SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Reportable/Not Reportable
Case no: 2026-013973
In the matter between:
COMMUNITY UPLIFTMENT PROJECTS
APPLICANT
In re: Purple Blok Projects (Pty) Ltd v Coetzee and Others
and
In re: Purple Blok Projects (Pty) Ltd v Combrink and Others
and
GOODFIND PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD FIRST RESPONDENT
PURPLE BLOK PROJECTS (PTY) LTD SECOND RESPONDENT
THE SHERIFF OF THE MAGISTRATE’S COURT: THIRD
RESPONDENT
GOODWOOD
THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS, CAPE TOWN FOURTH
RESPONDENT
THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, LAND REFORM FIFTH
RESPONDENT
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Neutral citation: Community Upliftment Projects V Goodfind Properties (Pty)
Ltd And Others (Case No: 2026-013973) [2026]
ZAWCH … (11 February 2026)
Coram: SALLER AJ
Heard: 29 January 2026
Delivered: 11 February 2026
Summary: Urgent application for stay of execution of eviction orders – urgent
application for anti-spoliation order – hearsay – standing – urgency
ORDER
1. Part A of the application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of Part A of this application on Scale A.
JUDGMENT
Saller AJ:
[1] Before me is a n application brought by the applicant Community Upliftment Projects
(‘CUP’) in two stages.
[2] Part A of the application was brought before me on an ex parte , urgent basis in
chambers on 2 6 January 2026. I raised with CUP’s counsel two issues : the ex parte
nature of the Part A proceedings, and their alleged urgency. I directed CUP to file a
supplementary affidavit dealing with th ose issues. Upon consideration of the
supplementary affidavit, I made an inter im interim order which maintained the status
quo, pending the determination of Part A later in the week, and provided for expeditious
service on the respondents.
The relief sought
[3] In Part A, with which I am currently seized, CUP seeks what it refers to as interim relief
which is primarily aimed at achieving a stay of execution of two eviction orders granted
by this Court in favour of the second respondent, Purple Blok Projects (Pty) Ltd
(‘Purple Blok’). Purple Blok is t he registered owner of the properties to which those
eviction orders relate.
[4] The first eviction order was made on 13 August 2025 in respect of property commonly
known as […] L[…] T[…] Street, Ruyterwacht, Cape Town, against Mr Colin
Combrink and other occupiers holding title under him (‘t he Combrink family’ and ‘the
Louis Trichardt Street property’). The Court ordered the Combrink family to vacate the
Louis Trichardt Street property by 31 December 2025, failing which the sheriff was
authorised to evict them by 9 January 2026.
[5] The Combrink family are not applicants in the present application.
[6] The second eviction order was made on 30 October 2025 in respe ct of property
commonly known as 1 […] H[…] Street, Ruyterwacht, Cape Town, against Mr
Christopher Coetzee, Ms Rita Coetzee and other occupiers holding title under them
(‘the Coetzee family’ and ‘the Huguenot Street property’). The Court similarly ordered
the Coetzee family to vacate the Huguenot Street property by 31 December 2025,
the Coetzee family to vacate the Huguenot Street property by 31 December 2025,
failing which the sheriff was authorised to evict them by 7 January 2026.
[7] The Coetzee family are also not applicants in the present application.
[8] In Part B of the application, CUP seeks in the main an order declaring the sale and
transfer of properties forming Part of Erf 3 […], Epping, Garden Village, Cape Town
(‘the Garden Village properties’) to have been unlawful and invalid, alternatively void
ab initio , setting them aside , as well as ancillary relief relating to the registration of
transfer.
[9] A deed of transfer is attached to the founding affidavit which further identifies the
Garden Village properties – it is common cause they include the Louis Trichardt Street
property and the Huguenot Street property. It appears from the deed of transfer that the
sale of the Garden Village properties from the first respondent Goodfind Properties
(Pty) Ltd (‘Goodfind’) to Purple Blok took plac e on 22 November 2023, and transfer
was registered on 21 June 2024.
[10] The grounds on which CUP impugns the sale and transfer of the Garden Village
properties to Purple Blok arises from restrictive title deed conditions incorporated from
a Crown Grant dated 28 March 1947 (‘the Crown Grant’) which prohibits bulk sale and
transfer of the properties to which it relates.
