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S v Young (620/95) [1996] ZASCA 106 (25 September 1996)

85 Reportability
Criminal Procedure
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Brief Summary

Criminal Procedure — Appeal — Grounds for appeal — Allegations of irregularity in legal representation — Appellant convicted of theft following guilty plea based on advice from legal representatives — Appellant later claimed that his representatives misled him regarding the facts of the case and the implications of his plea — Court of Appeal found that the alleged misconduct of the legal representatives constituted a gross irregularity that vitiated the trial, warranting the setting aside of the conviction without reference to the merits.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings took the form of a criminal appeal to the then Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) against the refusal of a review application. The appellant, J L Young, sought to have his conviction and sentence reviewed and set aside on the basis of alleged serious irregular conduct by his legal representatives. The respondent was the State.


The matter originated in the Klerksdorp magistrates’ court after the appellant’s arrest on 6 September 1993 on a charge of theft of a motor vehicle, namely a Ford Sierra allegedly stolen on 19 October 1992 from the premises of D & D Performance. After a guilty plea supported by a written statement under section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the proceedings were postponed for sentencing in the regional court in terms of section 122C(2)(a). The regional court convicted the appellant in terms of section 122C(3)(b) and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment.


An appeal against sentence was initially noted, but was later struck from the roll due to non-prosecution. The appellant then obtained new attorneys, sought condonation for the late continuation of the appeal, and additionally instituted a review application under Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court. Both the appeal against sentence and the review application were dismissed by the Transvaal Provincial Division (court a quo). Leave to appeal to the Appellate Division was granted only in respect of the refusal of the review application, and the appeal before the Appellate Division was accordingly directed at whether the conviction and sentence should have been set aside on review for irregularity.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned whether alleged misconduct by the appellant’s attorney and candidate attorney—said to have involved advice to conceal a co-perpetrator’s involvement and to present a false version—constituted an irregularity so serious that it rendered the trial proceedings invalid, even though the appellant had pleaded guilty.


Material Facts


The appellant was arrested on 6 September 1993 for theft of a Ford Sierra. Shortly after his arrest he was visited in the police cells by Mr H Hattingh, a candidate attorney employed by Mr G T Pretorius, an attorney at Klerksdorp. After consulting with Hattingh, the appellant signed a written statement under section 112(2) in which he admitted stealing the Sierra.


On 7 September 1993 the appellant appeared in the Klerksdorp magistrates’ court represented by Hattingh. He pleaded guilty consistently with the section 112(2) statement. The magistrate postponed the matter for sentencing in the regional court under section 122C(2)(a). In the regional court, Pretorius represented the appellant, and the regional court convicted him under section 122C(3)(b) and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment.


Following sentence, Pretorius noted an appeal against sentence and the appellant was released on bail pending the appeal. The appeal was set down for 6 May 1994 in the Transvaal Provincial Division but was struck from the roll when it was not proceeded with. The appellant later asserted on oath that he had instructed Pretorius to continue with the appeal and had never authorised its abandonment; he alleged Pretorius had decided unilaterally not to proceed because he believed there were no prospects of success.


Ahead of a later hearing date, the appellant launched a review application under Rule 53, also set down for hearing, in which he sought the setting aside of his conviction and sentence on the basis of alleged serious irregular conduct by Pretorius and Hattingh.


The factual foundation of the review application, accepted by the Appellate Division as the basis on which the application fell to be decided, was substantially the appellant’s version. The respondents did not materially dispute it in their answering affidavits; the investigating officer confirmed that the appellant’s initial statement implicated a co-perpetrator but the later statement did not. Pretorius filed an affidavit acknowledging Hattingh had been employed as his candidate attorney, indicating Hattingh had since terminated his articles and could not be located, and stating he was not prepared to give further comment despite requests to respond to the appellant’s allegations. No affidavit from Hattingh was obtained.


