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[2026] ZAGPJHC 97
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SGR Finance (Pty) Ltd v Centurion Med Inc and Another (100061/2024) [2026] ZAGPJHC 97 (9 February 2026)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO.: 100061/2024
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
09
February 2026
In the matter between:
SGR
FINANCE (PTY)
LTD
Plaintiff
and
CENTURION
MED
INC
First Defendant
ENGELA
MAGDALENA VAN WYNGAARDT
Second Defendant
JUDGMENT
Mahosi, J
Introduction
[1]
This is an opposed application for summary judgment in terms of which
the plaintiff, SGR Finance (Pty) Ltd, seeks payment
of R111 952.50
plus interest thereon, and costs against the defendants, Centurion
Med Inc. (the first defendant) and Ms. Engela
Magdalena Van Wyngaardt
(the second defendant).
[2] The defendants
have filed an affidavit resisting summary judgment, raising several
points
in limine
and substantive defences.
Background
[3] The plaintiff’s
claim arises from a Master Rental Agreement concluded on 22 May 2024,
in terms of which the plaintiff
rented telecommunications and office
equipment to the first defendant. The second defendant bound herself
as surety and co-principal
debtor.
[4] The plaintiff
alleges that the first defendant defaulted on its monthly rental
obligations, leaving arrears of R3 795.00
and future rentals
amounting to R108 157.50. The plaintiff issued a simple summons,
followed by a declaration. The defendants entered
an appearance to
defend and filed a plea. Dissatisfied with the defendants’
preliminary points and defenses, the plaintiff
launched this
application claiming that the defences raised by the defendants in
their plea do not raise any issue for trial. In
turn, the defendants
filed an affidavit resisting summary judgment.
Legal Framework
[5] Rule 32 of the
Uniform Rules requires the defendant to “fully” disclose,
in an affidavit, the nature and grounds
of the defence and the
material facts relied upon. It is trite that the summary judgment is
a “drastic” and “extraordinary”
remedy,
designed to prevent a defendant who has no
bona fide
defense
from delaying the claim. A court will grant summary judgment if the
plaintiff has made out a clear case and the defendant
has failed to
set out a
bona fide
and good-in-law defence. Thus, the Court
does not at this stage decide disputed issues of fact, but only
whether the defendant
has made out a
prima facie
case for
leave to defend.
[6] In the current
matter, the defendants raised five points
in limine
in their
affidavit resisting summary judgment. I deal with them in turn.
Points
in limine
Authority to depose to
the affidavit
[7] The defendants
argue that Ms. Natasha Domingo, the deponent to the plaintiff’s
founding affidavit, lacks authority
to bring the application on
behalf of the plaintiff, a juristic person. They contend that no
board resolution authorising her has
been attached.
[8]
It is trite that a deponent in motion proceedings need not prove
specific authorisation to depose to an affidavit. Only
the initiation
of the proceedings and their prosecution require authorization.
[1]
The plaintiff correctly referred this Court to a judgment in
Unlawful
Occupiers of the School Site v City of Johannesburg
[2]
,
where the Court clarified that challenges to the authority of someone
acting on behalf of an applicant should be raised under
Rule 7(1)
rather than as a preliminary issue.
[9]
Additionally, Rule 32(2)(a) provides for the affidavit supporting the
notice of application for summary judgment to be
made by the
plaintiff or any other person who can swear positively to the fact.
Thus, an affidavit made by a deponent other than
the plaintiff
himself does not require special authority from the plaintiff to be
valid. However, the deponent is required to state
that facts are
within his personal knowledge unless such knowledge appears from the
other stated facts.
[3]
[10] In the current
matter, the deponent is the plaintiff’s employee, the
Collections Manager. She deposes to facts
within her knowledge,
stating that she has full, direct access and control over the first
respondent’s accounts, records,
and other relevant documents
relating to this application and the main action proceedings. This is
not disputed. In light of the
above, the supporting affidavit is
compliant with the requirements of sub-rule 32(2). Consequently, any
points raised regarding
authority in this context are misconceived
and ought to be dismissed.
