar.
[55] In a nutshell, the submissions were that Sono had failed to account for fees,
resisted reasonable loan conditions that would enforce accountability, and that
the Union was however not in a position to secure any other funding. It was
contended that Vosloo on the other hand was willing to accept the loan
conditions and complete the task of the administration.
[56] The intervening parties (in an application that was before Phakedi AJ), were
identified as members of the Union in good standing and employed at various
entities where the Union enjoyed organisational rights. S ome of them were
elected union representatives at various levels of its structures , and their
interests are to be considered within the framework of section 103A(3) of the
LRA.
[57] Central to their submissions in support of the removal application was that Sono
had failed in material ways to act in the best interests of the Union and its
members. They submitted that despite Sono being accountable to Union
members, he had nonetheless acted on ‘frolic of his own’, disregarded statutory
obligations, failed to convene national congress and constitutional structures of
the Union despite prior commitments, and thus eroded its democratic
the Union despite prior commitments, and thus eroded its democratic
governance. They shared the Registrar’s concerns that there was no financial
accountability in managing the affairs of the Union, that there was no justification
not to pursue the unlawful cash withdrawals made by Mashanda (the third
ground of removal), and confirmed that there was no progress in completing the
AFS. They submitted that the delays were in the interests of Sono, who wanted
to prolong the period of administration. For personal reasons.
19
[58] In opposition to his removal, Sono submitted that the removal application was
misconceived and premature in the first place, in view of his tenure reaching its
end, and further in the light of previous extensions granted by this Court. He
contended that the grounds relied upon by the Registrar for his removal were
resolved through various litigation that came before this Court, and were further
undermined by the Registrar’s concession that the primary cause of any delays
in completing the AFS or convening a National Congress was the Union’s
financial distress.
[59] He submitted that the primary reason for the extension of the administration of
the Union and his tenure as per the various Court orders, was the lack of funds
which made it impossible for him to complete the duties that he was appointed
to perform , and to pay auditors . He contended that he had to appoint new
auditors who were willing to proceed despite arrear payments. He contended
that the Union was in a debt of about R35m, and that completing the AFS and
convening a National Congress were costly exercises for which no funds were
available.
[60] In respect of finalising the AFS, Sono submitted that the previous Administrator,
Mashanda, had completed the 2017 statements after receiving R42m in loans
from the CI. He contended that he inherited outstanding statements for 2012-
2021 of which he had completed the 2018 – 2020. He attributed the delays in
respect of 2021 – 2024 to Mashanda having withheld reports due to her unpaid
fees. He further conceded that there could have been disclaimers and
qualification in the audits of 2022 and 2023, but attributed these to a variety of
factors including historical and pre-administration dysfunction and data loss, to
which he had attended to through reconstruction of data. He denied that this
indicated default on his part and instead argued that the modified opinions
reflected a remedial process he had undertaken resulting from inherent data
reflected a remedial process he had undertaken resulting from inherent data
deficits and faults by appointed auditors.
[61] Sono further attributed the financial problems to the dysfunctional state of the
CDT since 2011 which had operated without trustees . He however contended
that he had formulated a rescue plan to unlock the necessary funds through the
regularisation of the CDT.
20
[62] Sono contended that evidence pointed that he had made progress in stabilising
the finances of the Union despite the constraints, and the need for an estimated
R3.1m to finalise the audit. He contended that he had inherited huge arrears
and notwithstanding the constraints, he had produced the AFS sequentially.
Progress was made as at May 2024 and even though the AFS for 2022- 2024
were outstanding, it was anticipated that these would be completed within six
months. As at the filing of further papers after 30 July 2025, he had contended
that the 2021 – 2023 AFS were complete and furnished in October and
November 2025 whilst those for 2024 were in the process of being prepared.
[63] Sono regarded his refusal to accept the conditional funds from the CI as
reasonable in order to protect the independence of the administration process .