On the appellant’s version, immediately after arrest he told the investigating officer, Lieutenant Reynecke, that Mr Theo Swanepoel was “cop in one mus” with him and had been a co-perpetrator in the theft. The appellant alleged he had not previously known Hattingh and neither he nor his family had instructed Hattingh to act; he asserted Hattingh told him Swanepoel had instructed Hattingh to represent him. The appellant further alleged that Hattingh advised him to lie to the police by stating that he had acted alone, and advised him to plead guilty. Hattingh allegedly indicated that, because the appellant was a first offender, the court would impose only a fine, and that Swanepoel would pay the fine and legal costs. The appellant claimed he was shocked after arrest and followed this advice.


Consistently with that advice, the appellant alleged that he made a later written statement omitting any reference to Swanepoel. He then pleaded guilty on the facts contained in his section 112(2) statement, in which he admitted all the elements of the offence and similarly did not mention Swanepoel.


The appellant further alleged that when Pretorius consulted with him before the regional court appearance, the appellant told Pretorius the “true facts,” including Swanepoel’s involvement, but Pretorius similarly did not convey those facts to the court. According to the appellant, Pretorius adopted the same stance that Swanepoel should not be implicated and that Swanepoel would ensure payment of a fine.


On the appellant’s account, Swanepoel’s role included an initial intention to remove electrical switches from the Sierra for Swanepoel’s own vehicle, followed by a proposal that the Sierra be removed so that additional parts could be used.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the conduct attributed to Pretorius and Hattingh constituted an irregularity in the criminal proceedings and, if so, whether it was an irregularity so fundamental and serious that it amounted per se to a failure of justice, rendering the proceedings a nullity irrespective of the merits.


A further question was whether, on the appellant’s own accepted version of events, the appellant could properly claim that justice had not been done where he knowingly participated in the concealment of Swanepoel’s involvement and was prepared to place a false version before the police and the courts for perceived personal advantage.


The dispute therefore concerned a combination of legal characterisation and application of law to fact: the legal classification of the alleged conduct as an irregularity, the normative assessment of whether it was “fatal” in the sense described in the appellate jurisprudence, and whether public policy and the proper administration of justice justified setting aside the proceedings on that basis in the circumstances presented.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter by first identifying the governing framework for irregularities in criminal trials. Drawing on established appellate authority, it distinguished between irregularities that are so gross and fundamental that they vitiate proceedings without any need to consider the merits, and irregularities of a lesser kind which permit separation of defective from sound aspects and, where appropriate, an assessment of whether a proper court would inevitably have convicted.


In explaining this framework, the court referenced the jurisprudence distinguishing “fatal irregularities” from less serious procedural missteps. It noted the approach in S v Moodie 1961 (4) SA 752 (A), where the irregularity was treated as so gross that it constituted a failure of justice per se, making it unnecessary to consider whether a conviction would inevitably have followed. It also referred to S v Naidoo 1962 (4) SA 348 (A), read together with S v Naidoo 1962 (2) SA 625 (A), for the proposition that some irregularities allow a court to consider merits and decide whether the conviction can stand on admissible material, with consequences for whether a re-trial is permissible. The court further relied on S v Mushimba en Andere 1977 (2) SA 829 (A) to emphasise that whether justice has been done is not synonymous with factual innocence or guilt, but depends on whether proceedings met fundamental requirements of law and fairness, and that the analysis involves considerations of public policy. It also cited S v Mkhise; S v Mosia; S v Jones; S v Le Roux 1988 (2) SA 868 (A), which reaffirmed the inquiry as whether the irregularity is so fundamental and serious that public policy and proper administration of justice require it to be treated as fatal.


Applying those principles, the court accepted—on the premise that the appellant’s factual allegations were to be taken as true for the purpose of the review—that the conduct of Pretorius and Hattingh could not be described as anything other than irregular. On the appellant’s version they had acted in the interests of Swanepoel rather than the appellant, and persuaded the appellant to withhold the full facts from the police and the court in order to conceal Swanepoel’s involvement.


