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2026
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[2026] ZAFSHC 40
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Rosswill Millin v Saddlebred Society of South Africa & Others (1304/2025) [2026] ZAFSHC 40 (5 February 2026)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION,
BLOEMFONTEIN
Not reportable
Case no: 1304/2025
In
the matter between:
ROSSWILL
MILLIN
APPLICANT
and
SADDLEBRED
SOCIETY OF SOUTH AFRICA
FIRST
RESPONDENT
TED
GROENEWALD: LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
SADDLEBRED
SOCIETY OF SOUTH AFRICA
SECOND
RESPONDENT
JACQUES
WIGGINS
THIRD
RESPONDENT
KOBUS
GERBER
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Rosswill
Millin
v
Saddlebred
Society of South Africa & Others
(1304/2025)
[2026] ZAFSHC 40
(5 February 2026)
Coram:
Reinders
ADJP and Loubser J
Heard:
27
October 2025
Delivered:
5
February 2026
Summary:
Application for review and setting aside of
decision not to institute disciplinary proceedings against members of
the first respondent
after an incident at championship event held at
Robertson.
ORDER
1
The first and the second respondent’s
decision taken on 28 November 2024, not to institute disciplinary
proceedings against
the third and fourth respondents following the
incident that took place at the Western Province Grand Championships
at Robertson
on 28 September 2024, is hereby reviewed and set aside.
2
The first respondent is directed to
implement the disciplinary proceedings envisaged in clause 5.5 of the
rules pertaining to disciplinary
investigations and hearings within
10 days of date of this order.
3
The first respondent is ordered to pay the
costs of the application on the party and party scale, including the
fees of counsel
on scale B up to 13 October 2025.
4
There is no order as to costs pertaining to
the second, third and fourth respondents.
JUDGMENT
Loubser
J (Reinders J concurring)
[1]
This is an application for the review and
setting aside of a decision taken by the first and second respondents
not to institute
disciplinary proceedings against the third and
fourth respondents, following an incident at the Western Province
Grand Championships
held by the first respondent at Robertson on 28
September 2024.
[2]
On that day, the applicant’s stallion
by the name of Solitaire participated in the fine harness class 247
competition in the
oval arena of Robertson, a town situated in the
Western Province. The class in which Solitaire participated, entailed
a single
horse pulling a cart. According to the applicant, who is a
member of the first respondent and the owner of Solitaire, it is
standard
procedure for the participants to enter the oval in an
anti-clockwise direction along the rails of the oval. This is what
Solitaire
did, but when the third respondent entered the oval with
his horse and cart, he failed to follow the standard entry procedure
and
travelled across the centre grass area of the arena directly
towards Solitaire, the applicant says.
[3]
This maneuver of the third respondent
caused the horse and cart of the third respondent to collide with
Solitaire. The front legs
of Solitaire ended up between the wheels of
the third respondent’s cart, and the front left leg of
Solitaire sustained various
cuts in the process. As a result,
Solitaire had to be withdrawn from the class. The applicant alleges
that the third respondent
acted intentionally or negligently in
causing the collision. The ringmaster of the day, namely the fourth
respondent, was also
negligent in that he failed to maintain proper
control of the arena. He thereby contributed to the happening of the
incident. The
applicant maintains that both the third and fourth
respondents breached the rules of the first respondent published in
its rule
book by their actions, or in the case of the fourth
respondent, by his failure to act.
[4]
As a result of these beliefs, the applicant
then proceeded to lodge a complaint against the third and fourth
respondents with the
first respondent in terms of the constitution of
the first respondent. Clause 5.1 of the first respondent’s
disciplinary
code, which is an annexure to its constitution, provides
that directly subsequent to receipt of a complaint, the president of
the
first respondent will refer it to the legal representative, who
may appoint investigators with the request to assist him on the
nature of the complaint, that is whether a disciplinary hearing is
warranted. Clause 5.2 provides that the finding of the legal
representative regarding the merits of the complaint and whether or
not it deserves a disciplinary hearing, will then be advised
to the
president. If the legal representative makes a decision not to
proceed with a disciplinary hearing, the president is entitled
to
request reasons for the decision not to proceed.
[5]
In the present matter these steps were duly
followed, and the legal representative eventually came to the
conclusion that there
was no merit in the applicant’s
complaint, and he accordingly advised that no disciplinary action
would follow. The legal
representative concerned features in this
application as the second respondent. The president referred to is
Dr George Aldrich
of the first respondent’s office in
Bloemfontein.
[6]
The applicant says he could not lodge an
internal appeal against the decision not to institute disciplinary
action because, in terms
of the rules, such an appeal can only be
lodged where a formal disciplinary hearing was held. For this reason,
the applicant says
that his only remedy is to approach this Court for
orders that the decision of the first and second respondents be set
aside and
that the first respondent be directed to institute the
disciplinary proceedings envisaged by the disciplinary code.
[7]
In response to this application for a
review, which was brought in terms of rule 53 of the Uniform
Rules of Court and served
on the respondents on 27 March 2025, the
respondents filed a notice of intention to oppose on 17 April 2025.