He contended that the CI was not neutral funder or independent, as it was too
enmeshed in Union politics. He relied on the judgment Snyman AJ that it was
not for CI to impose conditions that circumscribed the administrator’s discretion,
let alone redefine accountability in a manner that had the effect of displacing the
Court’s supervisory role. He further submitted that the issues of funding and
reliance on it by the Registrar in seeking his removal were in any event a matter
that was res judicata, as the Court had accepted the Administrator’s
independence and further since various Court Orders had extended his tenure
in the past, notwithstanding the financial constraints.
[64] He further submitted that the Registrar had throughout understood the
constraints and supported him in turning around the Union’s affairs. According
to Sono, t he Registrar’s support was an acknowledgment of these persistent
problems, which were compounded by various litigation and factionalism within
the Union. In his view, the relationship with the Registrar soured when Ntseki
was appointed as the Union’s National Organiser in 2024. He submitted that the
was appointed as the Union’s National Organiser in 2024. He submitted that the
appointment of Ntseki was in any event determined and resolved by this Court
in a judgment delivered on 14 August 2024 (per Prinsloo J), and thus could not
be used as a ground to remove him.
(ii) Failure to convene a National Congress:
[65] In accordance with an order granted by this Court (per Snyman AJ) on 7
December 2022, Sono was ordered to convene a National Congress to enable
21
the election of a new leadership of the Union, which would manage its own
affairs.
[66] The order had further provided that Sono was to appoint an experienced and
reputable facilitator to ensure that congresses were convened in terms of the
constitution of CEPPWAWU for the purposes of electing a new national
leadership; that the congresses were to be convened and concluded prior to 30
September 2023; that the control, management and affairs of the Union were to
be handed over to the new leadership upon expiry of the period of administration
on 12 December 2023, unless extended further by the C ourt on application by
the Registrar.
[67] The Registrar disputed Sono’s reasons that there was a lack of funds to
convene a National Congress. It was reiterated that available funds were being
utilised for all the wrong reasons. This was apparent when he had in the
application to set aside the appointment of the National Organiser, he (Sono),
had averred that the National Organiser's salary was minute and had no
influence on the Union's ability to service the Unions legacy debt.
[68] It was not in dispute that the convening of a National Congress was interdicted
as Sono had at the time not completed the AFS. The Registrar however
submitted that Sono did not appear to prioritise the completion of the AFS or the
convening of the National Congress , despite his allegations that he spend six
hours a day on the administration of the Union. This was further in
circumstances where Sono had refused to provide the Registrar with a
breakdown of his fees in relation to the work he had done, on the basis that the
request was arbitrary.
[69] The above according to the Registrar, displayed lack of regard for the
Registrar’s office authority, and is indicative that the Administrator’s task will not
be completed for a handover to the Union. It was further contended that the
failure to convene the National Congress undermined the Unions democratic
governance.
failure to convene the National Congress undermined the Unions democratic
governance.
[70] Sono in response submitted that the lack of funds was central to the planned
congress not being convened, as the AFS were not completed. He however
22
contended that he had taken steps towards that objective by planning regional
congresses and having a draft plan which was subject to funding.
[71] Sono contended that in any event, he was granted condonation by this Court
for not convening congress on time, and that it was at the Registrar’s own
instance that the AFS be completed prior to convening the congress. It was
added that it was common cause that the Union's outstanding debts continued
to remain a challenge in properly executing the duties of Administrator.
(ii) Alleged Negligence in the Management of the Union's affairs:
[72] The Registrar’s complaint in this regard was that in July 2022, Sono had
reported that the previous Administrator, Mashanda, had withdrawn a total
amount of R566 044.33 in two transactions on 6 and 7 April 2022 from the
Union's Investec Bank account . The withdrawals took place after Mashanda’s
term as administrator had come to an end. The Registrar contends that despite
Sono having undertaken since August 2022 to follow up on the matter, there
has been no progress of the recovery of the funds.
