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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO.: 38989/2018
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
DATE: 11/02/2026
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
AFRIKAANS IS GROOT (PTY) LTD
Plaintiff
and
EWALD BERNARDUS COLESKE
Defendant
JUDGMENT
VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, J
2
[1] The plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant claiming the
return of a vehicle that was made available to the defendant whilst the
latter was still in the employ of the plaintiff. The action was defended
and a counterclaim was pled.
[2] The plaintiff’s claim related to a Toyota Prado vehicle for which the
plaintiff claimed the ret urn as well as the payment of an amount that
related to alleged insurance costs and registration fees during a
specified period. In the counterclaim, the defendant sought the transfer
of ownership in the said vehicle.
[3] The plaintiff led the evidence of two witnesses. The first witness was
one Brendan Hargroves, who w as a director of the plaintiff and who
oversaw operations and finances. The second witness was one Arnold
Coleske, who was a director of the plaint iff and the brother of the
defendant. Arnold Coleske was the driving force behind the plaintiff.
The defendant was the creative brain behind the plaintiff until he left
the plaintiff during 2018.
[4] The vehicle concerned, was one of seven Toyota vehicles that were
handed to the plaintiff in terms of a sponsorship agreement entered
into between the plaintiff and Toyota SA. Each of the Coleske brothers
received a sponsored vehicle. Of t he remaining vehicles , one was
handed to Hargroves and three were handed to regular musicians who
were used by the plaintiff during musical events arranged by and on
behalf of the plaintiff. The remaining vehicle was sold off a few days
after receiving the vehicles from Toyota . The sponsored vehicles were
to be used by the plaintiff for a period of three years during which the
sponsorship would endure. Should the sponsorship be ended during
that three-year period, the vehicles had to be returned to Toyota in
terms of the written sponsorship agreement . After the elapse of the
three-year sponsorship period, the plaintiff would retain the vehicles.
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[5] The crux of the matter relates to an alleged oral agreement entered
into between Arnold Coleske and the defendant on the receipt of the
sponsored vehicles and the allocating thereof to the defendant and the
other recipients. It was alleged that in terms of the said oral agreement
between the brothers , the defendant would retain the vehicle as his
own subsequent to the elapse of the sponsorship agreement. The
defendant would become the owner thereof.
[6] The evidence of Hargroves leaves much to be desired. He was evasive
on many issues and in particular during cross-examination. He testified
in a refrain that he either cannot remember , or that he was not a party
to a particular issue or circumstance. Despite stating that he was in the
financial section, he could not readily explain why the amounts
received in respect of the vehicles sold , subsequent to the lapsing of
the sponsorship agreement , were not entered into the financial
statements at the appropriate time.
[7] Further in that regard, it was testified that the board of the plaintiff had
apparently delegated its authority to deal with the vehicles , and any
disposal thereof , to a committee. No evidence of the MOI or the
delegation of the authority was introduced into evidence. The evidence
revealed that in terms of the spons orship the vehicles were not dealt
with in the same manner when they were disposed of, but in a random
manner. This highlighted the apparent discrepancy in the financial
records of some of the vehicles.
[8] Hargroves confirmed that a stra ined relationship existed between the
Coleske brothers. During or about 2021 , a protection order was taken
out by Arnold Coleske against his brother , the defendant. That
protection order is still in existence. The relevance of that evidence was
not explained , other than that it was a mere attempt to create
atmosphere.
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[9] In terms of th e aforesaid oral agreement, made shortly after receipt of
the Toyota vehicles in terms of the sponsorship agreement, the
defendant could retain the vehicle allocated to him when the three-year
period of the sponsorship elapsed. It would become the defendant’s
property. Arnold Coleske denied the alleged oral agreement concluded
between the two brothers . The defendant further alleged that a similar
agreement was entered into between Arnold Coleske and one Johan
Vorster in respect of the vehicle that was allocated to the said Johan
Vorster. However, Johan Vorster left the plain tiff in the second year of
the sponsorship and was obliged to return the vehicle to t he plaintiff;
the three years of sponsorship not having elapsed.
[10] Prior to the defendant leaving the plaintiff in 2018, the defendant was
approached by Arnold Coleske stating that they were to sing at a show
known as the Versnit Show. They were to participate in the show for
free. Toyota would also have a presence at the show . The defendant
was further told by his brother that they could negotiate a recommitting
of the sponsorship with Toyota. Arnold Coleske further told his brother
that Toyota promised delivery of two new Toyota Landcruiser vehicles.
Each of them would receive one. Arnold Coleske confirmed the
participation at the Versnit Show for free and that a recommitting of
sponsorship was in the offing and that it would be negotiated with
Toyota. He further confirmed that Toyota offered the two Landcruiser
vehicles. However, Arnold denied that each of the brothers would
receive one. He further confirmed that the vehicles were duly delivered
by Toyota. Arnold Coleske further confirmed that the sponsorship was
subsequently re -negotiated. It is to be noted that a copy of that
recommitted sponsorship agreement was not introduced into evidence.
The evidence testified to by Arnold Coleske was surprisingly short of
stating that the Landcruiser vehicles were to be supplied in terms of a
stating that the Landcruiser vehicles were to be supplied in terms of a
sponsorship agreement. The impact of the evi dence leaned towards a
hint that the vehicles were in lieu of the free of charge participation at
the Versnit event.
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[11] The defendant confirmed that whilst negotiating his departure from the
plaintiff, he was offered a deal in terms of which he could purch ase his
vehicle at a discounted price. He declined the offer as he had an
agreement with his brother in respect of the ownership of that vehicle.
