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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 2024-070316
In the matter between:
RYNARD PIENAAR APPLICANT
And
ENGINEERING COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA FIRST RESPONDENT
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INVESTIGATING SECOND RESPONDENT
COMMITTEE OF THE ENGINEERING COUNCIL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL THIRD RESPONDENT
OF THE ENGINEERING COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
(3) REVISED: YES / NO
17 February 2026 __________________________
DATE SIGNATURE
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Heard: 14 October 2025
Delivered: 17 February 2026
Headnote: Administrative law — Legality review — Self-review by statutory professional
regulator — Cancellation of professional registration in terms of s 20(3) of the Engineering
Profession Act 46 of 2000 — Meaning of “investigation” — Whether confined to
preliminary fact-finding under s 28 or includes ensuing disciplinary process — Proper
construction encompassing disciplinary process until its completion — Cancellation
effected while investigation not concluded therefore unlawful and liable to be set aside —
Regulator constitutionally obliged to seek correction of unlawful administrative act — Just
and equitable remedy —Public-protective purpose of statutory disciplinary regime —Main
review application dismissed.
Summary: The applicant sought to review and interdict disciplinary proceedings instituted
by the Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA) on the basis that his registration had
been cancelled in terms of s 20(3) of the Engineering Profession Act 46 of 2000.
ECSA brought a counter-application to set aside the cancellation as unlawful.
The court held that the “investigation” contemplated in s 20(3), properly construed in its
textual, structural and purposive context, includes the disciplinary process that follows
upon the investigation of a complaint and is concluded only once that process has run its
course. Because the applicant’s registration was cancelled before that process had been
completed, the cancellation was unlawful and fell to be set aside on legality review. ECSA
was constitutionally obliged to seek judicial correction of its own unlawful act.
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The applicant’s request for a stay of disciplinary proceedings based on his residence and
professional practice abroad was refused. Such a stay would undermine the statutory
purpose of professional accountability and was not just and equitable.
Upon the setting aside of the cancellation, the applicant remained subject to ECSA’s
disciplinary jurisdiction. The premise of the main application therefore fell away, and the
application was dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT
WINDELL J:
Introduction
[1] This matter concerns two interrelated applications arising from disciplinary steps
taken by the first respondent, the Engineering Council of South Africa (“ECSA”), against
the applicant, Mr Rynard Pienaar, a former registered professional.
[2] The first is the applicant’s application for review and declaratory and interdictory
relief, directed at ECSA’s decision to charge him with alleged unprofessional conduct and
to convene disciplinary proceedings against him. The second is a counter-application by
ECSA in which it seeks to review and set aside its own earlier decision to cancel the
applicant’s registration.
[3] Although the factual background includes allegations of professional misconduct,
the merits of those allegations do not arise for determination. The dispute turns instead
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on the proper interpretation and application of section 20(3) of the Engineering Profession
Act 46 of 2000 (“the Act”), the legality of the cancellation of the applicant’s registration,
and the jurisdictional consequences that follow.
Background facts
[4] The material facts are largely common cause. ECSA is a juristic person
established in terms of section 2 of the Act to regulate the engineering profession in South
Africa. It is the body responsible for the registration of all engineering professionals who
practice as engineers in South Africa. Registration with ECSA is mandatory if an engineer
wants to practice as such in the country.
[5] The applicant was registered with ECSA from August 2004 until 20 May 2024. In
September 2021, a complaint was lodged with ECSA in relation to professional services
rendered by the applicant. ECSA appointed an investigator in terms of section 28 of the
Act to investigate the complaint. On 15 August 2022, the investigator furnished a report
concluding that there was prima facie evidence of improper conduct and recommending
that disciplinary proceedings be instituted..
[6] The applicant states that he was not informed that the investigation had been
finalised, nor that subsequent internal steps had been taken within ECSA during late 2022
to recommend and approve the institution of disciplinary proceedings. He further
contends that communications sent by ECSA during 2023 were directed to an email
address to which he no longer had access. Nothing in this judgment turns on those factual
contentions, which are recorded only as part of the narrative background.
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[7] During October 2022, the applicant emigrated from South Africa and ceased
practising within the Republic. He now practises as an associate engineer in Ireland.
[8] On 18 May 2024, the applicant requested cancellation of his registration at ECSA.
On 20 May 2024, ECSA confirmed that his registration had been cancelled in terms of
section 20(3) of the Act. Approximately ten days later, on 31 May 2024, ECSA notified
the applicant of a disciplinary inquiry scheduled for 23 July 2024 and furnished him with
a charge sheet.
[9] The applicant disputed ECSA’s jurisdiction to proceed in light of the cancellation
of his registration. In these proceedings, he obtained an urgent interim interdict on 10 July
2024, by agreement between the parties, restraining ECSA from proceeding with the
disciplinary hearing pending the institution and determination of the present review
application now before this Court.
