IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD IN JOHANNESBURG CASE NO
J4116/98
In the matter between:
MM PRETORIUS Applicant
and
BLYVOORUITZICHT GOLD MINING COMPANY LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGMENT
de VILLIERS AJ
1. This is an application in terms of section 191 (5) (b) (ii) of the Labour
Relations Act of 1995 (“the Act”) in which the Applicant claims that his
dismissal on 24 February 1998, based on the operational requirements of
the Respondent, was unfair.
1. Relative to the fairness of the dismissal, according to the pretrial
minute, the parties are agreed that:
1.1. the Applicant’s position as safety manager became redundant
due to a change in the respondent’s operational requirements; and
1.1. the Applicant is bound by the terms of a retrenchment
agreement concluded between the Respondent and the union of which the
Applicant was a member at the time the agreement.
1. What is in dispute, is that the Respondent failed to properly consider
possible avoidance measures and that the Respondent should have
considered the following possibilities:
1.1. the Respondent ought to have created a position of chief safety
officer at Category 18; and
1.1. the Respondent ought to have paid the Applicant the agreed
retrenchment package, appointed the Applicant to the new position and
retained the employee, who was appointed chief safety officer, in the
position he currently held (that of training officer).
1. In addition, the Applicant contended that consultations regarding the
dismissal of the Applicant were not conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the retrenchment agreement or in accordance with the
provisions of section 189 of the Act.
1. Evidence material to the dispute is as follows.
1. As a result of his position as safety manager becoming redundant, the
Applicant was requested by his immediate superior, the Respondent’s
general manager, Derek Steyn, to prepare a proposal on how his
department should be restructured.
2. Five alternative proposals, in which the Applicant suggests that he be
retrenched and either be demoted to chief safety officer/safety officer or be
employed on retainer as a consultant are attached to a memorandum from
the Applicant to Steyn dated 26 January 1998. In the memorandum, the
Applicant, inter alia , says the following:
“I realise that the mine cannot employ a safety manager, but must employ a chief
safety officer in terms of the Regulations [of the Mines and Works Act ]. I
propose that I be retrenched under the present agreement and be reengaged as a
chief safety officer. A retrenchment package could be used to pay the outstanding
amount due on my car and that monthly saving would make up for the lowered
monthly earnings over 3 years.”
1. It is common cause that the Applicant presented these proposals to the
mine’s forum (a body made up of representatives of the Respondent and
representatives of the various unions involved at the Respondent’s mine,
which was established as a consultative forum to consider the
restructuring of the Respondent) on 14 February 1998.
2. Steyn testified that, after the Applicant had made his presentation to
the forum and left, the forum, at the instance of the trade union
representatives, decided that a new position combining the position of
chief safety officer (which is a legal requirement in terms of the Mines and
Works Act) and training officer should be created. This was confirmed in
evidence by the Respondent’s Human Resources manager, Willie Boshoff.
3. Thereafter Bosoff advised Steyn that, in discussion with the Monitoring
Committee, (a structure established in terms of the retrenchment
agreement to deal with “specific cases”), it was agreed that the
Respondent’s training officer, a Willie Nelson, should be appointed to the
newly created position mainly because the failure to do so would result in
“bumping” (the term used when a senior employee’s position becomes
redundant and a more junior employee is retrenched in order to make way
for the senior employee) and that the Applicant should be retrenched.
“Bumping” is prohibited in terms of the retrenchment agreement.
4. On 20 February 1998, the Applicant was advised in writing that his
services with the Respondent had been terminated and he was given 30
days’ notice. However, it is common cause that he left the premises on 24
February 1999 and the parties agreed that his dismissal took place on that
date.
5. Steyn testified that after he gave the Applicant the letter advising him
that he had been retrenched, he “asked him to come back with things for
us to consider, proposals for his redeployment”.
1. Steyn testified that the Respondent could not afford to retrench and re
employ the Applicant in the new position because it would then also have
to pay Nelson a retrenchment package.
2. Boshoff conceded under crossexamination that the Monitoring
Committee (as constituted in terms of the retrenchment agreement) had
not considered the matter. Instead, he had consulted with a group of five
minebased union officials from a newlycreated union, UASA (a merger of
the Administrative, Technical and Electronic Association and OASA, the
Officials Association of South Africa, the latter of which the Applicant was a
member). He testified that this group agreed with his proposal that Nelson
be appointed to the new position and that the Applicant should be
retrenched. They agreed mainly because, to do otherwise, would have
resulted in Nelson being “bumped”. He explained that the forum had
delegated the monitoring function to union officials whose members were
affected by the decisions of the forum. These officials were required to
consult with the heads of departments whose employees were affected by
retrenchments.