The defendant further confirmed that he was part of the meeting
between Arnold Coleske and Johan Vorster when the latter was told
that he could not retain his vehicle due to the fact that the three -year
sponsorship had not run out and he was thus obliged to return the
vehicle. After that meeting the defendant stated that Johan Vorster
confirmed that he had a similar agreement with Arnold Coleske to
receive ownership of the vehicle after the elapsing of the sponsorship
period.
[12] After receipt of the Toyota Landcruiser vehicles, one was not handed to
the defendant as promised. However, Arnold Coleske took one and the
other was given to Hargroves. At that time, the latter had already
received a vehicle supplied to him by the plaintiff as replacement of the
Toyota vehicle he had been allocated in terms of the original
sponsorship agreement. Consequently, he had been provided with two
vehicles from the plaintiff. No explanation for that was provided .
Hargroves had no knowledge of the Vers nit Show and the discussion
surrounding it, but confirmed that a recommitted sponsorship
agreement was subsequently concluded. In this regard, he was
cautious in his evidence not to state that the Toyota Landcruiser he
had received was in terms of the renegotiated sponsorship agreement.
Surprisingly, the evidence of Arnold Coleske and Hargroves made no
reference to the supply of vehicles by Toyota in terms of a sponsorship
agreement. The absence of such evidence is startling.
[13] A further curious fact is the absence of evidence that the Landcruiser
vehicles were only delivered after the re -negotiating of a sponsorship.
The evidence leaned towards delivery prior to any negotiations.
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[14] From the foregoing, there appears to be direct contradictory evidence
on two material issues. The circumstances surrounding the fate of the
initial delivery of the sponsored vehicles after the lapse of the
sponsorship agreement, and the circumstances surrounding the supply
of the two Landcruiser vehicles.
[15] The approach to be taken and the test to be applied is set out in
Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd v Martel et Cie .1 A three
pronged test is to be applied:
(a) The credibility of the witnesses:
(b) Their reliability; and
(c) The probabilities.
[16] It is recorded earlier in this judg ment that the evidence of Hargroves
left much to be desired. He admitted that he was not privy to any of the
two oral discussions and subsequent agreements between the two
brothers. Furthermore, he was unable to explain the apparent
discrepancy in the financial statements of the plaintiff, despite him
being in charge of the financial department of the plaintiff. His evidence
is also to be considered against the background that he could not
explain the divergent and haphazard approach followed in respect of
the disposal of the initial sponsored vehicles, and in particular that of
the one disposed of shortly after receipt of the vehicles from Toyo ta.
That disposal was clearly in contravention of the term of return of the
vehicles, should the sponsorship end within a tree -year period. His
evidence is of no assistance.
[17] The evidence of Arnold Coleske is of primary bias against the
defendant. He has a domineering attitude and is clearly the alter ego of
1 2003(1) SA 11 (SCA)
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the plaintiff. His managerial approach is one of “do as I say”. This is
supported by his admitted aut ocratic managerial style. What is of
importance is his evidence relating to the two alleged oral agreement s
that follows closely on that of his brother, the defendant, however
differing at the crucial part, resulting in a blatant denial.
[18] The defendant’s evidence was given in a consistent manner . There
was no hesitance in conceding where required and is to be s een,
against a confirmed background of a non-harmonious filial relationship
close to one of open animosity . His version was closely confirmed by
Arnold Coleske, but for the crucial admi ssion of ownership being
denied.
[19] The defendant was not tripped up during cross-examination and gave a
consistent version. It is to be noted that the cross -examination of the
defendant was curt and not to the point. In particular, the defendant
was not cross -examined on the alleged agreement between the
defendant and his brother.2
[20] In view of the foregoing, applying the th ree pronged test, the following
is apparent, namely that the credibility of the plaintiff’s witness es were
impugned and placing any reliability there upon would result in an
eschewed view. The probabilities favour the version of the defendant
on the material disputed issues.
[21] In view of all the aforesaid, the plaintiff has failed to prove its claims for
the return of the vehicle and payment of the costs associated with the
monthly instalments of the short -term insurance on the vehicle. In
respect of the latter, the plaintiff failed to prove an obligation on the part
of the defendant to pay such amounts.
2 See in this regard, President of the Republic of South Africa et al v South African Rugby
Football Union et al 2000(1) SA 1 (CC) at par [61]-[65]
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[22] It follows further, where the plaintiff failed to prove its claim for ret urn of
the v ehicle and where the defendant’s version of the agreement in
respect the ownership of the vehicle is found to be more proba ble, the
defendant proved his right to transfer of the vehicle registration into his
name as pled in the counterclaim.
[23] On the issue of c osts, there is no reason why costs should not follow
the event.
I grant the following order:
1. The plaintiff’s action is dismissed;
2. The plaintiff is to pay the costs of its failed action to be taxed on
scale C;
3. The plaintiff is ordered to effect transfer the ownership in the Prado
vehicle with registration no. F[...] 2[...] [...] and Vin no. J[...] into the
defendant’s name and to take all steps to give effect to such
transfer within 10 days of the date of this order;
4. The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the counterclaim on scale C.
________________________________
C J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
PRETORIA
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On behalf of Plaintiff: C Gibson
Instructed by: Senekal Simmonds Attorneys
On behalf of Defendant: D N Hinrichsen
Instructed by: Couzyn Hertzog & Horak Attorneys
Date of hearing: 11-12 November 2025
Date of Judgment: 11 February 2026