IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(HELD AT CAPE TOWN)
CASE NO: C34/2025
In the matter between:
TASNEEM GOUS
Applicant
and
ANTHONY DOUGLAS JAMES
First Respondent
GENESIS DISTRIBUTION Second Respondent
In re:
ANTHONY DOUGLAS JAMES Applicant
and
GENESIS DISTRIBUTION First Respondent
TASNEEM GOUS Second Respondent
(1) Reportable: NO
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes
Signature Date
2
Heard: 16 January 2026
Delivered: Judgment was emailed to the parties on 20 February 2026. The date
of judgment is deemed to be 20 February 2026.
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1] This application has been brought to seek my recusal from further
dealings in this matter. The dispute has a long and unfortunate history.
Since this dispute was first brought by first respondent, the applicant has
launched various applications several of which may be legitimately
labelled frivolous and vexatious.
Material facts
[2] The principal issue relates to the order that the court issued on 24 June
2025, in which the court found the applicant guilty of contempt . Reasons
for that order were issued on 4 September 2025.
[3] Thereafter, the applicant filed an application which may charitably be
referred to as an ‘application for leave to appeal’ on 23 September 2025,
together with an application for condonation, and an application to stay
the execution of the contempt order . The ‘application for leave to appeal ’
was withdrawn on 26 September and t he application to stay the
contempt order was never enrolled.
[4] Thereafter, the applicant filed a second ‘application for leave to appeal .’
In the notice of motion, the applicant sought an order directing the
Registrar to provide the transcript of the hearing on 9 May 2025 to her,
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authorising the issue of various subpoenas, and setting aside the
arbitration award which formed the basis of the contempt . In addition, the
applicant filed an application for my recusal from the application for leave
to appeal and ‘any further proceedings.’
Legal principles
[5] There can be little doubt that the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary is essential to the functioning of our constitutional democracy
and remains at the core of a fair trial.
[6] It is trite that, in our law, there exists a presumption that judicial officers
are impartial and independent , arising from the extensive training and
experience which Judges hold. This prepares judicial officers for the task
of determining the truth “in a welter of contradictory evidence.” 1 Our law
assumes that judicial of ficers can apply themselves fairly and disregard
personal beliefs and predispositions. That assumption is not easily
dislodged, and cogent evidence of bias or a reasonable apprehension of
bias is required.2
[7] An applicant who seeks to have a judicial officer recuse him or herself
must first show bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. The relevant
principles were set out in President of the Republic of South Africa and
others v South African Rugby Football Union and others 3 (“SARFU”). As
the Constitutional Court explained the question is whether “a reasonable,
objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably
apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to
bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to persuasion
1 President of the Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union
and others 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) (“SARFU”) at para [40]
2 AfriForum v EFF and Others 2024 (6) SA 1 (SCA) at para [22]
3 See fn. 1
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by the evidence and the submissions of counsel”. 4 The Court explained
further that the “ apprehension of the reasonable person must be
assessed in the light of the true facts as they emerge at the hearing of
the application. It follows that incorrect facts which were taken into
account by an applicant must be ignored in applying the test.”
[8] An apprehension of bias may arise from the judicial officer’s association
with a litigant, a personal interest in the dispute, or comments during
litigation. If the applicant founds his apprehension of bias on comments
made by the judicial officer during a hearing, he must overcome the
presumption of impartiality and show that such comments “were of such
a number or quality as to go beyond any suggestion of mere irritation ...
and establish a pattern of conduct sufficient to dislodge the presumption
of impartiality and replace it with a reasonable perception of bias.”
5
Grounds for recusal and analysis
[9] The applicant alleges that she has a reasonable apprehension of bias in
that the court earlier remarked on her husband’s poor choice of attire and
prevented him from reading the documents that he had already handed
up to the court. By contrast, the applicant states, the first respondent’s
representative was permitted to talk for more than an hour without
interruption. This should be understood in context. On 9 May 2025, the
applicant failed to attend court despite a court order directing her to do
so. Instead, her husband, Mr Gous, attended court, dressed casually (in
a tee shirt). When the court enquired about the whereabouts of the
applicant, Mr Gous stood up, introduced himself, and informed the court
that the applicant was ill. Mr Gous produced a medical certificate which
made the following bare assertion:
4 SARFU (fn.1 ) at para [48]
5 S v Basson 566 (CC) at para [42]
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“This is to certify that TASNEEM GOUS attended this practice on 8 May
2025. To my knowledge, she will be unfit to attend work, from 8 May
2025 to 16 May 2025. Due to: Illness.”