3. The Applicant testified that he was unaware, at the time of his
retrenchment, that his union, OASA, had amalgamated with another. (It is
common cause that at the time of his dismissal, the dues being deducted
from his salary were deducted in the name of OASA and not UASA.) He
identified three of the five union officials who had discussed his position
with Boshoff as being officials of the Administrative, Technical and
Electronic Association and the only official representing the Applicant’s
union, OASA, as being an official from the Doornfontein and not the
Blyvooruitzicht mine.
4. Boshoff testified that the Applicant was insistent that he could not take
a demotion without being retrenched because he needed the severance
package to pay off debt which would enable him to afford the demotion.
He testified that the union officials he had spoken to had rejected the
Applicant’s proposal that he be retrenched and reemployed in the more
junior, newlycreated position because that would involve “bumping”
Nelson. He also confirmed that after the Applicant was given the letter
terminating his services (on Friday 20 February 1999) Steyn gave the
Applicant the opportunity to return the following Monday with further
proposals.
1. Boshoff also testified that, between the 14 and 20 February 1998, the
Applicant had approached him on a number of occasions to find out what
was going on. He had also had cause to counsel the Applicant because
he had heard that the Applicant had been telling other employees that he
was going to be appointed Chief Safety Officer. At these meetings, he
advised the Applicant that he could not tell him anything until he had
consulted with the union officials. The Applicant denied this saying that
Boshoff had told him that he (Boshoff) and he alone would make the
decision about who would be retrenched.
1. Taking the approach suggested by the Labour Appeal Court in
Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Limited v Chemical Workers Industrial
Union [1998] 12 BLLR 1209 LAC, I do not intend applying a mechanical
‘checklist’ to see if the provisions of section 189 of the Act have been
complied with in this case.
1. Against the background of the retrenchment agreement concluded by
the parties which set the rules by which the retrenchment of the Applicant
was to be effected, in order for me to determine whether the conduct of the
Respondent relative to the dismissal of the Applicant was fair, I believe the
following questions require consideration.
1.1. Did the Respondent have a fair reason to reject the Applicant’s
proposals?
1.1. Having rejected them, was the decision to select Nelson rather than
the Applicant for the newly created position fair?
1.1. Was the decision to retrench the Applicant made in accordance
with the agreed alternatively a fair procedure?
1. Answering the first question first. I have no reason to reject the
testimony of both Steyn and Boshoff that the reason why the Applicant’s
proposals were rejected was because the forum, at the instance of the
union representatives, decided it would make better business sense to
amalgamate the position of chief safety officer and training officer and
create a new position. From the evidence it appears that this was a
commercially rational and sustainable decision and that there was no
ulterior motive involved and therefore this Court cannot question the
commercial imperatives underlying this decision. (In this regard see
SACTWU & Others v Discreto (A Division of Trump and Springbok
Holdings) [1998] 12 BLLR 1228 (LAC). The Applicant adduced no
evidence to persuade me otherwise. In any event, because his union was
involved in the decision he is bound by that decision. I am therefore
satisfied that the Respondent has a fair reason to reject the proposals
made by the Applicant in favour of the decision taken at the forum
meeting. The Applicant’s contention that the Respondent ought to have
created the position of chief safety officer and appointed him to that
position cannot be sustained.
1. To answer the second question, I must have regard to the terms of the
retrenchment agreement relative to selection criteria. The agreement
clearly establishes the selection criteria in the event of retrenchment and
the process to be followed by the parties in implementing the criteria.
What falls to be considered is whether the Respondent applied the agreed
selection criteria and the agreed process for selection.
2. This raises a jurisdictional question. Because the criteria are contained
in the agreement (which complies with the definition of a collective
agreement in terms of the Act), I have considered whether, in fact, the
dispute is one which is covered by section 24 of the Act relating to the
dispute is one which is covered by section 24 of the Act relating to the
interpretation and application of a collective agreement. If this is so, then
the CCMA and not this Court has jurisdiction to determine the dispute by
arbitration.
