IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT BRAAMFONTEIN
CASE NO: JR 217/01
In the matter between:
NORTHERN PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Applicant
and
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
& ARBITRATION First Respondent
ERIC PHINDELA Second Respondent
MXOLISI NICK BAMBO Third Respondent
_______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________________
TIP AJ :
1. The third respondent is a former employee of the applicant. At the
time of his dismissal on 13 May 1999, he was employed as the
Corporate Manager : Remuneration. He disputed the fairness of
the dismissal and referred the matter to the CCMA. The dispute
was ultimately referred to arbitration before the second respondent,
for hearing on 7 February 2001. On that day, the second
respondent ruled that the applicant’s counsel was not entitled to
appear in the matter, he being a parttime commissioner of the
CCMA. The second respondent also dismissed an application for
the postponement of the hearing. The matter proceeded in the
absence of the applicant and an award was made in favour of the
third respondent. This is an application for the review of that
award.
THE REPRESENTATION ISSUE
2. This question turns on the status of a policy decision taken by the
governing body of the CCMA. It is not clear when the relevant
decision was taken but it appears to have been circulated on 2
November 2000 under the subject “Parttime Commissioners
appearing in the CCMA”. The text of the communication, from the
director of the CCMA, was in the following terms:
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“I have received numerous requests from parttime
Commissioners wanting to appear on behalf of parties at
the CCMA. This matter was discussed extensively by the
National Directorate and the Governing Body. The GB
came to the conclusion that parttime commissioners
should not appear in the CCMA.”
3. At the hearing on 7 February 2001, the third respondent was
represented by his attorney, Mr Mahlase. Mr Mahlase had been a
parttime commissioner of the CCMA but, evidently in response to
the policy decision set out above, he had resigned by the time of
the hearing. He presented a letter to that effect.
4. By contrast, Adv Laka, who had been instructed on behalf of the
applicant, was also a parttime commissioner of the CCMA but had
not resigned. As appears more fully below, he informed the
second respondent that he had been advised by the convening
senior commissioner of the CCMA in Mpumalanga, the province
where he was enrolled as a parttime commissioner, that he could
appear in other provinces. Since the dispute had arisen and was
heard in the Northern Province, Mr Laka contended that he was
therefore entitled to appear. The second respondent nevertheless
interpreted the CCMA policy directive as being of general
application and therefore held that Mr Laka could not appear.
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5. Mr Laka appeared for the applicant in these review proceedings
also. Given that the key issue was concerned with his locus standi
as a representative in the CCMA, as well as ancillary issues which I
will set out below, it is in my view undesirable that he should have
appeared in this court in these proceedings. Inevitably, given the
background to this matter, he appeared not only as counsel for his
client but also as counsel in his own cause. Be that as it may, the
first question to be addressed is whether the exclusion of Mr Laka
at the arbitration hearing was competent as a matter of law.
6. The functioning of the CCMA is regulated in part A of Chapter VII of
the Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”). Section 116
establishes the governing body of the CCMA and provides that its
acts are “acts of the Commission”.
7. Section 117 deals with the appointment of commissioners,
including parttime commissioners. Such appointments are made
by the governing body. Section 117(1) stipulates merely that such
commissioners are to be “adequately qualified persons”. Section
117(2)(d) requires the governing body, when making appointments,
to “have due regard to the need to constitute a Commission that is
4
independent and competent and representative in respect of race
and gender”. Section 117(4) provides that::
“The governing body must determine the commissioners’
remuneration, allowances and any other terms and
conditions of appointment not contained in this section.”
Section 117(6) is in these terms:
“The governing body must prepare a code of conduct for
the commissioners and ensure that they comply with the
code of conduct in performing their functions.”
In terms of section 117(7)(c) the governing body may remove a
commissioner from office for “a material violation of the
Commission’s code of conduct.”
Consideration must also be given to section 115, which sets out the
functions of the commission. One of those is to make rules inter
alia regulating the practice and procedure for conciliation and
arbitration proceedings (section 115(2)(cA)(iii)).
8. To complete this review of the statutory framework, it is necessary
5
to have regard also to the provisions of section 138(4) of the LRA,
which is in these terms:
“In any arbitration proceedings, a party to the dispute may
appear in person or be represented only by –
a) a legal practitioner;
b) a director or employee of the party; or
c) any member, office bearer or official of that party’s
registered trade union or registered employers’
organization.”
