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  • Christian v Colliers Properties (C323/2004) [2005] ZALC 56; …

Christian v Colliers Properties (C323/2004) [2005] ZALC 56; (2005) 26 ILJ 234 (LC); [2005] 5 BLLR 479 (LC) (25 February 2005)

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Labour Law
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Brief Summary

Labour Law — Unfair dismissal — Automatically unfair dismissal due to sexual harassment — Applicant dismissed after rejecting advances from her manager — Court finding dismissal was directly linked to refusal of sexual advances, constituting an automatically unfair dismissal under Section 187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act — Compensation awarded in accordance with Section 194(3) of the Act.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were adjudicated in the Labour Court of South Africa (Cape Town) and concerned a claim that a dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended). The claim was framed as arising from circumstances amounting to sexual harassment, coupled with a further claim for relief under the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.


The parties were Amarall Christian (the applicant and former employee) and Colliers Properties (the respondent employer). The respondent did not appear at the hearing, while the applicant was represented.


The procedural history included an initial service-related difficulty: the applicant’s statement of claim was served by telefax to a number different from that recorded as the respondent’s fax number in the statement of claim, with no initial explanation or proof that the fax number used belonged to the respondent. The court considered whether there had been proper service under the Labour Court Rules, and ultimately accepted an affidavit from the applicant’s attorney establishing that the fax number used was indeed that of the respondent.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the applicant’s dismissal, occurring shortly after commencement of employment, was causally linked to her refusal to submit to the manager’s sexual advances, and what remedial consequences should follow under both the Labour Relations Act and the Employment Equity Act.


2. Material Facts


The applicant was a 23-year-old matriculant who had previously held various clerical and administrative positions on a contract basis. She applied for a secretarial position advertised by the respondent, attended an interview, and commenced employment on 21 June 2004 at a salary of R2 000,00 per month. During her first two days she performed reception and typing work, and on the morning of 23 June 2004 she did filing. The court noted that no criticism had been levelled by co-workers regarding her work performance during this period.


On the morning of 23 June 2004, the applicant met with the respondent’s manager, Mr Collier, in his office to discuss and clarify employment conditions. During this interaction, he asked about her boyfriend and the duration of the relationship, then suggested she accompany him for supper and drinks. When she responded that she would do so if her boyfriend were also invited, the conversation became more sexually suggestive, including Mr Collier asking what she would do if he asked her to sit on his lap. The applicant replied that there were chairs available.


The court accepted that Mr Collier then moved around the desk and positioned himself at the door holding the handle. He approached the applicant and kissed her on the neck. The applicant pushed him away and left the office.


At approximately 14h00 the same day, the applicant returned to Mr Collier’s office to express her displeasure. The court recorded that Mr Collier was unsympathetic and minimised the incident. He gave the applicant an ultimatum that, before leaving work that afternoon, she had to indicate whether she was “out or in”. The court accepted the applicant’s interpretation that this required her to indicate whether she would accept his advances, and found this interpretation fair in context.


At the end of the day, Mr Collier again asked whether she had decided. The applicant stated she was not “in”. Mr Collier asked why, in that event, he should keep her employed. He handed her an envelope with her name on it containing the equivalent of two days’ salary, and asserted that other secretaries had reported on her work and that she was not fit for the job. The applicant was then dismissed.


The court treated as material the sequence that, only after the applicant rejected Mr Collier’s advances, did he raise purported performance-related concerns. The court found it implausible that the asserted performance concerns were genuine, given the absence of earlier complaints and the timing of the allegations.


Following dismissal, the applicant took tranquilising medication for six months, and stated that the episode made her apprehensive in job interview and recruitment situations, particularly where a male conducted the interview. She later found employment with a large insurance company, though that employment was due to expire shortly (with prospects of further work thereafter).


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the applicant’s dismissal fell within the category of automatically unfair dismissals contemplated by section 187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act, on the basis that the dismissal occurred in circumstances amounting to sexual harassment and unfair discrimination, and whether the applicant was entitled to the maximum compensation permitted by section 194(3).