However, the court’s decisive reasoning lay in its assessment of the appellant’s own participation and knowledge. On the accepted version, the appellant was fully aware that Hattingh’s involvement was initiated by Swanepoel rather than by the appellant or his family. The appellant also knew, after consultation, that Swanepoel’s involvement was to be kept secret “at all costs,” and he was willing to do so. It was the appellant himself who provided the later version omitting Swanepoel’s role, and who signed the section 112(2) statement likewise omitting it. The court therefore treated the appellant as the person who knowingly withheld the true state of affairs from the police and the court, and who did so willingly.


The court also considered the appellant’s motivation as presented on his own papers. It noted that, if the plan had succeeded, Swanepoel would have paid the fine and costs and the appellant would have benefited. The appellant relied on a document attached to his affidavit which the court characterised as a purported acknowledgement of debt under which Swanepoel would pay him R4000 at R500 per month. The court viewed the appellant’s attempt to rely on the concealed “true facts” only after imprisonment rather than a fine had been imposed as inconsistent with the interests of justice.


On that basis, the court held that the appellant could scarcely contend that justice had not been done. It concluded that it would rather be contrary to justice to permit the appellant, in those circumstances, to rely on the irregularity to set aside the proceedings. In addition, and independently, the court held that the irregularity was in any event not of such a serious nature that it could, per se, vitiate the entire process. Having found that the proceedings were not null, the court considered it decisive that, on the appellant’s own accepted account, he was guilty of the theft and had been correctly convicted.


Outcome and Relief


The appeal was dismissed. The court therefore refused to set aside the conviction and sentence on review. No separate costs order is recorded in the judgment.


Cases Cited


S v Moodie 1961 (4) SA 752 (A).


S v Naidoo 1962 (2) SA 625 (A).


S v Naidoo 1962 (4) SA 348 (A).


S v Mushimba en Andere 1977 (2) SA 829 (A).


S v Mkhise; S v Mosia; S v Jones; S v Le Roux 1988 (2) SA 868 (A).


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 112(2).


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 122C(2)(a).


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 122C(3)(b).


Criminal Code, section 370(c).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 53.


Held


The court held that, accepting the appellant’s version as true, the conduct of the attorney and candidate attorney was irregular in that it involved advancing the interests of an alleged co-perpetrator and encouraging concealment of relevant facts from the police and the courts. It nevertheless held that the appellant, who knowingly and willingly participated in the concealment and did so for anticipated personal benefit, could not in the circumstances establish that justice had not been done.


The court further held that the irregularity was not, in any event, of such a fundamental and serious nature as to vitiate the proceedings per se. Because the proceedings were not a nullity and because the appellant’s own accepted account established his guilt, the conviction was not set aside and the appeal was dismissed.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


An irregularity in criminal proceedings may, depending on its nature and degree, amount per se to a failure of justice that vitiates the proceedings, in which event a conviction may be set aside without reference to the merits. Less serious irregularities do not automatically vitiate proceedings and may permit consideration of whether a conviction would inevitably have followed on a proper approach to admissible material.


Whether an irregularity is “fatal” depends on whether it is so fundamental and serious that the proper administration of justice and considerations of public policy require the proceedings to be treated as invalid. The concept of “justice having been done” in this context concerns the fairness and lawfulness of the proceedings rather than the accused’s factual innocence or guilt, and it requires evaluation in light of the circumstances of the particular case.


Where an accused knowingly participates in the withholding or distortion of facts and later seeks to invoke the irregularity arising from that conduct, the court may treat such reliance as inconsistent with justice in the circumstances, particularly where the accused acted willingly and for perceived personal advantage.