Plaintiff not the
contracting party / Lack of Locus Standi
[11] The defendants
contend that the plaintiff is not the correct contracting party. They
point to a clause in the guarantee
(clause 1), which refers to “Hirer
Pty Ltd”, arguing that this is a different entity from “SGR
Finance (Pty)
Ltd”. They also allege that the plaintiff ceded
the agreement to a third party (Digital One) and thus lacks standing
to sue.
[12] An examination
of the agreement as a whole makes it abundantly clear that “Hirer”
is defined as and refers
to SGR Finance (Pty) Ltd. The Master
Agreement cover page (Annexure A1 to the declaration) expressly
states: “ask us or Hirer
SGR Finance (Pty) Ltd” and the
debit order authority is in favour of SGR Finance (Pty) Ltd. The
reference to “Hirer
(Pty) Ltd” in clause 1 of the
guarantee is clearly a typographical error. The defendants’ own
correspondence, which
is the letter of demand from Hamel Attorneys
dated 21 June 2024, acknowledges dealing with “SGR Finance”.
[13] Furthermore,
the document the defendants rely on as a “cession”
(Annexure A5, the Payment Plan and Release
Note) states the agreement
“has been ceded “by us”, which in context refers to
the supplier ceding its rights
to the plaintiff, not vice versa. The
plaintiff’s
locus standi
is clear. Thus, this defense is
not
bona fide
and is subject to dismissal.
Claim not based on a
liquid document or for a liquidated amount.
[14] The defendants
argue the claim is not one for a liquidated amount of money as
required by Rule 32, because it requires
calculation and evidence. It
is trite that a “liquidated amount in money” is an amount
either agreed upon or capable
of speedy and prompt ascertainment. The
claim in this matter is for a specific sum of R111 952.50, comprising
admitted arrears
of R3 795.00 and the accelerated balance of future
rentals, amounting to R108 157.50, as per the fixed-term agreement.
The amount
is readily ascertainable from the agreement’s terms:
60 months at R1 897.50 per month. Furthermore, clause 9 of the
agreement
provides that a certificate signed by the plaintiff’s
manager shall be proof of the indebtedness. Such a certificate has
been provided as Annexure B1. It is apparent that the claim is
liquidated. As such, this point is dismissed.
Non-compliance with
Rule 32(2)(c)
[15] The defendants
argue the plaintiff failed to annex a “liquid document”
to its affidavit. As the claim is
for a liquidated amount in money
and not “founded” on a liquid document, Rule 32(2)(c) is
not triggered. Therefore,
the point has no merit and is dismissed.
Non-compliance with
Rule 17(2)(a) – Use of Simple Summons
[16] The defendants
contend that the plaintiff should have issued a combined summons
because the claim is not liquidated and
involves factual disputes.
[17] For the
reasons stated above, the claim is liquidated. A simple summons was
therefore appropriate. In any event, the
plaintiff subsequently filed
a declaration, and the defendants pleaded fully to it. They have
suffered no prejudice. This technical
point, raised defensively, does
not bar summary judgment. Consequently, it is dismissed.
Jurisdiction of the
Court
[18] Although
raised in the plea and heads of argument, this point was not
prominent in the summary judgment resistance. The
defendants’
chosen
domicilium
is in Centurion, which they argue falls
under the Pretoria High Court’s jurisdiction. However,
Government Notice 408 of 2018
confirms the concurrent jurisdiction of
this Court with the Gauteng Division, Pretoria. The plaintiff was
entitled to institute
proceedings here. Resultantly, this point is
dismissed.
Substantive defences
[19] I turn to the
substantive defenses raised in the affidavit resisting summary
judgment.
Applicability of the
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (“NCA”)
[20] The defendants
argue that the agreement is a credit agreement subject to the NCA,
that the plaintiff is not a registered
credit provider, and thus the
agreement is void under section 89(5).
[21] The agreement
contains a conspicuous representation on its face, just above the
signature block, wherein the first defendant
warrants that its
turnover or net asset value exceeds R2 million. This is intended to
bring the transaction within the exclusions
of sections 4(1)(a) and 6
of the NCA for large juristic persons. The second defendant, a
medical doctor and director, signed this
representation.