3. Incidental and necessary, if not fundamental, to the determination of
the dispute concerning the fairness of the dismissal of the Applicant for
operational requirements, a function conferred on this Court in terms of the
provisions of section 191 (5) (b) (ii) of the Act, is a determination as to
whether the Respondent applied the agreed selection criteria and followed
the agreed procedure for selection as contained in the retrenchment
agreement.
1. By virtue of the provisions of section 158 (1) (j) of the Act which
empowers the Court to:
“deal with all matters necessary or incidental to performing its functions in terms of
this Act…… .”
I believe this Court does have the necessary jurisdiction to deal with this
aspect of the dispute.
1. The key agreed criterion, and the one applicable to this case, is that
special skills had to be retained. In this regard, the agreement requires
that heads of departments identify the skills to be retained and “motivate to
the relevant Full Time Officials” (Clause 2.3 and 3.1 of the retrenchment
agreement). Should the application of this criterion result in employees
ranking equally, then breadwinners and those with continuous group
service would be retained, in consultation with the Monitoring Committee.
2. The Respondent (as I understand its evidence through Steyn and
Boshoff) justifies its decision to place Nelson, and not the Applicant, in the
position of chief safety officer/training officer on two grounds.
2.1. Firstly, it claims that, operationally, in the amalgamation of the
two functions (safety and training), it made more business sense that the
safety function should be absorbed into the training function. In the words
of Boshoff, that “training should drive safety”. Nelson had superior training
skills to those of the Applicant and therefore his skills had to be retained at
the expense of the Applicant.
2.1. Secondly, the union representatives who consulted with Boshoff
agreed to this proposal mainly because to do otherwise would have led to
Nelson being “bumped”.
1. As I see it, when the Respondent decided to amalgamate the two
functions of chief safety and training officers, it created a new position.
The new position was on a different grade (Grade 18) to the positions held
by both the Applicant (Grade 20) and Nelson (Grade 16). Therefore as a
result of the creation of the new position both the Applicant’s position and
Nelson’s position became redundant and they both became contenders for
the new position. Hence, on the second point, the Respondent was
wrong. Nelson would only have been ”bumped” had the Respondent
decided to place the Applicant in the position of training officer and
retrenched Nelson as a result. With the creation of a new post on a
different grade, “bumping” did not come into the picture because Nelson’s
position had become redundant as well.
1. Hence, the critical decision on this aspect of the dispute is whether the
Applicant’s or Nelson’s skills were better suited to the newly created
position. In this regard, I must find for the Respondent. Once one accepts
(and I have no reason to doubt the testimony of Steyn and Boshoff in this
regard) that training was the core function in the newly created position,
one must then evaluate the two contenders’ abilities as trainers.
1. There is no doubt, on the evidence before me, that, while the Applicant
had some, not inadequate training skills, Nelson’s were far superior. He
had been head of the Chamber of Mines Training College and was
conversant with training in the full range of mining activity whereas
Applicant’s training was limited to the production of course materials in
loss control and the evaluation and production of course materials in and
presentations on the safety function only.
1. In order to find for the Applicant in this regard, I would have to second
guess the wisdom of people who are intimately involved in the industry and
know what skills are required. The Applicant failed to convince me that
his training skills were sufficient to make him rank equally with Nelson in
the race for the new position. Inequality in the ranking meant that, in terms
of the agreement, a consideration of his longer service in making the
choice between him and Nelson was irrelevant.
1. I therefore find that the selection criterion relative to the retention of
special skills was applied and that the selection of Nelson rather than the
Applicant for the newly created position was fair.
1. Which brings me to the third question namely whether the
Respondent’s decision to appoint Nelson to the new position and to
dismiss the Applicant, without further reference to the Applicant, was
effected in accordance with the agreed procedure alternatively a fair
procedure
1. In this regard, the Applicant contends that the process was flawed and
unfair because:
1.1. the Monitoring Committee, as constituted in the retrenchment
agreement, was not involved in the decision;
1.1. the union officials who met Boshoff and agreed to his
retrenchment were not fulltime officials; and
1.1. the officials who met Boshoff were not his representatives (they
were unknown to him, they did not know about his qualifications and
experience and were not sufficiently senior to represent his interests
properly).
