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S v Lebopa (390/96) [1997] ZASCA 31 (27 March 1997)

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Criminal Law
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Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Murder — Common purpose — Appellant convicted of murder as part of a robbery gone wrong — Appellant and co-accused engaged in a robbery where one co-accused fatally shot an accomplice — Appellant's knowledge of the plan and subsequent actions indicated foresight of potential fatal consequences — Appellant's conviction upheld on appeal.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This matter concerned a criminal appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against a conviction for murder, arising from an armed robbery incident in which a member of the robbing group was shot and killed by one of the robbers.


The appellant, Heavystone Lebopa, had been accused 2 in the regional court trial. The respondent was the State. The appellant’s younger brother was accused 1, and Frans Mnguni was accused 3.


In the regional court (South-Transvaal), all three accused were convicted of murder and robbery and each was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on each count. Accused 1 was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. The appellant appealed to the Transvaal Provincial Division against his murder conviction and against both sentences of 10 years, but the appeal was dismissed, as was his petition for leave to appeal further. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal with leave of the Chief Justice, but only against the murder conviction.


The general subject matter of the dispute was whether the appellant, who did not fire the fatal shots, was nonetheless guilty of murder on the basis of common purpose, given the circumstances of the armed robbery and the appellant’s alleged foresight of lethal consequences.


Material Facts


It was common cause that on 4 February 1994 at approximately 18:00, the appellant was part of a group of four who went to a sports ground in Actonville (East Rand) with the purpose of committing robbery. The group consisted of the appellant, accused 1, accused 3, and a fourth person referred to in the judgment as “the deceased” (who was a member of the group and later became the person killed).


It was also common cause that the group saw a motor vehicle parked under trees with occupants inside and decided to rob them. The deceased initially had a loaded .22 pistol with two rounds, while accused 1 had a toy revolver. The appellant knew that these weapons were in the group’s possession. Shortly before reaching the vehicle, the weapons were produced and exchanged, with accused 1 taking possession of the loaded pistol and the deceased taking the toy revolver.


Two robbers approached the driver’s side and two the passenger side. The occupants—a male complainant (“the complainant”) and a female complainant (“the complainant’s companion”)—were removed from the vehicle. It was common cause that the complainant and the deceased became involved in a physical struggle some distance from the vehicle, and that the complainant initially began to gain the upper hand. It was further common cause that accused 1 then went to assist the deceased.


According to the complainant (whose evidence the court treated as credible on key aspects), accused 1 was aggressive, struck him on the head with the pistol, and then, in a loud voice, ordered the other three young men to move away, adding words to the effect: “let me shoot this man.” The complainant then heard two shots, after which the deceased fell. It was not in dispute that the deceased was shot and killed by accused 1. Accused 1 then pointed the firearm at the complainant and ordered him to stand still, but the complainant ran away. The complainant testified that these events occurred in clear daylight.


The evidence indicated that accused 3 stayed near the vehicle and kept watch over the complainant’s companion during the struggle and shooting. The material factual uncertainty for purposes of the appeal was what the appellant did during the struggle and at the moment of the shooting, and whether he had in any way withdrawn from the common enterprise.


On this aspect, the complainant’s companion gave a version that differed from the other witnesses. She alleged that before the complainant fought with the deceased, the complainant struck the appellant, causing the appellant to run away from the scene. The court noted that neither the complainant nor the appellant nor the other accused supported this version. The court also considered that, on the companion’s own evidence, the appellant must have remained in the vicinity (and thus not disappeared entirely), because after the shooting accused 1 called the appellant to come and help carry the deceased, and the appellant approached.


The complainant could not state precisely where the appellant or accused 3 was when the shots were fired, explaining that he was shocked at that stage. He did not see what the appellant did immediately before the shooting, but stated that the appellant was “also there.” The court treated the complainant’s limited observation on this point as understandable given his involvement in a violent struggle.


As to events after the shooting, accused 1 testified that he left the appellant and accused 3 with the complainant’s companion while he assisted the deceased; and he confirmed calling the appellant after the shooting to help carry the deceased. Accused 1 added that the appellant first went to take money from the complainant’s companion shortly before helping carry the deceased. The complainant’s companion testified that it was accused 3 who took her money, not the appellant. However, accused 3 supported accused 1’s version that it was the appellant, and the appellant himself admitted that he took the companion’s money after the shooting and helped accused 1 carry the deceased away.


