Franken and Others v Molly Mop Cleaning Services CC (JS 501/01) [2002] ZALC 119 (12 February 2002)

65 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Dismissal — Unfair dismissal — Applicants claiming unfair dismissal after termination of services due to loss of cleaning contract — Respondent failing to consult adequately as required by Section 189 of the Labour Relations Act — Court finding dismissals both substantively and procedurally unfair — Respondent ordered to pay severance and notice pay to applicants.

Sneller Verbatim/MLS
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
BRAAMFONTEIN CASE NO: JS 501/01
12/02/2002
In the matter between
DOROTHEA FRANKEN & 17 OTHERS Applicant
and
MOLLY MOP CLEANING SERVICES CC Respondent
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J U D G M E N T
Delivered on 20 February 2002
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REVELAS J:
1. The respondent, Molly Mop Cleaning Services CC conducts  
business   in   the   cleaning   service   industry.       In   this  
case,   it   employed   several   cleaners   (approximately   55)  
and a supervisor and contracted their services to ABSA  
bank   in   Pretoria.       The   respondent   also   employed   an  
area manager, Ms Steyn.    For   many   years,   the  
respondent   managed   to   successfully   tender   for   a

cleaning contract with ABSA bank.
1. 1. 2. On 29 August 2000, the provincial property manager  
of ABSA wrote to Mr Von Landsberg of the respondent and  
advised him of the termination of the cleaning contract  
with   three   months'   notice.     The   respondent   was   also  
given   the   opportunity   to   tender   for   another   cleaning  
contract with ABSA.
3. On   30   October   2000   the   respondent   notified   to   its  
employees as follows:
"As you are aware, ABSA head office called for tenders and
gave us the opportunity to tender again for the cleaning
contract.
We hope that we might be successful. We, however, regret to
inform you that if we are not successful this letter serves as a
letter of termination of your services with Molly Mop Cleaning
Services. Your last working day will be 30 November 2000.
(My emphasis)
If Molly Mop be awarded any new contract, you will be
contacted and offered re-employment.
We wish to express our appreciation for your services and wish
you every success for the future."
4. The letter is not addressed to any particular employee  
and is not signed by Mr Von Landsberg.   
5. This application concerns 18 of the 55 employees whose  
service   were   terminated.   These   are   the   18   applicants

who work the nightshift at the respondent.   The first  
applicant Mrs Franken,was the supervisor of the 2nd to  
17th applicants.
6. The applicants allege that their last working day was  
28   November   2000.       It   is   their   case   that   no  
consultations   were   held   with   them   and   that   the  
dismissals were substantively and procedurally unfair.  
1. 7. The respondent contends that it had no   choice but  
to terminate the services of the applicants due to the  
fact   that   another   cleaning   company   obtained   the  
cleaning contract previously held by the respondent and  
there was no more cleaning work for the applicants.   
8. Respondent further argued that it had consulted within  
the spirit of Section 189 of the Labour Relation Act 66  
of 1995, (“the Act”), and therefore the dismissal was  
fair, both procedurally and substantively.
9. It   is   common   cause   that   the   respondent   paid   no  
severance   pay   to   the   applicants.       The   respondent  
argued   that  it   was    not  obliged   to  pay   any  severance  
pay,   as   it   had   offered   the   applicant   alternative  
employment   in   Centurion   near   Pretoria .   The   positions  
offered   were   similar   in   nature   to   the   work   under   the  
contract with ABSA, yet the applicants and unreasonably  
rejected   this   offer   of   alternative   employment   out   of  
hand, on the basis that they had to travel further.

10. The   respondent   argued   that   the   respondent   was   not  
obliged to pay the first applicant severance pay, since  
she   was   offered   the   position   of   area   manager,   which  
offer she had also unreasonably turned down.
11. The   applicants   claim   that   notice   pay   is   due   to   them,  
since this was not paid to them for the month worked in  
November 2000.   The respondent argues that the letter  
dated   30   October   2000,   referred   to   above   (the   notice  
letter), constitutes a proper notice and the applicants  
had   worked   their   last   month   (November)   and   received  
payment therefore.
1. 12. The individual applicants each earned R780,00 per  
month.   It is not entirely clear what first applicant,  
their supervisor (Mrs Franken), earned per month. 
13. Mr   Von   Landsberg   testified   that   at   the   beginning   of  
September   2000,   and   at   the   workplace,   he   advised   the  
applicants   that   there   was   a   possibility   that   the  
service   contract   with   ABSA   would   be   terminated.       He  
offered   the   applicants   work   in   Centurion,   but   that  
their   attitude   was   that   they   were   not   prepared   to  
travel  that far.   It  is not  certain to  me whether  
he   ,  at   that  stage,   conveyed  to   them  that   there  were  
only   five   posts   available   for   cleaners   in   Centurion.  
He   repeated   the   offer   to   the   day   shift.     It   follows  
that   fifty   five   emplyees   (including   the   applicants)