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[1996] ZASCA 106
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S v Young (620/95) [1996] ZASCA 106 (25 September 1996)

Saaknommer: 620/95
IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA (APP
LAFDELING)
In die saak tussen:
J L YOUNG
Appellant
en
DIE STAAT
Respondent
Coram: HEFER, F H GROSSKOPF, MARAIS, SCHUTZ et
ZULMAN ARR
Verhoordatum:
27 AUGUSTUS 1996
Leweringsdatum:
25 SEPTEMBER 1996
UITSPRAAK
2
F H GROSSKOPF AR:
Die appellant is op 6 September 1993 op 'n aanklag van diefstal van 'n motorvoertuig gearresteer. Die bewering in die klagstaat was
dat hy 'n Ford Sierra motor ("Sierra") op 19 Oktober 1992 by die besigheidsperseel van 'n sekere D & D Performance
gesteel het.
Kort na sy arrestasie is die appellant besoek deur 'n sekere mnr H Hattingh ("Hattingh"), 'n kandidaatprokureur in diens
van 'n sekere mnr G T Pretorius ("Pretorius"), 'n prokureur van Klerksdorp. Nadat die appellant die saak met Hattingh bespreek
het, het hy 'n skriftelike verklaring ingevolge die bepalings van art 112 (2) van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 ("die wet")
onderteken waarin hy erken het dat hy die Sierra gesteel het. Die appellant het op 7 September 1993 in die Klerksdorpse landdroshof
verskyn. Hy is tydens die verrigtinge in daardie hof deur Hattingh verteenwoordig. Die appellant het skuldig gepleit op die aanklag
van diefstal van die Sierra soos in sy verklaring uiteengesit. Daarna het die landdros die verrigtinge ingevolge art 122 C (2) (a)
van
3
die wet tot 29 Oktober 1993 verdaag vir vonnis deur die streekhof.
Pretorius het die appellant tydens die verrigtinge in die streekhof bygestaan. Die streekhof het die appellant ingevolge die bepalings
van art 122 C (3) (b) van die wet skuldig bevind aan die aanklag waarop hy skuldig gepleit het, en hom vervolgens tot 4 jaar gevangenisstraf
gevonnis.
Pretorius het namens die appellant app
l teen die vonnis aangeteken, en die appellant is op borgtog vrygelaat hangende die aanhoor van die app
l. Die app
l sou op 6 Mei 1994 in die Transvaalse Provinsiale Afdeling aangehoor word, maar is by verstek van die rol geskrap.
Die appellant het nuwe prokureurs aangestel en op 19 Desember 1994 het hulle namens die appellant kennis gegee dat hy by die aanhoor
van die app
l aansoek om kondonasie vir die laat-voortsetting van die app
l sal doen. Die appellant beweer in sy eedsverklaring ter ondersteuning van die kondonasie aansoek dat hy Pretorius opdrag gegee
4
het om die app
l teen vonnis voort te sit en dat hy nooit toestemming verleen het dat die app
l laat vaar word nie. Volgens die appellant het Pretorius hom egter na die tyd meegedeel dat hy van oordeel was dat die app
l geen vooruitsig op sukses gehad het nie. Pretorius het op eie houtjie besluit om nie met die app
l voort te gaan nie.
Die app
l sou weereens op 13 Maart 1995 aangehoor word. Met die oog op daardie verskyning het die appellant op 13 Februarie 1995 'n hersieningsaansoek
ingevolge re
l 53 van die Eenvormige Hofre
ls geloods wat ook vir 13 Maart 1995 op die rol geplaas is. In die hersieningsaansoek het die appellant gevra dat sy skuldigbevinding
en vonnis hersien en ter syde gestel word op grond van sekere beweerde emstige onre
lmatige optrede van Pretorius en Hattingh.
Beide die app
l en die hersieningsaansoek is op 13 Maart 1995 uitgestel en het uiteindelik op 15 September 1995 voor die Transvaalse Provinsiale
Afdeling gedien. Sowel die app
l teen die vonnis as die hersieningsaansoek is toe deur die hof a quo afgewys. Die hof a quo het
5
