Lotz v Anglo Office Supplies (JS52/05) [2005] ZALC 98; [2006] 5 BLLR 491 (LC); (2006) 27 ILJ 809 (LC) (1 December 2005)

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Brief Summary

Labour Law — Dismissal — Wrong party — Employee dismissed by old employer after negotiations for transfer of business failed — Employee claiming automatic unfair dismissal related to transfer — Court finding that employee could only pursue claim against new employer as per section 197 of the Labour Relations Act — Point in limine raised by respondent dismissed with costs.

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO. JS 52/05
In the matter between:
ROGER LOTZ Applicant
And
ANGLO OFFICE SUPPLIES Respondent
JUDGMENT
MUSI AJ
[1]  This is a judgement on a point  in limine  raised by the respondent  
to the effect that the applicant has brought a wrong party to court.  
The essence of the point   in limine , as I see it, is that where an  
employee   has   been   dismissed   by   his\her   employer   (the   old  
employer)   for   a   reason   related   to   a   transfer   of   the   employer’s  
business  or part thereof as set out in section 197 of the Labour  
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA), any action that the employee  
takes in connection with the dismissal can only be brought against  
the   person   or   entity   to   whom/which   the   business   has   been  
transferred (the new employer).  Put otherwise, it is contended that

under  no circumstances  can the employee have recourse against  
the old employer. The issue concerns the interpretation of section  
197.
[2] The factual background to the dispute is based on facts that are not  
disputed (save in one respect which I shall indicate) and is briefly  
as   set   out   hereunder.   The   respondent   is   a   company   duly  
incorporated   in   terms   of   the   company   laws   of   the   Republic   of  
South Africa and which conducts the business of supplying paper  
and stationery products with wholesale and retail components. The  
applicant was employed by the respondent in its retail division as a  
sale   representative.   During   August   2004   the   respondent   made  
known its intention to sell its retail division to a company called  
Makulu   Time   Office   Products   (Pty)   Ltd   (Makulu).   Discussions  
were   held   between   the   applicant   and   a   representative   of   the  
respondent in connection with the contemplated sale with a view to  
the applicant’s employment contract being transferred to Makulu.  
The   applicant   objected   to   what   he   perceived   as   less   favourable  
terms and conditions of employment offered by Makulu and the  
move to transfer the applicant appears to have been abandoned.  
Now this is not a proven fact or common cause but I make this  
conclusion   on   the   basis   of   the   fact   that   the   negotiations   in   that  
direction were not pursued but instead alternative proposals were  
made to the applicant. When the negotiations around these failed to  
bear   fruit,   the   respondent   simply   dismissed   the   applicant.   The  
applicant then declared a dispute with the CCMA and conciliation  
having   failed,   he   instituted   action   in   this   court   seeking  
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compensation  on the basis  that this  was an automatically  unfair  
dismissal as set out in section 187 (1) (g) of the LRA.
[3] The dismissal took place on 1 September 2004. Subsequently, and  
on 8 September 2004, the respondent and Makulu concluded an  
agreement in terms of which the respondent’s retail unit was sold  
and transferred to Makulu as a going concern, which agreement  
took effect on 1 October 2004.
[4] The gist of the respondent’s case is that since the applicant avers  
that his dismissal was for a reason related to the transfer and therefore  
automatically unfair, he has triggered the provisions of the entire section  
197. It is pointed out that in terms of subsection 
2 (a) Makulu has been substituted for the respondent and emphasis  
is placed on the provision of subsection 2 (c) which stipulates:
“anything   done   before   the   transfer   by   or   in   relation   to   the   old  
employer, including the dismissal of an employee or the commission  
of   an   unfair   labour   practice   or   act   of   unfair   discrimination,   is  
considered to have been done by or in relation to the new employer”.
It is contended that the applicant could have recourse only against  
Makulu, the new employer.
[5] Mr.   Graham   for   the   respondent   referred   to   Transport   Fleet  
Maintenance (Pty) Ltd and Another v National Union of Metal  
Workers of South Africa and Others (2004) 25 ILJ 104 (LAC) , 
especially the passage in paragraph 25 where Zondo JP stated the  
following in relation to the old section 197:
“   It can also be said that because 197 (2) (a) provides that anything  
done by the business transferor in relation to an employee before the  
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transfer of the business, must be regarded as having been done by the  
business   transferee.   The   business   transferee   is   regarded   after   the  
transfer of the business, as the one who dismissed the employee and is  
therefore, the person against whom the employee is entitled to pursue  
arbitration   or   legal   proceedings   to   enforce   his   rights   not   to   be  
dismissed unfairly”
Counsel submitted that this statement clearly indicates that Makulu  
is   the   entity   that   the   applicant   should   have   sued   and   not   the  
respondent.