A further legal issue was the determination of appropriate relief under section 50(1)(d) and section 50(1)(e) of the Employment Equity Act, read with section 6(1) (prohibition of unfair discrimination) and section 6(3) (harassment as a form of unfair discrimination). This required a remedial assessment of what would constitute an “appropriate order”, including the possibility of an award of compensation and/or damages.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of law to fact, specifically the causal nexus between the refusal of sexual advances and the termination of employment, and a remedial value judgment in assessing quantum under both statutory regimes.


A preliminary procedural issue concerned whether there had been proper service by telefax under the Labour Court Rules, given the discrepancy in fax numbers and the absence of initial independent proof that the fax number used belonged to the respondent.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On the procedural point, the court considered Rule 4(1)(iv) (service by fax) and emphasised that a party relying on service by fax must provide satisfactory proof that the fax number used is in fact the opposing party’s fax number. The court observed an inherent risk in the Labour Court Rules when compared to civil jurisdiction service by sheriff supported by a return of service, and stated that independent verification could take the form of letterheads, cards, brochures, or appropriate extracts from a telephone directory. The court indicated that similar concerns applied to service by registered post under Rule 4(1)(vii). In this case, the court accepted an affidavit from the applicant’s attorney that reliably established that the fax number used was the respondent’s number, thereby resolving the service issue.


On the merits, the court evaluated the chronology and content of the interactions of 23 June 2004. It treated the absence of performance complaints in the first days of employment as significant, and considered the later performance justification as arising only after the applicant refused Mr Collier’s advances. The court concluded that the applicant was dismissed because she was not prepared to accept Mr Collier’s advances, and found the performance rationale implausible and not genuine in the circumstances.


In relation to compensation under the Labour Relations Act, the court emphasised that the legislature had decreed certain categories of dismissal to be automatically unfair, and that section 194(3) permits compensation substantially higher than for ordinary unfair dismissals. The court reasoned that this higher compensation reflected a legislative purpose of eradication of the listed categories in section 187(1) and protection of workers against such dismissals, and that the compensation contains punitive and preventative elements. The court held that a tribunal fixing compensation in such cases should bear these policy considerations in mind and attempt to give effect to them.


Applying these considerations, the court characterised the matter as illustrating the type of conduct against which the legislature had “firmly set its face”: an employee was sexually victimised and lost employment as a result. The court stated that the short duration of employment did not reduce the entitlement to protection, as newly appointed and long-established employees are equally vulnerable in sexual harassment situations.


The court treated as aggravating the calculating manner in which the dismissal occurred. It found that Mr Collier persisted with advances after being rebuffed and, when the applicant made clear that his attentions were unwelcome, dismissed her in a callous manner and sought to justify the dismissal on a false pretext. On this basis, the court could identify no reason why the applicant should not receive the full 24 months’ compensation contemplated by section 194(3).


On the Employment Equity Act claim, the court considered the statutory power under section 50(1) to make “any appropriate order”, including awarding compensation and damages in circumstances contemplated by the Act. It linked those circumstances to the prohibition of unfair discrimination in section 6(1) and the express provision in section 6(3) that harassment is a prohibited form of unfair discrimination. In determining what was “appropriate”, the court endorsed a multi-factor assessment encompassing the need to redress the infringement, deter future violations, dispense justice fairly to affected parties, and ensure that the order can be complied with, relying on constitutional court authority for this remedial approach.


For guidance on assessing compensation/damages for unfair discrimination, the court referred to comparative authority stressing a balance: awards should not be so low as to trivialise the policy, but should also be restrained to avoid being viewed as excessive. The court also referred to South African authority emphasising deterrence and the traditionally conservative approach to damages assessment.


The court reviewed local case outcomes in sexual harassment-related litigation to illustrate comparative quantum, while stressing that awards in other matters serve only as a guideline and should not be rigidly applied. It noted that numerous factors may be relevant, including duration and frequency of harassment, the intrusiveness of the acts, the harasser’s arrogance or maliciousness, and the consequences for the victim.