were offered only five positions.
14. Two of the nightshift employees who are not applicants  
in this matter testified on behalf of the respondent.  
They confirmed that Mr Von Landsberg had consulted with  
them   and   that   the   nightshift   staff   all   refused   to  
accept the positions in Centurion.
15. Mr   Von  Landsberg   said  he     had   also  consulted   with  Mr  
Thobejane, the official for SATAWU, who represented the  
applicants.       According   to   Mr   Von   Landsberg   four   or  
five   of   the   staff   members   were   members   of   SATAWU   and  
one   of   the   applicants,   Paulina   Sibanda,   was   the   shop  
steward for SATAWU.
1. 16. Mr   Thobejane   denies   that   there   were   any  
consultations   with   him   regarding   the   retrenchment.  
According to him the only consultation he had was with  
Mr Von Landsberg, was about an unrelated retrenchment,  
prior to the one in question.     He also negotiated on  
behalf of the applicants during wage negotiations.   
17. Mr   Von   Landsberg   could   not   say   with   any   certainty  
whether   any   union   dues   were   deducted   from   the  
applicants'   salaries,   because   they   received   their   pay  
slips   and   he   did   not   keep   a   copy   thereof.       I   found  
this a particularly evasive answer.
18. Mr   Von   Landsberg   also   testified   that   he   had   a   lunch  
with Mr   Thobejane where the applicants’ positions were

discussed. This was also denied.   He did not have the  
applicants interests at heart.   There are two letters  
on   record,   written   by   Mr   Thobejane,   from   which   it   is  
apparent   that   the   respondent,   or   rather   Mr   Von  
Landsberg, was unable to consult with him at the times  
that he had proposed.     No fixed date was set. There  
are no notes of any meetings, which could be provided  
by Mr Von Landsberg. Between these two witnesses there  
is no trace of a joint consensus seeking attempt. 
19. Ms   Steyn,   the   area   manager,   on   three   occasions,   the  
last   one   being   on   28   November   2000,   met   with   the  
employees   in   question   and   told   them   abreast   of   the  
developments. She was not called to testify by either  
party.   Yet,   even   on   the   respondent’s   version,   these  
meetings do not assist the respondent.
1. 20. In my view, such meetings, as may have been held,  
did not constitute proper consultations. Neither Mr Von  
Landsberg nor Mr Thobejane could give my any detail of  
what   was   discussed   on   behalf   of   the   applicants   or   in  
their interests.
21. In my view there was no proper consultation as required  
by Section 189 of Act.
22. The   respondent   argued   that   it   had   complied   with   the  
spirit   of   Section   189.       If   I   were   to   find   on   these  
facts,   that   there   was   consultation   in   the   spirit   of

Section   189   of   the   Act,   in   this   matter,   the   whole  
section might as well be disregarded.
23. The   letter   of   30   October   2000   constituted   a   complete  
fait accomplis .     The applicants had no choice in the  
matter.     If   they   had   been   consulted   they   could   have  
perhaps influenced events. The contract with ABSA bank  
was not the only service contract that Mr Von Landsberg  
was   involved   in   by   virtue   of   the   fact   that   he   was   a  
member of the respondent.   
24. Consultation as envisaged by Section 189 of the Act is  
a joint consensus seeking exercise.   The letter of 30  
October   2000  reflects   the  attitude   of  the   respondent.  
“Bumping”   could   have   been   discussed.   Alternative  
employment   in   other   companies   could   have   been  
discussed. The possibility of a new tender and future  
re­employment could have been put on the table.
25. It   was  argued   that  a   letter,  which   was  before   me,  in  
which Mr Von Landsberg pleaded with ABSA to extend the  
contract   for   a   month,   indicated   that   he   considered  
alternatives to dismissal.
1. 26. As   the   respondents   counsel   conceded,   Mr   Von  
Landsberg was a businessman and not a missionary.   In  
my view he wrote that letter out of self­interest and  
not just because he felt sorry for the applicants.   Mr  
Von   Landsberg   had   no   problem   with     charging   his

employees   15%   interest   on   loans   to   them,   through   a  
company   of   which   he   was   a   director.   So   much   was  
subtracted   from   their   salaries   as   repayment   for   the  
loans,   that   on   28   November   2000   some     applicants  
received no money at all.   
27. If   five     positions   are     offered   to   fifty   five  
employees and  they were told in unequivocal terms that  
only   five   of   them   would   qualify   for   the   position,   or  
would be successful in applying for the position, that  
would   not   constifute   a   genuine   offer   of   alternative  
employment to avoid dismissal.   I  also do not believe  
it was properly explained to the applicants that they  
would be dismissed unless they accept the offer of five  
positions in Centurion. 
28. In the circumstances, the respondent is obliged to pay  
the   applicants   severance   pay.   One   week’s   wages   for  
every completed year of service would have been fair.  
29. Notice   should   have   been   given   to   employees  
unequivocally and in clear terms.   The notice was not  
unequivocal   in   this   matter.       The   termination   of   the  
applicants’ services, was conditional upon the event of  
a contract   not  being concluded with ABSA.     It is not  
open   to  the   respondent  on   the  one   hand  to   argue  that  
the notice letter was proper notice, and on the other  
hand, to argue that it is not a  fait accomplis .