egter verlof aan die appellant verleen om teen die afwysing van die hersieningsaansoek na hierdie hof te appelleer.
In sy eedsverklaring in die hersieningsaansoek sit die appellant uiteen wat die beweerde onre
lmatige optrede van Pretorius en Hattingh was. Die appellant meld dat hy na sy arrestasie op 6 September 1993 sekere mededelings aan
die ondersoekbeampte, luitenant L Reynecke, gemaak het. Hy het hom onder andere meegedeel dat 'n sekere mnr Theo Swanepoel ("Swanepoel")
kop in een mus met hom was en dat Swanepoel 'n mededader by die pleging van die diefstal was.
Die appellant verduidelik verder in sy eedsverklaring dat Hattingh kort daarna by die polisieselle opgedaag het waar hy aangehou was.
Hy beweer dat hy Hattingh nie voorheen geken het nie en dat n
g hy n
g enige van sy familielede Hattingh opdrag gegee het om hom te adviseer en by te staan. Hattingh het trouens vir hom ges
dat hy opdrag van Swanepoel het om namens die appellant op te tree. Volgens die appellant het Hattingh hom toe geadviseer om 'n leuen
aan die polisie te
6
vertel deur te s
dat hy alleen by die diefstal betrokke was en dat sy vorige verklaring aan die polisie foutief was vir sover hy Swanepoel by die
diefstal betrek het. Hattingh het die appellant verder aangeraai om skuldig te pleit op die aanklag van diefstal. Volgens die appellant
het Hattingh aan hom verduidelik dat aangesien hy 'n eerste oortreder was, die hof hom slegs 'n boete sou opl
. Hattingh het bygevoeg dat Swanepoel daardie boete sou betaal, asook die regskoste met betrekking tot die verhoor. Die appellant
beweer dat hy na sy arrestasie in 'n geskokte toestand was en dat hy as gevolg daarvan Hattingh se advies gevolg het.
Die appellant beweer voorts in sy eedsverklaring dat hy na aanleiding van Hattingh se advies 'n skriftelike verklaring by die polisie
afgel
het waarin hy die weergawe soos deur Hattingh voorgestel, uiteengesit het. Volgens die appellant was die ondersoekbeampte baie ontevrede
oor die gewysigde weergawe wat toe geen melding van 'n tweede oortreder gemaak het nie.
7
Die appellant verduidelik verder in sy eedsverklaring in die hersieningsaansoek dat hy op 7 September 1993 in die landdroshof verskyn
het en dat hy toe op advies van Hattingh skuldig gepleit het. Dit was gedoen op grond van die erkennings en feite vervat in sy artikel
112 (2) verklaring. In hierdie verklaring het die appellant al die wesenlike elemente van die misdryf erken sonder om enigsins te
verwys na die rol wat Swanepoel by die beplanning en pleging van die diefstal sou gespeel het.
Die appellant meld verder in sy eedsverklaring in die hersieningsaansoek dat Pretorius op 29 Oktober 1993 namens hom in die streekhof
verskyn het. Tydens 'n konsultasie die vorige dag het die appe
lant na bewering ook aan Pretorius "die ware toedrag van sake" meegedeel. Volgens die appellant het Pretorius egter nie
hierdie ware feite aan die hof oorgedra nie. Pretorius se houding was nes di
van Hattingh, naamlik dat Swanepoel nie by die aangeleentheid betrek moes word nie en dat hy dan sou toesien tot betaling van die
appellant se
8
boete.
Die appellant verduidelik in sy eedsverklaring watter rol Swanepoel by die diefstal van die Sierra gespeel het. Volgens hom wou Swanepoel
aanvanklik slegs sekere elektriese knoppies van die Sierra verwyder om in sy eie motor te gebruik. Later het Swanepoel egter voorgestel
dat hulle die Sierra moes verwyder sodat hulle ook ander onderdele van die Sierra kon gebruik.
Die respondente in hierdie hersieningsaansoek was die betrokke landdros en streeklanddros asook die prokureur-generaal. Die bewerings
