IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
In the matter between:
ALAN ROBERT RAVES
and
IRSHAD LAHER
THE STATE
Heard : 16 February 2026
Delivered : 17 February 2026
Case number no: CC21/2016
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Summary: Recusal -There is a high threshold for displacing the presumption of judicial
impartiality. Mere irritation or impatience with counsel's or an accused conduct is
generally insufficient to justify recusal. - Court is tasked with the management of the
proceedings before it. It is therefore the court's inherent duty to oversee the proper
conduct and orderly administration of the trial proceedings. - At times that may entail
robust judicial management.
ORDER
The application for the recusal is dismissed.
Nziweni, J
Introduction
JUDGMENT
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[1] This Court is currently seized with an opposed interlocutory application for the
recusal of this Court. Importantly, however, the matter was set down for the
commencement of the trial. The application is brought by or on behalf of Mr Raves
[accused 2].
[2] Messrs Arshad Laher and Alan Raves ("the applicants") stand indicted on
various charges. For the purposes of determining this application, I consider it
superfluous to recite the specific charges preferred by the second respondent against
the applicant and Mr Laher.
[3] The comprehensive procedural history of this matter is sufficiently detailed in
the chronology provided by Mr Hodes SC, representing Mr Laher. As such, I am not
going to fully recount it [the procedural history of this matter]. Save, to mention but a
few highlights of the postponements.
[4] On 04 November 2016, the matter appeared for the first time in the High Court.
[5] The matter was then on the pre-trial roll from 10 February 2017 to 20 August
2022. On 20 August 2022, the matter was declared trial ready and postponed for trial
to 03 October 2022. On 03 October 2022, the trial could not proceed and was
postponed to 24 July 2023. On 24 July 2023, the trial was postponed to 7 October
2024. On 7 October 2024, the trial was postponed for pre-trial conference to 5
November 2024. On 05 November 2024, the matter was postponed for the
commencement of the trial before this Court, with the proceedings scheduled to
resume on 13 October 2025.
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[6) On 13 October 2025, Mr Barclay - Beuthin appeared on behalf of the applicant
to move for an adjournment of the trial. The Court was advised that the applicant's
attorney was unable to confirm Ms Kilian SC's brief or mandate, resulting in the
applicant being without legal representation to proceed. Furthermore, it was submitted
that the applicant's counsel was indisposed due to medical reasons; however, the
details regarding the further availability of the applicant's erstwhile counsel remained
patently ambiguous.
[7] In a similar vein, the communication regarding the applicant's erstwhile counsel
lacked the requisite clarity necessary to establish whether she was still on record and
when she would be able to attend Court. Mr Barclay - Beuthin made it abundantly
clear that his mandate was strictly limited to moving an application for postponement,
and that he held no further instructions in the matter.
[8] While the State and Mr Laher [Accused 1] formally placed on record their
readiness to proceed, it became clear that a postponement was unavoidable. This was
the case despite the patent deficiencies in the merits of the applicant's application for
a remand. Consequently, I directed that the matter be postponed to the current term,
rather than the third term as proposed by Mr Holdes SC. I further advised the applicant,
Mr Barclay - Beuthin and Mr Laher, that, should their preferred counsel be unavailable
for this term, an alternative counsel must be instructed, failing which they would be
required to conduct their own defence.
[9] The applicant's representative for the day, provided an undertaking that the
applicant would manage his affairs accordingly. The matter was subsequently
adjourned until 16 February 2026 for the commencement of the trial. As previously
mentioned, the applicant has since launched an application seeking the recusal of this
Court.
[1 OJ On 16 February 2026, Mr Mor1and, representing the applicant, placed on record
Court.
[1 OJ On 16 February 2026, Mr Mor1and, representing the applicant, placed on record
his instructions to move both a recusal application and a postponement of the trial.
While the applicant's founding affidavit clearly indicates a desire for the matter to be
remanded, he submitted that it is incompetent to expect him to argue the
postponement before a Court whose impartiality he has formally challenged.
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Grounds for recusal
[11] In his founding affidavit, the applicant avers that the present application is
brought bona fide and in the interests of justice, having particular regard to his
fundamental right to a fair trial.
[12] According to the applicant, this is the case because:
1. The manner in which the last appearance was dealt with by this Court;
and
2. The further correspondence subsequently sent by this Court.
[13] The applicant further contends that, where a legal representative is in default,
an accused person is entitled to a postponement as of right. He expresses concern
regarding my observation that this matter is delayed and currently the oldest on the
Division's roll, asserting that he has no knowledge as to the source of this information.
Consequently, the applicant submits that it is irresistible to conclude that this Court's
primary objective is the expeditious commencement and finalisation of the trial for the
purpose of clearing the roll, rather than ensuring his constitutional right to a fair trial.
[14] The applicant further submits that the Court was obligated to conduct an
enquiry into any unreasonable delay in the proceedings, as mandated by Section 342A
of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 ("CPA"). The argument proceeds that,
had such an enquiry been undertaken, it would have become apparent that the
"protracted nature" of this matter was not attributable to the applicant's conduct, but
rather the State.
[15] The applicant further states that, he is of the view that this Court did not act with
abundant caution and that it appeared to him to be hostile, disinterested to understand
the history of the matter and it was not inclined to provide him with meaningful
opportunity to defend himself. According to him, this Court's ruling was problematic,
as it is not consistent with precedent.
[16] The applicant further asserts that, the most prejudicial ruling was that if he does
not procure counsel for these proceedings he would be forced to proceed without
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representation. It is the applicant's view that the necessary corollary of this, is that this
Court has already predetermined that he would not be granted a postponement. And
this was confirmed by follow up correspondence from the chambers of this Court.