[73] The Registrar had followed up the matter with Sono on 21 June 2024, and the
latter had responded in August 2024 and advised that i t would not make
commercial sense to pursue the repayments with Mashanda, as the fees owed
to her exceeded the amount she had withdrawn after her tenure. Against this
response, the Registrar held the view that the Administrator displayed
negligence for over two years to recover the unlawful withdrawals of Union
amounts, his inability to conduct accurate due diligence over the aff airs of the
Union, and further that he had falsely reported to the Registrar on such matters.
Summary of the parties contentions:
[74] In the end, the Registrar submitted that other than the above grounds, Sono had
effectively failed to carry out his mandate, had demonstrated lack of
transparency in the administration of the Union, and had caused it ongoing harm
transparency in the administration of the Union, and had caused it ongoing harm
due to his failures to get it out of its financial position.
[75] Sono’s case was that against financial constraints and various litigation, he had
managed the Union’s finances prudently, balanced salaries, operational debt
and compliance. It was submitted that the Registrar had not shown that his
removal was just and equitable on the facts; that issues surrounding funding
23
were either issue- estoppel or not persuasive; that there was no evidence of
dereliction of his tasks, that he had managed the financial challenges faced by
the Union, made progress despite all obstacles, demonstrated independence
and impartiality, and further that his removal was not in the interests of the
Union, as it was not ready to exit administration.
[76] He contended that no case was made out as to he should be replaced by with
Vosloo, whose suitability was not established. He viewed any attempts to
remove him as being disruptive, costly, counter-productive and likely to result in
duplication of work already done, and cause further delays in the winding up of
the administration process.
Evaluation:
[77] As a starting point, it is correct as pointed out on behalf of the Registrar and the
CI, that congress cannot be convened until the AFS are completed, since this
is a prerequisite for handing over to the newly elected union leadership. The
mandate from sec tions 98 – 100 of the LRA and the various administration
orders in regards to the AFS, and whether it was achieved, is a crucial question
under section 103A(5), when determining whether a continuation or removal of
administration is just and equitable.
[78] When he was appointed in March 2022, Sono’s mandate, was time-bound given
his limited interim appointment. He was in terms of the Order, required to
appoint a reputable and experienced f acilitator to ensure that the Union
convened a Congress within the 180 days , and that a new national leadership
was properly elected, interim or otherwise; and to hand over the affairs and full
control of the Union to such duly elected national leadership. Implicit in this
mandate was that there be could no legitimate congress convened, until the
AFS were completed. In my view, it made sense that the Registrar had obtained
an interdict stopping the convening of congress, when the AFS were nowhere
near being completed. It would not make sense for the new leadership of a
near being completed. It would not make sense for the new leadership of a
Union to take over when its financial state remains unresolved. As at the hearing
of this matter, over three years had passed and the AFS had not been
completed nor is a Union congress anywhere near to be convened.
24
[79] From the initial administration order to other orders regarding the extension and
variation of the administration, it will be accepted that indeed the Union had
always been in a dire financial position. What is common cause however, is that
loans or funding from the CI was and is readily available, other than the fact that
it is conditional.
[80] It is issues surrounding this loan, which in my view are determinative of whether
the financial position the Union can be resolved, and whether the refusal to
accept the loans demonstrates cause for a removal. This is so in that it is
common cause that both the completion of the AFS and the convening of
congress cannot be resolved unless funds are available.
[81] From the papers it appears that the only application that Sono made to the CI,
for a loan to fund Union's operating costs was in May 2022
19. He had sought a
loan in the capital sum of R 107 million in accordance with funding request
schedules as was attached to the application.
[82] In its response
20, the CI had raised concerns surrounding the inadequacy of
information provided; the absence of a road map to achieve goals with clearly
defined objectives and outcomes, and a timetable to attain those objectives
coupled with details of the anticipated costs pertaining to each milestone.
[83] Concerns were also raised by the CI in regard to the drastic deterioration of the
Union and its finances despite the previous loan of R42 million , and Sono’s
ongoing inability to provide CI with the actual monthly income and expenditure
of the Union since the beginning of 2022. CI set out principles for further support
and what would be required for its board to consider extending a further loan.