[6] Mr. Lennox, for the applicant, submitted in essence that the instant  
case is distinguishable from the situation that obtained in cases like  
Transport Fleet Maintenance  where the entire business was sold  
as a going concern and that that is a typical case for which section  
197 was meant. In such cases, an employee dismissed prior to the  
transfer will be remediless if he/she could not proceed against the  
new employer and that is precisely the sort of hardship that the  
section was meant to prevent, so counsel submitted. He went on to  
say that the instant matter is complicated by the fact that where  
only a portion of the business is transferred, the employees to be  
transferred should be identified as not necessarily all the people  
who   worked   in   the   particular   unit   would   be   transferred.   Mr.  
Lennox   pointed   out   that   in   fact   the   respondent   and   Makulu  
identified the employees to be transferred by way of a list annexed  
to   the   contract.   Significantly,   the   applicant   is   not   one   of   those.  
Counsel referred to   NEHAWU v University of Cape Town and  
Others (2002) 23 ILJ 306 (LAC)  at 338F where Zondo JP stated  
the following:
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“Accordingly,   each   transaction   must,   in   my   view,   be  
considered   on   its   own   merits   in   the   light   of   all   the  
surrounding   circumstances   of   the   transaction   before   a  
determination   can   be   made   whether   they   constitute   the  
transfer of a business as a going concern”
Counsel pointed out that this approach was approved in a further  
appeal to the Constitutional Court in   NEHAWU v University of  
Cape Town and Others (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC) , paragraph [7].
[7]  As   both   counsel   pointed   out   in   argument,   there   is   no   direct  
authority on the point in issue. However, in my view, there are  
sufficient indications in the reported cases that not in every case of  
a transfer in terms of section 197 would an employee be obliged to  
have recourse against the new employer. It is clearly a matter to be  
determined with reference to the particular facts of each case, as  
was indeed stated in the two cases of   NEHAWU v University of  
Cape Town  (supra).
[8] In my view, an aspect that is critical and renders the instant case  
distinguishable is that, on the papers, the applicant appears to have  
been   withdrawn   from   the   transfer   process   as   I   have   already  
indicated. That this is so further confirmed by the fact that he was  
not   included   in   the   list   of   the   employees   to   be   transferred.  
Significantly,   one   particular   employee,   McCann,   who   had   been  
transferred and in respect of whom there appears to have been a  
pending   dispute,   was   singled   out   and   provision   made   in   the  
contract for the handling of his case, whereas no such provision  
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was made in respect of the applicant.
[9] The Constitutional Court in the   NEHAWU v University of Cape  
Town  case,   endorsed   the   view   expressed   by   Zondo   JP   in   his  
minority judgement in the LAC, that it is not a  sine qua non  that 
the employment contracts of employees be transferred as well for a  
transaction to qualify as a transfer of a business as a going concern  
within   the   meaning   of   section   197.   Cf   SA   Municipal   Workers  
Union and Others v Rand Airport Management Co (Pty) Ltd and  
Others   (2005)   26   ILJ   67   (LAC),   paragraphs   (22)   to   (24);  
NEHAWU v University of Cape Town and Others (2000) 21 ILJ  
1618(LC).
[10] Mr. Graham also suggested that the applicant cannot claim that his  
dismissal   was   for   a   reason   related   to   the   transfer   and   therefore  
automatically unfair within the meaning of section 189 (1) (g) if he  
was not part of the transfer. In my view, the test in this regard is  
not whether he was ultimately transferred or not but whether his  
dismissal was for a reason related to the contemplated transfer. A  
contemplated transfer may fail to materialise but if an employee is  
dismissed for a reason related thereto, such dismissal would be an  
automatically unfair one. Compare  SA Municipal Workers Union  
and Others   (supra), especially at 83F­J. In this case it was held  
that transfer in terms of section 197 had not taken place, yet the  
dismissal of the employees was held to have been automatically  
unfair as the reason therefor related to the contemplated transfer.
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[11] I should indicate that I am not hereby making any finding that the  
dismissal   in   casu   was   an   automatically   unfair   one   within   the  
context of section 187 (1) (g). That is an issue to be decided at the  
trial.
[12] In conclusion, I should point out that the larger part of the day of  
hearing was devoted to oral argument on the point, the parties having  
previously arranged to set aside the 8 th November 2005 for same, as it  
had been thought that its determination might dispose of the entire case. It  
is therefore only proper that the respondent should carry the costs of the  
day.
[13] In the result, the point  in limine  is dismissed with costs.
______________________________
  H. M. MUSI
Acting Judge of the Labour Court
For the Applicant Advocate M A Lennox
Instructed by Natasha Moni
For the Respondents Advocate D G Graham  
Instructed by Marshall Attorneys
Date of Hearing 08 November 2005
Date of Judgment 01 December 2005
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