The court considered it significant that the appellant did not claim that he ever left the scene or distanced himself from the events. Taking the evidence as a whole, the court held that it could not be found that the appellant had withdrawn from the events; and that by taking money after the shooting and helping carry the deceased away, the appellant associated himself with the preceding conduct of accused 1.


Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the appellant’s conviction for murder could be sustained where the fatal shots were fired by accused 1, but the appellant had participated in the robbery and remained associated with the group.


More specifically, the court was required to determine whether, on the facts found proved, the appellant had the required mens rea for murder under the doctrine of common purpose, namely whether he subjectively foresaw the possibility that death might result from conduct undertaken in pursuit of the common enterprise and nonetheless persisted, reconciled to that outcome.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal principles to fact, involving inferential reasoning about the appellant’s state of mind (foresight and recklessness) from the proved circumstances, including his knowledge of the firearm, what he likely heard and perceived at the scene, and his conduct before and after the shooting. It also involved a measure of evaluative judgment in determining what inferences were justified as the only reasonable inferences from the evidence accepted.


A further issue, addressed explicitly by the court, was whether foresight of death extended beyond the possible killing of a victim to include the possibility that a co-perpetrator (here, the deceased who was part of the group) could be killed in the course of an armed robbery, including in circumstances akin to a shooting affray.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that it was proved that the appellant was a participant in a common purpose to rob and that the deceased was killed by a co-perpetrator (accused 1) during the execution of that purpose. The decisive remaining enquiry was whether the appellant had the necessary mens rea for murder.


In dealing with mens rea, the court referred to authority indicating that in a case of this nature the relevant mental state is that which existed when the accused initially embarked on the robbery, while recognising that subsequent conduct may provide an evidential basis to infer what the accused’s state of mind was at the outset. The court considered that the appellant’s conduct after the shooting—particularly his admission that he took money from the complainant’s companion and helped carry the deceased away—supported the conclusion that he did not disassociate from the robbery and instead aligned himself with what had occurred.


The court accepted the complainant’s evidence as credible that accused 1 had given a warning ordering the other participants to move away and stating an intention to shoot the complainant. It found it unlikely that the appellant was too far away to hear this warning, and it considered it improbable that accused 1 would order his companions to move away if they were already far from the scene. From this, the court inferred that the appellant must have heard the warning and therefore became aware, at least at that point, that accused 1 intended to shoot. Despite that, the appellant did nothing to dissuade accused 1 and did not withdraw from the enterprise.


The appellant’s testimony that the firearm was taken merely to frighten possible victims was evaluated against the broader factual matrix. The court reasoned that, on the appellant’s version, accused 1’s expressed intention to shoot would have been a significant shock; yet the appellant did not claim to have been shocked and his post-shooting conduct contradicted the notion of surprise or repudiation. The court therefore held that the inference was unavoidable that from the start the appellant appreciated that the firearm was taken to overcome resistance and that shooting might occur if necessary.


The court then addressed the scope of foresight. It reasoned that the appellant must have foreseen not only that a victim might be shot, but also that potential victims could themselves be armed, leading to an exchange of gunfire in which anyone present could be hit. The court relied on evidence indicating the prevalence of firearms in the relevant area, including accused 3’s statement that in the location any person might possess a firearm, as supporting the inference that an armed confrontation was a foreseeable risk in the execution of the planned robbery.


Having set out these factual and inferential conclusions, the court applied the doctrine of common purpose as articulated in prior authority: where one participant in the execution of the common purpose performs the act causing death, and the other participants have the requisite mens rea, then as a matter of legal policy the act causing death is treated as the act of all participants. The court emphasised that the liability is not purely vicarious; it turns on each participant’s own subjective foresight and recklessness in persisting.


On the mens rea test, the court applied the approach that the State must prove that the appellant foresaw (not merely ought to have foreseen) the possibility that a co-perpetrator might commit the lethal act in pursuit of the common purpose, and that the appellant persisted, reckless as to whether death occurred. In this context the court considered whether foresight had to extend to the possibility that a member of the robbing group might be killed, not only a victim. Drawing on authority dealing with similar fact patterns in which robbers foresee a desperate gun battle and accept the possibility that anyone, including a confederate, might be killed, the court concluded that the appellant did foresee that possibility.