In the applicant’s case, the court treated as relevant that a substantial amount would already be awarded under section 194(3) of the Labour Relations Act. It applied what it termed the collateral source rule to take into account that the same act of harassment constituted both an automatically unfair dismissal and a contravention of section 6 of the Employment Equity Act, and that a separate substantial sum would be paid under the former.


The court also took into account that the acts occurred on the same day within a short period; that the only direct physical advance was an attempted kiss on the neck; and that there was no evidence of particularly severe psychological trauma or consequences. Considering all these features, the court concluded that R10 000,00 would fairly represent the compensation payable under section 50 of the Employment Equity Act.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court found that the applicant’s dismissal was automatically unfair, on the basis that she was dismissed for refusing to accept Mr Collier’s sexual advances, and that the asserted performance-related reasons were not genuine.


The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant R48 000,00 as compensation in terms of section 194(3) of the Labour Relations Act (equivalent to 24 months of the applicant’s monthly remuneration). The respondent was further ordered to pay R10 000,00 in terms of section 50 of the Employment Equity Act.


The court ordered the respondent to pay interest on both amounts from the date of judgment to date of payment at the rate laid down in the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act, and to pay the applicant’s costs of suit.


Cases Cited


Hoffmann v South African Airways (2000) 12 BLLR 1365 (CC).


Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (1997) 7 BCLR 851 (CC).


Alexander v Home Office (1988) IRLR 190 (Court of Appeal).


Buthelezi v Poorter 1975 (4) SA 608 (W).


Intertech Systems (Pty) Ltd v Sowter (1997) 18 ILJ 689 (Labour Appeal Court).


Ntsabo v Real Security CC (2003) 24 ILJ 2341 (Labour Court).


Grobler v Naspers Beperk and Another (2004) 25 ILJ 439 (C).


Van der Berg v Coopers and Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) SA 242 (Supreme Court of Appeal).


Nydoo v Bengtas 1965 (1) SA 1 (A).


Kennel Union of South Africa v Park 1981 (1) SA 714 (C).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended), sections 187(1)(f), 194, and 194(3).


Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, sections 6(1), 6(3), 50(1)(d), and 50(1)(e).


Prescribed Rate of Interest Act (as referenced in the order).


Rules of Court Cited


Labour Court Rule 4(1)(iv).


Labour Court Rule 4(1)(vii).


Held


The court held that the applicant was dismissed because she refused the manager’s sexual advances, and that the dismissal therefore constituted an automatically unfair dismissal within the meaning of section 187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act. The court held further that the conduct also amounted to harassment, a form of unfair discrimination prohibited by section 6(3) of the Employment Equity Act, justifying a separate award of compensation under section 50 of that Act.


On remedy, the court held that the aggravating nature of the respondent manager’s conduct justified the award of the maximum 24 months’ compensation under section 194(3). In respect of the Employment Equity Act claim, the court held that a further amount of R10 000,00 was appropriate, having regard to the short duration and limited physical nature of the harassment, the absence of evidence of severe psychological consequences, and the fact that substantial compensation was already being awarded under the Labour Relations Act.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Compensation for automatically unfair dismissal under section 194(3) of the Labour Relations Act must be assessed with regard to the legislature’s purpose of eradicating the categories of automatically unfair dismissal listed in section 187(1), and may legitimately reflect punitive and preventative policy considerations intended to deter such conduct and protect employees.


Where a dismissal follows an employee’s refusal to submit to sexual advances by a person in authority, and a performance-based justification is raised only after such refusal, the timing and context may support a finding that the asserted performance rationale is pretextual, establishing a causal nexus between the refusal and the dismissal.


In determining what constitutes an “appropriate order” under section 50(1) of the Employment Equity Act, the court must consider remedial objectives including redress for the infringement, deterrence of future violations, fairness to affected parties, and practical enforceability or compliance with the order.


Awards for unfair discrimination and harassment should avoid trivialising the statutory policy by being merely nominal, but should also be restrained so as not to be excessive; comparative awards may provide guidance but are not to be applied rigidly, as quantum depends on the evidence and circumstances of each case.