1. As to the first point raised by the Applicant, the agreement does not
require consultations or discussion, where retention of skill is an issue, to
take place with the Monitoring Committee. As I understand the agreement,
the function of the Monitoring Committee is to monitor the progress of the
retrenchments and “specific cases”. I am unable to make a finding as to
whether the Applicant’s case would have qualified as a “specific case” as
no evidence was led in this regard.
1. As I see it, with regard to the second point raised by the Applicant, in
terms of the agreement, the Respondent was obliged to motivate and
discuss its proposal to appoint Nelson and not the Applicant to the new
position (because it involved the retention of special skills) with the full
time officials of the unions and associations which were party to the
agreement (in terms of clauses 2.3 and 3.1). There is no evidence before
me that the Respondent motivated its decision to keep Nelson and
retrench the Applicant with the fulltime officials. On the evidence, the only
discussion which took place with the fulltime officials was in the forum
where the decision to amalgamate the safety and training functions was
discussed. As to who had the skill to fill that position, that was still to be
determined.
1. On the Respondent’s own version, the people to whom Boshoff
motivated the decision to retain Nelson and not the Applicant were not full
time union officials but rather mine based officials and therefore the
Respondent was in breach of the written agreement
1. I have attached very little weight to Boshoff’s testimony that the forum
dispensed with the agreed procedures in favour of the procedure which
was followed and am in agreement with the Applicant’s argument that this
testimony is somewhat “suspect” for the following reasons.
1.1. Boshoff’s evidence in this regard was that of a single witness
and must, in any event, be treated with some caution;
1.1. Throughout his evidenceinchief, Boshoff represented to the
Court (as he had to Steyn) that agreement with regard to the appointment
of Nelson had been reached with members of the Monitoring Committee.
Only under crossexamination did he concede that the Monitoring
Committee (as constituted) had not been party to the discussion or the
agreement reached.
1.1. The evidentiary burden of proving that the written agreement
had been varied in the way alleged by Boshoff lies with the Respondent.
The Respondent adduced insufficient evidence in this regard persuade
me, on a balance of probability, that it had been varied and hence failed to
discharge the burden.
1. I therefore find that the Respondent did not follow the agreed
procedure.
1. The question then is: having departed from the agreed procedure, was
the procedure which was followed fair?
1. The Respondent argued that the departure from the agreed procedure
was technical in nature and that the only difference between the
representatives which took part in the discussion and the Monitoring
Committee as constituted in the agreement was the absence of two
management representatives at the meeting. In this way, contends the
Respondent, the Applicant got more rather than less representation that he
would have got had the agreed procedures been adhered to.
1. The Respondent has missed the point. What was required, in terms of
the agreement, given the criterion being applied, was motivation and
discussion with the fulltime union officials, not the Monitoring Committee.
Whilst it would be incorrect, generally, to adopt an overly formalistic
approach in respect of the status of an employees’ representatives in the
consultation process, the Respondent’s failure to consult with the fulltime
officials and rather rely on the fruit of discussion with the officials with
whom it alleges it did consult, in the circumstances of this case, is not a
mere technical breach of procedure.
1. There is a material difference between what fulltime union officials
bring to the process of consultation and what companyemployed shop
stewards contribute. Fulltime officials are, by virtue of their position,
independent of any company influence. Being paid from the dues of all
members they are able to enter into debates, such as the one raised by
the facts of this case, with greater objectivity and evenhandedness. Also,
fulltime officials have a greater depth of experience and knowledge of
what is required in a proper consultation process.
1. In this case it was even more important for the Respondent to engage
with the fulltime officials, at a distance from the mine, because Nelson
was himself a minelevel union official. The Appellant is justified in
querying the bona fides, objectivity and fairness of a process which
involved only the colleagues of his rival for the position.
1. The Respondent’s representative argued that, after Boshoff had told
the Applicant that the decision regarding his position would be discussed
with the union officials (on the evidence of Boshoff that was not challenged
in crossexamination), the onus was then on the Applicant to seek out
these officials and make representations to them. Although the Applicant
conceded that he could not recall everything Boshoff said, he was insistent
that he never believed he was going to be retrenched without being offered
reemployment as chief safety officer. He also testified that, at the time of
his discussion with Boshoff, he did not know about the forum decision to
create the new position.
