SNELLER VERBATUM/JHB/LKS
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT JOHANNESBURG
DATE: 30 November 2000 CASE NO. J2525/98
In the matter between:
CHEMICAL WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNION Applicant
and
POLIFIN LIMITED Respondent
J U D G M E N T
SUTHERLAND, AJ :
[1] In this case five individual workers, represented by their union,
Chemical Workers Industrial Union, have referred to this court a case in
which they plead an unfair dismissal for want of compliance with the
retrenchment procedures provided for in section 189 of the Labour
Relations Act.
[2] A challenge has been raised to the propriety of that dispute by these
five individuals being heard by this
court. To this end the parties settled a statement of preliminary
issues to be resolved prior to entering into the principal case.
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[3] The parties formulated a draft document entitled "Separate Adjudication
of Issues" which was later
refined. I have had regard to both drafts. I am of the view that there
is no difference of substance and in the revised draft the points are
somewhat better expressed. The issues are:
"1. Whether or not the dispute that the court is called upon to adjudicate
upon in terms of the applicant's statement of case, read with the
contents of the pretrial minute, was referred for conciliation as
intended by section 191 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995.
2. If the dispute had not been referred for conciliation in terms of
section 191, whether or not the court has jurisdiction to determine the
dispute.
3. Whether or not an attempt had been made to resolve the dispute through
conciliation as intended by section 157(4)(a) of the Labour Relations
Act, 1995.
4. If an attempt had not been made to resolve the dispute through
conciliation as contemplated by section 157(4)(a), whether or not the
court should determine the dispute or in terms of section 157(4)(a) of
the Labour Relations Act refuse to do so.
5. Whether or not the settlement of a severance pay dispute on the 3rd June
1998 was a final settlement between the respondent and the individual
five applicants regarding their retrenchment which was effective on 15
September 1997."
[4] It emerged from the hearing that the critical question of fact is
whether or not the dispute concerning the five individual applicants was
ever referred to the CCMA for conciliation, and in this regard a debate
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ensued concerning the implications of the judgment which was handed down
in the Labour Appeal Court in The National Union of Metal Workers of
South Africa and Others v Driveline Technologies (Pty) Ltd and Another
(2000) 21 ILJ 142. The bench consisted of Zondo JP, Conradie JA and
Mogoeng AJA. There are two judgments, the majority given by the Judge
President and Mogoeng
AJA and minority judgment in which a dissenting view on the application of
section 157(4) was given. Section 157 provides extensively for the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court and deals with various aspects in which
it enjoys exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts,
and in section 157(4)(a) provides that: "The Labour Court may
refuse to determine any dispute, other than an appeal or review before
the Court, if the Court is not satisfied that an attempt had been made
to resolve the dispute through conciliation".
[5] Conradie JA took the view that this provision authorised the Labour
Court to entertain matters notwithstanding the absence of conciliation,
where, nevertheless, provisions elsewhere in the Labour Relations Act
prescribed conciliation. That view was not shared by the majority.
[6]/..
[6] At page 158I of the judgment, the Judge President observed that:
"The Act does contemplate that the Labour Court will have jurisdiction
to adjudicate a dispute even when there is no meaningful conciliation in
respect of such a dispute. This is supported by the fact that section
191(5) of the Act contemplates, amongst others, that a dispute may be
referred to arbitration or adjudication if the dispute remains
unresolved after a period of 30 days have elapsed since the council or
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the CCMA received the referral of such dispute to conciliation.
[7] The learned judge then deals with various other aspects of the debate
and then at page 160 he stated:
"To me it is as clear as daylight that the wording of section 191(5)
imposes the referral of a dismissal dispute to conciliation as a pre
condition before such a dispute can either be arbitrated or be referred
to the Labour Court for adjudication. I cannot see what clearer
language the Legislature could have used other than the language it
chose to use in section 191(5)... In section 191(5) the Legislature
used the wording:
'If a council or commissioner certified that or if 30 days have expired
since and the dispute remains unresolved
(a) the counsel or the commissioner may arbitrate the dispute;
(b) the employee may refer the dispute to the Labour Court for
adjudication."