The court held that, in the circumstances, the only reasonable inference was that the appellant planned and executed the robbery with dolus eventualis in the sense of dolus indeterminatus, namely that he foresaw the possibility that any person involved in or in the vicinity of the robbery could be killed in gunfire or crossfire, and he was reckless as to who might die. The fact that accused 1 warned his companions to stand aside before shooting was treated as indicative that at least accused 1 at that stage foresaw the possibility of hitting one of them; and the court held that this was a possibility the appellant not only should have foreseen but in fact did foresee, rejecting the appellant’s denial as not credible in light of the proved facts.


On this reasoning, the court concluded that the requirements for murder liability under common purpose were satisfied, and that the appellant was properly convicted of murder.


Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.


The appellant’s conviction for murder remained in place. No separate costs order is recorded in the judgment (consistent with criminal appeal practice as reflected in the text provided).


Cases Cited


S v Shaik and Others 1983(4) SA 57(A).


S v Petersen 1989(3) SA 420 (A).


S v Daniëls en 'n Ander 1983(3) SA 275(A).


S v Safatsa and Others 1988(1) SA 868(A).


S v Malinga and Others 1963(1) SA 692 (A).


S v Madlala 1969(2) SA 637 (A).


S v Nkombani and Another 1963(4) SA 877(A).


S v Nhlapo and Another 1981(2) SA 744(A).


S v Mtshiza 1970(3) SA 747(A).


S v Mavhungu 1981(1) SA 56(A).


Legislation Cited


No legislation is cited in the text of the judgment provided.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court are cited in the text of the judgment provided.


Held


The court held that the appellant was a participant in a common purpose to commit robbery, that the death of the deceased was caused by a co-perpetrator (accused 1) in the execution of that purpose, and that the appellant had the requisite mens rea for murder because he subjectively foresaw the possibility of fatal consequences during the armed robbery, including the possibility that a co-perpetrator could be killed, and nonetheless persisted in the enterprise.


The court further held that the appellant did not withdraw from the common purpose; his conduct during and after the shooting, including taking money from the complainant’s companion and helping carry the deceased away, demonstrated continued association with the robbery and supported the inference of foresight and recklessness.


Accordingly, the murder conviction was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that under common purpose, where one participant performs the act that causes death in furtherance of the common enterprise, and the other participants have the requisite mens rea, the act causing death is attributed to all participants as a matter of legal policy. The judgment treated this as dependent on proof of each participant’s own mental state, rather than as purely vicarious liability.


The judgment applied the principle that the required mens rea in this setting is established where the accused foresaw (subjectively, not negligently) the possibility that a co-perpetrator might commit the lethal act in the course of executing the common purpose, and the accused persisted, reckless as to whether death would result. The judgment recognised that such foresight may be proved by inference from the proved facts, including the accused’s conduct before and after the fatal event.


The judgment applied the principle that later conduct indicating association with what occurred during the execution of a robbery may support an inference that the accused had foreseen the possibility of death and was reckless as to that outcome. In addition, the judgment applied the concept of dolus indeterminatus (as a form of dolus eventualis) to the effect that, in an armed robbery context, foresight may extend to the possibility that any person involved in or near the scene—including co-perpetrators—may be killed in a firearm confrontation or crossfire, and that acceptance of this risk can ground liability for murder under common purpose.

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[1997] ZASCA 31
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S v Lebopa (390/96) [1997] ZASCA 31 (27 March 1997)

