IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
In the matter between:
THOMASEDWARDTSOEU
and
CHIEF MOLAPO JERRY MOPELI
PRECIOUS LIVES CHRISTIAN SCHOOL
Not reportable
Case no: 629/2024
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Tsoeu v Mopeli and Another (629/2024) [2026] ZAFSHC 27 (26
January 2026)
Coram: DANISOJ
Heard: 14 August 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
representatives by email and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is
deemed to be 16h00 on 26 January 2026
Summary: Uniform Rules of Court (rules) - rule 30A- application to strike out rescission
application for alleged non-compliance with rule 6(5)(a), 6(5)(b)(iii) and 31 (2)(b) -
substantial delay after serving notice to rectify before launching striking out application -
rules conflated and misconstrued.
2
ORDER
The application is dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT
Daniso J
[1] In these opposed proceedings, the applicant seeks an order, in terms of rule 30A of
the Uniform Rules of Court (the Rules), 1 that the rescission application filed by the
respondents on 26 April 2024 be struck out on the grounds of non-compliance with rule
6(5)(a), 6(5)(b)(iii) and 31(2)(b).
[2] The facts upon which the rescission application arose are briefly the following: The
first respondent is a headman of the Mabolela Traditional Council in the Matsikeng Village
situated in Matsokong Township in Witsieshoek. As headman, he is responsible for
allocating stands to residents and businesses in that area. During June 2018, the second
respondent purchased and was thereafter allocated stand number 101A (the stand) in
Matsikeng Village by the first respondent.
[3] On 5 February 2024, the applicant launched an urgent application, in this Court,
alleging that he is the owner of the stand and the respondent was in unlawful occupation
thereof. He sought an order that the second respondent removes its shack and fence from
the stand and that the first respondent ensures that the order is duly carried out. The
application was served on the first respondent's wife on 5 February 2024. On the next day,
the matter served before Van Zyl J unopposed. An order was subsequently granted in
favour of the applicant on the following terms:
1 Rule 30A deals with enforcement of compliance with Rules and Court Orders. It reads as follows:
'Non-compliance with Rules and Court Orders
(1) Where a party fails to comply with these Rules or with a request made or notice given pursuant thereto,
or with an order or direction made by a court or in a judicial case management process referred to in rule
37 A, any other party may notify the defaulting party that he or she intends, after the lapse of 10 days from
the date of delivery of such notification, to apply for an order-
the date of delivery of such notification, to apply for an order-
(a) that such rule, notice, request, order or direction be complied with; or
(b) that the claim or defence be struck out.
(2) Where a party fails to comply within the period of 10 days contemplated in subrule (1), application may
on notice be made to the court and the court may make such order thereon as it deems fit.'
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'1. The Applicant is granted leave to bring this application on an urgent basis and to dispense
with Rules relating to service requirements.
2. The First Respondent is authorised to immediately ensure removal of the Second
Respondent's shack and fence from the stand allocated to the Applicant situated at Matsikeng
Village, opposite Maluti Towing and Repairs situated at Matsokung Township between Clubview
and Bluegumbosch, Witsieshoek.
3. The Second Respondent shall immediately vacate the stand situated at Matsikeng Village,
opposite Maluti Towing and Repairs situated at Matsokung Township between Clubview and
Bluegumbosch, Witsieshoek and to immediately remove his/her shack and fence erected thereon.
4. The Applicant is granted leave to serve this application in the following manner:
4.1 By delivering the application documents to the office of the MABOLELA TRADITIONAL
COUNCIL at Matsikeng Village, Witsieshoek;
4.2 By affixing the application documents to the fence or shack erected by the Second
Respondent.
5. The Sheriff of the above Honourable Court is authorised to immediately remove the shack
and fence erected by the Second Respondent on the stand situated at Matsikeng Village, opposite
Maluti Towing and Repairs situated at Matsokung Township between Clubview and
Bluegumbosch, Witsieshoek.
6. The First Respondent shall immediately cause the correction of the Applicant's Permission
to Occupy in respect of the stand situated at Matsikeng Village, opposite Maluti Towing and Repairs
situated at Matsokung Township between Clubview and Bluegumbosch, Witsieshoek to reflect the
date of its issue to be 26 December 2023.'
[4] The respondents' rescission application was served and filed on 26 April 2024. It is
premised on the provisions rule 42(1 )(a) and it is based on the grounds that the order was
granted in the absence of the respondents due to the severely truncated time periods
provided by the applicant to oppose the application. The order was also erroneously
provided by the applicant to oppose the application. The order was also erroneously
granted in that, the court would not have granted the order if it had the benefit of
considering the respondents' version.