[8] He then, at page 161E says the following:
"The long and the short of the above is, therefore, that in my view
section 137(4)(a) provides no basis for the proposition that the Labour
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a dismissal dispute which has not
been referred to conciliation . It is only a basis for the proposition
that in a case where no certificate of outcome stating a dispute remains
unresolved has been issued but the dispute was referred to conciliation
but no attempt was made to conciliate the dispute, the Labour Court may
in its discretion refuse to determine the dispute."
[9] The submission was made in this court that the remarks both of the
JudgePresident and of Conradie JA were obiter for purposes of the
decision in the Driveline case. It seems to me that this is an apposite
submission to advance. However, in my view, whether it is obiter or
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not, I am inclined to adopt the view articulated by the JudgePresident.
[10] In my view the Labour Relations Act as a whole is intended to, and must
be understood to, create an exclusive dispute resolution system. One of
the
fundamental tenets of that system is that disputes are to be submitted
to a process of conciliation. Only when that process is exhausted is it
envisaged that adjudication either in the CCMA, by way of arbitration,
or in the Labour Court by way of trial, may occur. The only instances
in the Act of judicial intervention without the prior exhaustion of the
conciliation process, are those instances where the Labour Relations
Act expressly authorises the Labour Court to grant relief which is
intended to support the consensus seeking objectives of the dispute
resolution procedures provided for in the Act. The classic example of
this sort of intervention is where a Labour Court is approached in order
to obtain an interdict in respect of industrial action which is on
going. Such relief is not required to be preceded by conciliation.
[11] A rare example of the exercise of a discretion in terms of section 157(4)
is that which is offered in the judgment of Landman J in Lomati Mill
Barberton v Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union and Others
(1997) 18 ILJ 178. In that case the court was approached on urgency to
determine a dispute which had arisen in regard to picketing rules.
Picketing is governed by section 69. It is incumbent upon
parties who are in dispute concerning the content or the application of
such rules, to approach the CCMA and have it conciliated. That did not
happen in this case. The learned judge, for reasons of urgency, excused
the absence of conciliation, relying on the provisions of section 157(4)
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in order to assume jurisdiction to grant the appropriate urgent relief.
[12] This is a significant example in relation to the remarks I have already
made because it indicates that the role of the court in adjudicating
disputes of different classes, proceeds from the premise that where the
process requires to be protected, conciliation anterior to adjudication
by this court is unnecessary or may be excused. In contra disctinction
to those matters, the present dismissal dispute does not give rise to a
need to protect the process. The only point in issue now is whether or
not the individual applicants have or have not been visited with an
unfair dismissal.
[13] I am therefore of the view that a referral of a dispute for a
conciliation, either to the CCMA or a Bargaining Council is indeed a
jurisdictional precondition for a dismissal matter to be adjudicated
in this court.
[14] The respondents, in challenging the propriety of the dispute being before
the court, advanced two independent arguments. The first was that the
dispute which had been referred to the court and upon which reliance is
made now in order to advance a claim was different to the case which has
been pleaded. The second argument was that the dispute referred to the
CCMA upon which reliance is made to conduct this case, was not a
dispute, however valid it may have been, which encapsulates the case of
the five individual applicants. I shall deal with these two arguments in
turn.
[15] It is appropriate to look first of all at the referral which was lodged
with the CCMA on 21 June 1997. That dispute, lodged on the prescribed
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form, LR 7.11, described the nature of the dispute as:
"unilateral restructuring of the PVC Division without proper
consultations which affected our members' employment".
And in regard to the relief sought, the referral articulated the
following prayer:
"Company to consult bona fide before embarking onto this programme as
already done and also indicated the
date for implementation being 31 July 1997."
[16] The contention of the respondent was that that dispute is so distant from
the one which is before this court that the differences cannot be
reconciled. It is clear that what is in issue before the court is
whether or not the individual applicants were unfairly dismissed. It is
of course made plain that the foundation for the complaint of unfairness
has its root in noncompliance with the provisions of section 189 of the
Labour Relations Act.
[17] In addition to what appears from the record as such, the evidence revealed
what had transpired at the conciliation meeting before the commissioner
of the CCMA on 18 August 1997. The evidence of Mrs Strydom, a human
resources practitioner engaged by the respondent, who had made a
contemporaneous note was indeed the only meaningful information on what
did transpire on that day. The evidence of the trade union official,
Ngcana, did not in any material respect challenge or contradict what was
recorded there. When regard is had to what was included in her notes,
one sees once again a fair reflection of the dispute which was
articulated on the Form 7.11.