DIE HOOGSTE HOF VAN APP
L VAN SUID-AFRIKA
Saaknommer: 390/96
In die saak tussen:
HEAVYSTONE LEBOPA
Appellant
DIE STAAT
Respondent
Coram: F H GROSSKOPF OLIVIER et SCOTT ARR
Verhoordatum: 20 Maart 1997
Leweringsdatum:
27 Maart 1997
2
UITSPRAAK F H GROSSKOPF AR:
Die appellant was beskuldigde 2 tydens die verhoor in die streekhof vir die afdel
ng Suid-Transvaal. Sy jonger broer was beskuldigde 1 en ene Frans Mnguni was beskuldigde 3. Al drie is aan sowel moord as roof skuldig
bevind en tot 10 jaar gevangenisstraf op elkeen van die aanklagte gevonnis. Beskuldigde 1 is ook aan die onwettige besit van 'n vuurwapen
skuldig bevind.
Die appellant het na die Transvaalse Provinsiale Afdel
ng geappelleer teen sy skuldigbevinding aan moord en teen die twee vonnisse van 10 jaar elk wat hom opgel
is. Sy app
l is van die hand gewys en so ook sy aansoek om verlof om na hierdie hof te appelleer. Hy appelleer nou met die verlof van die Hoofregter,
maar slegs teen sy skuldigbevinding aan moord.
Die appellant was een van 'n bende van vier. Dit is gemene saak dat hulle op 4 Februarie 1994 om ongeveer 18:00 na 'n sportterrein
in
3
Actonville aan die Oos-Rand gegaan het met die oogmerk om te roof. Die groep het bestaan uit die appellant, sy twee mede-beskuldigdes
en 'n vierde persoon ("die oorledene"). Hulle het 'n motor op die terrein onder bome sien staan en opgemerk dat daar mense
in die motor was. Hulle het toe besluit om die insittendes te beroof. Dit is gemene saak dat die oorledene 'n gelaaide .22 pistool
met twee patrone by hom gehad het terwyl beskuldigde 1 'n speelgoed rewolwer gehad het. Die appellant het goed geweet dat hulle hierdie
wapens by hulle gehad het. Kort voordat hulle by die motor aangekom het, is die wapens te voorskyn gehaal en omgeruil sodat beskuldigde
1 toe die gelaaide pistool gehou het en die oorledene die speelgoed rewolwer. Twee van die rowers het na die bestuurder se deur gegaan
en twee na die passasiersdeur. Die twee insittendes is toe uit die voertuig gehaal. Dit was 'n man ("die klaer") en 'n
yrou ("die klaagster"). Dit is gemene saak dat die klaer en die oorledene 'n ent van die motor af handgemeen geraak het.
Volgens die klaer het hulle digby die motor gestoei, maar
4
volgens die beskuldigdes het die klaer 'n ent weggehardloop voordat die oorledene hom ingehaal het en hulle twee begin baklei het.
Dit is gemene saak dat die klaer die oorhand in die geveg begin kry het en dat beskuldigde 1 toe vir die oorledene gaan help het.
Volgens die klaer was beskuldigde 1 baie aggressief en het hy hom drie keer met die pistool oor die kop geslaan sodat hy later elf
hegsteke vir die beserings aan sy kop moes kry. Die klaer het daarna gehoor hoe
beskuldigde 1 "in 'n harde stem
vir die ander drie jong mans gelas
om weg te beweeg" van hulle af, waarop beskuldigde 1 bygevoeg het: "laat ek hierdie man skiet". Die klaer s
hy het twee skote gehoor waarna die oorledene geval het. Dit is nie in geskil nie dat die oorledene daar deur beskuldigde 1 doodgeskiet
is. Beskuldigde 1 het toe die vuurwapen op die klaer gerig en hom gelas om te bly staan, maar die klaer het weggehardloop. Hierdie
gebeure het volgens die klaer in helder daglig plaasgevind.
Dit blyk uit die getuienis dat beskuldigde 3 gedurende die
5
bakleiery en skietery vir die klaagster by die motor opgepas het. Die vraag is egter wat die appellant gedoen het terwyl die stoeiery
tussen die klaer en die oorledene voortgeduur het, en toe die skietery plaasgevind het.
Die klaagster se getuienis omtrent die appellant se optrede en sy teenwoordigheid op die toneel verskil van di
van die ander getuies. Volgens die klaagster het die klaer nog voor sy geveg met die oorledene eers vir die appellant met die vuis
geslaan. Dit het volgens haar tot gevolg gehad dat die appel
ant toe van die toneel weggehardioop het. N
g die klaer n
g die appellant en die ander beskuldigdes steun hierdie weergawe van die klaagster. Die klaagster se verdere getuienis bevestig trouens
dat die appellant na die skietery op die toneel moes gewees het, want toe beskuldigde 1 die appellant geroep het om hom te kom help
om die oorledene te dra, het die appellant volgens die klaagster nader gestap. Selfs op die klaagster se getuienis het die appellant