Section 140(1) deals with the circumstances under which legal
practitioners may appear in arbitration proceedings. I need not
consider those provisions in any detail, since it is common cause in
this matter that it was resolved that legal practitioners could indeed
appear in the arbitration before the second respondent.
9. Against the backdrop of the various provisions set out above, it is
necessary next to consider what the source of authority is for the
decision of the governing body that was circulated on 2 November
2000. In doing so, I bear in mind two general perspectives:
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9.1. The first is that the governing body of the CCMA is a
creature of statute with no inherent power to regulate its
own affairs or those of the CCMA.
9.2. The second is that a purposive approach must be taken to
the interpretation of the LRA. The CCMA performs a vital
dispute resolution function and, in doing so, contributes
substantially to the achievement of the overall objects of
the LRA. The independence of commissioners is an
important part of that process. Plainly, commissioners
must not only indeed be independent but must manifestly
be seen to be so. The need for an independent CCMA is
indeed one of the specific statutory charges upon its
governing body. In such circumstances, it would form
part of the duty of the governing body to address a
situation, assuming that such exists, where individuals
frequently sit as parttime commissioners and frequently
appear before it as representatives, since that may well
negatively affect the public’s perception of the
independence of commissioners. That is a policy and
reguIatory matter that is properly to be dealt with by the
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governing body. I should add that it is in general far from
being this court’s function to substitute its views on such
matters for those of the governing body. Thus, it falls
within the province of the governing body to consider the
facts and statistics before it and to decide whether there
should be a policy that is in absolute terms and whether or
not it should differentiate the situation where a parttime
commissioner who sits in one province should be
excluded from appearance as a representative in another.
10. A purposive approach to the role of the governing body of the
CCMA does not however mean that the structure and wording of
the LRA can in effect be disregarded. The policy decision here at
issue must therefore be located within the Act itself. The attempt
to do so does not produce a readily apparent answer. Three
specific possibilities present themselves:
10.1. The first is that the governing body’s decision falls within
the ambit of “any other terms and conditions of
appointment” contemplated in section 117(4). However,
that construction may more readily present itself as
8
producing a valid result in respect of appointments made
after the decision than those effected before it. In this
regard, the “fixed term” of appointment of a commissioner,
as stipulated in section 117(2)(b) is relevant. For some
individuals, it may be a very material alteration of the
basis upon which they were appointed as commissioners,
to be instructed midstream that they are no longer
permitted to appear before the CCMA. There is nothing
before me to suggest that the change brought about by
the policy directive has been anything but unilateral.
10.2. The second possibility is that the decision is to be read as
forming part of the “code of conduct” referred to in section
117(6). If that had indeed been the intention then, in my
view, it was more than a little desirable that it should have
been described as such. This is particularly so having
regard to the provisions of section 117(7)(c) which
contemplates a related removal from office. Again, the
question presents itself as to the validity of a unilateral
alteration to a code of conduct in terms of which
commissioners have been appointed and have operated
9
until the decision circulated on 2 November 2000.
10.3. The third possibility is that the decision of the governing
body amounts to a rule as envisaged in section 115(2)
(cA)(iii). It may well be that this interpretation is
unavoidable, given that Rule 21 of the CCMA Rules
promulgated on 31 March 2000 in Government Gazette
No. 29081 expressly deals with the application of section
138(4) of the LRA. These rules are described as “rules
regulating the practice and procedure for resolving
disputes through conciliation and at arbitration
proceedings” and were made in terms of section 115(2)
(cA)(iii) and (iv). Rule 21 deals with representation at
arbitrations in inter alia the following terms:
“21.1 Section 138(4) read with section 140 of the
Act exclusively states who may appear or be
represented in arbitration proceedings. A
commissioner has no discretion to permit any
person other than those listed in that section
to appear or act as a representative even if
the other parties have no objection.
21.2 If a party to the dispute objects to the
representation of another party to the dispute
or the commissioner suspects that the
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representative of one of the parties to the
dispute does not fall within the ambit of
section 138, the commissioner must
determine this issue.”
