Biggs v Rand Water (JS1480/01) [2002] ZALC 103; (2003) 24 ILJ 1957 (LC) (11 December 2002)

70 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Unfair dismissal — Discrimination based on race — Applicant employed under fixed-term contracts, applied for permanent position but was not appointed — Court finding that applicant was unfairly discriminated against on the basis of race, constituting an automatic unfair dismissal under section 187(f) of the Labour Relations Act — Compensation awarded for ten months' remuneration.

INTHE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT JOHANNESBURG
       Case  
No: JS 1480/01
In the matter between
YVETTE BIGGS Applicant
and
RAND WATER   Respondent
________________________________________________________
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
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REVELAS, J.    The applicant, Yvette Biggs, a white woman in her  
twenties, had been employed by the respondent as a Water Quantity  
Administrator   at   its   Head   Office   in   Glenvista   since   12   September  
2000.  Her position was not permanent and her employment contract  
was renewed from time to time.

During May 2001 the position of the applicant’s became permanent  
and she applied for that position.  In other words, she applied for her  
own   post   of   Water   Quality   Administrator   which   she   had   filled   for  
almost a year.
On   12   September   2001   she   was   notified   that   her   application   was  
unsuccessful.  The person who successfully applied for the position of  
Water Quality Administrator was a black woman who was an existing  
employee of the respondent, and employed in a different department.
The applicant’s case is that she was automatically unfairly dismissed  
in terms of section 187(f) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the  
LRA) and Section 6 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (the  
EEA) in that she was unfairly discriminated against by the respondent  
on the basis of her race.  The relief she seeks is compensation.
The respondent had an affirmative action policy in place and in terms  
of   it   the   affirmative   action   process   applied   to   “all   women”   and  
according to the applicant she fell within a designated group and the  
policy equally applied to her.
The respondent’s case is firstly, that the employment contract between  
itself   and   the   applicant,   had   come   to   an   end   by   agreement.     The  
contract   signed   with   the   Scientific   Services   Department   of   the  
respondent recorded that her employment would terminate   from 18

October   2000.     Thereafter   until   the   post   became   permanent   the  
applicant’s contract was extended on a monthly basis so that she could  
assist with the “backlog  in administrative work”.
It   was   common   cause   between   the   parties   that   the   applicant   was  
dilligent,   competent   and   a   great   asset   in   the   department   where   she  
worked.
The respondent’s case is secondly, that in certain respects the black  
woman Ms Mahlala was more suitable for the position as she had an  
“N5 certification” and the applicant only had matric.   Further, since  
the demographics of the relevant band within the department reflected  
that mostly white women were employed, it was fair to appoint Ms  
Thlaleng Mahlala to the position.
The   Respondent   in   its   answer   to   the   applicant’s   statement   of   case,  
stated that the reason for not appointing the applicant was due to the  
application and employment equity endeavours.   It stated that it had  
sought to appoint a person competent to perform in the position while  
taking into consideration the spirit of the  EEA.  In paragraph 19 of its  
response   the   respondent   “denies   that   the   Applicant   was   the   best  
candidate”   and   suggested   that   she   and   Ms   Mahlala   were   equally  
competent but stated that they do not have the “same qualifications,  
skills and experience.”

The evidence lead by the applicant and her witnesses and which was  
not   dented   by   the     cross­examination,   strongly   suggests   that   the  
applicant had a legitimate expectation to be appointed and therefore  
established a dismissal for the purposes of section 186(b) of the LRA.  
During the ten month period when the applicant worked in terms of  
the several fixed term contracts which were extended continuously,  
she   underwent  training  and   induction.    She  was  supported  in  these  
endeavours by her line manager, Ms Anne Vincente who also gave  
evidence at the trial.  She was called by the respondent.  According to  
Mrs   Vincente’s   evidence,   she   recommended   to   the   panel   that   the  
applicant be appointed because the applicant introduced systems and  
procedures   as   a   water   quality   assistant   to   the   extent   that   she   came  
inexpendable.  
I   gained   the   very   strong   impression   that   the   applicant   changed   the  
functional content of her position into one which was quite different  
and   more   effective   than   it   was   when   she   was   appointed.     Ms  
Vincente’s   evidence   was   that   through   her   good   performance,   the  
applicant created systems and procedures to such an extent that the  
respondent   identified   an   absolute   need   for   the   creation   of   the  
permanent   position.     The   respondent’s   contentions   that   she   mainly  
assisted   with   the   backlog   (the   respondent’s   statement   of   case)   is  
completely incorrect.
  