wat die appellant in sy eedsverklaring in die hersieningsaansoek gemaak het, word nie betwis in die beantwoordende eedsverklarings
wat namens die respondente ingedien is nie. Die ondersoekbeampte bevestig trouens in sy eedsverklaring die appellant se bewering
dat hy in sy aanvanklike verklaring aan die polisie vir Swanepoel by die diefstal betrek het, maar dat hy in sy latere verklaring
geen melding van 'n mededader gemaak het nie. Die respondente het ook 'n eedsverklaring van Pretorius voor die
9
hof geplaas waarin hy erken dat Hattingh as kandidaatprokureur vir hom gewerk het. Volgens Pretorius het Hatt
ngh sedertdien sy leerkontrak opges
en kon hy nie s
waar Hattingh hom bevind nie. Daar is ook geen eedsverklaring van Hattingh bekom nie. Pretorius erken verder in sy eedsverklaring
dat hy verskeie kere deur die kantoor van die prokureur-generaal versoek is om op die appellant se bewerings in sy eedsverklaring
te antwoord. Pretorius se reaksie op daardie versoek is kort en bondig soos volg in sy eedsverklaring vervat: "Ek is nie bereid
om enige verdere kommentaar daarop te lewer nie." In die omstandighede moet die hersieningsaansoek dus beoordeel word aan die
hand van die feite soos deur die appellant in sy eedsverklaring uiteengesit.
Die appellant se advokaat het betoog dat die onbetwiste weergawe van die appellant aantoon dat Pretorius en Hattingh met opset 'n
leuenagtige weergawe van die relevante gebeure aan die polisie, die landdros en die streeklanddros voorgehou het met die oogmerk
om hulle
10
werklike kli
nt, Swanepoel, se aandadigheid aan die diefstal te verdoesel. Hierdie optrede, so is betoog, was so grof onre
lmatig dat dit sonder meer tot nietigheid van die verrigtinge gelei het, ongeag of die appellant op sy eie weergawe skuldig was aan
die diefstal.
Ter ondersteuning van hierdie argument verwys die appellant se advokaat na onder andere S v Moodie
1961 (4) SA 752
(A) en S v Naidoo
1962 (4) SA 348
(A). In Moodie se saak was die appellant van moord aangekla. Dit was 'n jurieverhoor. Die jurie het die appellant skuldig bevind
aan moord, waarna hy ter dood veroordeel is. Op app
l het hierdie hof egter beslis dat die teenwoordigheid van die adjunk-balju in die kamer waar die jurielede beraadslaag het, so 'n
growwe onre
lmatigheid was dat dit daartoe gelei het dat geregtigheid nie geskied het nie en die proses dus nietig was. Holmes AR stel dit soos
volg op 759 C - D:
"It was so gross a departure from established rules of procedure that it can be said that the appellant was not properly tried.
In
11
other words it was an irregularity of such a nature as to amount per se to a failure of justice.
t is therefore unnecessary to enquire whether, on the evidence, a reasonable jury would inevitably have convicted if the deputy sheriff
had not been present."
Die saak van Naidoo het ook gehandel oor onre
lmatigheid in die
proses. In daardie geval is die appellant ook deur 'n jurie aan moord
skuldig bevind. Dit het egter geblyk dat die tolk wat die getuienis van
sekere getuies moes vertolk het, nie ingesweer was nie. Op app
l (1962
(2) SA 625 (A)) het die hof beslis dat daar wel 'n onre
lmatigheid was
deurdat die getuienis wat deur die betrokke tolk vertolk was, voor die
jurie geplaas was. Die hof het egter bevind dat die onre
lmatigheid in
daardie geval nie so 'n ernstige afwyking van die gevestigde prosedure
was dat dit per se tot nietigheid van die verrigtinge gelei het nie. Die
sku
digbevinding en vonnis is egter op app
l tersyde gestel op grond van
die bevinding dat die jurie op die oorblywende getuienis wat wel
12
toelaatbaar was, nie noodwendig sou bevind het dat die appellant skuldig