[11] In the alternative, CUP asks that the fifth respondents, the Minister of Agriculture, Land
Reform and Rural Affairs (‘the Minister’) be directed to determine whether to grant a
waiver of restrictive title deed conditions arising from the Crown Grant in respect of the
Garden Village properties.
[12] Part B of the application seeks no relief relating to the eviction orders.
Opposition
[13] Purple Blok and Goodfind opposed the application and filed answering affidavits.
[14] They raised multiple complaints, among them lack of genuine urgency, a challenge to
CUP’s locus standi, and CUP’s reliance on hearsay evidence.
[15] On the merits, Purple Blok denied CUP’s allegation (in the supplementary affidavit) of
spoliation of the Huguenot Street property on the part of Purple Blok , and denied CUP
spoliation of the Huguenot Street property on the part of Purple Blok , and denied CUP
had made out a case for a stay of execution of the eviction orders.
[16] Goodfind aligned itself with Purple Blok’s case and additionally disputed CUP’s
prospects in Part B. In what follows, I refer to Purple Blok and Goodfind as ‘the
respondents’ unless it is necessary to distinguish them.
[17] CUP did not file a reply. However, at t he hearing on 29 January 2026 , CUP’s counsel
provided the Court with a photocopy of a n affidavit of Mrs Rita Coetzee, the second
respondent, apparently deposed to at the Brackenfell p olice station that same morning.
In the affidavit, Mrs Coetzee elaborates on the alleged spoliation by Purple Blok on
26 January 2026. Counsel for the respondents did not object to it being accepted by
way of reply.
[18] Although the issues raised in the application are to some extent interlinked, I will deal
with each of them in turn.
Hearsay
[19] I begin with the question of hearsay which is foundational to the application. Save for
the affidavit of Mrs Coetzee in reply, CUP’s papers are deposed to by Mr Keown.
[20] Mr Keown says he has personal knowledge of the facts deposed to but does not say
how. He does not set out his personal involvement with, nor relationship to, the
Coetzee and the Combrink families, or even the wider community. There is no mention
of consultations with the families in the preparation of the affidavits , nor are there
confirmatory affidavits – even Mrs Coetzee’s affidavit in reply does not say that she has
read the founding and supplementary affidavits, much less confirm their contents.
[21] The high point of CUP’s case in this regard is to be found in the supplementary
affidavit, where CUP says it was approached by the Coetzee and the Combrink families
in March 2025 for advice, at which point it advised the families to approach the Legal
Practice Council for assistance . It seems that the re was a further instance of
engagement in December 2025, when CUP says it began searching for a legal
representative willing to take the matter pro bono. CUP does not say whether and to
representative willing to take the matter pro bono. CUP does not say whether and to
what extent Mr Keown was personally involved in engaging with the families.
[22] The Supreme Court of Appeal has cautioned (my emphasis):1
“… Merely to allege that that information is within the ‘personal knowledge’
of a deponent is of little value without some indication, at least from the
context, of how that knowledge was acquired so as to establish that the
information is admissible, and if it is hearsay, to enable its weight to be
evaluated. In this case there is no indication that the facts to which Mr
Chikane purports to attest came to his knowledge directly and no other basis
for its admission has been laid. Indeed, the statement of Mr Ch ikane that I
have referred to is not evidence at all: it is no more than bald assertion.
It was submitted by counsel for the appellants that it is probable that Mr
Chikane had direct knowledge of the purpose for which the appointment was
made by reason of the office that he held at the time. We are not concerned
with probability. …”
[23] It follows that the affidavits on the basis of which I am asked to determine the
application largely constitute inadmissible hearsay, and the application is consequently
devoid of the necessary foundational facts required to support the relief sought , on the
basis of which I might exercise my discretion in CUP’s favour to suspend the eviction
orders.