[5] In addition to opposing the rescission application on the merits, on 24 May 2024,
the applicant also served the respondents with a rule 30 A (1) notice objecting to the validity
of the notice of motion. The premise is that the notice of motion does not comply with rule
6 (5)(a) and (5)(b)(iii) in that, it does not specify a day by which the applicant must file his
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notice of intention to oppose the rescission application. In respect of the dies for the filing
of the notice to oppose, the notice of motion refers to ten days instead of five days from
the date of service of the application. Furthermore, the application was also filed out of the
20-day time limit predicated in rule 31 (2). The respondents were granted ten days to
remove the causes of complaints. 2 The respondents have since failed to rectify the defects
despite being granted an opportunity to do so.
[6] The striking out application was filed on 7 February 2025. It is the applicant's case
that there are no time frames within which the striking out application ought to be lodged.
The application can be lodged at any time. It is the applicant's case that he is prejudiced
by the respondents' failure to specify the date in the notice of motion because he does not
know exactly when he should file the notice to oppose.
[7] The applicant argues that the rescission application has also been filed out of time.
In terms of rule 31(2)(b), the rescission application ought to have been filed within 20 days
after the order was granted on 6 February 2024. Instead, it was filed months later, on 26
April 2024. No condonation has been sought as a result, the rescission application 'does
not exist'.
[8] It is further argued that the respondents' reliance on rule 42(1)(a) is merely an
attempt to avoid compliance with the time frames as predicated in rule 31(2)(b) in any
event, rule 42(1 )(a) is designed to correct a wrong judgment and in their rescission
application, the respondents do not point out any error of law or fact that has been
committed by the Court in granting the order. Based on all these reasons, the rescission
application must be struck out with costs.
[9] The application is opposed on the grounds that the application is hopelessly out of
time. In paragraph 8 to 9 of the respondents' answering affidavit, the respondents aver
that:
time. In paragraph 8 to 9 of the respondents' answering affidavit, the respondents aver
that:
' ... the rule stipulates that a party must notify the opposing party of their non-compliance within
ten (10) days and allow them a further ten (10) days to rectify the issue. Furthermore, if the non
compliance is not remedied within the given timeframe, the applicant has 15 days from the expiry
of that period to. institute the necessary application.'
2 Subrule (1).
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[1 0] The respondents point out that the striking out application was only launched eight
months after the notice to rectify was served on the respondents. The application is
accordingly pro non scripto as condonation has not been sought.
[11] Considering that rule 30A is intended to enforce compliance with court rules to
ensure the expeditious completion of litigation, the delay of eight months in launching the
striking out application is indeed extreme. Be that as it may, there is no substance to the
respondents' contention that rule 30A contains a 'further ten ( 10) days timeframe to rectify
the issue' and 15 days within which the striking out application has to be flied. It is clear
from the proper reading of rule 30A that, except for the ten days' notice to rectify the
defects, there is no timeframe provided within which to lodge the striking out application.
In Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission, 3 the formalities of the
provisions of rule 30A are succinctly explained by Kollapen AJ writing for the dissenting as
follows:
'Rule 30A may not, as suggested in the first judgment, be read disjunctively. It is a rule in terms of
which non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court is investigated by the High Court itself . The
difficulty with separat ing rule 30A (1) from (2) is that under the rule only one application is envisaged
and a single enquiry is conducted . There is no separate application to which rule 30A (2) applies.
The application made to the court in terms of this subrule is the same applicat ion that was referred
to in the notice previously issued in terms of rule 30A(1). In other words, rule 30A (1) authorises
only the issuance of notice to a defaulting party. If that notice is not complied with, then rule 30A
(2) is triggered and an application may be made to the court .'
[12] The respondents have clearly conflated the provisions of rule 30A with rule 30 which
deals with irregular proceedings.4 The respondents' objection on this aspect is
deals with irregular proceedings.4 The respondents' objection on this aspect is
unsustainable.
[13) With regard to the merits, it is the respondents' case that the application is frivolous,
3 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission 2018 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 151.
4 Rule 30 reads:
'(1) A party to a cause in which an irregular step has been taken by any other party may apply to court to set
it aside.
(2) An application in terms of subrule (1) shall be on notice to all parties specifying particulars of the
irregularity or impropriety alleged, and may be made only if-
( a) the applicant has not himself taken a further step in the cause with knowledge of the irregularity;
(b) the applicant has, within 10 days of becoming aware of the step, by written notice afforded his opponent
an opportunity of removing the cause of complaint within 10 days;
(c) the application is delivered within 15 days after the expiry of the second period mentioned in paragraph
(b) of subrule (2).'