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[18] Various complaints were raised. One seemed to focus on the role which Mr
Kobotwane, an employee representative and member of the union, played in
certain meetings which were convened. There were also complaints
concerning the noninvolvement of the
union or its individual members in the consultations. Ultimately the
meeting ended inconclusively. One thing that is odd when one has regard
to the evidence of what took place is the decision of the commissioner
in his certificate which he issued on that same day, to describe what
had taken place as a dispute concerning unfair dismissal, with reference
to section 189. It is common cause that the five applicants were not,
as at 18 August dismissed. Their dismissal in fact took place only on
15 September. To the extent to which a debate could have been conducted
on 18 August it could not have been premised on the basis that they had
been dismissed. It is plain when one examines what was referred to the
CCMA at that time and what is pleaded in this court that a different
dispute has in fact been placed before this court.
[19] However, if one adopted a generous approach to what is articulated as
having been referred it may bear a
different interpretation. I entertain this thought because there is
some support for a generous view in a judgment of the JudgePresident in
the Driveline decision to which I have already referred. In that
particular decision a party had referred a dispute alleging an unfair
dismissal for want of compliance with section 189 and it sought at the
trial stage to amend its pleadings to include an allegation based on an
automatically unfair dismissal. This was challenged on the basis that
it was a wholly different dispute. The JudgePresident found that in
his view it was not that different that it could not be encapsulated by
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the dispute which had been referred. If one takes that generous view, I
suppose it is possible to conclude that the nature of the dispute
referred to conciliation and deliberated upon on 18 August, could,
conceptually, have contemplated the imminent dismissal of the
individuals and on that basis the day may well be saved from the
applicants' point of view. That approach, if adopted, would dispose of
the respondent's point. I shall assume, without deciding so, that the
referral and the pleaded case are on common ground.
[20] The key controversy in this case relates to the question of whether or not
it can be found that the five applicants were party to the dispute which
was indeed referred to the CCMA on 21 June 1997.
[21] The respondent company was at the time a gargantuan organisation with
plants in several places in South Africa. One such place was in the
vicinity of Sasolburg where, so the evidence disclosed, several plants
or factories or business units, as the case may be, were situated,
geographically distinct from each other on a tract of land some 12
square kilometres in extent, known as 'Midlands'. Amongst the business
units which are situated on the site was one factory known as the PVC
Division and another known as the Polyethylene Division. These are the
two divisions that are central to the controversy. In addition to that,
a central head office
establishment was also in existence, geographically distinct from all
other factories. At that head office was situated the industrial
relations department where Steenkamp and Slier, who are mentioned in the
evidence, had their offices.
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[22] The five applicants worked at the polyethylene plant. They did not work
at the PVC plant but certain other
workers, including one Mkwanazi, worked there. They were all members
of the union. During 1997 restructuring took place within the
respondent's concerns. At more or less the same time restructuring of a
radical nature took place in both the PVC Division and in the
Polyethylene Division. The places are about half a kilometre apart. In
each case the company furnished notices to the respective workers
informing them of the risk of retrenchment. Workers in the polyethylene
factory, including the five applicants, received a notice dated 13 March
1997. Workers in the PVC Division received notices dated 1 April 1997.
[22] In the respondent's operations three principal unions were active, the
South African Chemical Workers Union, the Mine Workers Union and the
first applicant, the Chemical Workers Industrial Union. The company
applied a principle of giving recognition to any union that had members
in excess of a 15% proportion of employees on a site. The Chemical
Workers Industrial Union enjoyed recognition at various sites where they
exceeded that threshold but did not enjoy recognition at the Midlands
site. At
Midlands it was the South African Chemical Workers
Union and the Mine Workers Union which enjoyed such recognition. This
is a significant fact because it explains why, although consultations
occurred with certain unions, the Chemical Workers Industrial Union was
not notified. As a result, when its members in both the PVC plant and
in the polyethylene plant received notices telling them of their jobs
being in jeopardy, the union was not itself at the same time notified.