In assessing relief where the same conduct gives rise to both an automatically unfair dismissal claim and an Employment Equity Act discrimination/harassment claim, the court may consider the overlap between remedies and the fact that substantial compensation is being awarded under one statutory scheme when determining what further amount is appropriate under the other.

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORTABLE
HELD AT CAPE TOWN
CASE NO: C323/2004
In the matter between:
AMARALL CHRISTIAN       Applicant
and
COLLIERS PROPERTIES   Respondent
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________________
The Applicant claims that her dismissal from the Respondent’s employ was  
automatically unfair on the grounds specified in Section 187(1)(f) of the Labour  
Relations Act, No 66 of 1995 as amended.  She claims that she was dismissed in  
circumstances amounting to sexual harassment.  She seeks an order for  
compensation in terms of Section 194 of the Labour Relations Act, as well as an  
order for payment of damages in terms of Section 50(1)(e) of the Employment  
Equity Act, No 55 of 1998. 
It is first necessary to deal with a procedural aspect.   The Applicant’s Statement of Claim was  
served on the Respondent by telefax.  The telefax number to which the Statement of Claim was  
transmitted   differed   from   that   given   on   the   Statement   of   Claim   as   the   Respondent’s   telefax  
number.  There was no explanation for this discrepancy.  There was, moreover, no proof on the  
papers before me that the telefax number in question was in fact that of the Respondent.  Rule  
4(1)(iv)   provides   that   a   document   may   be   served   “ by   faxing   a   copy   of   the   document   to   the  
person, if the person has a fax number ”.  Any litigant wishing to bring himself within the ambit of  
this rule must show that the number to which the documents were faxed was the fax number of

“the person ”, ie the intended recipient.  If the document is faxed to some other fax number, proper  
service has not been effected.   There is, therefore, an inherent danger and shortcoming in the  
particular Rules ­   a shortcoming which does not exist, for example, in litigation in the courts of  
civil jurisdiction where service is effected by the Sheriff, and proved by a service return reflecting  
the full details of such service. 
In my view, and save where the circumstances are exceptional, a party wishing  
to rely on service in the manner indicated in Rule 4(1)(iv) must place before the  
court satisfactory proof that the fax number used is indeed that of the opposing  
party.  This may take the form of a letterhead, card, marketing brochure or, if  
appropriate, an excerpt from the telephone directory containing the relevant  
information.  In the absence of such independent verification of the fax number, I  
have grave doubts as to whether there is proper compliance with the provisions  
of Rule 4(1)(iv).  I might add that these comments are equally applicable to the  
sending of documents by registered post, in terms of Rule 4(1)(vii).  
Fortunately, by the time the matter was heard, the Applicant in the instant matter  
was represented by an attorney, who provided an affidavit with sufficient detail to  
reliably establish that the number to which the Statement of Claim was faxed was  
the Respondent’s number. 
Applicant, a twenty three year old matriculant, had held various administrative  
and clerical positions on a contract basis, before she made application to the  
Respondent for a secretarial position which had been advertised in the press.  
She attended an interview and was employed with effect from 21 June 2004.  
Her salary was agreed at R2 000,00 per month.  She spent the first two days of  
her employment doing receptionist and typing work, and spent the morning of 23  
June 2004 filing documentation.  During this period no criticism was levelled by