These were inter alia;
(a) Transparency and a full and comprehensive accounting for the expenditure
of the previous R42 million loan with supporting invoices, and full disclosure
and transparency with regard to the activities of the Union and those of the
and transparency with regard to the activities of the Union and those of the
Administrator and the implementation of the road map and attendant costs
at each stage.
19 Caselines 011 -225 – 011-228
20 Caselines 001 – 232 - 011235
25
(b) National Congress - the provision of a comprehensive and detailed plan,
road map and budget to National Congress;
(c) Direct payments on a monthly basis to agreed parties on behalf of the Union
where acceptable supporting documentation, time sheets, tax invoices and
motivation are provided;
(d) Union’s Operational Budget to be provided on a monthly basis following
monthly reports on actual income and expenditure;
(e) Creditors’ accounts to be properly verified and these creditors engaged to
delay settling of these outstanding amounts until the new leadership is
elected.
[84] Sono objected to CI’s conditions and the reporting requirements. He viewed
these conditions as intended to undermine his independence as an
administrator, and were in his view, unlawful, onerous, and inappropriate or
impractical in relation to his fiduciary duties.
[85] Other reasons related to his refusal were that it was not appropriate to accept
the conditions where the CDT was in a dysfunctional state with disputes still
pending before the High Court. He further contended that the conditions would
place him in a conflict of interest, as he would have to be answerable to the CI
rather than the Registrar. In the same token, Sono submitted that the CI loan
was in any event not necessary to secure, as he had secured new auditors who
were prepared to proceed with the AFS wi thout immediate funding, and that
these were to be completed within six months without the Ci’s loan.
[86] The Registrar’s submissions were that the CI’s loan has always been available
to Sono as a ready solution to complete the AFS and convene congress. His
refusal over a period of three and half years was unreasonable and not principle
based, and had effectively caused delays in the finalisation of the administration
process and hand over of the Union to its elected leaders.
[87] In Mashanda
21, it was held that since Sono was asking for funds from CI, it was
[87] In Mashanda
21, it was held that since Sono was asking for funds from CI, it was
always up to the latter as independent party, to decide whether to make such
funds available, on whatever conditions it may stipulate. At face value, the
21 At 76
26
enquiry is whether the conditions the CI imposed were in the interests of
legitimate governance and accountability, or whether they were an improper
encroachment on Sono’s powers and responsibilities, or an interference in the
administration process.
[88] It is accepted that in his position as administrator, Sono was not obliged to
accept the CI’s loan if the conditions were onerous and unacceptable as he
alleged, or were such that they breached or encroached on his constitutional,
statutory or fiduciary duties, to the detriment of the interests of the Union and its
members.
[89] Having had regard to prolonged period of administration, the countless
extensions and the continuous parlous financial position the Union finds itself
in, coupled with any lack of progress in either the finalisation of the AFS or
convening of congress , I have serious difficulties in appreciating from Sono’s
submissions, as to what could possibly be onerous and encroaching with the
conditions set by the CI.
[90] The Court accepts that even if an administrator must act independently,
independence cannot be equated with insulation from transparency and
financial accountability, especially since the loan was from the Union’s own
investment arm whose assets were for the benefit of its members. Even within
the context of administration and independence, Union members are indeed
entitled to accountability and transparency as to how those assets are utilised.
[91] What CI required, more particularly in the light of the concerns surrounding the
previous loan of R42m and lack of accountability in that regard, was some
measure of transparency and accountability , on how a loan of R107m was to
be used. What the CI required is not fundamentally different from the Sono’s
obligations under section 100(c) of the LRA in regards to reporting on financial
matters, and which on the Registrar’s version, Sono had not consist ently
complied with. On the other hand, it appears that Sono sought unrestrained
complied with. On the other hand, it appears that Sono sought unrestrained
access to the loan, in the name of independence, which is nothing but disguised
form of self-preservation to circumvent transparency and accountability.
[92] There is something fundamentally flawed, when accountability and
transparency related to an expenditure of R107m is required, and when on the
27
opposite, it is perceived as an encroachment on Sono’s independence in the
administration process . That very process demanded transparency and
accountability.