The relevance of that rule to the present issue is that the
responsibility of a commissioner visàvis representation
is explicitly placed within the confines of section 138(4)
read with rule 21, neither of which in any way
contemplates the situation of a wouldbe representative
who happens also to be a parttime commissioner. In
this context, the question mark over the status of the
policy directive is clear Moreover, if the decision of the
governing body were intended to fall within the ambit of a
rule, it would have required publication in the Government
Gazette. See section 115(6) of the LRA. Insofar as the
decision is not a rule, it leaves commissioners with the
difficulty that they are required to apply rule 21 in a
situation where the decision of the governing body has no
equivalent status.
11. It is however unnecessary for me, for the purpose of this judgment,
11
to make a final determination in respect of the validity of the
governing body’s decision, having regard to the difficulties that I
have briefly outlined above. This is so because analysis of the
decision resolves into two components:
11.1. firstly, does the governing body have the power to decide
that persons who appear as representatives before the
CCMA shall not be appointed as commissioners of the
CCMA or, having been so appointed, shall be removed
from office;
11.2. secondly, does the governing body have the power to
determine that persons who sometimes sit as parttime
commissioners of the CCMA shall be excluded if they
present themselves as representatives in a dispute.
The application before me requires a decision on the second
component but not the first.
12. Mr Laka argued that section 138(4) sets out a clear statutory
definition of who is entitled to appear as a representative. As a
12
duly admitted and properly instructed advocate, he asserts that he
falls clearly within the ambit of that statutory stipulation and that it is
beyond the power of the governing body or, in this instance, the
second respondent, to exclude him from performing that
representative function. He submitted further that the CCMA could
at the most act against him in his capacity as a parttime
commissioner, but not in his capacity as a representative. On the
basis of the analysis that I have set out above, I must conclude that
this submission is well founded. Neither section 115 nor section
117 of the LRA purports to empower the Commission or its
governing body to vary the terms of section 138(4). As already
indicated, CCMA rule 21 is consistent with section 138(4) and is
plainly calculated to give effect to it.
13. I accordingly find that the exclusion by the second respondent of
Advocate Laka from the proceedings before him on 7 February
2001 was not competent. It follows that the award which resulted
after the exclusion of the applicant’s chosen legal representative
cannot stand.
THE POSTPONEMENT ISSUE
13
14. In case I should be wrong in relation to the representation issue, I
proceed to consider the ruling made by the second respondent in
refusing a postponement as requested by the applicant’s
representatives on 7 February 2001. The application for
postponement was made after the ruling that Adv Laka could not
represent the applicant and was said to be for two purposes: an
application for the review of the decision to exclude Adv Laka; and,
an opportunity to arrange alternative legal representation. That
those two reasons could not meaningfully coexist is selfevident,
but of no real consequence for the purpose of this judgment. The
second respondent was unpersuaded that the intimation of a review
obliged him to postpone the proceedings. I agree with him.
However, I do not share his view that the circumstances before him
were such as to warrant the refusal of a postponement in relation to
the second reason.
15. The relevant background factors may be summarized as follows:
15.1. The arbitration was first enrolled for 25 October 2000 but,
evidently by agreement, was postponed to 20 November
2000. It appears that the issue of legal representation
14
arose on that day, that it was decided that there could be
legal representatives, and that the matter was again
postponed in relation to that issue. There is a dispute on
the papers as to whether or not the decision of the
governing body was pertinently raised on that occasion.
There are strong indications that it was, but these are not
reflected in the award made by the second respondent.
In any event, I need not determine that question. I should
add that the second respondent’s award states that the
postponement on 20 November 2000 was at the request
of the employer, i.e. the applicant. However, the affidavit
of the third respondent filed in the proceedings before me
states that this postponement was agreed upon his
“special request and instance”.
15.2. The matter was then enrolled for 29 January 2001 and
proceeded to hearing, as already indicated, on 7 February
2001. Again, and as reflected in the award, this appears
to have been done by agreement between the parties.
15.3. It is common cause that the third respondent’s attorney
15
contacted the applicant’s attorney to advise that an
objection would be made to Adv Laka representing the
applicant at the arbitration, on the ground that he was a
parttime commissioner. According to the affidavit of Ms
Morobane, a candidate attorney employed at the
applicant’s attorney, this was on 24 January 20001.
