IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(Held at Johannesburg)
Case Number: J5549/00
In the matter between:
E G DEETLEFS Applicant
and
MINISTER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN Respondent
DEFENCE FORCE
_________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_________________________________________________________
Landman J:
1.I recused myself in this matter and indicated that my reasons would follow. These are
my reasons.
Allegations of bias
2.Adv Prinsloo, his instructing attorney Ms Salome Roux and his client, Captain Deetlefs,
have alleged that I am biassed (alternatively have created a perception of bias)
against Adv Prinsloo and therefore also his client. See the application for leave to
appeal and other documents in E G Deetlefs v Minister of the SADF J5549/00 It
is alleged there (I summarise and comment on the grounds relating to alleged bias)
that:
3.1. I was biassed, hostile and had the intention to harm and demean Adv Prinsloo in
case J3369/98.
The judgment in this case reflects my dissatisfaction with the way he conducted
himself and also criticises the conduct of counsel for the respondent.
1
3.2. I had a double agenda.
I am not sure what is implied.
3.3. I “failed to inform the applicant mero motu about his bias or possible perceived bias
against Applicant’s Advocate (and hence again displaying discriminatory bias and or
perceived bias)”.
I was unaware that Adv Prinsloo held the opinion that I was biassed against him. He
did not inform me of his opinion.
3.4. I was motivated by irrelevant, erroneous and/or biassed opinions, preconceptions
and/or notions when I decided to uphold the exception in case J5549/2000.
The judgment speaks for itself. The statement of case did not disclose a cause of
action. The applicant was granted an opportunity to remedy the situation by
amending her papers.
3.5. I displayed discriminatory bias when I criticised and made adverse comments about
Adv Prinsloo and his attorney after delivering judgment.
The intertwining of a statement of case and a review application and the obvious
failure to set out facts and allege that the dispute fell within the scope of the single
dispute adjudicable by the Labour Court sitting as the Defence Special Tribunal
caused me to be concerned about the plight of the client. It is difficult to ignore this.
But perhaps I should have.
3.6. I displayed discriminatory bias when I allegedly failed to decide that Adv Prinsloo
and his attorney “made a (more than) reasonable effort to place, as fully as
possible, a complex case before the court” etc.
The statement of case must show a cause of action.
3.7. I displayed bias when I refused my associate permission to fax a judgment to Adv
Prinsloo.
2
The judgment was delivered orally from rough notes. There was no judgment which
could be faxed at that stage.
3.8. I displayed bias by not giving him credit for apologizing that he would not be in
court, and that he tendered to attend court to note the judgment, but the court would
not wait for him.
. I informed the parties in open court that judgment would be delivered at a certain time
on a certain date. It is unthinkable that a court should then have to wait for counsel
to make himself available to note the judgment at another time, more convenient to
himself.
3.9. I displayed bias when “I accepted or caused a position where Applicant’s [Captain
Deetlefs] case was one of two other cases that was apparently removed from the
initially allocated roll in front of the Honourable Judge Revelas, and transferred”
them to myself.
It is common practice for a judge who is available to assist a colleague with his or her
roll. I did not know and have no association with Captain Deetlefs
3.10 I displayed a discriminatory bias by hearing what was an unopposed matter (alleged
to be such because there was no affidavit attached to the notice of motion) as an
opposed matter.
Rule 11 does not require the notice of motion to be accompanied by an affidavit.
3.11. I displayed discriminatory bias when I did not postpone the matter sine die after
being informed that the matter was on the unopposed roll and that the parties were
willing to settle.
. The matter was on the opposed motion roll. Had the parties wished to postpone the
application and had they moved to do so this application would have been
entertained.
4.I have known Adv Prinsloo only in the course of my judicial duties in the Labour Court.
He has appeared in a trial, an opposed motion and one unopposed motion. I
recused myself in another opposed motion after receiving the application for leave
to appeal.
3
Complaints by Adv Prinsloo about others
5. Besides Adv Prinsloo’s charge that I am biassed against him and therefore also his
instructing attorney and client, he has complained about a number of other persons:
6.1. Adv Bezuidenhout, Adv Blom and Mr Eybers, their instructing attorney, have been
accused of trying to extort security from Adv Prinsloo by threatening to report him
for allegedly taking work from the streets, and launching vexatious and personal
attacks on him.