[10] ECSA thereafter instituted a counter -application seeking to review and set aside
its own decision of 20 May 2024 cancelling the applicant’s registration, contending that
the cancellation was effected contrary to section 20(3) of the Act.
The counter-application
[11] The counter -application is logically anterior. If the cancellation is set aside, the
applicant remains a registered person subject to ECSA’s disciplinary jurisdiction. If it
stands, the jurisdictional enquiry proceeds on the footing that registration ceased. The
validity of the cancellation must therefore be determined first.
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[12] Section 20(3) provides that the council must cancel registration upon written
request, save where an investigation into alleged improper conduct is in progress or is to
be held, in which event cancellation may occur only once the investigation has been
concluded.1
[13] ECSA contends that it was not empowered to cancel the applicant’s registration
while the investigation remained pending and that the cancellation was therefore effected
in error. It does not allege fraud or misrepresentation, nor rely on any express statut ory
power of revocation. The counter-application is brought as a legality self-review.
Interpretation of section 20(3)
[14] The Act does not define the term “investigation”. Its meaning must therefore be
determined with reference to the text of the provision, its context within the statutory
scheme, and the purpose of the disciplinary framework created by the Act.2
[15] The applicant contends that the “investigation” contemplated in section 20(3) is
confined to the initial enquiry conducted in terms of section 28. On this interpretation, the
investigation is concluded once the investigating committee has completed its enq uiry
and submitted the report and recommendations contemplated in section 28(4), which
expressly refers to the conclusion of the investigation at that stage. The subsequent
processes regulated by sections 29 to 32 — including the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings, the conduct of a disciplinary hearing, and the imposition of sanction — are
1 Section 20 “Cancellation of registration (3) The council must at the written request of any registered person
cancel his or her registration, but where an investigation into alleged improper conduct by that person is in
progress or is to be held, the registration may not be cancelled until the investigation has been concluded.”
2 University of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary and Another 2021 (6) SA 1 (CC);
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).
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said to constitute distinct procedural stages, not part of the investigation itself. On this
construction, the statutory impediment to cancellation falls away once the section 28
report has been furnished.
[16] ECSA advances a broader construction. It submits that the “investigation”
contemplated in section 20(3) forms part of a continuous disciplinary process extending
from the receipt of a complaint to the final determination and any sanction that may follow,
with the result that cancellation is postponed until that process has run its course.
[17] In support of that construction, ECSA relies on the structure and purpose of the
Act. Sections 28 to 32 establish an integrated regulatory mechanism directed at
determining whether a registered person has committed improper conduct and, if so, what
consequences should follow. On that reading, the investigation cannot sensibly be
regarded as concluded while the disciplinary process initiated by it remains incomplete.
[18] The applicant’s narrower construction gives rise to significant practical and
purposive difficulty. On that approach, once an investigating committee has
recommended that disciplinary proceedings be instituted, a registered professional could
immediately request cancellation of registration and thereby avoid the disciplinary enquiry
that the investigation was intended to initiate. Such a result would permit the evasion of
professional accountability through deregistration and would undermine the protective
and regulatory purpose of the Act.
[19] These consequences are relevant to the proper interpretation of section 20(3)
within the statutory scheme. Sections 28 to 32 establish a single disciplinary framework
directed at determining and, where appropriate, sanctioning improper conduct committed
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while a person was registered. An interpretation that treats the investigation as
terminating before that process has run its course would fragment that framework and
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the provision.
[20] The language of the Act does not compel a different result. Although section 28
regulates the investigation in express terms, the subsequent provisions give effect to and
complete the process initiated by that investigation. Read in context, the reference in
section 20(3) to an investigation that “has been concluded” is most coherently understood
as referring to the completion of the disciplinary process arising from the complaint.
[21] This interpretation accords with the statutory purpose. The Act is directed at
safeguarding the public, maintaining professional standards, and ensuring accountability
within the engineering profession. Those objectives would be materially weakened if
disciplinary jurisdiction could be avoided by the simple expedient of deregistration
following an adverse investigative report.
[22] Properly construed, therefore, the investigation contemplated in section 20(3)
encompasses the disciplinary process that follows upon the investigation of a complaint
and is concluded only once that process has run its course. At the time the applicant’s
registration was cancelled, that process had not been completed, with the result that the
statutory precondition for cancellation was absent.
Lawfulness of the cancellation
[23] Because the investigation contemplated in section 20(3), properly construed, had
not been concluded at the time the applicant’s registration was cancelled, the statutory
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precondition for cancellation was absent. The purported cancellation of 20 May 2024 was
therefore effected in circumstances prohibited by the Act.
[24] The approval of cancellation in conflict with section 20(3) constituted the exercise
of public power beyond the limits of the empowering statute and was accordingly
inconsistent with the principle of legality.