This was followed
by an answering affidavit filed by the first and
second respondents on 22 July 2025. The third and fourth respondents
did not file
any answering affidavits, thereby indicating that they
no longer opposed the application. The answering affidavit styled
‘first
and second respondent’s answering affidavit’
is deposed to by the second respondent. In the first paragraph he
mentions
that he is opposing the application on behalf of the first
respondent, and in this respect, he refers to a resolution of the
executive
committee of the first respondent dated 17 April 2025. In
this resolution the second respondent is ‘authorized to depose
to the answering affidavit and oppose the application on behalf of
the society’.
[8]
In this answering affidavit of the
first respondent, the second respondent extensively dealt with the
evidence that served before
him when he made the impugned decision
that a disciplinary hearing was not warranted. In particular, he
pointed out that video
footage of the incident showed that the
incident did not happen against the railing of the oval, as claimed
by the applicant. Be
that as it may, the fact remains that the second
respondent did not file an answering affidavit in his personal
capacity, but only
the affidavit on behalf of the first respondent.
In the premises, the application remained opposed only by the first
respondent
and not by any of the other respondents.
[9]
The applicant filed a replying
affidavit to the answering affidavit deposed to by the second
respondent on 6 August 2025, maintaining
that the matter should have
been referred to a disciplinary hearing where the evidence could have
been dealt with properly. With
the filing of this replying affidavit,
the application became ripe for hearing.
[10]
However, on 27 August 2025 the first
respondent resolved not to persist in opposing the review
application. Consequently, on 13
October 2025, the attorney acting
for the respondents filed a notice informing that the first, second
and fourth respondents are
withdrawing their opposition to the
applicant’s review application. This was done despite the fact
that the second respondent
had never filed an answering affidavit in
his personal capacity, while the fourth respondent had never filed
such an affidavit
at all. As intimated earlier herein, the
application therefore remained only opposed by the first respondent.
Curiously enough,
on 21 October 2025 the third respondent also filed
a notice withdrawing his opposition to the application, while he had
failed
to file an answering affidavit in any event.
[11]
The notice of 13 October 2025
therefore only pertained to the first respondent, strictly speaking.
It needs mentioning that by that
time, the hearing of the application
had already been set down on 1 July 2025 for 27 October 2025.
[12]
In my view, the decision of the
first respondent not to persist in its opposition to the review
application, was the correct decision
and a fair outcome to the
dispute before the court. This is so, because it appears to be common
cause on the papers before this
Court that an incident indeed
happened at the Robertson event during which the applicant’s
horse indeed became injured. The
only manner in which it can be
established how this had happened and whether anyone has to carry the
blame for it, appears to be
by means of a disciplinary hearing where
the evidence of witnesses and perhaps visual recordings can be duly
considered by the
disciplinary panel.
[13]
The notice of 13 October 2025 did
not bring an end to the matter, however. A fierce battle then ensued
between the parties pertaining
to the question of costs. This
resulted in the appearance of the three counsels for the applicant,
the first respondent and the
second respondent respectively on the
date of the hearing of the application to make submissions on the
costs of the matter only.
[14]
In my view, the matter of costs is
not as complicated as represented by the counsel appearing for the
different parties. Firstly,
the applicant prayed in his notice of
motion that the first respondent and all other parties opposing the
application be ordered
to pay the costs of the application jointly
and severally. Secondly, we have seen that it was only the first
respondent which had
opposed the application, and not the other
respondents. Thirdly, since the first respondent had terminated its
opposition on 13
October 2025, it should be liable to pay the
applicant’s costs up to that date. Fourthly, since the second,
third and fourth
respondents have not opposed the application, costs
orders are not warranted against them.
[15]
In the premises, the application for
review and the setting aside of the decision taken on 28 November
2024, must succeed. The following
orders are made:
1
The first and the second respondent’s
decision taken on 28 November 2024, not to institute disciplinary
proceedings against
the third and fourth respondents following the
incident that took place at the Western Province Grand Championships
at Robertson
on 28 September 2024, is hereby reviewed and set aside.
2
The first respondent is directed to
implement the disciplinary proceedings envisaged in clause 5.5 of the
rules pertaining to disciplinary
investigations and hearings within
10 days of date of this order.
3
The first respondent is ordered to pay the
costs of the application on the party and party scale, including the
fees of counsel
on scale B up to 13 October 2025.
4
There is no order as to costs pertaining to
the second, third and fourth respondents.
P J LOUBSER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
I concur and it is so
ordered.
C REINDERS
ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE
PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For
the applicant:
A
Walters
Instructed
by:
Bellinghan
Muller Hanekom Inc., Belville
c/o
Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For
the first respondent:
J
C Coetzer
Instructed
by:
Lange
Carr and Wessels, Upington
c/o
McIntyre & van der Post, Bloemfontein
For
the second respondent:
W
A van Aswegen
Instructed
by:
Phatshoane
Henney Inc., Bloemfontein
For
third and fourth respondents:
No
appearance.