[24] Counsel for CUP submitted that given the urgency of the matter, it was not possi ble to
obtain confirmatory affidavits. But urgency alone cannot explain a failure to place
proper evidence before the Court. If the Coetzee and Combrink families were
consulted with in the course of drafting the founding papers , it is hard to see why a
confirmatory affidavit could not have been obtained , or at least a contemporaneous
affidavit setting out only the facts which each of them provided to CUP. Mrs Coetzee’s
affidavit of 26 January 2026 shows that there are no insurmountable hurdles to sworn
evidence being obtained from the families . On the other hand, if the Coetzee and
evidence being obtained from the families . On the other hand, if the Coetzee and
Combrink families were not consulted with, then there is no basis upon which I might
rely on the facts contained in CUP ’s papers as they relate to the Coetzee and Combrink
families.
1 The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M & G Media Ltd (2011 (2) SA 1 (SCA); [2010]
ZASCA 177 paras 38-39.
[25] That must be the end to the relief sought in Part A. There are other reasons, too, why
the application must fail and I deal with them below, mindful of the jurisprudence of
our appellate courts 2 that, even if a single issue may dispose of a matter, it is desirable
for a court to determine all of the issues before it.
Urgency
[26] CUP’s case for urgency is based on the imminency of eviction, coupled with the alleged
inability of the Coetzee family and the Combrink family to secure legal representation.
[27] It says that the Coetzee family and the Combrink family unsuccessfully sought pro
bono legal representation from the Legal Practice Council (‘LPC’) a nd were placed on
a waiting list in April 2025 and June 2025, respectively. Respective letters of the LPC
are attached to the founding affidavit. CUP says that b y December 202 5, the families
had not heard back from the LPC.
[28] There is no supporting evidenc e of any engagement or follow up by either CUP or the
families after April and June 2025, respectively . Nor is there supporting evidence of
what CUP says was its attempts to contact “multiple priv ate law firms for pro bono
assistance”, nor to seek “ assistance through civil society and housing advocacy
networks”. The founding papers merely conclude that “about two weeks ago” CUP
secured pro bono legal representation, again without any substantiation or detail. This,
at least, must be information of which CUP must have specific knowledge but which it
did not place on record.
[29] CUP says that it was under the bona fide belief that legal representation could be
secured before the evictions were executed, and that the families were under the bona
fide belief that the evictions would not be enforced pending clarification of the
ownership dispute. But not every bona fide belief in a state of affairs will support a
case for urgency. Even accepting for the sake of argument the evidence as it relates to
case for urgency. Even accepting for the sake of argument the evidence as it relates to
the families’ state of mind in the absence of confirmation from them, their belief was
quite unreasonable.
2 S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae)
2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) para 21; Maharaj and Others v Mandag Centre of Investigative Journalism NPC and
Others 2018 (1) SA 471 (SCA) para 26; Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Somali Association of South
Africa and Another 2015 (3) SA 545 (SCA) para 18.
[30] The supplementary affidavit attaches a letter of the Minis ter of Human Settlements to
the Presidency dated 10 May 2024, wherein the Minister refers to community meetings
during the course of May 2024 regarding disputes about evictions sought by
Communicare, the predecessor in title over the properties and the holding company of
Goodfind. My understanding is that this includes the properties in issue in this matter.
In the letter, the Minister records that tenants are challenging the transfer of ownership
of the properties from Communicare to Goodfind , and demanding that Communicare
hold in abeyance all evictions from the affected properties. It is clear from the facts of
the present matter that this did not happen.
[31] The respondents have set out in some detail their efforts to proceed with the eviction
proceedings against the Coetzee and Combrink families . They show that Purple Blok
firmly resisted the family’s efforts to have their respective eviction proceedings
postponed, including through personal appearances . In those circumstances, it was not
only reasonably foreseeable but likely that Purple Blok would also take steps to enforce
the eviction orders granted in its favour , once the period for vacating the properties had
run out.
[32] It is hard to fault the respondents’ submission that the rem arkable lack of detail in
CUP’s narrative as to what steps they and the families took in the months after the
eviction order were granted , fatally undermines its case that such urgency as has now
arisen was not self-created. If one has sympathy for the relative lack of sophistication
on the part of the families, CUP as an experienced housing rights advocacy organisation
must have known better than to come to court on the vaguest of allegations.
Standing
[33] CUP claims standing under section 38(b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution, in the public
interest and on behalf of persons whose rights to housing and lawful administrative
action are affected.
action are affected.
[34] Somewhat surprisingly, given its stated objects, CUP does not rely on own-interest
standing provided for in section 38(a) of the Constitution . It also makes no claim to be
an association acting on behalf of its members under section 38(e).