Plainly, the applicant discharged the arms of proving that her services

were terminated.  Based on all the facts and the continuous extensions  
of her contract she had a legitimate expectation that a proper and fair  
process   would   be   followed   and   fair   criteria   be   applied   when   she  
applied   for   the   existing   post   she   had   already   manned   so   very  
competently.   Her superiors ensured her that she was by far the best  
candidate.     The   respondent’s   denial   of   this   fact   is   facile   as   Ms  
Vincente’s evidence confirmed the evidence of the applicant in this  
regard.
Dr Kassan, the respondent’s General Manager, explained that he was  
compelled   to   employ   Ms   Mahlala   despite   the   interviewing  
committee’s recommendation that the applicant should be appointed.  
The compelling factor he says he   was obliged to take into account  
was the following sequential racial prefence:
1.

Black females
2. Black males
3. Indians
4. Coloureds
5. People with disabilities
6. White females
It appears that white  males are completely out of the question as they  
were   not   mentioned.     According   to   Dr   Kassan   the   demographics  
indicated that too many white females were appointed.
Ms  Vincente  confirmed that she  and Mr  Lubout, as  line managers,  
were   responsible   for   the   implementation   of   the   respondents  
affirmative action policies and they were members of the interviewing  
panel.  Dr Hassan overruled the interviewing panel’s recommendation  
that the panel appoint the applicant, without even  meeting her or Ms  
Mahlala or the other candidate and without weighing up various other  
factors.   Important considerations were the candidates   qualifications  
and     experience.   The   fact   that   the   applicant   would   become  
unemployed   due   to   his   decision   and   Ms   Mahlala   already   had   a  
position with the respondent when she applied, should also have been  
considered.
   The written motivation   memo of the interviewing panel had gone  
missing and could not be found despite dilligent searches.   This was  
according   to   the   respondent’s   legal   advisor   who   was   called   by   the

respondent to testify. 
 
According   to   the   Respondent’s   Equity   consultant,   the   targets   for  
appointing  designated group of employees had not yet been reached.  
The need for racial transformation in this country and the objects and  
aims of the EEA is trite and need not be set out in any detail in this  
judgment. 
The applicant  was  treated  unfairly  in  more  than  one way.     Section  
186(b)   was   included   in   the   LRA   to   prevent   the   unfair   practice   of  
keeping   an   employee   in   a   position   on   a   temporary   basis   without  
employment   security   until   it  suits   the   employer   to   dismiss   such   an  
employee without the unpleasant obligations imposed on employers  
by   the   LRA   in   respect   of   permanent   employees.     The   applicant’s  
situation   fell   squarely   with   the   purview   of   section   186(b).     In   this  
context,   Ms   Mahlala   who   already   had   a   job,   gained   another   at   the  
expense of the applicant.
The respondent did not furnish a written policy to support its view that  
it is entitled to discriminate between black and white females.   The  
applicant’s   case   is   that   no   provision   existed   for   the   preferential  
treatment   between   members   of   a   designated   group­in   this   case,  
females­within the respondent or the EEA.   The applicant also made  
the   point,   and   correctly   so,   that   Dr   Kassan’s   classification   and  
considerations   were   not   supported   by   any   collective   agreement   or

policy   document.     No   documentation   as   to   Ms   Mahlala’s  
qualifications were produced.
In   my   view   Dr   Kassan’s   conduct   in   overruling   the   panel’s  
recommendation without even meeting any of the candidates was so  
arrogant   that   it   could   not   justify   the   discrimination   which   he  
implemented.   The other employee shortlisted was Indian, according  
to Ms Vincente.
Basically   the   respondent’s   case   was   that   it   indeed   discriminated  
against the applicant,  but was legally entitled to do so,  because it had  
done so fairly.  This was of course not its case initially.  Then it had  
been that Ms Mahlala was more suitable and qualified for the position.  
The   respondent   used   the   applicant’s   skills,   initiative,   templates   and  
other methods with  which she created a fine post, only to put her out  
on the street and   replace her with a person Dr Kassan did not even  
interview.   He acted solely upon the names and race of the persons  
involved.  Such conduct is rationally not capable of being construed as  
fair discrimination.  If Dr Kassan’s method of appointing employees is  
to be accepted as fair then the applicant should have been advised not  
to   apply   or   the   advertisement   in   question   should   have   stated   that  
whites   and   indians     need   not   apply   for   the   position.     In   fact,   the  
applicant should have been dismissed long ago.
The applicant was turned down only because of her race in a process

which was devoid of any fairness   or foundation in the respondent’s  
policies.   The respondent failed to justify the discrimination against  
the applicant in terms of Section 2(2)(b) of Schedule 7 of the LRA.
The   applicant   sought   compensation.     To   award     her   the   maximum  
compensation, namely an amount equal to 24 months’ remuneration  
would not be realistic, since the applicant was only appointed for ten  
months.
In   the   circumstances   I   awarded   the   applicant   10   months’  
remuneration, and costs against the respondent.   
_______________
E. 
Revelas

Date of hearing: 24 October 2002
Date of judgment: 11 December 2002
For the applicant: Mr W. G. Jonker
For the respondent: Mr van As