Nyoka v National Research Foundation (J230/01) [2001] ZALC 4 (30 January 2001)

40 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Disciplinary Inquiry — Interdict — Applicant, a former employee, seeking to interdict disciplinary proceedings post-resignation — Court finding no clear right established for relief sought — Inquiry permissible despite resignation — Application dismissed with costs.

Sneller Verbatim/MC
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
BRAAMFONTEIN CASE NO: J230/01
Date of judgment: 2001-01-30
In the matter between
NYOKA SINDISIWE PATRICIA VENON Applicant
and
NATIONAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION Respondent
________________________________________________________________
J U D G M E N T
________________________________________________________________
REVELAS J:
1.This is an urgent application in which the applicant, the former employee  
of the respondent, seeks   relief to the effect that the respondent be  
interdicted from:
1. participating in any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of any  
disciplinary action against the applicant.
2.  carrying to completion it's disciplinary action against the applicant.
3. participating in any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of it's  
disciplinary action against the applicant.
4. making   any   disciplinary   decision,   verdicts,   findings   and   or  
sanction/sentence against the applicant in this matter.
2.The applicant also seeks costs against the respondent.
On the papers before me, the applicant had resigned and 
subsequent to her resignation was informed that she had been suspended  
and   she   was   notified   to   attend   a   disciplinary   inquiry.     She   was  
suspended pending this inquiry.

3.Further   notification   received   by   the   applicant   from   the   respondent   was   a  
notice to attend a formal inquiry on 31 January 2001, which is tomorrow.  
It   is   this   event,   which   the   applicant   by   way   of   interdict   seeks   to  
prevent from taking place.
4.Although   the   applicant   has   in   her   notice   of   motion   set   out   the   relief  
sought   in   the   form   of   an   interim   rule,   the   nature   of   the   relief   she  
seeks is final.  
5.Whereas it is so that a disciplinary inquiry should normally not be held  
when an employee has resigned, this principle is only applicable in law  
in certain circumstances which in my view do not apply for purposes of  
the present matter.  
6.In the present case the applicant has alleged that she left the employ of  
the respondent because of the manner in which she was treated and could  
no longer in circumstances, tolerate working for the respondent.
7.Firstly   I   have   to   examine   whether   the   applicant   has   established   a   clear  
right to entitle her to the relief she seeks.  
8.In the circumstances of this case she does not have a clear right.  Whereas  
it   would   be   perhaps   undesirable   in   certain   circumstances   to   have   a  
disciplinary   inquiry   or   an   inquiry   in   respect   of   someone   who   has  
resigned previously from an employer's employ, the former employee does  
not have a right to insist that the inquiry does not proceed in their  
absence, simply because they are no longer employed.  
9.This   is   so   because,   there   are   many   other   reasons   why   an   employer   would  
choose to proceed with such an inquiry.  
10.The   purpose   of   the   inquiry   might   have   changed   because   the   respondent  
considered the fact that the applicant has resigned. Reference was made  
to   the   notice   to   the   applicant   to   attend   “a   formal   inquiry”   not   a  
disciplinary enquiry, as it was termed before.  Be that as it may there

disciplinary enquiry, as it was termed before.  Be that as it may there  
is no guarantee that the applicant would be found guilty of fraud or any

of the other charges levelled against her.
11.I also  considered whether  the applicant  had established  that she  has no  
alternative   remedy   but   to   approach   this   court   on   an   urgent   basis   to  
interdict the inquiry from taking place.
12.By   it's   nature,   an   inquiry   into   fraud   falls   within   the   ambit   of   the  
managerial   prerogative.     The   fact   that   the   employee   had   resigned   does  
not diminish that prerogative.  Furthermore, if the applicant should be  
found   guilty   and   a   dismissal   is   imposed,     she   may   later   attack   the  
dismissal, on the basis that she had resigned and that the dismissal was  
of   no   effect,   or   she   could   attack   any   of   the   findings   of   the  
disciplinary   inquiry.     Her   remedy   is   not   to   prevent   it   from   taking  
place.  The applicant has  await the outcome of that inquiry, and should  
need be,  refer it  to the  appropriate forum  which would  the Commission  
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration.
13.It was also argued that the applicant made out a case that there was an  
injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended on the part of the  
applicant.  
14.The inquiry has not yet taken place.  
15.There is no indication of what the outcome would be and there is also no  
indication   that   the   respondent   may   or   may   not   inform   prospective  
employers   of   the   applicant's   alleged   conduct   or   of   the   disciplinary  
inquiry or the outcome thereof as suggested.
16.It also  appears that  this application  was designed  rather to  escape the  
consequences of  an inquiry  than to  prevent it  from happening  as would  
appear form the reasons set out by the applicant.  
17.In   the   circumstances   the   application   must   fail.   Costs   should   follow   the  
result.
18.The application is dismissed with costs.

_________________
Revelas J
On behalf of Applicant:  Adv. J Maphahlane instructed by
M M Baloyi Att.
On behalf of Respondent: Adv. Boda instructed by 
Perrott, Van Niekerk & Woodhouse Inc.