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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case No. 2026/008776
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED
DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 2025
SIGNATURE:
In the matter between:
GOLDEN CANDLE BED & BREAKFAST
APPLICANT
And
GAUTENG LIQUOR BOARD
FIRST RESPONDENT
Coram: Millar J
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Heard on: 10 February 2026
Delivered: 16 February 2026 - This judgment was handed down electronically
by circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being
uploaded to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to
SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 09H00
on 16 February 2026.
JUDGMENT
MILLAR J
[1] This is an application for an order compelling the issue of a temporary liquor
license to the applicant, pending a review of the decision taken by the
respondent on 22 December 2025, to refuse the applicant’s application.
[2] The present application, which was heard by way of urgency, arises in
consequence of events that occurred relating to a prior application that had
been submitted, refused, and then by agreement after the applicant had brought
an urgent application before this Court, remitted back, by agreement between
the parties, to the respondent for reconsideration.
[3] The circumstances of the matter, which are not in dispute between the parties,
are as follows:
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[3.1] On 7 February 2025, the applicant lodged an application in terms of s
28(1)(c) for an on-site consumption liquor license in terms of the
Gauteng Liquor Act1 (the Act).
[3.2] No objections to the granting of the license were raised.
[3.3] Although the respondent decided on 25 July 2025 to refuse the
application, this was only reduced to writing on 29 September 2025
and the applicant notified of this for the first time on 7 October 2025.
[3.4] The reason proffered for the refusal of the license that had been
applied for was that the respondent had considered the application
as one having been made in respect of premises from which a
“tavern” was to be operated.
[3.5] The business of the applicant, and the application that was made,
was for an on-site consumption at a guest house and function venue
and not for a tavern.
[4] The applicant then brought an urgent application in December 2025, to review
the decision that had been taken inter alia based on a report relating to the
proximity of churches and a school to the venue and without any proper
consideration of the public interest as required by s 30(3) of the Act.
[5] On 3 December 2025 and agreement between the parties an order was made
besides agreeing that the decision to refuse the application was reviewable and
1 2 of 2003.
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should be set aside, that it would be remitted back to the respondent for re-
consideration upon strict timelines. Additionally, it was agreed that:
“Pending the receipt of the reconsidered decision, the applicant is authorised to
trade in liquor in its business known as Golden Candle Bed & Breakfast, situated
at 1[...] T[...] Street, Roodepoort, Gauteng Province, with reference G[...], as if the
s 28(1)(c) on – consumption liquor license applied for had been granted and
issued, from today, 3 December 2025 until 12 January 2026, on which date the
interim order will lapse.”
[6] The respondent undertook to reconsider the applicant’s application by 18
December 2025 and to then communicate the decision on re-consideration
within 5 days. The respondent duly complied and on 22 December 2025,
notified the applicant that it had once again declined the application.
[7] The applicant is aggrieved by the fact that notwithstanding the respondent had
conceded that its initial decision to refuse the application had been impeachable
and subject to review and setting aside, it had again, and for precisely the same
reasons, rejected the application for a second time.
[8] The initial reasons given for declining the application on 25 July 2025 were:
“The granting of the license is not (sic) public interest in terms of Section 30(2)(c)
(sic) Gauteng Liquor Act.
In terms of Section 30(3) of the Act, the Board shall grant application in the
premises not situated within a radius of 500 meters in the vicinity of a place of
Worship and educational institution. City Life Church 100 meters, New Harvest
Christian Fellowship 500m, Canterbury International School 300m.”
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[9] Central to the first decision was the report of an inspector dated 25 April 2025
from which the proximity of the churches and educational institutions were
derived. The content of this report was placed in issue in the first application.
[10] The second decision to refuse the application, taken on 22 December 2025,
was for the following reasons:
“1. The inspector’s report dated 25 April 2025 is duly correct.
2. The granting of the license is not in the public interest in terms of section
30(2) of the Gauteng Liquor Act, No 2 of 2003.
3. In terms of section 30(3) of the Act, the board shall grant application in the
premises not situated within a radius of 500 meters in the vicinity of a place
of worship and educational institution, and in this instance when an in -loco
inspection was conducted, more places of interests (sic) were identified (see
attached report).”
[11] The report, which was attached to the decision of 22 December 2025, is
prefaced with a statement that:
“The purpose of this inspection is to confirm the existence if there are any
premises of interest within 500 m radius from the applicant’s premises as per the
inspector’s report.”
[12] It is readily apparent that in respect of both the inspector’s reports of 25 April
2025 and 10 December 2025, that both reports focus exclusively on the
proximity of the applicant’s premises to places of worship and schools.2 The
2 Proximity to none of the other places referred to in s 30(3) of the Act such as similar licensed premises
or public transport facilities are relevant in this case.
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report of 10 December did no more than repeat and attempt to bolster the
contents of the report of 25 April 2025.
[13] Having regard to the two decisions as set out above, it is evident that:
[13.1] Both were made for the same reasons.
[13.2] Both relied on what was in effect the same proximity reports.
[13.3] There is no report or any indication that any consideration or
investigation was conducted in respect of the “public interest”, the
second ground upon which the application was refused.
[14] Section 30(3) of the Act provides that:
“(3) The Board shall grant an application in the case of premises not situated
within a radius of five hundred (500) meters in the vicinity of a place of
worship, educational institution, similar licensed premises, public
transport facility, or such further distance as the Board may determine or
as may be prescribed from time to time.”
[15] It is readily apparent that the refusal of the application when it was remitted
back to the respondent is predicated upon the self-same reasons as the first
refusal.