15.4. Ms Morobane than contacted a commissioner at the
CCMA in Gauteng, Mr Hlongwane, relating to this
objection and was informed by him that parttime
commissioners were not allowed to appear as
representatives in the province where they were engaged
as commissioners. It was suggested by him that this
should be confirmed with Mr Van Zeydman, whose
capacity is not described in the affidavit but may be
assumed to be a senior official of the CCMA.
15.5. Mr Van Zeydman was contacted by Ms Morobane. His
advice was that Adv Laka should get permission from his
convening senior commissioner in Mpumalanga to appear
in a CCMA hearing conducted in the Northern Province.
16
15.6. On 7 February 2001, the second respondent was
informed of these enquiries and their fruits. He was
informed also that Adv Laka had indeed approached the
convening senior commissioner in Mpumalanga and that
he had been told that he could appear in a different
province, being the Northern Province. There is nothing
on record to suggest when this conversation took place.
It is also clear that none of the steps outlined about were
conveyed to the third respondent’s attorney before the
hearing on 7 February 2001.
16. The second respondent was unpersuaded by these considerations.
He held:
“The employer was warned well in advance by Mr Mahlase
on 25 January 2001, some ten days before the hearing,
that its chosen counsel would not be allowed to appear in
the proceedings. It must have anticipated this by making
alternative arrangements. On the other hand, Ms Snyders
who was the instructing attorney in this matter, was in
attendance. Ms Snyders’ submission that only Advocate
Laka prepared for the matter has a hollow ring and can
therefore not be sustained. In my view Ms Snyders, as an
instructing attorney, is privy to the issues which were to be
raised in the proceedings and she was accordingly
competent to represent the employer. I need not canvass
in full the involvement of an attorney in a matter in which
17
she/he is instructing a counsel. It is sufficient to state that
to my mind an attorney instructing discusses the matter
with counsel and together they outline the line of defence to
be followed.
Alternatively, if Ms Snyders was serious about representing
the employer or the employer was serious about defending
the matter, she could have applied that the matter stand
down for an agreed time so that she could refine her
preparations and the employer could have instructed her
accordingly. In my view such an application would not
have been unreasonable, more so that the matter was set
down for the whole day.”
17. In my view, these reasons for refusing the postponement show that
the second respondent did not have adequate regard to the full set
of facts that had been placed before him. Although he had been
informed of the various measures that had been taken in relation to
the position of Mr Laka and although the second respondent noted
“that they laboured under the impression that he would be allowed
to appear”, that factor appears not to have weighed with him at all.
Instead, he adopted the robust approach that there had been a
warning on 25 January 2001 and that the applicant should therefore
have made alternative arrangements.
18. In this context, he took the view that Ms Snyders was in a position
to represent the applicant or could, without requiring a
18
postponement, “refine her preparations” if given a short
adjournment. In expressing that view, the second respondent
entirely discounted the statement made by Ms Snyders that Adv
Laka had been briefed to represent the applicant and that he was
prepared, whereas she was not. The hearing was evidently to be
a fairly substantial one. It is common cause on the affidavits that
the matter had been set down for two days of hearing, with a third
day in reserve. In those circumstances, it is in my view thoroughly
unrealistic to take the view that an instructing attorney can simply
step into the shoes of counsel briefed to conduct the matter or
would be in a position to do so after a short adjournment to refine
her instructions. (Equally, I am unpersuaded by the submission
advanced to me on the third respondent’s behalf by Mr Nowosenetz
that the applicant’s team present at the arbitration consisted of
senior and competent people and that any one of them could
simply have substituted as the representative.) Such approach
has no regard to what is involved in a proper process of preparation
for the conduct of a hearing, including the presentation of one’s
own evidence, the crossexamination of opposing witnesses and
the submission of arguments. In addition, it must be observed that
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the dispute concerned a senior employee and was a matter of
some consequence.