[35] The starting point w hen a court considers a litigant’s standing is to separate this
question from the merits. What this means is that “in determining a litigant’s standing,
a court must, as a matter of logic, assume that the challenge the litigant seeks to bring is
justified.”3 Further, a broad approach to standing is appropriate in cas es where
constitutional rights are implicated,4 and even under the common law.5
[36] Nevertheless, the generosity of the Constitution’s standing provisions does not mean
that standing is there for the taking , or section 38 would be rendered nugatory .6 In the
present matter, I have considerable difficulty with CUP’s standing in respect of Part A
of the application (I express no opinion regarding its standing to pursue relief in Part B)
on the grounds it asserts.
[37] Section 38(b) of the Constitution allows a party to litigate on behalf of another who
cannot act in their own name. On the papers, t here is nothing to suggest the Coetzee
family and /or the Combrink family are legal ly or practically incapacitated, nor
disadvantaged in their ability to litigate7 – there is no indication on the papers that
CUP’s current legal representatives might be unwilling to act for the families. G iven
the relief sought in Part A that would be a curious position to adopt , and require
explanation. There is also no evidence of the families having granted authority to CUP
to litigate on their behalf , particularly in the absence of affidavits from them, and it is
not clear to me on what basis such authority might be granted.
[38] Section 38(c) provides standing to a litigant acting as a member of, or in the interest of,
a group or class of persons. CUP makes no attempt to define a group or class whose
interests it is pursuing in Part A (nor Part B).8 The beneficiaries of relief in Part A are
3 Giant Concerts CC v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others [2012] ZACC 28 para 32, endorsing
Jacobs en ‘n Ander v Waks en Andere 1992 (1) SA 521 (A) at 536A and Hoexter Administrative Law in South
Africa 2 ed (Juta & Co, Cape Town 2012) at 488.
4 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para
165 (Chaskelson J) and para 229 (O’Regan J).
5 Trustees for the time being of Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and
Others 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA) paras 29-34; Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (5) SA 89
(CC) para 32.
6 Afriforum and Another v University of the Free State 2018 (2) SA 185 (CC) para 29.
7 Alluded to in Afriforum and Another v University of the Free State 2018 (2) SA 185 (CC) para 24.
8 Trustees for the time being of Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and
Others 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA) paras 29-34 (in the context of common law rules of standing)
the Coetzee and Combrink families. Even on a generous interpretation of section
38(c),9 on the facts before me, these two families do not constitute a class.
[39] Lastly, section 38(d) provides for public interest litigation. CUP says it acts in the
public interest. But CUP does not explain how the stay of execution of the eviction
orders sought in Part A constitutes a public good. In Ferreira v Levin O’Regan J said
the following in relation t o public interest standing provided in equivalent terms under
the Interim Constitution:10
“This Court will be circumspect in affording applicants standing by way of s
7(4)(b)(v) and will require an applicant to show that he or she is genuinely
acting in the public interest. Factors relevant to determining whether a person
is genuinely acting in the public interest will include considerations such as:
whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which the
challenge can be brought; the nature of the relief sought, and the extent to
which it is of general and prospective application; and the range of persons or
groups who may be directly or indirectly affected by any order made by the
Court and the opportunity that those persons or groups have had to present
evidence and argument to the Court. These factors will need to be considered
in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case.”
[40] It would have been of considerable assistance had CUP engaged in such enquiry. On
the limited facts before me, particularly the availability of the Combrink and Coetzee
families to be joined as applicants in their own interests in light of the relief sought, I
am not satisfied CUP has a public interest standing to seek the relief it does in Part A of
the application.
Spoliation
[41] Turning then to the merits, the logically first issue is the question of spoliation. CUP
says that on 26 January 2026 Purple Blok ordered the locks changed on the Huguenot
says that on 26 January 2026 Purple Blok ordered the locks changed on the Huguenot
9 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA) paras 13-
14.
10 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC)
para 234 (O’Regan writing in the minority without disagreement by the majority); endorsed in Lawyers for
Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC) para 17
Street property while Mrs Rita Coetzee was visiting her daughter and other family
members were absent. Since the eviction order authorised only the sheriff to evict the
Coetzee family, CUP says this constitutes an unlawful spoliation of the property over
which the Coetzee family was in peaceful and undist urbed possession which must be
restored.