[25] Where an organ of state discovers that it has exercised statutory power unlawfully,
the rule of law requires it to seek judicial correction in the public interest. ECSA was
therefore not only entitled, but obliged, to institute self -review proceedings. 3 The
uncontested evidence shows that the administrative error giving rise to the cancellation
was identified during the urgent proceedings and acted upon without undue delay.
[26] The counter-application must accordingly succeed, and the decision cancelling the
applicant’s registration falls to be reviewed and set aside.
Just and equitable remedy
[27] The applicant contends that, even if the cancellation of his registration is set aside
and ECSA is found to retain disciplinary jurisdiction, the Court should grant a just and
equitable remedy in the form of a stay of the disciplinary proceedings for so lo ng as he
does not practise within South Africa. Reliance is placed on the Court’s remedial powers
under section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.
3 Pepcor Retirement Fund v Financial Services Board 2003 (6) SA 38 (SCA) para 10. See also
Ntshangase v MEC for Finance, Kwa Zulu- Natal and Another 2010 (3) SA 201 (SCA) para 18.
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[28] The applicant’s reasoning is, in essence, the following. ECSA’s mandate is to
protect the South African public in their dealings with registered persons. Because the
applicant emigrated and now practises as an engineer in Ireland, the South African public
is, so it is said, not exposed to him in his professional capacity. He is registered with
Engineers Ireland and earns his livelihood there. It is further contended that the complaint
has been pending for a considerable period. On that basis, it is submitted that it would be
just and equitable to stay the disciplinary proceedings until such time as the applicant
returns to South Africa and resumes practice as an engineer within the Republic.
[29] While this Court possesses a wide remedial discretion where unlawfulness is
established, 4 that discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent with the statutory
scheme and the public-protective purpose of the Act. A stay that suspends the operation
of the disciplinary framework created by the legislation is an exceptional remedy requiring
compelling justification, rooted in the statutory purpose and the interests the Act seeks to
protect.
[30] The difficulty with the applicant’s submission is that it assumes ECSA’s protective
mandate comes to an end merely because the applicant is no longer physically present
in South Africa. The Act regulates the professional standing and accountability of persons
registered under it through a disciplinary framework directed at determining allegations of
improper conduct committed while registered. That protective purpose is not confined to
safeguarding the public from present local exposure, but includes maintaining the integrity
4 State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 281 (SCA) para
53; Millenium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board Limpopo Province and Others
2008 (2) SA 281 SCA.
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of the register and enforcing professional standards through the proper determination of
such allegations.
[31] A stay based on the applicant’s continued practice abroad would allow professional
accountability to be avoided simply through relocation and would make the operation of
the disciplinary process depend on whether, and when, a registered person returns to
practise in South Africa. Such a result would undermine the proper functioning of the
statutory disciplinary scheme and would not be just and equitable.
[32] The fact that the applicant is registered with a professional body in Ireland does
not answer the difficulty. The complaint concerns conduct allegedly committed while he
was registered under South African law, and the Act entrusts the determination of such
conduct to ECSA.
[33] The passage of time relied upon by the applicant likewise does not justify an
indefinite suspension of the disciplinary process. The matter should proceed in
accordance with the Act, subject to the requirements of procedural fairness and
reasonable expedition.
[34] The applicant has therefore not shown that a stay of the disciplinary proceedings
would be just and equitable. The request for alternative remedial relief must be refused.
Consequences of the setting aside of the cancellation
[35] The setting aside of the cancellation means that it is treated in law as never having
occurred. The applicant therefore remained, and remains, a registered person under the
Act.
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[36] As a registered person, he remains subject to ECSA’s disciplinary jurisdiction in
respect of conduct allegedly committed while registered. No jurisdictional impediment
exists to the continuation of disciplinary proceedings arising from the complaint. The
submission that disciplinary sanctions would be academic in the absence of registration
does not arise, because the cancellation has been set aside.
[37] The central premise of the main application, namely that ECSA lacked jurisdiction
following cancellation, therefore falls away. No independent ground of review directed at
the disciplinary proceedings has been established. The main application must accordingly
fail.
[38] In the result the following order is made:
1. The counter application succeeds.
2. The decision of 20 May 2024 cancelling the applicant’s registration with the
Engineering Council of South Africa is reviewed and set aside.
3. The applicant’s status as a r egistered person under the Engineering
Profession Act 46 of 2000 is restored.
4. The main application is dismissed.
5. The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, including the costs of
the counter-application.
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L. WINDELL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
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Delivered: This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 17 February 2026.
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant: L Seegels-Ncube
Instructed by: Shamase Ramotswedi Attorneys
For the Respondent: B Lekokotla
Instructed by: Malatji & Co Attorneys
Date of hearing: 14 October 2025
Date of judgment: 17 February 2026