June 2004 filing documentation.  During this period no criticism was levelled by  
any of her co­workers, at the manner in which she performed any of her duties. 
On the morning of 23 June 2004 she went into the office of the Respondent’s  
manager, Mr Collier, to discuss and clarify certain other of her conditions of  
employment.  She sat facing him across his desk.  In the course of the  
conversation he asked her whether she had a boyfriend, and how long she and  
her boyfriend had been involved with one another.  From there he proceeded to  
suggest that she accompany him one evening to supper and drinks.  She replied  
that she would do this if her boyfriend was also invited.  The conversation then  
took a somewhat inappropriate turn with Mr Collier asking what she would do if  
he asked her to sit on his lap.  Her reply to this was that she did not need to sit  
on his lap, as there were chairs on which to sit. 
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At this point, Mr Collier got up and moved around the desk.  The Applicant  
initially thought that he was going to switch on a television set in the corner of the  
office, but then realised that this was not so.  She thereupon stood up, and  
turned to find him standing at the door, holding the door handle.  Mr Collier came  
towards the Applicant, and kissed her on the neck.  She pushed him away from  
her, and left the office. 
At about 14h00 that same day she returned to the office to discuss and voice her displeasure at  
the incident that had occurred.  Mr Collier was not particularly sympathetic, indicating that he did  
not understand her difficulty and that it was not a situation of him having thrown her on top of the  
table.  He then gave her an ultimatum, namely that before she left work that afternoon she had to  
indicate to him whether she was “ out or in ”.  She interpreted this to mean that she had to tell Mr  
Collier whether she was prepared to accept his advances or not.  This is a fair interpretation on  
the conversation that occurred ­ the utterance occurred in the course of a discussion concerning  
what had transpired that morning.   The request that she must tell him whether she was “ out or in ” 
could not have meant that she should decide whether she wanted to be employed or not ­ she  
had already been appointed three days earlier.   It was probably intended to ascertain how she  
would in future react to further amorous advances. 
Mr Collier again called her into his office at the end of the day, and enquired whether she had  
decided on the issue raised.   She stated that she was not “ in”.   He then enquired why, in that  
event, he should keep her in his employ.   He thereupon picked up an envelope that had been  
lying on his desk, with her name on it, and handed it to the Applicant. It contained the equivalent  
of two days’ salary.  Mr Collier then said that other secretaries had been reporting on the work

that she had been doing and that it was clear to him that she was not fit for the job.   She was  
thereupon dismissed. 
The above facts indicate, in my view, that she was dismissed because she was  
not prepared to accept Mr Collier’s advances.  There had been no complaints  
about her performance in the days preceding her dismissal, and the raising of the  
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complaint after she had indicated that she was not prepared to make herself  
sexually available to Mr Collier, makes it implausible that the concerns he raised  
about her suitability for the job were genuine ones.  
I turn to consider the relief which should be granted to the Applicant. 
Following her dismissal, Applicant took certain tranquilising medication for a  
period of 6 months.  She stated in evidence that the entire episode has made her  
apprehensive in the job interview and recruitment situation, especially where a  
male is doing the interviewing and recruiting.  She has since found employment  
with a large insurance company, which expires shortly, although she does have  
the prospect of further work thereafter. 
The legislature has decreed that certain categories of dismissal are automatically  
unfair and has, in Section 194(3), provided for compensation, in the case of such  
dismissals, considerably in excess of that which may be awarded in the case of  
other dismissals.   The legislature’s clear purpose is the eradication of the seven  
categories of automatically unfair dismissal laid down in Section 187(1) of the  
Labour Relations Act, and the protection of workers against such dismissal.  The  
compensation which, in terms of the Act, may be awarded in the case of an  
automatically unfair dismissal obviously have a punitive and preventative  
element.  Employers who subject employees to this form of dismissal face the  
dire consequences intended by the legislature.  I believe that a tribunal, when  
fixing compensation in the case of an automatically unfair dismissal, should bear  
these policy considerations in mind and attempt to give effect to them.  
The instant matter illustrates precisely the type of situation which the legislature  
has so firmly set its face against.  An employee was sexually victimised and lost  
her employment as a consequence of such victimisation.  It matters not that the  
employment from which she was dismissed was of short duration.  Newly