[42] Despite raising the issue in the supplementary affidavit, CUP made no effort to amend
its notice of motion.
[43] Purple Blok denied spoliation , on the grounds that the Coetzee family voluntarily
vacated the Huguenot Street property. In support, they put up an email of Mrs Coetzee
dated 24 January 2026 wherein she says the following:
“We vacate property 1 […] H[…] str Ruyterwacht erf 4 […] on the 9 and 10
January 2026. No sheriff of court come or so to be new owners Purple blok
phoned to collect key of 1[…] H[…] str Ruyterwacht erf 4[…].
…
So what is happing with property 1 […] H[…] str Ruyterwacht erf 4 […] and the
key. We will not be responsible for any damage or vandalism of property.”
[44] Counsel for the respondents submitted that the email provided strong contemporaneous
evidence that the Coetzee family had voluntarily vacated the property, and Purple Blok
was entitled to cause the locks to be changed in anticipation of another tenant movi ng
into the property. He submitted that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from
Mrs Coetzee’s concern with being held responsible for any damage or vandalism of the
property was that she and her family were not, in fact, occupying the property at the
time the email was written.
[45] Counsel for CUP, on the other hand, relied on the affidavit of Mrs Coetzee’s in reply.
Mrs Coetzee says there that on an unspecified date prior to 26 January 2026 she moved
out “some” of her furniture – counsel for CUP urge d me to conclude that this meant
that the remainder of the Coetzee family furniture remained in the property on the day
that the remainder of the Coetzee family furniture remained in the property on the day
the locks were changed. Mrs Coetzee further says she still has the original keys, and
that “it was not my intention to move out ” but she did so, as she says, “in a state of
duress”. She does not mention her email of 24 January 2026.
[46] In my view the email of 24 January 2026 and Mrs Coetzee’s replying affidavit can be
read together without difficulty , and without undermining Purple Blok’s version. She
may have moved some of the family’s furniture ahead of 9 and 10 January 2026 , and
the remainder on those days when she says they vacated the property without
intervention of the sheriff . The eviction order and its impending execution would
undoubtedly have placed Mrs Coetzee in a perceived state of duress, where she might
regard any representative of Purple Blok, including security personnel in the area, as a
threat. I have no difficulty accepting that in these circumstances, her and her family
vacating the property on 9 and 10 January 2026 was accompanied by unhappiness and
resentment, and was not experienced as voluntary. But that does not change the fact
that, on her own version in the email of 24 January 2026, that is what happened. In the
absence of a clear explanation dealing with the content of the email of 24 January 2026,
there is nothing in Mrs Coetzee’s affidavit that supports CUP’s allegation of spoliation.
The case for a stay
[47] Rule 45A permits a court, on application, to suspend the operation and execution of any
order for such period as it may deem fit. The Rule affords a court a wide discretion, to
be exercised judicially .11 The Court is called to consider what real and substantial
justice requires in the circumstances , and in appropriate circumstances may be guided
by factors usually applicable to interim interdicts.12
[48] CUP’s case is that it seeks a stay of the eviction orders so as to allow the legality of the
sale of the Garden Village properties and of the evictions to be adjudicated , that it has
no alternative remedy, that irreparable harm will befall the Coetzee and Combrink
no alternative remedy, that irreparable harm will befall the Coetzee and Combrink
families if the eviction orders are not stayed pending the determination of Part B, and
that while Purple Blok’s prejudice is merely financial and procedural, its own prejudice
(I assume in CUP’s favour that it refers here to prejudice to the Coetzee and Combrink
11 R.A v F .A [2024] ZAWCHC 35 para 19; and authorities discussed there.
12 Gois t/a Shakespeare's Pub v Van Zyl and Others 2011 (1) SA 148 (LC) paras 33-37; Van Rensburg and
Another NNO v Naidoo and Others NNO; Naidoo and Others NNO v Van Rensburg NO and Others 2011
(4) SA 149 (SCA); Stoffberg N.O and Another v Capital Harvest (Pty) Ltd (2130/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 37
para 26
families) is existential and irreversible. It says that if the sale agreements and transfers
of the two properties are declared unlawful and invalid, “the judicial foundation for the
eviction orders will fall away entirely”,
[49] A number of immediate difficulties present themselves.