dus nie totaal van die toneel verdwyn nie.
6
Die klaer kon nie s
presies waar d
e appellant of beskuldigde 3 was toe beskuldigde 1 die skote afgevuur het nie. Die klaer verduidelik dat hy in ieder geval op daardie
stadium baie geskok was. Die klaer het ook nie gesien wat die appellant kort voor die skietery gedoen het nie, maar volgens hom was
die appellant "ook daar". Dit moet in gedagte gehou word dat die klaer in 'n geveg om lewe en dood betrokke was en dat
hy nie verkwalik kan word as hy nie behoorlik gekyk het wat presies die ander rowers besig was om te doen nie.
Volgens beskuldigde 1 het hy die appellant en beskuldigde 3 by die klaagster gelos terwyl hyself die oorledene gaan help het. Hy bevestig
die klaagster se getuienis dat hy na die skietery vir die appellant geroep het om hom te kom help om die oorledene te dra. Hy voeg
by dat die appellant trouens eers gou geld by die klaagster gaan vat net voordat die appellant hom gehelp het om die oorledene weg
te dra. Volgens die klaagster was dit beskuldigde 3 wat haar geld gevat het, en nie die appellant nie. Beskuldigde 3 beaam egter
beskuldigde 1 se
7
weergawe dat dit die appellant was wat die klaagster se geld gaan vat het, en die appellant self bevestig dit ook.
Dit is egter van belang te kyk wat die appellant self omtrent sy optrede direk voor en na die skietery s
. Hy beweer nie dat hy op enige stadium die toneel verlaat het of dat hy homself van die gebeure gedistansieer het nie.
In die lig van al die getuienis kan daar na my oordeel nie bevind word dat die appellant hom op enige s
adium aan die gebeure onttrek het nie. Die appellant erken trouens dat hy na die skietery die klaagster se geld gevat het en beskuldigde
1 gehelp het om die oorledene weg te dra. Hy het hom gevolglik met die voorafgaande optrede van beskuldigde 1 vereenselw
g.
Die appellant se optrede voor en na die skietery is ook van belang vir sover dit lig mag werp op sy mens rea. Volgens S v Shaik and
Others 1983(4) SA 57(A) op 62H moet daar in 'n geval soos hierdie bepaal word wat d
e appellant se geestesgesteldheid was toe hy hom
8
aanvanklik op die rooftog begewe het. Maar sy optrede na die voorval
kan wel aanduidend wees van sy geestesgesteldheid voor die tyd. In S
v Petersen 1989(3) SA 420 (A) is daar soos volg op 425E-F beslis:
"Nou is dit so dat, in gevalle waar twee persone deelneem aan 'n roof, en die een van hulle in die loop van die aanranding die
slagoffer dodelik verwond, en die ander daama optree op 'n wyse wat daarop dui dat hy hom vereenselwig met wat gebeur het, sodanige
latere optrede dikwels aangewend kan word as die grondslag van 'n afleiding dat hy die moontlikheid voorsien het dat die slagoffer
gedood kon word en onverskillig daarteenoor gestaan het."
Dit blyk uit die appellant se eie getuienis dat hy gesien het hoe beskuldigde 1 die oorledene tydens sy geveg met die klaer probeer
help het. Die appellant getuig verder dat hy 'n skoot gehoor het en gesien het hoe die oorledene op die grond val. Die appellant
is ongelukkig gladnie uitgevra oor beskuldigde 1 se waarskuwing nie. Na my mening moet dit egter op grond van die klaer se geloofwaardige
getuienis aanvaar word dat beskuldigde 1 wel so 'n waarskuwing gegee het. Die blyk nie dat die appellant te ver weg was om die waarskuwing
te kon
9
hoor nie. Dit is ook onwaarskynlik dat beskuldigde 1 sy drie makkers sou gelas het om weg te beweeg as hulle reeds ver weg gestaan
het. Dit volg myns insiens dat die appellant die waarskuwing moes gehoor he
en dat hy dus daarvan bewus was dat beskuldigde 1 van voorneme was om die klaer te skiet. Nogtans het hy niks gedoen om beskuldigde
1 van sodanige optrede te laat afsien nie.
Volgens die appellant se getuienis het hulle die vuurwapen saamgevat net om moontlike slagoffers mee skrik te maak. Op sy weergawe
moes beskuldigde 1 se verklaarde voorneme om die klaer dood te skiet dus as 'n groot skok gekom het. Hy s
dit egter nie, en sy optrede na die skietery weerspreek dit. Na my oordeel is die afleiding onvermydelik dat die appellant van die
begin af besef het dat die vuurwapen saamgeneem word om enige weerstand van potensi