employment from which she was dismissed was of short duration.  Newly  
appointed and long established employees are equally vulnerable in situations of  
sexual harassment, and therefore equally deserving of protection. 
The calculating manner in which Mr Collier effected the Applicant’s dismissal, in  
the instant matter, is an aggravating circumstance.  His actions were not  
performed unthinkingly and in the heat of the moment.  Having been rebuffed by  
the Applicant on the morning of 23 June, he did not allow the matter to rest but  
persisted with his advances in the two conversations that took place that  
afternoon. When the Applicant made clear that his attentions were not welcome,  
he dismissed her in a callous manner, and compounded the gravity of the  
situation by seeking to justify the dismissal on a false pretext. 
I view this conduct in a serious light, and can think of no reason why the  
Applicant should not be awarded the full 24 months compensation for which  
Section 194(3) provides.  
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The   Applicant   brings   a   separate   claim   for   damages   under   Section   50(1)(d)   and   (e)   of   the  
Employment   Equity   Act.     That   section   empowers   the   court   to   make   “ any   appropriate   order ” 
including “ awarding compensation in any circumstances contemplated in this Act ” and “ awarding 
damages in any circumstances contemplated in this Act ”.  The circumstances contemplated in the  
Act include the prohibition, in Section 6(1), that “ no person may unfairly discriminate, directly and  
indirectly,   against   an   employee   …   on   one   or   more   grounds   including   race,   gender,   sex,  
pregnancy …” .  This falls to be read with the qualification, in Section 6(3), which stipulates that  
“harassment of an employee is a form of unfair discrimination and is prohibited on any one, or a  
combination of grounds of unfair discrimination listed in subsection (1) ”.  
Section   50(1)   of   the   Equity   Employment   Act   requires   the   court   to   make   an   order   which   is  
appropriate.  The determination of appropriate relief requires that the court duly consider various  
interests, including the need to redress the wrong caused by the infringement, the deterrence of  
future violations, the dispensation of justice which is fair to all those who might be affected, and  
the   necessity   of   ensuring   that   the   order   can   be   complied   with.   ( Hoffmann   v   South   African  
Airways, (2000) 12 BLLR 1365 (CC)  at  para 45;   Fose v Minister of Safety & Security , (1997)  
7 BCLR 851 (CC)  at  para 38 ). 
In   the   assessment   of   damages   for   compensation   resulting   from   unfair   discrimination,   useful  
guidance is to be found in the case of  Alexander v Home Office , (1988) IRLR 190 (CA) , where  
the court said the following: 
“The objective of an award for unlawful racial discrimination is restitution.  For the injury  
to feelings, for the humiliation, for the insult, it is impossible to say what is restitution and

the   answer   must   depend   on   the   experience   and   good   sense   of   the   judge   and   his  
assessors.     Awards   should   not   be   minimal,   because   this   would   tend   to   trivialise   or  
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diminish respect for the public policy to which the Act gives effect.  On the other hand,  
just because it  is impossible  to  assess the monetary  value  of  injured feelings,  award  
should be  restrained.    To  award sums  which are generally  felt to  be excessive does  
almost as much harm to the policy and the result which it seeks as do nominal awards ”. 
Our courts should strive to achieve this balance.  On the one hand, awards should give effect to  
the qualities and purposes which underlie the anti­discriminatory measures in the Employment  
Equity Act.  An award should be sufficiently high to deter the defendant and other persons from  
similar behaviour in the future ­  Buthelezi v Poorter , 1975 (4) SA 608 (W)  at  617).  On the other  
hand, awards should not be so exorbitant or excessive that they induce a sense of shock, or lead  
to a situation where even litigants who have suffered minor consequences as a result of unfair  
discrimination reap financial benefits far in excess of what could, in any normal economic sense,  
be   regarded   as   their   loss.     There   is   good   reason   for   the   conservative   approach   traditionally  
adopted by our courts in assessing damages.  
There   have   not   been   many   cases   in   which   our   courts   have   considered   the   quantum   to   be  
awarded in sexual harassment claims. In  Intertech Systems (Pty) Ltd v Sowter , (1997) 18 ILJ  
689 (LAC)  am employee had resigned after being employed for 19 months.  The evidence before  
the court showed that she had been harassed in a sustained and continuous manner both in and  
away from the workplace.   She had been subjected to unwanted telephone calls, unwelcome  
visits   to   her   home,   to   being   followed   while   driving   her   car,   to   attempted   and   actual   physical  
intrusions upon her person, and to unwelcome declarations of affection towards her.   She was