[50] The most obvious difficulty is the fact that CUP does not seek any relief relating to the
eviction orders in Part B. Even if the sale of the Garden Villa ge properties, including
the Louis Trichardt Street property and the Huguenot Street property, were to be
invalidated and set aside (not a given, in light of the alternative relief in Part B even if
CUP were to succeed) , that alone has no bearing on the enforceability of the eviction
orders, which remain binding.
[51] CUP does not seek relief setting the eviction orders aside, and has not identified a legal
basis upon which they may be set aside.
[52] It is far from clear that Purple Blok’s lack of ownership over the properties in question
at the time of the eviction orders is fatal to its claim. Here, a recent case of Dlamini
and Another v Gumede 13 in the Gauteng Local Division is of assistance in that it is
analogous in some important respects. That matter concerned PIE eviction proceedings
which were instituted after the property in question was sold and the residential tenant
refused to vacate the property. The tenant challenged the lawfulness of the sale, and
sought a stay of the ev iction proceedings until such time as its validity could be
determined. The Court had no difficulty in refusing to stay the eviction proceedings, on
the grounds that, first, that the tenant had no standing to challenge the validity of the
sale, and second, that title was not a prerequisite to the conclusion of a lease agreement
and its attendant consequences such as the obligation to vacate upon its termination.14
[53] Such reasoning is by no means unpersuasive, albeit that the Constitutional Court
[53] Such reasoning is by no means unpersuasive, albeit that the Constitutional Court
authority the Court relies on 15 dealt with commercial , not residential, leases . In PIE
evictions, it is a statutory requirement that the applicant be the owner or person in
13 Dlamini and Another v Gumede and Others [2024] ZAGPJHC 145.
14 Dlamini and Another v Gumede and Others [2024] ZAGPJHC 145 paras 7-10, with reference to Mighty
Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Limited and Another 2006 (1) SA 621 (CC).
15 Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Limited and Another 2006 (1) SA 621
(CC) paras 33, 51-52 and 56.
control of the property to which the proceedings relate . But even assuming in CUP’s
favour that it has better standing to challenge the sale and transfer of the Garden Village
properties than Mr Gumede had, and further, that in Part B a court will be persuaded to
either declare such sale void or retrospectively invalidate it, Purple Blok’s lack of
ownership of the property is not an obvious bar to successful eviction proceedings in
light of its undisputed control over the property at all relevant times.
[54] Furthermore, the right on which CUP seeks to rely is not the kind of substantive right
which founds entitlement to an interdict, nor, in my view, a stay , on the principles
articulated in OUTA.16
[55] CUP says it asserts a prima facie right to lawful land administration, constitutionally
compliant processes and to have eviction founded on ownership de ferred until the
lawfulness of that ownership has been judicially determined. Those are rights akin to
the right to review unlawful administrative action, which the Constitutional Court in
OUTA found insufficient to justify the granting of an interim interdict . They do not
found a right, whether prima facie or not, to reside in the properties.
[56] Leaving aside all other deficiencies in the a pplication, before I might be persuaded to
consider a stay of execution of the eviction orders pending the determination of Part B
on the grounds that this is what real and substantial justice demands, I would need to be
persuaded that the Coetzee family and the Combrink family have a t least a prima facie
substantive right to reside in their respective properties which they are able, or should
have been able, to assert against Purple Blok , and that such a right is in substance
pursued in Part B of the application. On the papers before me, they do not.
Conclusion
[57] For all these re asons, Part A of the application must fail, and the interim interim order
falls away.
falls away.
[58] On the question of costs, it was not suggested that there are any reason s why costs
should not follow the result, nor that that matter was of the kind of complexity which
16 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC)
para 50
warranted an increased scale of costs. CUP must bear the costs of its unsuccessful
application on a scale A.
Order
[59] In the premises, the following order is made:
3. Part A of the application is dismissed.
4. The applicant is to pay the costs of Part A of this application on Scale A.
_____________________________
K SALLER
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For applicant: S Peer
Instructed by: Sayeed & Co Attorneys
For respondent: Lawrence
Instructed by: Toefy Attorneys