IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(Held at Johannesburg )
Delete whichever is not applicable:
Reportable : yes / no
Of interest to other Judges: yes / no
Revised
30 April 1999
Signature
Case
No: J2258/98
In the matter between :
NATIONAL BARGAINING COUNCIL FOR
THE ROAD FREIGHT INDUSTRY Applicant
and
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
REVELAS J :
[1] The applicant applied to this court for an order in terms of section 142(9)
read with section 33 (3) of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (“the Act”),
declaring that the first, second and third respondent, had committed contempt of
the applicant, the Bargaining Council for the Road and Freight Industry, in that
the first, second and third respondent were subpoenaed to appear before the
applicant but, failed to attend at the time and place stated in the subpoena..
[2] The applicant seeks an order directing the respondents to comply with the
subpoena and to direct the respondents to pay a fine or undergo imprisonment on
terms determined by this court.
[3] During argument the applicant’s legal representative, conceded that this is
not a matter were a prison sentence would be suitable, should I find that there was
contempt on the respondents part. I agree fully.
[4] The three respondents are members of a close corporation, which, on the
version of the first respondent, is currently dormant. However, despite its dormant
status, the close corporation, known as M A J Roets Vervoer CC, joined the
Allied, Small and Medium Business Organisation (“ASAMBO”) and continues to
be a member.
[5] According to the founding affidavit of the first respondent, one of the first
matters in which the close corporation was involved, which was referred to the
applicant, was a referral which the Transport and General Workers Union
( TGWU) made to the applicant, concerning an alleged dispute with the close
corporation about “victimisation of all the workers [of respondent] who had joined
the union [TGWU] and threat of dismissal, as well as bribery, to resign from the
union”.
[6] This dispute was served on the close corporation on 6 November 1997.
[7] The first respondent alleges that on behalf of the close corporation, he
requested that an official of ASAMBO represent the close corporation at the
conciliation process.
[8] By reason of the applicant’s “well known approach” to the conciliation
process, according to the first respondent, the conciliator refused that an official
of ASAMBO represent the close corporation. The conciliation meeting was then
scheduled for 13 January 1998. Following the applicant’s refusal that an official of
ASAMBO represented the close corporation, the first respondent was advised by
ASAMBO not to attend this scheduled conciliation meeting. The applicant then,
ASAMBO not to attend this scheduled conciliation meeting. The applicant then,
issued a certificate of outcome in which it was stated that the dispute remains
unresolved and made an endorsement in the certificate to the effect that, the
respondents “failed to attend the dispute hearing”. On this occasion none of the
respondents were subpoenaed.
[9] A further notice of a referral was served on the close corporation. This
dispute allegedly concerned the terminating of the services of an employee
without a fair reason and certain other allegations relating to alleged nepotism.
[10] According to the first respondent, the official from ASAMBO was not
permitted to represent the close corporation at the conciliation proceedings
pertaining to the latter dispute either. Subpoenas were issued against the three
respondents with which they did not comply.
[11] The first respondent avers that he was subsequently advised, by one of the
ASAMBO officials that the three respondents should not attend the conciliation
proceedings and they did not do so.
[12] It was the case for the respondents that the subpoenas had not been lawfully
served and are in any event invalid since no payment of witness fees accompanied
the subpoena or was even tendered in the subpoenas as required by section 142 (7)
of the Act. The provisions of section 142 and section 33 of the Act apply to both
Bargaining Councils and the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration.
[13] Furthermore, the respondent’s case is that they acted in accordance with the
advice of experts, namely, the employers’ organisation which they had joined.
They contend that they have been led to believe that their behaviour was lawful.
[14] According to the applicant, it sent to parties who had a dispute before it, a
certain standard letter, in which employer parties are warned that “ it is the policy of
the Council that an official of the company, who can give material information concerning
the events leading up to the dispute, and who is fully mandated to represent the company in
negotiations to settle the dispute, must attend , failing which a certificate of outcome will
automatically be issued to the applicant mandated consultants/lawyers attending a loan
will not be acceptable. The alternative would be to serve a subpoena in terms of section 2(1)
(A)(ii) of Schedule 7 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 compelling attendance, which
we would prefer to avoid.
Should you fail to attend the hearing without prior notification and good cause,
would so automatically result in the issue of a certificate of outcome to the
applicant(s)”.
[15] The respondents attached an example of the aforesaid standard letter
“JR11" to the founding papers and a letter containing the same information, which
was addressed to Interland Distributors, Cape Province. However, the
respondents , significantly, did not annex a copy of a similar letter addressed to
themselves by the applicant.
[16] According to the replying affidavit of the applicant, the three subpoenas
which were issued, were not intended for the close corporation, but for the
individuals concerned (the three respondents), so that the conciliation process
could be meaningful and could have the best chance of succeeding. The applicant
contends that it is its experience of conciliation and I accept this, both under the
present Labour Relations Act and its predecessor, that conciliation is impossible
where the parties who are involved in the dispute, who are able to give
information are not present and are not involved in the conciliation process.
[17] I agree with the contention of the applicant, that it was disingenuous of the
respondents to accuse the applicant of refusing to permit an official of their
chosen employers’ organisation to represent them. The standard letter, referred to
above, specifically makes the point that such an official cannot attend the
proceedings alone. According to the applicant, that was also the point of issuing
and serving the subpoena in the first place.
[18] Furthermore, common sense dictates that an official of an employers
organisation, when appearing alone and without the actual employers or managers
of the employer present, would be unable to give any meaningful input into the
of the employer present, would be unable to give any meaningful input into the
conciliation process. Since such a person does not work for an employer in
question, he or she would not have intrinsic and personal knowledge of matters
surrounding the dispute or of other aspects and facts, which directly impact on the
dispute which is to be conciliated.