intrusions upon her person, and to unwelcome declarations of affection towards her.   She was  
awarded   R92   088,00   but   the   award   was   intended   to   encompass   certain   items   of   special  
damages,   including   medical   expenses   of   R36   733,49   which,   although   incurred,   could   not   for  
causal reasons be attributed to the employer.  
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In  Ntsabo v Real Security CC ,  (2003) 24 ILJ 2341 (LC),  the applicant, a 34 year old mother, had  
been   subjected   to   sexual   harassment   by   her   supervisor   for   most   of   the   7   months   of   her  
employment.   This   had   consisted   of   him   frequently   touching   her   breasts,   buttocks   and   genital  
area.    There  was one  incident of  simulated  intercourse  by  the  supervisor,  culminating  in  him  
ejaculating   on   her   uniform.     As   a   result   of   this   harassment   she   had   undergone   a   character  
change, become intolerant towards her family, developed fears of sleeping alone, experienced  
nightmares   of   rape,   suffered   from   regular   headaches   and   loss   of   appetite,   developed   an  
extremely   negative   self­image   and   formed   suicidal   tendencies   and   acute   psychological  
symptoms.  She was awarded R50 000,00 for general damages.  
In   Grobler v Naspers Beperk & Another ,  (2004) 25 ILJ 439 (C) , the plaintiff had, over a 7  
month period, been sexually harassed by a trainee manager, one Samuels.   Samuels’ conduct  
included attempting to kiss her, touching her, making intimate suggestions to her, following her  
when she went to the toilet and, on one occasion, getting into her car and attempting to force her,  
at gunpoint, to have sex with him.  He had written numerous intimate letters, asked her to marry  
him, fondled her and threatened to have her two children killed should she report his harassing  
activities.  She was awarded R150 000,00 as general damages. 
These award exhibit a measure of inconsistency, but is appropriate to bear in mind that awards  
by   other   courts   in   comparable   cases   serve   as   no   more   than   a   guideline   ( Van   der   Berg   v  
Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd , 2001 (2) SA 242 (SCA)  at  260;   Nydoo v Bengtas , 1965  
(1) SA 1 (A)  at  19;   Kennel Union of SA v Park , 1981 (1) SA 714 (C)  at  732).   The court is, in

each   case,   required   to   determine   the   appropriate   amount   in   the   light   of   the   evidence   in   the  
circumstances before it, and should not rigidly adopt or apply amounts which other courts have  
considered appropriate. 
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It would also be unwise to attempt an exhaustive list of the factors to be taken  
into account.  These would include the duration, extent and frequency of the  
harassment, the extent to which the acts of harassment are blatant and intrusive,  
the arrogance and maliciousness attributable to the harassing party, and the  
consequences to the victim, but these are by no means the only factors which  
could play a role.
In the instant case, I consider it relevant that a substantial amount is also to be  
awarded to the Applicant in terms of Section 194 of the Labour Relations Act.  
The collateral source rule requires that I take into account that the same act of  
harassment constitutes an automatically unfair dismissal, and a contravention of  
Section 6 of the Employment Equity Act, and that a separate and substantial sum  
of compensation is to be paid to the Applicant in respect of the former.  
In addition, I take into account that the acts complained of all occurred on the  
same day and within a short space of time, that the only direct physical advance  
was Mr Collier’s attempt to kiss Applicant on her neck, and that there is no  
evidence before me of any particularly severe psychological trauma or  
consequences. 
Bearing all of the aforegoing in mind, I am of the view that an amount of 
R10 000,00 would fairly represent the compensation to which the Applicant is  
entitled in terms of Section 50 of the Employment Equity Act. 
The Respondent is accordingly ordered to pay the Applicant: 
[1] The sum of R48 000,00 in terms of Section 194(3) of the Labour Relations  
Act; 
[2] The sum of R10 000,00 in terms of Section 50 of the Employment Equity  
Act; 
[3] Interest on the said amounts from date of judgment to date of payment at  
the rate laid down in the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act; 
[4] The Applicant’s costs of suit. 
_____________________
A C OOSTHUIZEN A.J.
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DATE OF HEARING: 17­02­2005
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25­02­05
APPEARANCE
FOR THE APPLICANT: MR K. ALLEN
INTSRUCTED BY: N. ALLEN ATTORNEYS
FOR THE RESPONDENT
NO APPEARANCE
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