le slagoffers die hoof te bied en dat daar geskiet sal word as dit enigsins nodig mag word.
'n Verdere afleiding wat myns insiens noodwendig volg is dat die
10
appellant voorsien het dat potensi
le slagoffers moontlik self gewapen
mag wees en dat daar dan 'n oor-en-weer-skietery kan plaasvind waarin
enigiemand teenwoordig dodelik getref mag word. Die volgende brokkie
getuienis van beskuldigde 3 is veelseggend:
"Hoekom sou julle die vuurwapens saamvat?
—
Edelagbare, in die lokasie, enige persoon het 'n vuurwapen besit."
Teen die agtergrond van die voorgaande feite en bevindings moet beoordeel word of die appellant aan moord skuldig is.
InS v Dan
k cn 'n Ander 1983(3) SA 275(A) het Botha AR
soos volg op 323E-F beslis:
"Volgens my beskouing is die geldende regsposisie dat, waar een van die deelgenote tot 'n gemeenskaplike oogmerk die handeling
verrig wat die dood van die oorledene veroorsaak, en daar by die ander deelgenote die nodige mens rea aanwesig is, die handeling
van die een wat die dood veroorsaak, as 'n kwessie van regsbeleid, beskou word as die handeling van al die deelgenote".
(Vgl S v Safatsa and Others 1988(1) SA 868(A) op 900C-H.)
Na my mening staan dit vas dat die appellant 'n deelgenoot was tot 'n
11
gemeenskaplike oogmerk om te roof. Dit staan verder vas dat die dood van die oorledene veroorsaak is deur 'n ander deelgenoot, nl
beskuldigde 1. Die enigste oorblywende vraag is of die appellant die nodige mens rea gehad het.
In S v Malinga and Others 1963(1) SA 692 (A) het Holmes AR die vereiste mens rea soos volg op 694F-H beskryf:
"Now the liability of a socius criminis is not vicarious but
is based upon his own mens rea. The test is whether he foresaw
(not mere
y ought to have foreseen) the possibility that his socius
would commit the act in question in the prosecution of their
common purpose
In considering the issue of intention to kill, the test is whether the socius foresaw the possibility that the act in question in
the prosecution of the common purpose would have fatal consequences, and was reckless whether death resulted or not.
In both of the foregoing tests the foresight may of course be proved by inference; and remoteness of the possibility is relevant to
the subjective question of foresight thereof."
Daar kan ook verwys word na die volgende bekende passasie in die uitspraak van Holmes AR in S v Madlala 1969(2) SA 637 (A) op
12
640F-H:
"It is sometimes difficult to decide, when two accused are tried jointly on a charge of murder, whether the crime was committed
by one or the other or both of them, or by neither. Generally, and leaving aside the position of an accessory after the fact, an
accused may be convicted of murder if the killing was unlawful and there is proof -
(c) that he was a party to a common purpose to commit some other crime, and he foresaw the possibility of one or both of them
causing death to someone
in the execution of the plan, yet he persisted, reckless of such fatal consequence, and it occurred; ....". (Ek beklemtoon.)
Dit is myns insiens nie te betwyfel nie dat die appellant op die feite van die onderhawige saak wel die moontlikheid voorsien het
dat een van die bendelede in die uitvoering van die beplande rooftog 'n slagoffer kon doodskiet, maar dat die appellant nogtans volhard
het en hom met die moontlike intrede van so 'n gevolg versoen het. Dit vraag is egter of die appellant ook die moontlikheid voorsien
het dat een van die bendelede iemand anders, bv 'n mede-bendelid, kon doodskiet.
13
S v Nkombani and Another 1963(4) SA 877(A) is 'n geval waar
die feite in baie opsigte met di
van die onderhawige ooreenstem. Die
tw
ede appellant in daardie saak en 'n derde persoon het vuurwapens aan
die eerste appellant en die oorledene voorsien om garages te gaan
beroof. By die een garage het die eerste appellant en 'n werknemer by
die garage in 'n worsteling betrokke geraak terwyl die eerste appel
ant
'n pistool in sy regterhand gehad het. Die oorledene het die eerste
appellant gaan help. 'n Skoot uit die eerste appellant se pistool is
afgevuur en die oorledene is in die kop getref en hy het neergeval. Die
meerderheid van die hof het beslis dat beide appellante aan moord
skuldig is. Rumpff AR het onder andere soos volg in daardie saak