[93] Equally flawed is Sono’s reliance on the judgment of Snyman AJ in a previous
removal application, for the proposition that the current application is an attempt
to relitigate the same issues. This also applies to circumstances related to the
previous extension orders or condonation for failure to convene congress on
account of lack of funds which were acknowledged by the Courts.
[94] Since the judgment of Snyman AJ in December 2022, and other that Sono relied
on that financial availability was the elephant in the room in completing the AFS
or convening congress, a number of developments, even on Sono’s version
have taken place, which makes the excuse of lack of funds or the same set of
facts that led to previous extensions or condonations being no longer
sustainable three years later. On his own version, Sono had completed the AFS
for 2018 – 2020, albeit the Registrar’s contention was t hat these were non-
compliant. As to how he had done that given the financial constraints is not
clear.
[95] What is worrisome however is that as at the hearing of the matter, his contention
was that the remaining 2021-2024 AFS were to be completed within six months
should funding be available. In the same token, the remaining AFS were to be
completed with the assistance of new auditors who did not demand immediate
payment. What is apparent is that the new auditors are not going to render their
services pro bono. In an instance where the new auditors were to complete the
AFS as Sono has contended, they still have to be paid for their services, at some
point, thus leaving the Union with liabilities in circumstances where the
conditions under which the new auditors took over are unknown.
[96] The above however implies that if the AFS were to be completed within six
[96] The above however implies that if the AFS were to be completed within six
months depending on funding, (i.e, either from the unconditional loans from the
CI or resolution of the dispute regarding the CDT at the High Court ), the state
of affairs that the Union finds itself will persist. Any doubt of Sono’s intentions to
prolong the administration can be gleaned from the relief he seeks in his Notice
of Motion, which is an that order that the term of the administration be extended
28
to an indeterminate period, and to be terminated within a period of 6 (six) months
from the date of receiving funds from the C DT to settle the creditors; securing
of the balance of AFS, and the holding of the national congress. Because Sono
steadfastly refuses to accept the available conditional loan from the CI, there
are no immediate guarantees that the administration process will be finalised
anytime soon, since other than the CI’s loan, there is no guarantee that the
regularisation of the CDT will be ac hieved anytime soon and to Sono’s
expectations.
[97] The position the Union finds itself in cannot continue, nor is there justification
for its administration to continue indefinitely, and in circumstances where such
as in this case, there is an obvious solution to this state of affairs , which Sono
has unreasonably rebuffed for over three years.
[98] The administration of a Union is meant to be a temporary measure to restore
proper governance and ultimately facilitate democratic leadership through
congress. The need for extension of the administration is purely based on the
objective of placing the Union in a position it ought to be rather than indefinite
and unlimited control by administrators. In this regard, a higher premium is
placed on an administrator’s duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of
a Union and its members in achieving the objectives of the administration.
[99] The facts of this case point to an administration process since 2020, that has
failed to achieve its objectives. They point to unreasonable posture adopted by
Sono in completing the process, and in circumstances w here he completely
misunderstood his independence as an administrator and the need for
transparency and accountability to the extent that a solution was premised on
those principles.
[100] By all accounts, given the non- accountability in respect of the previous loan of
R42m, CI’s conditional loan was indeed lawful and necessary and in the best
R42m, CI’s conditional loan was indeed lawful and necessary and in the best
interests of the Union and its members who are entitled to accountability and
transparency. Sono’s refusal to accept the conditional loan for a period of over
three years had nothing to do with the interests of the Union and its members.
It had everything to do with his own personal reasons, which were detrimental
to the ultimate completion of the admin istration process and transfer of the
29
Union to its democratically elected structures. Since 2020, the Union still finds
itself in circumstances where its financial position has deteriorated significantly
(the R35m debt Sono referred to), and where its overall dysfunction remains
persistent with no end in sight.
[101] In the end, based on the approach in Knoop, the evidence and proven facts
points to the failures in the completion of the administration process having
caused actual prejudice and harm to the interests of the Union and its members.