was nie. Die appellant is daarna opnuut van moord aangekla, maar die
verhoorhof het sy pleit van vorige vryspraak gehandhaaf. Op app
l
(1962 (4) SA 348
(A)) het hierdie hof beslis dat daardie pleit tereg deur
die verhoorhof gehandhaaf is. In die loop van die uitspraak verduidelik
Holmes AR op 354 D - H dat daar verskillende kategorie
van
onre
lmatighede bestaan:
"I would add a word of explanation why Moodie could be re-tried but not Naidoo. In each case there was an irregularity in the
first trial. But irregularities vary in nature and degree. Broadly speaking they fall into two categories. There are irregularities
(fortunately rare) which are of so gross a nature as per se to vitiate the trial. In such a case the Court of Appeal sets aside the
conviction without reference to the merits. There remains thus neither a conviction nor an acquittal on the merits, and the accused
can be re-tried in terms of sec. 370 (c) of the Criminal Code. That was the position in Moodie's case, in which the irregularity
of the deputy sheriff remaining closeted with the jury throughout their two hour deliberation was regarded as so
13
gross as to vitiate the whole trial.
On the other hand there are irregularities of a lesser nature (and happily even these are not frequent) in which the Court of Appeal
is able to separate the bad from the good, and to consider the merits of the case, including any findings as to the credibility of
witnesses. If in the result it comes to the conclusion that a reasonable trial Court, properly directing itself, would inevitably
have convicted, it dismisses the appeal, and the conviction stands as one on the merits. But if, on the merits, it cannot come to
that conclusion, it sets aside the conviction, and this amounts to an acquittal on the merits. In such a case sec. 370 (c) of the
Code does not permit of a re-trial. That was the position in Naidoo's case, in which the failure to swear an interpreter at one stage,
resulted in certain evidence being regarded as inadmissible."
In S v Mushimba en Andere
1977 (2) SA 829
(A) het hierdie hof
beslis dat die skuldigbevinding en vonnis van elk van die appellante in
daardie geval tersyde gestel moet word vanwe
'n volgehoue en
langdurige skending van die privilegie wat daar tussen die appellante en
hulle prokureur bestaan het. Die hof het bevind dat dit 'n
onre
lmatigheid was wat so ernstig van aard was dat geregtigheid
14
inderdaad nie geskied het nie. Rumpff HR beslis soos volg op 844 H -845 A:
"Die 'geregtigheid' waarna hier verwys word, is nie 'n begrip wat veronderstel dat die beskuldigde noodwendig onskuldig is nie.
Geregtigheid wat geskied het in hierdie sin is die resultaat wat 'n bepaalde eienskap van verrigtinge aandui. Die eienskap toon aan
dat aan vereistes wat grondbeginsels van reg en regverdigheid aan die verrigtinge stel, voldoen is. Die vraag of onre
lmatige of met die reg strydige verrigtinge in verband met 'n verhoor van 'n beskuldigde van so 'n aard is dat dit ges
kan word dat van daardie grondbeginsels nie nagekom is nie, en geregtigheid dus nie geskied het nie, sal afhang van die omstandighede
van elke geval en sal altyd 'n oorweging van publieke beleid vereis."
Daar kan ook verwys word na die beslissing van hierdie hof in die
saak van S v Mkhise; S v Mosia; S v Jones; S v Le Roux
1988 (2) SA
868
(A). Die gemeenskaplike faktor in die geval van elkeen van die
appellante was daarin gele
dat elkeen van hulle tydens sy verhoor
verteenwoordig was deur 'n persoon wat nooit behoorlik as advokaat
15
toegelaat was nie, maar wat bedrieglik gepraktiseer het onder die naam van 'n ander persoon wat wel so toegelaat was. Die hof het
