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2026
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[2026] ZAGPJHC 118
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Anderson and Another v Anderson and Others (2023/013067) [2026] ZAGPJHC 118 (16 February 2026)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
2023-013067
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED:
In
the matter between:
WILLIAM
JOSEPH RICHARD ANDERSON
First
Intervening Party
MAGRIET
LOUISE STEENKAMP
Second
Intervening Party
and
ALETTA
JOHANNA ANDERSON
First
Respondent
MAGISTRATE
K ACHARY
Second
Respondent
SELENE
VAN NIEKERK N.O.
(In
her capacity as the appointed coexecutor
in
the late estate of W J R ANDERSON)
Third
Respondent
PERCY
ALLAN GRIMSHAW JONES, N.O.
(In
his capacity as the appointed co-executor
in
the late estate of W J R ANDERSON)
Fourth
Respondent
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT,
JOHANNESBURG
Fifth
Respondent
and
In
re:
ALETTA
JOHANNA ANDERSON
Applicant
MAGISTRATE
K ACHARY
First
Respondent
SELENE
VAN NIEKERK N.O
.
(In
her capacity as the appointed co-executor
in
the late estate of W J R ANDERSON)
Second
Respondent
PERCY
ALLAN GRIMSHAW JONES, N.O.
(In
his capacity as the appointed co-executor
in
the late estate of W J R ANDERSON)
Third
Respondent
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT,
JOHANNESBURG
Fourth
Respondent
This
Judgment was handed down electronically and by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by way of email and
shall be
uploaded on caselines/courtonline. The date for hand down is deemed
to be on 16 February 2026.
JUDGMENT
MOGOTSI
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The dispute centres on whether the intervening parties should be
granted leave to intervene in a review application concerning
the
quantum of spousal maintenance awarded to their father’s
surviving spouse, the first respondent.
Background
[2]
The first respondent is the surviving spouse of Mr W.J.R. Anderson,
who passed away in April 2022. The first respondent
and the deceased
were married out of community of property.
[3]
The intervening parties are the children of the deceased. The
co-executors of the estate are third respondent, a child
of the
deceased and fourth respondent, a child of the first respondent.
[4]
The High Court previously granted a declaratory order confirming the
first respondent’s entitlement to spousal maintenance.
However,
the quantum was left undetermined due to jurisdictional limits and is
now the subject of review.
The
applicant’s submissions
[5]
The essence of the first and second intervening parties’
argument is that, as heirs of the estate, they have a direct
and
substantial interest in the review application, which has the
potential to deplete the estate’s assets. They contend
that
they must be allowed to intervene to ensure the estate is properly
defended, as the current co-executors have a conflict of
interest.
They assert that the quantum of maintenance is a vital part of the
maintenance claim, and a high award directly reduces
the residuary
estate they will inherit. This, they argue, creates a direct legal
and financial interest in the review proceedings.
[6]
Additionally, counsel submitted that the co-executors are conflicted
in that one is a child of the deceased aligned with
the heirs and the
other is a child of the first respondent aligned with the spouse.
This deadlock, it is argued, prevents the estate
from mounting a
unified defence against the review, creating a risk of an unopposed
order.
The
respondent’s submissions
[7]
Counsel for the first and fourth respondents opposed the
intervention, arguing that the intervening parties lack legal
standing. Counsel submitted that the declaratory order has already
established the entitlement to maintenance, and only the quantum
remains to be determined. Therefore, the children’s interest is
purely financial and does not constitute a “direct
and
substantial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation itself”.
[8]
It was
further submitted that the intervening parties did not oppose the
initial application for the declaratory order, which undermines
the
seriousness of their current attempt to intervene. Relying on
United
Watch and Diamond Co (Pty) Ltd and others
v
Disa
Hotels and Another
[1]
,
counsel argued that a financial interest is insufficient for
intervention, as the interest must be in the legal right being
litigated.
The
issue
[9]
The crisp issue before this court is whether the intervening parties,
as heirs of the late estate of W.J.R. Anderson,
have a direct and
substantial interest in the review proceedings.