6.2. Mr Jansen who instructed Adv Prinsloo was accused of making sexual innuendos
towards him and lying about certain matters concerning their professional
relationship.
6.3. Mr Milo was accused of refusing to provide Adv Prinsloo with a copy of the
judgment in Deetlefs matter when oral judgment had been delivered using my rough
notes.
6.4. Adv Prinsloo informed the Judge President that he did not want Judge Revelas to
hear a matter in which I had recused myself.
6.5. A point was taken by counsel that in Adv Prinsloo’s heads of argument it is
suggested that the Minister of the South African National Defence Force attempted
to bribe the legal advisors of the opponent.
Adv Prinsloo and ethics
7.Adv Prinsloo is either unaware of the rules of ethics and good manners applicable to
advocates or chooses to disregard them.
8. He was prepared to waive his clients attorneycounsel/client privilege to protect
himself.
9. He consulted with a witness who was under crossexamination about an issue without
the knowledge or consent of the court or his opponent.
4
10. It was reported to me that Adv Prinsloo rammed his lectern into that of Adv
Bezuidenhout, presumably to reflect his annoyance with her.
11. Without informing me in chamber or in open court that he was of the view that I was
biassed against him, he complained, after judgment was granted against his client
and he an his attorney were precluded from recovering fees, that I was biassed.
12. When I recused myself in another opposed matter in which he was appearing. He
retorted in open court: ”Yes, because of bias”.
Adv Prinsloo’s skill
13. Adv Prinsloo has not yet mastered his craft although in time he will.
14.1. He is unaware that counsel do not provide information by affidavit in a matter in
which they are appearing but make a statement from the bar.
14.2. He did not read rule 11 of the Rules of the Labour Court or he would have known
that procedural applications need not be accompanied by an affidavit.
14.3. He drafted pleadings on the basis of an alleged retrenchment well knowing that
there was no factual foundation for this claim.
14.4. By obtaining clients through the offices of his Inner Circle of International Labour
Lawyers (and his relationship with his instructing attorney) a conflict between his
interest and those of his clients appeared to have risen.
14.5. He has complained that an exception should not have been upheld because the
majority of averments were set out in the statement of case.
Others relevant developments
15. A letter of complaint has been forwarded to the chairperson of the General Bar
Council as well as the association to which Adv Prinsloo belongs. This was done
prior to hearing to the matter concerning Captain Deetlefs.
16. An application was made to the Judge President to convene the Labour Appeal
Court to sit as a court of first instance to hear the application for leave to appeal.
5
This was withdrawn after an audience with the Judge President.
17. I was informed on 20 August by Adv Prinsloo that the application for leave to appeal
had not been withdrawn. Although I had been under the impression that this was
the case. It therefore became necessary to consider the application for my recusal
from this matter.
18. A judge is required to perform his or her duties impartially in accordance with the
oath of office. In appropriate circumstances a judge must recuse himself or herself
from a matter if it is alleged that an appearance has been created that the judge is
likely to be biased and most certainly if the judge is biased. In other circumstances
it would be improper for a judge to recuse himself or herself. E.g., where the
allegation of bias or an appearance of bias is a pretext for “judge shopping”.
19. In making the decision to recuse or not recuse himself or herself a judge would also
be influenced to a slight degree by the possibility of complaints of misconduct
should the judge recuse or fail to recuse himself or herself.
20.There is something unsatisfactory about a judge recusing himself or herself because
the judge, in the course of judicial duties, forms an unfavourable opinion about
counsel’s concept of ethics and competence. However, justice is about doing
justice to the public. If a litigant believes or is led to believe that he or she will not
receive a fair and impartial hearing the judge should recuse himself or herself. See
Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American Express Travel Service 1996 (3) SA 1
(A) especially at 12 FG. This case concerned partly the extra curial and partly the
alleged curial behaviour of an acting judge.
2.In the premises I recused myself from the application for leave to appeal.
Signed and dated at CAPE TOWN this 22 nd day of August 2001.
____________________
Judge A A Landman
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
6