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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2025-251259
In the matter between:
MEDIA HOST (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
NABEELAH ALLIE First Respondent
LORNA MOSCA Second Respondent
LINDIWE MAVIMBELA Third Respondent
PHILLIP MOKHOLOANE Fourth Respondent
DION REAGAN PIKES Fifth Respondent
MASSIMILIANO RICCHIUTI Sixth Respondent
NATHAN WILLIAMS Seventh Respondent
SIDNEY KHOLOMELO MAILULA Eighth Respondent
XR GLOBAL AFRICA (PTY) LTD Ninth Respondent
ARTISTS TECHNOLOGIES AFRICA (PTY) LTD Tenth Respondent
MICHAEL JOHN SMIT Eleventh Respondent
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
17 February 2026 __ ______
DATE SIGNATURE
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JUDGMENT IN RESPONDENTS’ APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
Badenhorst AJ:
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the whole of the judgment and
order of this Court delivered on 6 February 2026. In the main judgment, I granted
the Applicant final relief enforcing restraints of trade against the First to Eighth
Respondents ("the Employees") and interdicting the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Respondents from unlawful competition and springboarding. I continue, for ease
of reference, to refer to the parties as cited in the original application.
[2] The application for leave to appeal is premised on the grounds set out in the
Respondents’ Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal dated 9 February 2026,
as amplified by their Heads of Argument and oral submissions. The application
is opposed by the Applicant on whose behalf oral submissions were made.
[3] The test for leave to appeal is governed by section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013. Leave may only be granted if the court is of the opinion
that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success. This threshold is
higher than the test under the predecessor Supreme Court Act and requires a
measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court of first instance.
[4] A central pillar of the Respondents’ argument is that the Applicant failed to make
out a case in its Founding Affidavit that it intended to continue the Adstream
division of its business following the termination of its license on 31 December
2025. The Respondents contend that the Court erred in relying on the Replying
Affidavit - where the Applicant averred it had developed a replacement platform
- arguing this constituted an impermissible new case.
[5] The Applicant’s cause of action in the Founding Affidavit was premised on the
enforcement of contractual restraints and the prevention of unlawful competition
based on existing proprietary interests (the "service layer" and customer
based on existing proprietary interests (the "service layer" and customer
goodwill) – see paragraphs 44 – 45 of the Founding Affidavit which are not
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contested by the Respondents. The Applicant’s reference to its replacement
platform in Reply was not a new cause of action; it was a legitimate factual
rebuttal to the Respondents' defensive allegation that competition had ceased.
An applicant is entitled to traverse a defence raised in the answering papers to
demonstrate that the parties remain in competition, provided that the issue is
pleaded in the founding affidavit which it was . There is no reasonable prospect
that another court would uphold this contention.
[6] Regarding the Employees, the Respondents persist with the argument that all
"know-how" and customer connections were inextricably linked to the Adstream
platform license, which belonged to the licensor, and therefore the Applicant’s
interest "evaporated" on 31 December 2025.
[7] The Court found that the Applicant possessed a "service layer" of confidential
information - comprising internal workflows, pricing logic, client -specific
configurations, and institutional know -how that operates independently of the
platform's code. The Employees’ attempt to characterize their roles as merely
"generic" or "administrative" was inconsistent with the objective evidence of their
duties (client onboarding, quality control, account management) and the
coordinated manner of their departure. The fact that the Eleventh Respondent
("Mr. Smit") orchestrated the move of the entire team at the same time to ensure
"seamless continuity" is proof that their value lay in their collective, specific
knowledge of the Applicant's clients and workflows, not merely in their ability to
operate a software tool. I am not persuaded that another court would come to a
different conclusion on the facts.
[8] The Ninth to Eleventh Respondents argue, moreover, that their competitive
advantage was derived lawfully from the award of the license by the platform
owner, Extreme Reach, and that the Court erred in finding unlawful competition.
owner, Extreme Reach, and that the Court erred in finding unlawful competition.
[9] This argument ignores the dispositive evidence of the undisputed "nothing
changes" email sent by Mr. Smit on 10 December 2025. In that correspondence,
sent while the Applicant was still the licensee (until 31 December 2025), Mr. Smit
explicitly marketed the "seamless service continuity" provided by the Applicant’s
former workforce as his selling point. This constitutes the classic definition of
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springboarding: using the competitor’s own labour force and goodwill to bypass
the necessary start-up phase of a business. In my view, another court would not
sanction such conduct as lawful competition, particularly when orchestrated by a
former director still connected to the Applicant’s shareholder trust, who garnered
the support of then existing employees.
[10] The Respondents argue that the Court erred in granting an interdict against
unlawful competition for an "indefinite period," citing Knox D’Arcy v Jamieson
1992 (3) SA 520 (W) at 528I – 529B for the proposition that a springboard
evaporates with time.
[11] The interdict restrains unlawful competition. It prevents the Respondents from
holding out that they are the Applicant’s successor or using the Applicant’s
confidential information. Once the information loses its confidential character or
the springboard has naturally decayed, the conduct may no longer be "unlawful,"
but the order remains valid to prevent the specific illegality complained of. Given
the egregious "gutting" of the Applicant's business within a 72-hour window, and
the ongoing confusion among clients, the relief granted was appropriate and
necessary to stop the continuing harm. There is no reasonable prospect of
success on this ground.
[12] The argument that the Tenth Respondent was improperly joined bears no
prospect of success. The evidence established it was used as a vehicle to invoice
fees while Mr. Smit was a director, and its joinder was necessary to prevent the
circumvention of the order.
[13] The Respondents’ grounds of appeal largely rehash the arguments raised in the
main hearing, specifically the "platform defence," which was rejected on the facts.
The coordinated resignation of the entire workforce and the immediate "switch-
over" of service without a start-up period speaks for itself. I am not satisfied that
the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success.
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[14] In the result, I make the following Order:
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The Respondents are directed to pay the costs of the application, jointly and
severally.
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BADENHORST AJ
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Adv P S MacKenzie
Counsel for the applicant
Instructed by:
VanderSpuy Cape Town
Per: Mr Y Carriem
Adv S Miller SC
Counsel for the respondents
Instructed by:
Reid W Corin Attorney
Per: Mr R Corin