Evaluation
Did my conduct manifest a deep-seated antagonism of such a nature as to
render impartial adjudication impossible?
[17] The legal framework governing recusal is underpinned by well-established
principles consistently articulated by our Courts. Consequently, the jurisprudence on
this subject is settled and provides clear guidance for the detennination of such
applications.
[18] If I correctly apprehend the applicant's contentions, he suggests a reasonable
apprehension that this Court would not adjudicate his intended application for a
postponement fairly. If then that is the case, it follows then that this Court's impartiality
has been called into question. The pertinent issue for determination, therefore, is
whether the applicant has established a factual and legal basis for this Court's recusal,
or whether there exists a genuine doubt regarding this Court's objectivity.
[19] Primarily, it is of paramount importance to record that this Court did not refuse
the applicant's request to postpone the commencement of the trial that was scheduled
for 13 October 2025. As previously mentioned, it is evident that the motion for recusal
is predicated upon the rulings issued during the preceding proceedings [13 October
2025] and the correspondence directed by the Court to the parties.
[20] At times, the judicial management of a matter necessitates a firm hand to
ensure the orderly and expeditious conduct of the trial. Such firmness, exercised in
the interest of the administration of justice, does not in itself manifest or justify a
reasonable apprehension of bias.
[21] It is also significant not to forget that this Court is tasked with the management
of the proceedings before it. It is therefore this Court's inherent duty to oversee the
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proper conduct and orderly administration of the trial proceedings. At times that may
entail robust judicial management. It is not uncommon for a presiding officer, in the
exercise of their inherent power to regulate the Court's process, to reprimand or warn
counsel and or the accused person or a witness; as may be necessary for the orderly
conduct of the matter.
[22] Surely, if the Court had a closed mind attitude, I would not have granted the
postponement in the first place.
[23] There is a high threshold for displacing the presumption of judicial impartiality.
Mere irritation or impatience with counsel's or an accused conduct, is generally
insufficient to justify recusal.
[24] Surely, no adverse inference can be drawn from my observation that this matter
remains the oldest on the Division's roll; this is a neutral, objective administrative fact.
This is especially true given that the requested postponement was ultimately granted
notwithstanding the fact that there were no sufficient details given for the absence of
the applicant's erstwhile counsel.
[25] The imperative to finalise a matter expeditiously is not determined solely by the
attribution of blame for historical delays, but by the procedural lifespan and age of the
litigation. The age of this matter calls for its expeditious finalisation. As such, it is the
duty of the Court to prevent further delays.
[26] Furthermore, it is entirely appropriate for this Court to mandate that substantive
issues be ventilated in open Court rather than through informal or private
correspondence. Such a directive is particularly necessary where the Court seeks to
ensure the expeditious finalisation of the matter and to prevent the delays inherent in
'litigation by correspondence'.
[27] In S v Basson 2007 (1) SACR 566 (CC) the Constitutional Court stated:
"a judge may at times make remarks that are inappropriate or display irritation towards counsel.
At times such interventions may arise from attempts at humour. In considering the question of
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whether such remarks give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, a Court should not hold
a judge to an ideal standard which would be difficult to achieve. Moreover, a Court considering
a claim of bias must take into account the presumption of impartiality, mentioned by this Court
in SARFU. To establish bias, therefore, a complainant would have to show that the remarks
were of such a number or quality as to go beyond any suggestion of mere irritation by the judge
caused by a long trial, and establish a pattern of conduct sufficient to dislodge the presumption
of impartiality and replace it with a reasonable apprehension of bias."
[28] In the case of Take & Save Trading CC and Others v The Standard Bank of SA
Ltd (21/2003) [2004] ZASCA 1; 2004 (4) SA 1 (SCA); [2004] 1 All SA 597 (SCA) (27
February 2004 ), the following was stated:
"The circumstances of the litigant complain ing of the conduct of the Judge during the triar itself,
differ materially from those of one who relies on outside factors which he cannot judge on the
strength of personal observation - factors.
And this is not surprising, since the ordinary way of meeting any apparent bias shown by the
Court in its conduct of the proceedings would be by challenging his eventual decision in an
appeal or review. Bias, as it is used in this connection, is something quite different from a state
of inclination towards one side in the litigation caused by the evidence and the argument , and
it is difficult to suppose that any lawyer could believe that recusal might be based upon a mere
indication, before the pronouncement of judgment, that the Court thinks that at that stage one
or the other party has the better prospects of success .·
[29] While the duty to investigate is peremptory in terms of Section 342A of CPA,
the law does not always require a formal hearing or a formal finding to simply grant a
postponement. If a presiding officer simply enquires into the reasons for the delay and
postponement. If a presiding officer simply enquires into the reasons for the delay and
determines that a postponement is necessary to avoid an injustice, that typically
should suffice.
Conclusion
[30] At most, my conduct may be characterised as robust judicial management or a
firm hand in the administration of the trial; however, such actions fall far short of the
threshold required to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.
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[31] Consequently, I am not satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for this
Court's recusal. As a result, I make the following order:
31.1 The application for the recusal is dismissed .
C. N NZIWENI, J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
Counsel for the Applicant
Instructed by
Counsel for the First Respondent
Instructed by
Counsel for the Second Respondent
Advocate L Morland
BDB Attorneys
Ms B de Beer
Advocate L Hodes SC
Advocate R Mckerman
Hendricks Harmse Attorneys
Mr B Hendricks
Advocate N Breyl
Advocate SH Rubin
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