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[24] When exactly the first applicant trade union became aware of these events
is not clear but the union announced its awareness in a letter which it
sent to the Group Industrial Relations Department on 29 May 1997. This
correspondence is central to the controversy and it is necessary to look
closely at what passed between the parties. On 29 May Ngcana, the union
official who dealt with these matters throughout the course of events,
wrote a letter to the respondent for the attention of Steenkamp, the
then Group Industrial Relations Manager, as follows:
"Dear Sir
Re: Retrenchment
It came to our attention that the company has issued notification
letters with an intention to
carry out illegal retrenchments in the warehouse section. We want to
bring to your attention that the company has not complied with the
provisions of the LRA, section 189 thereof, as we are by no means party
to your retrenchment policy. We therefore demand that this action be
stopped at once and proper consultation process takes its course,
failing which we shall refer this dispute to the CCMA for legal
recourse."
What is significant, of course, is that this letter gives no indication
of who is involved, where they work or, indeed, what had been
communicated by individuals to the union in regard to the plans of the
company which might lead to retrenchment.
[25] This letter was received by the respondent and dealt with by Slier, the
Industrial Relations specialist. On 6 June he responded to the union's
letter saying the following:
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"Could you please provide the company with more specific information
regarding the above. On receipt of your response the company will be in
a more favourable position to investigate and reply according to your
specific concerns."
The company in requesting better and further particulars acted properly.
There may be some question mark about whether or not this letter was
carefully composed so as not to disclose any information to the union
and that may indeed be a warrantable inference. It is not necessary for
me to decide on it, but in so far as Ngcana gave voice to the fact that
he regarded the response as a delaying tactic, it is not hard to realise
why he did not take this letter at face value.
[26] What then happened was that on 12 June Ngcana wrote a further letter in
which he said the following:
"Retrenchment
Further to your response dated the 6th June 1997 we hereby wish to send
you a copy sent to one of our members. We must further add that should
this company intend to continue with this unfair labour practices, we
shall be compelled to obtain an order from the court restraining the
company not to continue, including an order for costs.
We thus demand an undertaking by yourselves by return fax not later than
the close of business, 20 June 1997, that the action will be postponed
pending proper consultation as outlined in the Act."
Attached to that letter is a document critical to the case. It was a
letter sent to T A Mkwanazi. It is dated 1 April. It was signed by Mr
E Roper who described himself as the operations manager, PVC Division.
The document is on a letterhead of 'Polifin, PVC Division' and Mkwanazi
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is addressed as being in the "Warehouse Section, PVC Operations
Department, PVC Division".
[27] On receipt of this communication Slier, on behalf of the respondent,
addressed a letter dated 13 June in which he described the subject he
was dealing with as "Restructuring at the PVC Warehouse Section" and he
invited a meeting with the union.
[28] On 16 June the union responded and at this stage entitled its
correspondence "Retrenchment at the PVC Warehouse". Thereafter further
correspondence passed in which some reference in one way or another to
the PVC Warehouse was maintained.
[29] A meeting was held on 17 June. It was not fruitful. It is not common
cause as to what exactly passed. The respondent contends that it broke
down on the basis of the union demanding that it be involved in the
retrenchment consultations, something which was
contrary to the recognition policy of the company. The union's version
is that it demanded that either the union or its individual members must
be properly consulted.
[30] What followed shortly thereafter on 21 June was the referral to the CCMA,
and on 18 August the consequent fruitless conciliation meeting took
place.
[31] What is possible to deduce from that record and from the testimony in
relation thereto is that only the PVC Division (to the exclusion of the
Polyethylene Division) was referred to. Respondent's representatives
say, in their testimony, that they had no idea throughout this period
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that the grievances of individuals in the Polyethylene Division were in
the least degree part and parcel of what was being complained about.
There is indeed not as much as a hint of evidence that they did become
aware at any relevant time.
[32] The only source for the idea that the complaints articulated in the
correspondence and the reference of a dispute on 21 June to the CCMA,
were intended to include the polyethylene warehouse and its workers,
including the five applicants, is the testimony of
the union organiser, Ngcana. Other than his evidence there is no other
source from where that idea emerges.
[30] Ngcana testified that he was ignorant at the relevant time of the
significance of the divisional set up within the respondent's
organisation. The absence of recognition of his union rendered it
unnecessary, and perhaps inappropriate, for him to visit the site. It
was not disputed that he had never been to the site although it was
suggested to him that any casual observation would have indicated the
geographic distinctness of the various divisions. I am satisfied that I
can accept that Ngcana was ignorant of the divisional set up at the
relevant time and that there was nothing from the respondent's
correspondence that would have alerted him to its significance at the
point at which it would have made any difference.