[19] In my opinion, the three respondents are not in a position to argue that they
were acting “lawfully” by not complying with the subpoenas. If they acted on the
advice of ASAMBO, ASAMBO advised them wrongly and the respondents
should face the consequences thereof. It is their close corporation which is a
member of ASAMBO and they initiated its membership thereof.
[20] The respondents’ have objected to the method of issuing and service of the
subpoena’s on various, very technical, grounds. Some of these objections were
mostly disingenuous and I do not wish to go into them, in any great detail.
[21] Since the respondents refused to accept receipt of the subpoena’s, and that
is the case on the papers before me, the applicant is in my view not in material
breach of any rule which would render the subpoena’s a nullity.
[22] It may be advisable that the deputy sheriff, in my view, rather than an
employee of the applicant should serve such subpoena’s. However the fact that Mr
Du Plessis, an employee of the applicant served the subpoena’s, in my view, does
not amount to an irregularity.
[23] As insofar as the question was raised by the three respondents, that the
witnesses’ fees weren’t paid as required by the Act, the respondents also state at
the same time that they did not see the subpoenas. I also regard this objection as
somewhat disingenuous.
[24] The standard letter “JR11” is a warning and explanation of a failure of the
consequences to attend conciliations at the applicant. This is a further reason why
the three respondents should not be excused from not attending the conciliation
proceedings. They deliberately flouted the subpoenas, which they received, on the
facts before me.
[25] I, subsequent to argument by the parties, raised the question whether this
court should grant contempt orders where subpoenas have not been complied with,
when in civil matters in the High Court and Magistrates Court, a defaulting
defendant does not face contempt of court charges for failing to appear in court. I
wanted to know why an employer party should be treated differently when failing
to appear at a conciliation meeting. Further, supplementary heads of argument
to appear at a conciliation meeting. Further, supplementary heads of argument
were served by both the applicant and the respondents.
[26] On behalf of the applicant it was contended that in civil matters the
consequences of a defendant not appearing at court on the designated trial date, is
that default judgment will be granted against such a defendant. This is also the
case of course, in the Labour Court. Arbitration awards are made orders of court
and are executed if the respondent remains in default.
[27] Section 142(8) (a) of the Act provides that “ a person commits contempt if,
after having been subpoenaed to appear before the commissioner, the person without good
cause does not attend at the time and place stated in the subpoena.” This also applies to
officials of Bargaining Councils in terms of item 21 A (2) of Schedule 7 of the
Act.
[28] Neither rule 39(1) of the rules of the High Court nor rule 32(2) of the rules
of the Magistrates Court, have similar provisions. Both the aforesaid rules provide
that, when a defendant does not appear at a trial of an action, judgment may be
given against such a defaulting defendant.
[29] It was emphasised that in this matter, not the employer, but the three
respondents were served with subpoenas. Their position seems to be the same as
that of a witness, since they were the appropriate parties with the personal
knowledge, necessary to give meaning to the conciliation process. It was pointed
out to me that in the present matter I am not dealing with a trial, but rather with an
appearance, under power of subpoena, before a bargaining council.
[30] The point was also made that both section 32 of the Supreme Court Act and
section 51(2) of the Magistrates Court Act, deal with the method of procuring the
attendance of persons in civil proceedings as well as the penalties of non
attendance. Similarly, the Labour Relations Act, it was argued, pertains to the
method of securing attendance of individuals in section 142 (1)(a) of the Act as
read with item 21(A)2 of Schedule 7 to the Act, and formulates the consequences
for not complying with a subpoena, in section 142 (8)(a) of the Act.
[31] In the supplementary heads of argument in regard to the aforesaid, the
respondents’ attorney made the following remark “1. The respondents have read the
supplementary heads of argument submitted on behalf of the applicant and wish to state
that they associate themselves with the views expressed therein”
[32] It is quite apparent, and I agree with the applicant in this regard, that there
is clearly an intention on the part of all three of the Acts in question, to censure the
disobedience of a subpoena. Of further importance, in considering this question, is
the fact that the conciliation process intended to take place, is imposed by statute
on the parties, and is aimed at ending the dispute between the parties. This
consideration renders the issuing of subpoenas, in these circumstances, lawful and
appropriate in my opinion. The standard letter issued, merely echoed the
appropriate in my opinion. The standard letter issued, merely echoed the
provisions of the Act and is not an attempt to lay down a new procedure.
[33] In terms of the Act, the applicant was entitled to issue a subpoena to obtain
the presence of the three respondents at the conciliation hearing. The Act makes
provision therefore. The standard letter issued, reminded the respondents of its
provisions. The respondents wilfully did not comply with the subpoenas. They are
therefore in contempt of the applicant and should pay a fine.
[34] There are no guidelines to follow, as to what an appropriate amount would
be but I intend to impose a fine which I believe is appropriate in the
circumstances.
[35] Consequently, I make the following order:
(1) The first, second and third respondents have committed contempt of the
applicant in that:
(1.1) The first, second and third respondents, failed to appear before the
applicant, having been subpoenaed to appear.
(1.2) The first, second and third respondents failed, without good cause, to attend
at the time and place stated in the subpoena.
(2) The respondents are directed to comply with the above mentioned
subpoena.
(3) The respondents are to pay a fine in the amount of R 50000 each for
contempt of the Bargaining Council, such fine to be payable to the
Bargaining Council within 14 days of the date of this Judgment.
(4) The respondents are directed to pay the applicant’s costs in this matter.
E REVELAS
For the applicant : Mr Truebody
BOWMAN GILFILLAN HAYMAN GODFREY
For the respondent: Mr E Louw
ERIC H LOUW