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vexatious and an abuse of process. The submission is that, the notice of motion clearly
states that the respondent must file the notice to oppose within ten days of which the
applicant would have been in possession of the date of service of the notice of motion and
could determine the exact deadline for filing of the notice to oppose without any difficulty.
[14] It is respondents' submission that, as opposed to rule 31, rule 42 does not prescribe
a specific time frame within which an application for rescission of judgment must be
brought. The applicant has misapplied the legal framework pertaining to rescission
applications. That aside, rule 30A is not the appropriate mechanism to challenge a delay
in the filing of a rescission application.
[15] I am in agreement with the respondents' contentions on this point. Rule 6(5)(a)
reads:
'Every application other than one brought ex parte shall be brought on notice of motion as near as
may be in accordance with Form 2(a) of the First Schedule and true copies of the notice, and all
annexures thereto, shall be served upon every party to whom notice thereof is to be given.' In
terms of ule 6(5)(b )(iii):
'In a notice of motion the applicant shall-
(iii) set forth a day, not less than 10 days after service thereof on the respondent, on or before
which such respondent is required to notify the applicant, in writing, whether respondent intends to
oppose such application .. .',
[16] The examination of the respondents' notice of motion reveals that this application
is indeed based on unmeritorious grounds as the notice of motion does mimic the
provisions of subrule (5)(a) and (5)(b)(iii). The relevant parts of the respondents' notice of
motion read as follows:
'TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT if you intend opposing this application you are required to:
(a) To inform the Applicant's attorneys of Record of its intention to do so within a period of ten
(10) days of receipt of this notice and file such notice of opposition with the Registrar of the
Honourable Court .. . '
[17] Nowhere in the subrules relied upon is it indicated that a day must be specified for
the filing of the notice of motion. There is also no reference to the 5-day period alluded to
by the applicant.
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[18] The issue of whether rule 31(2)(b) or 42(1)(a) is applicable in respect of the
rescission application, including the respondents' motives for relying on 42(1)(a), is a
matter to be adjudicated at the hearing of the rescission application.
[19) As I conclude, the applicant would be well advised to take note of what was said in
Khunou and Others v M Fihrer and Son (Pty) Ltd and Others:5
'The proper function of a Court is to try disputes between litigants who have real grievances and
so see to it that justice is done. The rules of civil procedure exist in order to enable Courts to
perform this duty with which, in turn, the orderly functioning, and indeed the very existence, of
society is inextricably interwoven. The Rules of Court are in a sense merely a refinement of the
general rules of civil procedure. They are designed not only to allow litigants to come to grips as
expeditiously and inexpensively as possible with the real issues between them, but also to ensure
that the Courts dispense justice uniformly and fairly, and that the true issues which I have
mentioned are clarified and tried in a just manner.
It follows that the principles of adjectival law, whether expressed in the Rules of Court or otherwise,
are necessarily flexible. Unfortunately, this concomitant brings in its train the opportunity for
unscrupulous litigants and those who would wish to delay or deny justice to so manipulate the
Courts' procedures that their true purpose is frustrated. Courts must be vigilant against this and
other types of abuse. What is more important is that the Court's officers, and especially its
attorneys, have an equally sacred duty. Whatever the temptation or provocation, they must not
lend themselves to the propagation of this evil, and so allow the administration of justice to fall into
disrepute.'
[20] In my view, this authority sums up the conduct of the applicant and how it shaped
these dilatory proceedings.
these dilatory proceedings.
[21] Taking all these factors into consideration, I am not persuaded that there has been
non-compliance with the rules. No proper case has been made out for an order striking out
the respondents' rescission application. The application fails.
Costs
[22] With regard to costs, there is no reason why the costs should not follow the result.
5 Khunou and Others v M Fihrer and Son (Pty) Ltd and Others 1982 (3) SA 353 (W) at 355-6.
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Order
[23] I make the following order:
The application is dismissed with costs.
The Honourable Justice
2026 -01- Z,6
N.S. Daniso NS DANISO
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
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Appearances
For the applicant: TE Tsoeu (In person)
Instructed by: Makhabane Mopeli Attorneys Inc, Bloemfontein
For the respondents: MP Madise
Instructed by: Noge Attorneys, Phuthaditjhaba
c/o Wesi Attorneys INC, Bloemfontein.