The evidence indeed supports the Registrar’s submissions that Sono’s refusal
of conditional loans was not only mala fide and unreasonable, but also harmful
and inconsistent with his f iduciary duties and the interests of the Union and its
members. It is this unreasonable refusal that had led to the delays in the
finalisation of the AFS or convening of congress. Based on his failures, it follows
that it would be just and equitable to remove him as administrator.
[102] The issue of negligence in management and breach of fiduciary duties related
to the unlawful withdrawals of cash by Mashanda from the Union’s bank
accounts, and Sono’s flippant response towards that unlawfulness, points to
monumental failures in the discharge of Sono’s fiduciary duties , and to more
reasons why his removal is necessary.
[103] If the facts are to be understood correctly, in April 2022, Sono had reported that
Mashanda had after her removal, withdrawn an amount of R566 044.00 from
the Union’s bank account in two transactions. Sono had merely sent Mashanda
a letter of demand in August 2022 calling upon her to repay the money. Nothing
happened until the Registrar had in June 2024 enquired about the matter.
Sono’s response effectively was that it was pointless to pursue the unlawfully
withdrawn amount of R566 044.00 since that amount was less than what
Mashanda was owed for her services rendered during her tenure.
[104] I fail to appreciate Sono’s posture in this regard. What it effectively means is
[104] I fail to appreciate Sono’s posture in this regard. What it effectively means is
that despite being removed as administrator, Mashanda was not only allowed
access to the Union’s bank account during Sono’s tenure and under his watch,
but was effectively allowed to resort to self-help in respect of the limited Union
funds. As to how Mashanda continued to have access to the Union’s bank
30
account some two years after her removal whilst Sono was an administrator is
unknown.
[105] Mashanda’s conduct was indeed serious and bordered on criminality in view of
the fact that she no longer had authori sed access to the Union bank account
after her removal . Y et Sono brushed off Mashanda’s conduct as not worth
pursuing, based on untested evidence that she was owed money for her
services during her tenure, and that she had in fact helped herself to less than
what she was owed. There was no evidence or legal basis for the set -off, nor
was the Registrar informed of the decision until an enquiry was made. This issue
on its own, albeit confined to insignificance by Sono, constituted serious
governance negligence, breaches of financial management and due diligence.
His conduct condoned criminality and self -help to assets he was supposed to
jealously protect, signifying compete neglect of the interests of Union and its
members in the management of financial affairs. It demonstrated that Sono was
other than being careless, incompetent in relation to his duties, which indeed
justified his removal.
[106] In summary and on the application of Plascon -Evans, any factual dispute
related to the failure to complete the AFS, convene congress and pursue the
unlawful withdrawals made by Mashanda, ought to be determined in favour of
the Registrar. Effectively the Court in the exercise of its discretion and upon a
consideration of the facts before it, deems it just and equitable to have Sono
removed as administrator.
[107] To the extent that the Registrar sought that Sono must be replaced with Vosloo,
all that Sono submitted was that Vos loo’s credentials were unknown, and that
his replacement would merely duplicate and prolong the administration process.
In his line with Snyman AJ’s judgment of December 2022, it is accepted that it
is not for the Court to choose its own candidate as admini strator, and that a
is not for the Court to choose its own candidate as admini strator, and that a
Court may confirm a nominee of the Registrar provided that he/she is sufficiently
qualified.
[108] The Registrar supported Vosloo’s appointment on the basis of his experience
as could be gleaned from his curriculum vitae. It was contended that Vosloo had
no personal interest in prolonging the administration; had already made an
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assessment of the position of the Union, and expressed a professional opinion
on the matter. He had expressed willingness to accept the CI’s conditional
loans, which would release the funds necessary to complete the administration.
[109] Sono could not mount any meaningful challenge to the Registrar’s contentions,
and the invariable conclusion to be reached is that Vosloo is suited for an
appointment within the provisions of section 103A(1)(c) of the LRA. His
appointment will be confirmed in accordance with the terms to be set out in the
order below.