1. From the evidence taken as a whole, it appears that, even if one
accepts Boshoff’s version, the Applicant had no reason, at that stage, to
believe that he was going to be retrenched without any alternative offer of
employment. For six days (between the date on which he made his
representations to the forum and the day he was advised that he had been
retrenched), the Applicant was kept in the dark, unaware that his proposals
at the forum had been rejected and that the “organized labour” officials that
Boshoff was talking to behind closed doors were not the fulltime
representatives that the Applicant knew and expected to be party to
discussions about his future. Had the Applicant been aware of what was
taking place, there might be a basis for the Respondent’s argument in this
regard. But, in the circumstances, there is no reason to for the Applicant
to have thought it necessary to brief his representatives.
1. Given the sensitivity of the choice facing the Respondent and taking
into account that the two key decision makers, Boshoff and Steyn, had
been at the mine but a few months, the Respondent was obliged to ensure
that the consultation process met the requirements of its own agreement
which ensured, where skills were being compared, an objective input from
the fulltime officials. Instead it disregarded the agreement and entered
into discussion with mine based officials from (on its own version and
merely the ipsa dixit of Boshoff) a newly formed union with scant, if any,
proof that the Applicant was even a member of the new union. (A copy of
the Applicant’s salary advice slip issued by the Respondent at the time of
the retrenchment indicates his membership of “OASA” not “UASA” (the
new union)). At best for the Respondent it seeks to rely on the fact that
one of the five officials who spoke to Boshoff was an official of OASA.
Boshoff did not contest that Applicant’s evidence that this official was in
fact from another mine and, as I understand it, had only been recently
transferred to Blyvoortuitzicht).
1. The facts of this case are not the same as those in other disputes
where this Court has found that employees are bound, through the law of
where this Court has found that employees are bound, through the law of
agency, by agreements reached between the employer and their union. In
those cases representations were made, from employee to employer, that
the union had the necessary authority to represent his or her interests in
the consultation process and hence they were estopped from denying the
authority. (In this regard see Ngcobo & Others v Blyvooruitzicht Gold
Mining Company J1178/98 unreported and Molatudi & Others v
Centurion College J2420/98 unreported). Here there was enough reason
for Boshoff to have been on his guard regarding these officials’ authority to
properly protect the Applicant’s interests in the consultation process and to
agree to his retrenchment particularly in view of the fact that, on Boshoff’s
version, the Applicant pestered him almost daily (during the six days
following the day on which the Applicant made his presentation to the
forum and the day on which the Applicant was advised that he had been
retrenched) for news of what was happening regarding his retrenchment.
This, in itself, must have alerted Boshoff to the fact that the officials that he
was consulting were not in touch with the Applicant.
1. The evidence of the Respondent’s witnesses suggests that further
consultation with the Applicant was unnecessary in any event because all
his proposals had envisaged him being retrenched and that, in discussion,
he had indicated that he could not accept a demotion without being paid
the retrenchment package. Also that he could not perform the work of
safety officer which involved “crawling around in the stopes”.
1. What the Respondent has lost sight of is that the Applicant’s proposal
(that he be retrenched) was inextricably linked to a condition that he
would either be reemployed or engaged as an independent contractor. It
was in this context that the Applicant voiced his financial and other
concerns. Confronted with a choice between demotion or the outright loss
concerns. Confronted with a choice between demotion or the outright loss
of work, the Applicant may have seen the picture a little differently.
1. The onus was on the Respondent to persuade me that it either
followed the agreed procedure or, having failed to do so, embarked on a
procedure which was fair to the Applicant. This it has failed to do. The
Respondent’s halfhearted attempt at redress after it advised the Applicant
that he had been retrenched by asking him to come back with suggestions,
does not take the matter any further. As the Applicant’s representative
correctly argued, giving the Applicant a final notice of termination coupled
with an invitation to return with suggestions after the weekend or merely
giving the Applicant an opportunity to make representations or give advice
does not satisfy the requirements of section 189 of the Act ( Chetty v
Scotts Select a Shoe (1998) 19 ILJ 1465 (LC); Ellias v Germiston
Uitgewers (Pty) Ltd [1997] 12 BLLR 1571 (LC)).
1. Hence, while I have no difficulty in finding that the dismissal of the
Applicant was substantively fair, the procedure was not.
1. Which brings me to a consideration of the appropriate remedy. The
Applicant has not asked for reinstatement and, in any event, it is not
appropriate having regard to the provisions of section 193 (2) (d) of the
Act. I must therefore consider the appropriate quantum of compensation
to award the Applicant.