bevind:
"As die getuienis as 'n geheel in die onderhawige saak beoordeel word, is dit m.i. wel bewys dat Hung [die tweede appellant]
geweet het dat sy gewapende rowers in 'n desperate pistoolgeveg betrokke kon raak en dat in so 'n geveg nie alleen die polisie en
onskuldige omstanders geskiet kon word nie maar ook dat die een rower die ander kon raakskiet. Hy het geweet dat van die
14
slagoffers hulle kon verset en dat beide rowers tesame in 'n worsteling met een of meer slagoffers betrokke kon raak waarby pistoolskote
van die rowers enigeen betrokke by so 'n worsteling kon raakskiet." (891F-G.)
"Volgens die feite van die saak het Hung [die tweede appellant] vir sover dit die beoogde roofaanvalle op garages betref, op
die betrokke aand, na my mening, 'n dolus indeterminatus gehad, in die sin dat hy die moontlikheid voorsien het dat enige persoon
wat by 'n roofaanval betrokke sou wees of kon word, deur die pistole van die rowers gedood kon word en dat dit hom onverskillig was
wie so gedood mog word." (892A.)
Holmes AR het saamgestem en onder andere soos volg op 896A-B beslis:
"In all the circumstances I come to the conclusion that the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that he [d
e tweede appellant] foresaw the possibility of a shooting affray in which one of the henchmen might be hit by a bullet fired by the
other. In other words, as far as he was concerned, the shooting of the deceased can be regarded as an envisaged incident or episode
in the crime to which he was a party."
'n Soortgelyke standpunt is ingeneem in S v Nhlapo and Another 1981(2) SA 744(A). In daardie saak het gewapende rowers geweet dat
15
hulle gewapende wagte gaan aanval. Deesdae is vuurwapens egter so
vryelik bekombaar dat 'n rower insgelyks moet verwag dat sy slagoffer
weerstand met 'n vuurwapen kan bied. In Nhlapo se saak het Van
Heerden Wnd AR die posisie soos volg op 750H-751C gestel:
"As stressed by the trial Court, the robbers knew that they would have to attack and overpower guards who were armed for the
specific purpose of using their fire-arms to thwart any attempted robbery. It may be conceded that they hoped to overpower the guards
without a shot being fired by the latter, but they must have known that the guards would endeavour to use their fire-arms when attacked.
It follows that they must have known that their attack on the guards could lead to a gun battle during which anybody, be it a guard,
one of the robbers or an innocent bystander, might be killed in the envisaged cross-fire. Consequently they also foresaw the possibility
of one guard being killed by a shot fired in the direction of the robbers by another guard or, for that matter, a person such as
a staff member of Makro witnessing the attack. In sum, the only possible inference, in the absence of any negativing explanation
by the appellants, is that they planned and executed the robbery with dolus indeterminatus in the sense that they foresaw the possibility
that anybody involved in the robbers' attack, or in the immediate vicinity of the scene, could be killed by cross-fire."
16
(Kyk ook in die algemeen S v Mtshiza 1970(3) SA 747(A), S v Mavhungu 1981(1) SA 56(A), Snyman
Strafreg
3e uitgawe 204-209.)
Na my oordeel was die omstandighede in de onderhawige saak sodanig dat die afleiding onvermydelik is dat die appellant nie net die
moontlike dood van 'n slagoffer voorsien het nie, maar die moontlikheid dat enigeen op die terrein dodelik getref mag word as daar
'n skietgeveg tussen die partye sou losbars. Die feit dat beskuldigde 1 sy mede-rowers gewaarsku het om opsy te staan toe hy die
klaer wou skiet, toon myns insiens dat minstens hy op daardie stadium voorsien het dat hy een van sy makkers kon tref. Na my oordeel
is dit 'n moontlikheid wat ook die appellant nie slegs moes voorsien het nie, maar inderdaad voorsien het. Sy bewering tot die teendeel
in die loop van sy getuienis kan net nie waar wees nie.
Na my oordeel het die appellant dus met dolus eventualis in die sin van (van dolus indeterminatus gehandel en is hy skuldig aan moord.
17 Die app
l word van die hand gewys.
F H Grosskopf AR
Olivier AR
Scott AR Stem saam

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