[34] He explains his references to the PVC Division as having been unconscious
and inspired by the correspondence which had come to hand. The
testimony indicates that the earliest correspondence to hand would have
been the letter of Mkwanazi which, as alluded to above, referred to the
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PVC Division. Clearly when that was furnished to Slier, Slier in his
correspondence, picked up on it and wrote back to Ngcana in like
fashion. The plausibility of an innocent misunderstanding arising is
manifest and it is not improbable that the references made by Ngcana to
the PVC Division were not necessarily, in his mind, limited to the PVC
Division and that he did so from ignorance. This is the perspective
which is consistent with the documentary record.
[35] What needs to be further examined is Ngcana's evidence that he was
conscious at the relevant time of the problems and grievances of the
five applicants in the polyethylene division. According to him, prior
to him sending his letter of 29 May to the respondent, various workers
came into the union office in Sasolburg to complain about retrenchments.
Amongst the workers who came in to complain were some of the five
applicants. These complainants gave him letters, some in the cast of
the letter sent to Mkwanazi and others in the cast of a letter dated 13
March which had been given to the five applicants. What appears on the
letters given to the five applicants is a matter of some significance.
They received letters dated 13 March 1997 on a letterhead upon which the
legend is inscribed 'Polifin,
Polythene Division'. They were addressed as being at the 'Warehousing
Section, Consumer Services Department, Polythene Division'. The letter
was signed by J Doherty, Distribution Manager, Polythene Division. If
Ngcana had had these letters prior to 29 May and had troubled to read
them, he would have been under no illusion that different letters had
been sent to individuals in the two divisions, giving not only an
indication of a divisionalisation but also, significantly, indicating
indication of a divisionalisation but also, significantly, indicating
that the date at which their potential retrenchment would take place was
different. The date of 31 August was designated in the applicants'
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letters of 13 March 1997 whereas Mkwanazi was told that he was at risk
from 31 July 1997.
[36] Ngcana explains his failure to respond to this information by saying that
he did not read all the letters. His evidence is that he received a
batch of letters and when he wrote to Slier in June 1997 he simply
picked Mkwanazi's letter from the top and did not apply his mind to any
of the others.
[37] There is, however plausible that explanation may be on its own terms,
reason to suspect the veracity of this evidence. Indeed, there is
reason to suspect
the veracity of his evidence in regard to his very possession of a
letter of 13 March at any relevant time and in consequence, the veracity
of his evidence that he was conscious of the complaints of those
individuals.
[38] Three grounds exist for the suspicions. The first is that he claims,
somewhat oddly, never to have read the letters. I have allowed in the
evaluation of his evidence for the prospect that for reasons of
slackness or pressure of other work (a consideration not unknown to
trade union organisations), that that may in fact have happened.
[39] The second consideration is, however, not capable of being excused. When
this case was pleaded in this court, not only did the claim refer
exclusively to the PVC Division, but the letters of 13 March 1997, self
evidently critical letters in the case of the applicants, were
conspicuous by their absence from the schedule of documents which is
required to be annexed to the statement of claim. What made their
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absence all the more astonishing was the inclusion of two letters
addressed to individuals in the PVC
Division of which Mkwanazi was one. If Ngcana indeed was in possession
of letters of both kinds from as
early as 29 May 1997, it is inexplicable why all of them were not
included with the pleadings. If the attorneys who drafted the pleadings
were in possession of such documentation, they could not have drafted
the pleadings as they initially read, to refer exclusively to the PVC
Division. No explanation has been advanced at all and the appropriate
inference is an adverse one.
[40] The third reason for suspecting the veracity of Ngcana's evidence derives
from what happened in the polyethylene division during the course of
late 1997. As alluded to earlier, the effective date of retrenchment
was 15 September 1997. It is common cause that a group of individuals
in the Polyethylene Division, including members of both SACWU and the
CWIU and including the applicants, referred a dispute concerning the
calculation of their severance pay to the CCMA. This was lodged on 6th
November 1997. Because of various difficulties, including a mixup in
regard to management being represented, the conciliation meeting did not
in fact proceed and the commissioner referred the matter immediately to
arbitration. That arbitration eventually was heard on 6 June 1998. At
that time the fact of no
conciliation was apprehended and the matter was resolved by way of a
conclusion of an agreement that the question of the calculation would be
revisited. The dispute was resolved on that footing.