[10] In PFE International and Others v Industrial Development Corporation of
South Africa Ltd6 the Constitutional Court stated:
“Since the rules are made for courts to facilitate the adjudication of
cases, the superior courts enjoy the power to regulate their processes,
taking into account the interests of justice. It is this power that makes
every superior court the master of its own process. It enables a superior
court to lay down a process to be followed in particular cases, even if
that process deviates from what its rules prescribe. Consistent with that
power, this court may in the interests of justice depart from its own rules.
(own emphasis)
[11] Given the absence of the applicant, the seriousness of the issue, and the
applicant’s lack of representation, the court deemed it in the interest of
justice to relax the rules of court and permit Mr Gous to address the court
as the applicant’s representative. Mr Gous was advised that the medical
certificate constituted hearsay evidence
7 and further informed that he
ought to dress appropriately . From the bar, Mr Gous volunteered to the
court that his own unregistered company was the “ true employer” of the
first respondent. The court informed Mr Gous that his statements from
the bar did not constitute evidence. Mr Gous then elected to testify but
limit his evidence to the applicant’ s medical condition. As a result, the
application was postponed to 24 June 2025 to allow the applicant a
further opportunity to attend.
6 2013 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para [30]
7 Mgobhozi v Naidoo NO & others (2006) 27 ILJ 786 (LAC)
6
[12] Unfortunately, the applicant did not appreciate that Mr Gous was allowed
to address the court as an indulgence. Nor did the applicant appreciate
that it is unnecessary for parties to read lengthy documents into the
record.
[13] The applicant submits that Mr Gous was improperly coerced to testify.
The record will reflect that there is no merit to this . Instead, the court
warned Mr Gous that he may wish to limit his testimony to the applicant’s
alleged medical condition.
[14] The applicant submits that the court erred by accepting the submission of
the first respondent’s representative - that Mr Gous conceded that his
company fell within the Genesis Group. This submission relates to the
merits of the dispute, and an application for leave to appeal. It does not
indicate bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[15] The applicant submits that the court’s finding that her answering affidavit
was inadequate indicates bias. She also submits that the court found that
contempt was established without first hearing her version. These
submissions are without foundation. The applicant was given a full
opportunity to make submissions on 24 June and only found to be in
contempt thereafter.
[16] The applicant submits that the court behaved improperly by instructing first
respondent’s representative to draft the order which was not materially
altered thereafter. First, this occurred after the court had heard the parties’
submissions. Second, it is not improper.
[17] The applicant submits that the refusal to grant her a further postponement
was unfair. It is trite that a postponement is not merely for the asking and
good cause must exist. The court must consider all relevant factors and
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exercise its discretion judicially. The court considered inter alia that the
applicant had earlier been afforded a lengthy postponement, more than
adequate to secure legal representation for 24 June. The court also
considered the prejudice to the first respondent, who had been trying to
enforce the arbitration award in his favour for a substantial period.
[18] The applicant alleges that the cumulative effect of my conduct indicated
hostility to her. This is without substance. The court initially postponed the
matter at the applicant’s request, permitted her a full opportunity to make
submissions, and relaxed the rules of court in her favour . None of this
suggests bias.
[19] On the true and objective facts, there can be no reasonable apprehension
of bias.
[20] It is alarming that litigants feel free to accuse judicial officers of bias solely
because they have made finding s in favour of the other party . Judicial
officers must be permitted to perform their duties impartially without fear,
favour, or prejudice, including the fear of being labelled biased.
[21] Despite the frivolous nature of the application, given the applicant’s limited
legal knowledge, I have decided not to make a cost order against her.
Conclusion
[22] The application for my recusal is dismissed. There is no order as to
costs.
RN Daniels
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
8
Appearances
For the Applicant:
Self-Represented
For the First Respondent:
Mr J Horn (pro bono)
Cowen Harper Madikizela Attorneys