1. In accordance with the principles laid down by the Labour Appeal Court
in Johnson and Johnson (supra), I have the discretion to award the
Applicant nothing or the statutory amount set out in section 194 (1) of the
Act an amount equal to the remuneration the employee would have
received between the date of dismissal and the last day of the adjudication
or arbitration.
1. The only guidance given by the Labour Appeal Court as to how this “all
or nothing” discretion ought to be exercised is at 1220A where Froneman
DJP says the discretion not to award compensation must be exercised
judicially and at 1220CD where he says the following:
"The nature of an employee's right to compensation under s.194(1) also implies
that the discretion not to award that compensation may be exercised in
circumstances where the employer has already provided the employee with
substantially the same kind of redress (always taking into account the provisions
of s.194(1)), or where the employer's ability and willingness to make that redress is
frustrated by the conduct of the employee."
1. Subsequent to Johnson and Johnson (supra), this Court has
introduced the principle of fairness into the equation. (See Whall v
Brandadd Marketing (Pty) Limited J1130/97 unreported ; Lorentzen v
Sanachem (Pty) Limited D637/98 unreported; de Bruyn v Sunnyside
Locksmith Suppliers (Pty) Limited J361/98 unreported)
1. Applying these guidelines to the facts of this case, the Respondent’s
offer to the Applicant, after its general manager had given him the letter
advising him of his retrenchment, to come back with “things for us to
consider, proposals for redeployment” (on the Applicant’s version he was
told that he could “come back on Monday if I had any questions or
suggestions”) does not amount to “substantially the same kind of redress”
(Johnson and Johnson (supra at 1220 C D)) and no evidence was
adduced to suggest that the Applicant frustrated “the employer’s ability or
willingness to provide redress” ( Johnson and Johnson (supra at 1220 C
D).
1. Although, by applying the statutory formula in section 194 (1) of the Act
the quantum is indeed substantial and some evidence regarding the
Respondent’s financial difficulties was led (that, at the time of the
retrenchment it was experiencing critical financial constraints due to the
low gold price and that it could not afford to retrench and then reemploy
the Applicant and retrench Nelson) no evidence was led as to the
Respondent’s inability to pay compensation should it be awarded. Given
the Applicant’s status with the Respondent, his age and what he lost by
way of benefits and income as a result of the retrenchment (he testified
that he lost R580 000 by having to cash in his pension three years before
time, that his monthly pension was R8 500 less than it would have been
had he been able to stay on until retirement and that the only employment
he had managed to secure earned him about a third of what he was
earning at the time of the retrenchment), fairness demands that he receive
some compensation for the unfairness and therefore I am bound to apply
the statutory formula.
1. More than 12 months had elapsed between the date of the Applicant’s
dismissal and the last day of the hearing of this dispute. Following the
reasoning of Maserumule AJ in Vickers v Aquahydro Projects (Pty)
Limited [1999] 6 BLLR 620 (LC) , I believe the Court must limit
compensation for procedural fairness to an equivalent of the remuneration
the employee would have earned over a 12month period. According to
the Applicant’s last payslip (dated 28 February 1998) his normal pay is
reflected as being R10 919,00. The only other amounts reflected under
the “Earnings” column are travelling claims (R473,00), a car allowance
(R4236,00) and share options (R15 733,31). Of these three amounts, only
(R4236,00) and share options (R15 733,31). Of these three amounts, only
the car allowance would qualify as remuneration (see Staff Association
for the Motor and Related Industries (SAMRI) v Toyota of South
Africa Motors (Pty) Limited [1998] 6 BLLR 616 LC) and it has therefore
been included in the calculation.
1. I therefore make the following order.
1.1. The dismissal of the Applicant was substantively fair but
procedurally unfair.
1.1. The Respondent is to pay the Applicant the sum of R181 860,00
(One Hundred and Eighty One Thousands Eight Hundred and Sixty
Rands) within 30 days of the date judgment.
1. There is no order for costs.
……………………………………
I de VILLIERS AJ
Date of Hearing : 24 27 May 1999
Date of Judgment : 25 August 1999
For the Applicant : Advocate S D Maritz
instructed by Tienus Roos Attorneys
For the Respondent : Attorney D J Pretorius