Grupo Antolin (Pty) Ltd v Numsa (D 356/03) [2004] ZALC 63 (2 September 2004)

55 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Severance pay — Review of arbitration award — Applicant contesting obligation to pay four weeks' severance pay per year of service — Evidence presented by first respondent indicating prior employer's policy and assurances regarding severance pay — Commissioner finding in favor of first respondent based on unchallenged evidence — Review application dismissed as award not reviewable despite minor flaws.

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
SITTING IN DURBAN
Of Interest
          D356/03
  HEARD ON       2004/09/02
     
Date of judgment    2004/09/02 
In the matter between
GRUPO ANTOLIN (PTY) LTD                                                                    Applicant
and
NUMSA Respondents
                                                                                                                             
JUDGMENT DELIVERED BY
THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE PILLAY
ON 2 SEPTEMBER 2004  
                                                                                                                             
Mr. M.B. Pitman
Deneys Reitz
Mr. B. Purdon
Brett Purdon Attorneys
                                                                                                                             
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PILLAY J
[1] This   is   an   application   to   review   and   set   aside   the   award   of   the   third   respondent  
commissioner.   The issue in dispute was whether the applicant had to pay the members of the  
first respondent four or two weeks' severance pay.
[2] First   respondent   had   led   evidence   and   made   submissions   at   the   arbitration   that   the  
applicant had to pay four weeks because:
(1) AECI,   the   previous   employer   and   owner   of   the   business   which   was   transferred   to   the  
applicant,  had informed  the  employees  when  they  were  employed  that  on  retrenchment  AECI  
would pay them four weeks' severance pay per year of service or  pro rata  a part of a year.
(2) AECI had, in fact, paid severance pay at the rate of four weeks per year to employees  
previously retrenched.
(3) AECI had assured the first respondent's members that, on transfer to the applicant, the  
following applied:
"Current employee benefits will remain in place for the employees concern.   There will be no severance  
pay (retrenchment benefit) unless the employees are retrenched."
And:
"Should the need arise for employees to be retrenched, the company retrenchment policy will  be followed."
3) Mr  Piero   Rossi,   the   Managing   Director   of   the   applicant,   had   assured   the   first  
respondent's   members   that,   in   the   event   of   retrenchment,   the   AECI's   policy   will  
apply.
(4) The first respondent's organizer testified that four weeks' severance pay per year of service  
would have been negotiated at national level and become part of the terms and conditions of  
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employment.
[3] The first respondent's members who were retrenched were paid retrenchment pay at the  
rate of two weeks per year of service according to the bargaining council agreement.
[4] The   applicant   led   no   evidence   at   the   arbitration,   despite   indicating   to   the   arbitrator   its  
intention to call Mr   Rossi to testify.  It is submitted therefore that it was the policy and the practice  
of AECI to pay four weeks' severance pay per year of service, which policy, on transfer of the  
business to the applicant, was assumed by  the latter.
[5] The review is brought on the ground that the commissioner did not apply her mind properly  
to the material before her.   The award is accordingly unjustifiable, it was submitted.   In order to  
succeed in their claim, the first respondent had to prove that its members had a right arising from  
contract or any other cause.
[6] Based on the only evidence before her, the commissioner found that the payment of four  
weeks was a term and condition of the applicant's employment for the three reasons set out in her  
award.     These   reasons   are   based   on   the   unchallenged   evidence   of   the   first   respondent  
summarised above.  
It was submitted that the commissioner ignored the evidence that it was the policy of the applicant  
to pay severance pay and failed to draw a distinction between policy and contract.  The arbitrator  
dealt with this issue as follows:
"Whilst I am alive to Mr   van Niekerk's argument that the applicants' witnesses made reference to 'policy', I  
am not of the view that this is fatal to their case.   I am required to make a determination based on the  
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evidence  as a whole  and I do not  consider myself confined  by the terminology  used by the witnesses  
herein."
[7] It is clear from this extract that the commissioner not only applied her mind to the distinction  
but also elected to deal with the dispute substantively without being distracted by terminology.  As  
it was not disputed that it was AECI's and later the applicant's policy to pay four weeks per year of  
service as severance pay, the applicant had accepted such an obligation.
[8] By presenting its policy thus, the first respondent and its members were entitled to rely on  
the representation and to expect that the applicant would act in terms of that policy.  If that were  
not the case, then the first respondent should have been told so that it could negotiate rates that  
were acceptable to it, if necessary.
[9] The commissioner misrecorded what Witness Pillay testified was said by Mr   Rossi.  Pillay  
had testified that Rossi had said that the AECI policy would apply.  Rossi had not made specific  
reference to severance pay of four weeks.  However, the misrecording is not fatal to the award.
[10] Although Malinga's evidence about the negotiations at national level did not read well from  
the transcript, his evidence that the national agreement became part of the terms and conditions  
of employment is unmistakable.   Besides, the commissioner had the benefit of observing him to  
understand him better.
[11] The award is not flawless.   However, it is not reviewable, for the reasons stated above.  
Because it is not flawless, the Court declines to make any special order of costs.
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[12] The order that I grant therefore is to dismiss the application with costs.
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Pillay D, J
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