19. It is clear from the background events outlined above that it had
throughout been the intention of the applicant to resist the relief
sought by the third respondent at the arbitration. It is in my view
difficult to understand how the second respondent could have
formed the view that Ms Snyders was not serious about
representing the employer or that the employer itself was not
serious about defending the matter. Although I agree with the
second respondent to this extent, that Mr Laka and other members
of the legal team representing the applicant should have done more
to clarify and formalise his status before the hearing of 7 February
2001, this is far from being a situation where the notification of the
proposed objection was simply ignored. Steps were taken and the
second respondent was informed inter alia that a convening senior
commissioner had given the advice that it would be in order for Adv
Laka to appear in a hearing in the Northern Province. The
deficiency that arises from this is that no formal ruling was obtained
and that the obvious precaution of securing an endorsement of that
advice by the head office of the CCMA was not pursued. Likewise,
20
the failure to respond to Mr Mahlase before 7 February 2001 was
more than professionally discourteous; it was certain to contribute
to a dispute at the hearing. The approach of, particularly, Adv
Laka was in my view unacceptably casual. All considered, it would
certainly have been appropriate for the second respondent to
require that the applicant pay the costs of a postponement.
20. In the result, it is my conclusion that the second respondent erred in
an unjustifiable manner in refusing a postponement on 7 February
2001, for the purpose of arranging properly prepared legal
representation. In coming to that conclusion, I do not lose sight of
the fact that the granting or withholding of a postponement involves
a considerable degree of discretion and that this court should
interfere with the exercise of such discretion only in very limited
circumstances. As an illustration of the common law approach to
this question see Tuesday Industries (Pty) Limited v Condor
Industries (Pty) Limited & Another 1978 (4) SA 379 (TPD). I have
regard also to the approach of this court in decisions such as the
following:
Ross & Son Motor Engineering v CCMA & Others [1998]
21
11 BLLR 1168 (LC);
Dimbaza Foundries Limited v CCMA & Others [1999] 8
BLLR 779 (LC);
MIT Tissue v Theron & Others [2000] 8 BLLR 947 (LC).
At the same time, it remains an important feature of the matter
before me that the applicant arrived at the arbitration hearing on 7
February 2001 fully prepared and willing to proceed. It was
believed that Adv Laka had clarified his position and that the
impediment raised by the decision of the governing body had been
cleared. In this important respect, this case is distinguishable from
those that I have referred to, in which a party came to the
proceedings intending to secure a postponement.
21. It is therefore my conclusion that the award made by the second
respondent in the absence of the applicant should be set aside also
on the ground of his refusal of the application for postponement, to
the extent that this was for the obtaining of properly prepared legal
representation.
22. Although the applicant must succeed, it does not follow that it
22
should enjoy the benefit of a costs award in its favour. I have
already described the extent to which I consider there to have been
significant shortcomings in the manner in which the notice of
objection by Mr Mahlase was responded to. Had that been dealt
with timeously and in a thorough and professional manner, the
situation which the second respondent was called upon to deal with
might well not have arisen. Likewise, recourse to this court may
then also have been unnecessary. A further consideration is that
although the applicant has succeeded in its principal point, that
concerning the legal standing of the decision of the governing body
of the CCMA, no contention with that formulation was placed before
the second respondent at the time of the hearing before him. At
that stage, Mr Laka’s objection was that the second respondent
himself did not have the authority and that it was for the governing
body to decide. The status of the governing body’s decision was
itself not challenged. Having regard to all the circumstances and
the terms of section 162(1) of the LRA, it is my conclusion that no
order as to costs should be made in respect of this application.
23. The applicant has sought a determination by this court that the
dismissal of the third respondent by the applicant was fair. There
23
is no basis for the granting of such relief. The transcript of the
proceedings in the CCMA obviously records only the version of the
third respondent. That version has not been tested by the
applicant. Likewise, the applicant’s version has not been tested on
behalf of the third respondent.
24. I make the following order:
24.1. The award made by the second respondent under CCMA
case number NP12992 on 22 February 2001 is hereby
reviewed and set aside to the extent of paragraph 1
thereof.
24.2. Paragraph 2 of the said award is varied to read: ‘The
employer is to pay the costs of today, as on
postponement, on the Magistrates Court scale’.
24.3. The matter is remitted to the CCMA for hearing de novo
before a commissioner other than the second respondent.
24.4. No order is made as to costs.
24
_____________________________
K S TIP
Acting Judge of the Labour Court
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Date of hearing : 28 September 2002
Date of judgment : 12 October 2001
For applicant : Adv A P Laka
Instructed by : Maponya Inc.
For third respondent : Adv L Nowosenetz
Instructed by : Mahlase, NonyaneMahlase
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