[16] It was argued for the applicant that s 30(3) does not impose a prohibition on
granting liquor licenses in proximity to schools or churches. What the section
requires is that such proximity is considered within the public interest enquiry
provided for in s 30(2)(c) of the Act. This is obviously so, having regard to the
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plain wording of the section. In its terms, the respondent is obliged,
notwithstanding distance to grant licenses (assuming proximity is the only issue)
if it is more than 500 meters but it does not preclude the granting of a license if
the proximity is less than 500 meters.3
[17] It was also argued that the fact that “public interest” was not properly considered
when the first decision was taken is indicative of a decision-making process
where the reference to the “public interest” is used as a “catch all” basis to justify
what is a patently incorrect application of s 30(3) of the Act. There is simply no
reference to any enquiry or any reason proferred as to why the granting or the
refusal of the application would or would not be in the public interest. It is a
reason tendered “in vacuo” and meaningless within the context of the
application given the body of information available to the respondent at the time
that it made both the first and second decisions.
[18] The applicant has indicated that it intends in part B of the application to seek an
order for the reviewing and setting aside of the second decision. This leaves
the question of whether the remedy sought now, being the grant of further
interim license is apposite.
[19] The requirements for an interim interdict are well known.4 The applicant must
establish prima facie right (even if open to some doubt), demonstrate
irreparable harm, there must be no alternative remedy, and the balance of
convenience must favour the grant of the interdict. The requirements are dealt
with sequentially hereunder.
3 Caroline Street Liquor Store CC v The Gauteng Provincial Liquor Board 2010 JDR 0804 GNP.
4 Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W).
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[20] In Airroadexpress (Pty) Ltd v Chairman Local Road Transportation Board,
Durban, and Others,5 it was held:
“I cannot accept that, if it can be shown in a case of this kind that the
appellant must inevitably succeed in the appeal, interim relief pending the
determination thereof can lawfully be withheld solely by reason of an order
which cannot conceivably be sustained. I am of the view further that in
principle the same approach should prevail where a strong prima facie case
is established that the permits applied for were wrongly refused. In my view
the principle applied in the De Fraetas type of case should be extended to
case like the present. The decision in that case is based on the existence
of a “general power” or, put differently, an inherent jurisdiction to grant
pendente lite relief to avoid injustice and hardship. An inherent power of
this kind is a salutary power which should be jealously preserved and even
extended where exceptional circumstances are present and where, but for
the exercise of such power, a litigant would be remediless, as is the case
here.”
[21] There is no doubt that this Court has the authority to grant the interim license
that the applicant seeks. Its entitlement is further fortified by the fact that the
respondent previously agreed to the grant of such an order when it knew that its
decision was impeachable.
[22] In Tabooz Glenanda (Pty) Ltd v The Gauteng Liquor Board,6 the Court referred
to Barshila Investments CC v The Gauteng Liquor Board in which it was held:
“The applicant for the interim relief must have a prima facie clear right to the relief
sought. In casu, the applicant applied for a license and has a right to have his
application decided. The applicant is suffering prejudice. Until such time that a
license is granted, the applicant will not be able to run a proper business of a
5 1986 (2) SA 663 (A) at 676C-E.
6 (2023/051124) [2023] ZAGPPHC 517 (26 June 2023) at para [28].
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game lodge as it is difficult to imagine enthusiastic patrons looking to stay at a
lodge if there is not liquor available to consume with meals, game drives or at the
bar.”
[23] In the present matter, the applicant similarly will suffer prejudice since it is a bed
and breakfast, and function venue will not attract the patronage and be able to
function as it ought to if it is unable to serve liquor with meals or during
functions.
[24] For the reasons set out above, I find that the applicant has prima facie right to
the issue of a temporary liquor license pending the determination of the review
in part B of the application. Having regard to the type of the business of the
applicant, there is no other remedy which can appropriately be granted.
[25] In this matter, the prior agreement on the part of the respondent to issue a
temporary license, establishes that the balance of convenience in granting the
order sought, favours the applicant. It was argued by the respondent that the
negative impact of the grant of the order upon it, would be disproportionate but
this squarely at odds with its own prior conduct of agreeing to a temporary
license in favour of the applicant not two months earlier when it knew its refusal
was impeachable.
[26] It is customary for costs to follow the result and it is for this reason that I intend
to make the order for costs that I do.
[27] In the circumstances, I make the following order:
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[26.1] Part A is heard as an urgent application and the non-compliance by
the applicant with the rules of Court in respect of service and form of
dies is condoned in terms of rule 6(12).
[26.2] The applicant is entitled to trade in liquor at its business premises
known as Golden Candle Bed & Breakfast, situated at 1[...] T[...]
Street, Roodepoort, Gauteng Province, with reference
G[...] as if the s 28(1)(c) on-consumption liquor license applied for by
it from the respondent was granted and issued, until such time as the
decision of the respondent not to grant the applicant the license has
been finalized on review in accordance with part B of the notice of
motion (including any appeals in respect thereof) and effect has been
given to the order that this Court makes in respect of the review.
[26.3] Part B of the application is postponed sine die.
[26.4] The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of part A of the
application as between party and party with counsel’s costs to be
paid on scale C.
_____________________________
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
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HEARD ON: 10 FEBRUARY 2026
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON: 16 FEBRUARY 2026
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: ADV. A VAN DER MERWE
INSTRUCTED BY: MARIUS BLOM INC
REFERENCE: MR. R VAN DER MERWE
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: ADV. G RAMARU
INSTRUCTED BY: THE STATE ATTORNEY PRETORIA
REFERENCE: MS. L. TSHIVHASE