[22] The principle
of “caveat subscriptor” applies. A party that signs a
document is presumed to have read, understood
and assented to its
terms. The defendant now seeks to resile from this representation by
attaching financial statements (Annexure
SM2) allegedly showing a
turnover below R2 million. This contradiction raises a clear dispute
of fact: whether the first defendant’s
turnover exceeds the
threshold? The plaintiff relied on the defendant’s signed
warranty. Whether this warranty was false,
and if so, what the legal
consequences are (including potential non-application of the NCA, or
a defense of misrepresentation),
cannot be determined on affidavit.
It requires trial.
Applicability of the
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (“CPA”)
[23] The same
representation serves to exclude the application of the CPA (section
5(2)(b)). For the same reasons as above,
the dispute over the
accuracy of the turnover warranty raises a triable issue regarding
the CPA’s applicability.
Validity of
Cancellation and Breach
[24] The defendants
allege that the equipment (a Yealink phone) was defective, and that
the plaintiff breached first by supplying
defective goods. The
plaintiff relies on clause 24 of the agreement, which cedes to the
“defendant” all claims the
plaintiff may have against the
supplier regarding the quality or state of the goods. The plaintiff
argues that any defect is a
matter between the defendant and the
supplier (Digital One), not a breach by it. This clause is unusual,
and its interpretation
is arguable. Whether it effectively insulates
the plaintiff from any responsibility for the functionality of the
core goods it
is leasing, and whether such a term might be
contra
bonos mores
or unreasonable, are arguable points.
[25] Furthermore,
the defendants allege they complied with the cancellation clauses
(clauses 2 & 22) by giving written
notice. The plaintiff disputes
the validity of this cancellation. Whether the defendant’s
cancellation was justified by a
material breach going to the root of
the contract, and the interplay between clauses 7 (acceleration on
breach), 15 (variation
in writing), 22 (cancellation), and 24
(cession of claims), involves complex interpretation best suited for
trial.
Enrichment
[26] The defendants
argue that the plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if it could claim
the full rental while the equipment
was faulty, used for only a short
period, and had been repossessed.
[27] This defense
is tied to the disputes over breach, cancellation, and the validity
of the acceleration clause. If the defendant’s
version of the
facts is accepted, an enrichment claim may be arguable. It cannot be
dismissed summarily.
Conclusion
[28] The defenses
raised regarding the NCA and CPA threshold, the cancellation of the
agreement due to alleged defective performance,
and the
interpretation of the contractual risk-allocation clauses (especially
clause 24) are not inherently unconvincing. They
disclose triable
issues of both fact and law. In light of the above, the defendants
have set out the nature and grounds of her
defense with sufficient
particularity to satisfy the requirements of Rule 32. In the words of
the authorities, there is a defense
that is bona fide and good in
lawmay succeed.
[29] In light of
the above, the plaintiff has established a
prima facie
case.
However, the defendant has succeeded in showing that she has a
bona
fide
defense, which is good in law. It would not be appropriate
to grant summary judgment.
Costs
[30] Regarding
costs, the defendants have been substantially successful in resisting
summary judgment. While they raised several
unsuccessful technical
points, their core substantive defenses have merit. In the exercise
of my discretion, I am of the view that
the the costs of the
summary judgment application should be the costs in the cause of
action.
Order
[31] Accordingly,
the following order is made:
1.
The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
2.
The defendants are granted leave to defend the main action.
3. The costs of the
summary judgment application are costs in the cause of action.
D. Mahosi J
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives through
email. The hand-down date is deemed
to be 09 February 2026.
Appearances
For
the Plaintiff:
Instructed
by:
Adv.
U. Ahir
Jay
Mothobi Incorporated Attorneys
For
the Defendants:
Instructed
by:
Adv.
J. Brenkman
Hamel
Attorneys Incorporated Attorneys
[1]
Ganes
and Another v Telecom Namibia Ltd
2004
(3) SA 615
(SCA), at para 19.
[2]
2005
(4) SA 199
(SCA), at para 14.
[3]
See
Absa
Bank Ltd v Lee Roux
2014 (1) 475 (WCC), at 477B-H and 478A-B.