The
law
[10]
The
Constitutional Court’s decision in the matter of
SA
Riding for the Disabled Association
v
Regional
Land Claims Commissioner and Others
[2]
, is the benchmark for intervention applications and has been
consistently applied as confirmed in
Mooville
(Pty) Ltd
v
Land
and Agricultural Bank
[3]
,
in which the court held that the enquiry remains whether the
applicant has a legal interest in the subject-matter of the
litigation, not merely an indirect commercial or emotional interest.
[11]
Once an
applicant demonstrates a direct and substantial interest in the
subject matter, the court has no discretion and must grant
leave to
intervene. It is a fundamental principle of law that no order should
be granted against a party without affording that
party a hearing
[4]
.
[12]
The applicant does not have to satisfy the court that they will
succeed in the main case. It is sufficient for the applicant
to make
allegations which, if proved, would entitle them to relief or show
that their rights are adversely affected.
Analysis
[13]
In deciding whether to grant the application for intervention, the
Court must determine whether the applicant has a direct
and
substantial interest in the right that is the subject matter of the
main application, whether the allegations made by the intervening
applicant constitute a prima facie case or defence, and whether the
application is made seriously and is not frivolous.
[14]
In considering whether the application should be granted, the quality
of the evidence must as well as conspectus of all
the facts presented
in respect of the application be evaluated.
[15]
The respondents’ counsel correctly states that a declaratory
order has settled the issue of entitlement to maintenance;
however,
çounsel overlooked the fact that the issue on review pertains
to the substantive fulfilment of the declared right.
[16]
I am persuaded by the submissions of the applicants’ counsel
that the quantum and any possible cost order if the
matter proceeds
unopposed directly and substantially dictates the extent of the
estate’s liability and, ultimately, the value
of the residual
estate to be distributed among the heirs.
[17]
I am of the view that an interest in the outcome of litigation that
dictates the size of one’s inheritance is not
a mere financial
interest as argued by the respondents, but a legally cognizable
interest in the review application.
[18]
It is apparent ex facie the papers that the co-executors are in a
position of inherent conflict, given their respective
familial
allegiances. In my view, the submissions of the applicants’
counsel that this structure creates a legitimate risk
of deadlock or
ineffective representation of the estate’s interests are
persuasive. To deny the heirs a voice in the review
would risk a
judgment being taken without proper opposition. I am of the view that
denying the applicants a voice in the review
application offends the
fundamental principle of
audi alteram partem
.
[19]
The legal authorities cited by the intervening parties, particularly
SA Riding for the Disabled Association
, are apposite. Where a
direct and substantial interest is shown, the court’s
discretion is narrow, and intervention should
be allowed.
[20]
In the premises, I find that the applicants have made out a prima
facie case for opposing the review, and that the application
is not
frivolous, as it constitutes a
bona fide
attempt to protect
their vested interests in the estate.
Costs
[21]
The intervening parties sought costs only in the event of opposition.
While costs normally follow the result, I have
regard to the first
respondent’s personal circumstances as outlined in the papers.
In the exercise of my discretion, and
to avoid unduly burdening her,
I shall make no order as to costs.
Order
[22]
I therefore make the following order:
1.
The intervening parties are granted leave to
intervene as fifth and sixth respondents in the review application
brought by Aletta
Johanna Anderson dated 19 February 2025;
2.
The intervening parties are permitted to
oppose the review application and in doing so deliver their answering
affidavits within
15 (FIFTEEN) days from date of this order;
3.
There is no order as to costs.
P
J MOGOTSI
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances
Counsel
for applicants:
Adv.
B Gradidge
brian@advgradidge.co.za
Attorney
for applicants:
McCallum
Attorneys Inc.
kevin@mccallumattorneys.co.za
Counsel
for respondents:
Adv
L Liebisch
advlindiliebisch@gmail.com
Attorney
for respondents:
Brits
Attorneys Inc.
admin@britsattorneys.co.za
Date
heard:
Date
of Judgment:
09
February 2026
16
February 2026
[1]
1972
(4) SA 409
(C) AT 415-417.
[2]
2017 (5) SA 1 (CC).
[3]
[2019]
ZAECPEHC 42
; Kufuma
(Pty) Ltd
v
Bidvest
[2023]
ZAGPJHC 591.
[4]
Unite
behind
v
Buthelezi
and Others
(2022/034768) [2025] ZAGPJHC 613 (17 June 2025).