1. 30. In   the   circumstances   I   find   that   the   respondent  
ought   to   have   paid   the   applicants   one   month's   notice  
pay.   
31. Relief:
I   do   not   believe   that   the   applicants   could   be  
reinstated. There  are   no   positions   left.       On   the  
evidence   before  me,   another  service   company  which   has  
its   own   employees   obtained   the   contract   with   ABSA.  
There remains only the question of compensation. 
32. The dismissal was substantively as well as procedurally  
unfair.   Since the dismissal was substantively unfair,  
I   have   a   discretion   as   to   how   much   compensation   to  
grant.   
33. I do not intend to grant compensation for the maximum  
amount permitted by the Act.   The applicants were not  
frank with the court.   They denied that Ms Steyn ever  
visited   them.       Ms   Steyn   did   not   give   evidence,  
although several versions were put to the respondent’s  
witnesses on behalf of the applicants which she was to  
substantiate   as   if   she   were   called   to   testify.  
Furthermore,   the  two   nighshift  employees   (who  are   not  
applicants) testified that Ms Steyn did in fact explain  
to   them  that   the  contract   with  ABSA   would  come   to  an  
end.
34. When the applicants received the notice of 30 October

2000, they did not immediately contact a lawyer.   They  
did   however,   contact   the   union   official   in   question,  
who did very little by way of assisting them.      
1. 35. I gained the impression from Mr Thobejane that he  
did   not  try   his  best   to  protect   the  interests   of  the  
applicants   and   it   is   probably   because   he   received   no  
union dues.   It may be that the union is at fault, in  
this case, but this should not be taken into account,  
at the expense of the respondent.   
36. In   my   view,   compensation   equal   to   an   amount   of   six  
months' renumeration for each employee would be fair.  
37. Insofar   as   the   first   applicant   is   concerned,   Mr   Von  
Landsberg and his secretary both testified that she was  
offered   the   position   of   area   manager   but   that   she  
unreasonably refused to accept the position.
38. The   first  applicant,   testified  that   she  discussed   the  
position of area manager on one occasion (in a garden)  
with   Ms   Steyn,   who   was   going   to   resign   due   to  
pregnancy,   Mr  Von   Landsber’s  secretary.   No  firm   offer  
was made to her. The first applicant testified that she  
and   the   respondent’s   secretary   agreed   that   she   would  
not   be   suitable   due   to   the   fact   she   did   not   get   on  
particularly   well   with   Mr   Van   Landsberg.     She   denies  
that   there   was   a   second   occasion   when   the   general  
manager,   who   testified   to   that   effect,   offered   her   a

position.
39. What is certain, is that no offer was made in writing  
and   the   offer   did   not   emanate   from   any   proper  
consultation   process   in   terms   of   Section   189   of   the  
Act.   Therefore the respondent was obliged to pay the  
first applicant severance pay.   
1. 40. The   fist   applicant   also   testified   that   no  
consultations   were   held   with   her   and   that   on   28  
November 2000, she and the other applicants were given  
notice.       Ms   Steyn   apparently   arrived   with   the   pay  
packages   and   announced   that   it   was   their   last   day   of  
work.   The applicants phoned their attorney whom they  
visited   the   next   day   and   referred   a   dispute   to   the  
CCMA.
41. However,   the   referral   to   the   CCMA   reflects   that   the  
referral was signed on 28 November 2000 and indicated  
who the attorney for the applicants were.   This means  
that   prior   to   determination   of   their   services,   there  
was   contact   with   an   attorney   and   the   applicants   were  
aware that their position was precarious.   
42. However, it is simply not true that the first time they  
heard   of   their   dismissal   was   on   28   November   2000.  
That   does   not   accord   with   the   other   evidence   and   the  
probabilities.     Ms   Franken’s   evidence   in   this   regard  
was   contradictory.   What   is   evident   from   Ms   Franken’s

(the   first  applicant)   evidence  is   that  the   individual  
applicants waited for events to take their worst turn,  
instead   of   making   an   effort   themselves   to   avoid   the  
retrenchments.       There   should   have   been   some   effort  
forthcoming from the applicants to indicate at least a  
willingness to approach the process as a bilateral one  
or to mitigate their losses.
43. In   such   circumstances,   I   do   not   believe   that   the  
applicants   are   entitled   to   the   maximum   amount   for  
compensation provided for in the Act.   
44. In the circumstances I make the following order:
1. 1. The   dismissal   of   the   applicants   was  
procedurally and substantively unfair.
2. The respondent is to pay the applicants severance pay  
in an amount equal to one week's wages worked for every  
completed year of service.
3. The   respondent   is   to   pay   the   applicants   notice   pay  
equal to one month's wages.
4. The respondent is to pay the applicants compensation in  
an amount equal to six months' renumeration, each.
5. The respondent is to pay the applicants' costs in this  
matter.
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