Costs:
[110] Cost in such matters are awarded upon a consideration of law and fairness. I
have already indicated the parlous financial state of the Union and the endless
litigation, which all the parties agree had compounded the Union’s financial
woes. The litigation within the administration process has diverted attention from
the primary objectives of that process and confined the interests of the Union
and its members to insignificance.
[111] One can only comment that the continuous litigation, which effectively amounts
to a war of attrition between the feuding parties in this matter, is hardly to the
benefit of the long suffering members of the Union. Since 2020, the Union
members have remained helpless bystanders in countless legal battles waged
allegedly in their interests, and which battles in an ironic twist, they have funded
through their subscriptions. A point is reached where the disputants in these
legal battles, especially the administrator in this case, need to take a step back,
pause the charade and the bravado, and seriously reflect on what is genuinely
in the interests of the union and its members.
[112] The point being made is that any costs order against Sono in effect implies more
costs for the Union which it does not have, and in circumstances where strictly
speaking, it was a spectator in these on-going legal battles. A costs order under
the circumstances would be inappropriate.
the circumstances would be inappropriate.
[113] To the extent that costs were sought against Sono in personal capacity, again,
the considerations of law and fairness militates against such an order. This is
so notwithstanding the CI and Registrar’s position that Sono’s tenure had
expired on 30 June 2025 and there was no need to persist with his extension
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application. The fact of the matter is that Prinsloo J’s Order of 4 June 2025,
extended Sono’s term for an interim period to 30 July 2025, and further ordered
that the Court in the consolidated matter must determine whether such
appointment should be extended further until 30 September 2026 or whether
the Second Respondent should be replaced by Vosloo. Furthermore, this Court,
when postponing the matter on 23 July 2025, had extended Sono’s term until
the date of this judgment. Effectively therefore, there is no cause for Sono to be
liable for costs for pursuing the matter after 30 June 2025 as until delivery of the
judgment, he remained an administrator.
[114] Against the above considerations and what has been stated in the judgment,
the following order is made;
Order:
1. The Applicant is granted leave to supplement its founding affidavit in the
Removal Application as uploaded on Caselines on 11 July 2025.
2. The First and Second Respondents are granted leave to file a
supplementary affidavit in the Extension Application as uploaded on
Caselines on 18 July 2025
3. The Fourth Respondent’s Answering Affidavit is declared an irregular
step and is accordingly struck out.
4. The Fourth Respondent’s written submissions are admitted.
5. The First and Second Respondent’s application to file a further
supplementary affidavit in the Extension Application as uploaded on
Caselines on 2 December 2025 is refused.
6. Paragraph 10.2 of the Court Order of Honourable Madam Justice Lallie
dated 4 December 2023 is amended , and the term of the administration
of the Second Respondent is extended from 30 June 2025 to 30
December 2026.
7. The Applicant’s application to remove the First Respondent as
Administrator of the Second Respondent is upheld.
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8. The Third Respondent is appointed as the administrator of the Second
Respondent with effect from 1 March 2026 to 30 December 2026, or until
he has finalised and concluded:
(i) All the outstanding audited financial statements of 2018, 2019,
2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 as well as 2025 financial years;
(ii) Convened a National Congress for the election of the Second
Respondent’s national leadership, and,
(iii) Handed over the Union to such elected leadership, whichever
comes first.
9. The powers and responsibilities granted in the Judgment and Order of
Rabkin-Naicker J dated 4 June 2020 are extended to the Third
Respondent.
10. The First Respondent is directed to facilitate an orderly handover of the
administration of the Second Respondent to the Third Respondent with
effect from the date of this Order to 27 February 2026.
11. There is no order as to costs in respect of the consolidated and other
interlocutory applications.
___________________
Edwin Tlhotlhalemaje
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
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For the Applicant: T. Madima SC with Adv. J
Chanza. Instructed by the
State Attorney, Pretoria.
For the 1
st and 2nd Respondents: F Boda SC with Adv. S
Bismilla, instructed by
LMNS INC.
Fourth Respondent: E. Wessels SC, instructed
Mendelow Jacobs Attorneys