tot die beslissing gekom dat die onre
lmatigheid in daardie sake so fundamenteel van aard was dat dit die verrigtinge in die geheel ongeldig gemaak het. Met verwysing na
vorige beslissings het die hof in daardie saak die basiese beginsels soos volg geformuleer:
"It is a well-established principle that an irregularity in the conduct of a criminal trial may be of such an order as to amount
per se to a failure of justice, which vitiates the trial. (I shall, for convenience, refer to an irregularity having such effect
as a 'fatal irregularity'). On the other hand, less serious and less fundamental irregularities do not necessarily have that effect."
(871 G)
"As the decisions in our law on the nature of an irregularity bear out, the enquiry in each case is whether it is of so fundamental
and serious a nature that the proper administration of justice and the dictates of public policy require it to be regarded as fatal
to the proceedings in which it occurred." (872 G)
16
Myns insiens moet daar in die onderhawige geval dus eerstens gevra word of daar 'n onre
lmatigheid plaasgevind het, en indien wel, moet daar vervolgens bepaal word of dit van so 'n ernstige aard was dat dit sonder meer
tot nietigheid van die proses gelei het. Volgens die appellant se weergawe, wat vir doeleindes van hierdie saak as die waarheid aanvaar
moet word, kan die optrede van Pretorius as prokureur en Hattingh as kandidaatprokureur sekerlik nie anders as onre
lmatig bestempel word nie. Hulle het eintlik die belange van Swanepoel behartig en nie di
van die appellant nie. In die proses het hulle die appellant oorreed om die volle feite van die polisie en die verhoorhof te weerhou.
Op die appellant se eie weergawe was hy egter terde
bewus van die feit dat dit nie sy familie nie, maar Swanepoel was wat vir Hattingh opdrag gegee het om hom by te staan. Die appellant
het na sy
17
aanvanklike konsultasie met Hattingh geweet dat Swanepoel se deelname aan die diefstal ten alle koste verswyg moes word. Die appellant
was heeltemal bereid om dit te doen. Hy was die persoon wat daarna in sy gewysigde verklaring aan die polisie en in sy art 112(2)
verklaring die rol van Swanepoel verswyg het. Hy was dus die persoon wat nie die ware toedrag van sake aan die polisie en die hof
openbaar het nie, en hy het dit heeltemal gewilliglik gedoen. In die omstandighede kan die appellant beswaarlik aanvoer dat geregtigheid
nie geskied het nie. En wat meer is, die appellant het dit vir eie voordeel gedoen. As alles volgens plan verloop het, sou Swanepoel
sy boete en regskoste betaal het. Die appellant steun trouens op 'n sogenaamde skulderkenning wat hy by sy eedsverklaring aangeheg
het waarvolgens Swanepoel hom R4000 teen R500 per maand moes betaal. Toe die appellant egter
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gevangenisstraf in plaas van die verwagte boete opgel
was, wou hy hom skielik op die ware feite beroep wat hyself verdoesel het. Na my mening sal dit eerder in stryd met geregtigheid
wees om die appellant onder hierdie omstandighede toe te laat om hom op die onre
lmatigheid te beroep. Daarbenewens is ek van oordeel dat die onre
lmatigheid in ieder geval nie van so 'n ernstige aard was dat dit per se tot nietigheid van die hele proses aanleiding kon gee nie.
En as die proses as sodanig nie nietig is nie, staan dit vas op die appellant se eie weergawe dat hy tereg skuldig bevind is.
Die app
l word gevolglik afgewys.
F H GROSSKOPF APP
LREGTER
HEFER AR
)STEM SAAM
MARAIS AR
)
SCHUTZ AR
)
ZULMAN AR
)

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