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[41] The question which arises from that set of circumstances is why the
applicants should have made themselves party to a further, and indeed
individually initiated, dispute about the calculation of the severance
pay, when they already were the subject matter of a dispute concerning
the whole of their retrenchment which had been referred on 21 June 1997 .
No satisfactory explanation emerges either from the record or from the
testimony. It is strange, to say the least, if they had just emerged
from an encounter with their employer, having been represented by their
union, in regard to the unfairness of the way they had been treated,
they would then not return to the union with their complaint about a
further aggravating feature of their retrenchment in the form of
concerning the alleged miscalculation of their retrenchment package.
[42] The inference which is warranted from these circumstances is that the
workers in fact had not
been in any way involved in the earlier dispute and in fact had only
approached the union after the issue concerning their severance pay had
been resolved, ostensibly not to their satisfaction, whereupon an
endeavour had been made to facilitate an opportunity for this court to
consider their retrenchment complaints by piggybacking on the referral
of 21 June which indeed, as all the other evidence points to
convincingly, dealt only with the restructuring and the complaints
within in the PVC Division.
[43] In my view, the evidence is convincing that the five applicants were never
part of the dispute which was referred to the CCMA on 21 June 1997.
However, even if I were to reach a favourable point of view in regard to
the credibility of Ngcana, his own evidence does not go far enough to
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help his case. It seems to me to be manifestly obvious that in the
absence of any hint that anyone other than himself at the relevant time
had the polyethylene plant in mind, it cannot be said that any referral
of the dispute could have been achieved, the very least to be expected
of a person referring a dispute, being to articulate, objectively
speaking, a dispute which is capable of being understood to encapsulate
the persons and
issues subjectively contemplated by him. If I were to set a threshold
any lower than that, it would have the absurd result that
notwithstanding what words or gestures or conduct of a person referring
a dispute, the nature and scope of the dispute would be whatever that
person wanted it to be regardless of whether or not it was capable of
being understood in that way by any reasonable person. Selfevidently
such an approach will not serve the interests of sound industrial
relations.
[44] I may add, reverting once again to the debate concerning section 157(4) of
the Act, which refers to an attempt to conciliate. Even under the
generous terms of that section, an "attempt" must be more than just a
subjective intention and it must at least achieve the result of calling
the attention of the
other party to the existence of the dispute. There must be, in my view,
at very least proven facts which support the conclusion that a
reasonable person would have understood that the scope of the dispute
submitted to the conciliation process, encapsulated the issues or
persons concerned.
[45] As a result, on one or other footing, I am satisfied that Ngcana did
either not refer or did not succeed
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in referring a dispute encapsulating the five applicants to the CCMA on
21 June when that dispute was referred. The absence of such a refusal
is fatal for the reasons which have already been dealt with above. In
the circumstances the appropriate order is for the application to be
dismissed.
[46] In regard to costs, as a general rule the court has declined to make costs
orders where an ongoing relationship exists between an employer and a
union. The union, albeit not recognised at the Midlands site, has an
ongoing relationship at other places and it seems to me that that would
not be a distinction which would be appropriate to make in regard to the
way in which this discretion has usually been exercised. However, given
the reasons supporting the judgment, I am of the view that the policy
reasons in regard to the nonaward of costs must be dependent, not
simply on an ongoing relationship, but also have some bearing in
relation to the way in which the particular causa has been prosecuted.
I have expressed views concerning the way in which the union dealt with
this matter, which
understandably leads to the conclusion that much is left to be desired
in its approach. The pursuit of
this matter, was illadvised and, in my view, these considerations make
it appropriate that this is not a case where I should decline to allow
costs to follow the result.
[47] In the circumstances the order I make is that the application is dismissed
together with an order for costs.
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___________________
ROLAND SUTHERLAND
Acting Judge of the Labour Court
: ADV J G RAUTENBACH
: Cheadle, Thompson & Haysom
: ADV F G BARRIE
: Deneys Reitz
30 NOVEMBER 2000
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