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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case number:2026-027560
In the matter between:
PETER PAULOS MOLOKO MONYAPAO Applicant
and
THE CITY OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY First Respondent
ADVOCATE BRIDGETTE SEHLAPELO N.O Second Respondent
ADVOCATE SANELE SIBISI N.O Third Respondent
Heard: 10 February 2026
Delivered: 11 February 2026
Headnote: Urgent application — Interdict to halt pending disciplinary proceedings —
Self-created urgency — Applicant delaying review for several months after knowledge of
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
(3) REVISED: YES / NO
11 February 2026 _________________________
DATE SIGNATURE
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alleged irregularities and contributing to postponements in disciplinary enquiry — Legal
costs of participation not constituting irreparable harm or absence of substantial redress
— Courts intervening in incomplete disciplinary proceedings only in exceptional
circumstances — Application dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel.
JUDGMENT
WINDELL J
Introduction
[1] At its core, this urgent application concerns an attempt by a suspended municipal
Chief Information Officer, Mr Monyepao, to halt disciplinary proceedings before they run
their course. He seeks an interdict preventing the continuation of the disciplinary enquiry
pending a review of the process that gave rise to it.
[2] The application is opposed by the first and second respondents. The first
respondent is the City of Ekurhuleni, the applicant’s employer. The second respondent
is Ms Sehlapelo, the advocate appointed as chairperson of the disciplinary hearing, and
the third respondent is Ms Sibisi, the advocate appointed as evidence leader in the
disciplinary proceedings
[3] The respondents contend that the matter is not urgent, that any urgency is self -
created, and that this Court ought not to intervene in incomplete disciplinary
proceedings governed by labour legislation.
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[4] The essential facts are largely common cause. The applicant has occupied the
position of Chief Information Officer since 1 June 2022, subject to the Municipal
Systems Act and the Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers,
2010. In April 2025 he was placed on precautionary suspension and disciplinary
proceedings were initiated soon thereafter.
[5] On 22 January 2026 the applicant instituted review proceedings in this Court
challenging the lawfulness of the disciplinary process. The disciplinary enquiry was
scheduled to proceed from 16 to 20 February 2026. In anticipation of that hearing, the
applicant sought a postponement pending the outcome of the review.
[6] The chairperson, the second respondent, refused the request for postponement.
Faced with the imminent continuation of the disciplinary enquiry, the applicant launched
the present urgent application to prevent the proceedings from continuing before the
review is determined.
Urgency
[7] Urgency is the gateway to relief in the urgent court. An applicant must set out
explicitly the circumstances rendering the matter urgent and demonstrate why
substantial redress cannot be obtained in due course.
1 Where urgency is self-created, a
court will ordinarily decline to exercise its discretion in favour of urgent intervention.2
[8] The respondents contend that the present application is a clear instance of self-
created urgency. That submission must be evaluated against the full chronology of
1 East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others (11/33767) [2011]
ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) para 6.
2 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Anthony Black Films (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 582 (W) at 586.
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events and, importantly, the role played by the applicant in delaying the progression of
the disciplinary process.
[9] The timeline emerging from the papers is largely undisputed. The applicant was
placed on precautionary suspension on or about 15 April 2025 to permit an
investigation. Shortly thereafter, on 23 April 2025, he launched urgent proceedings in
the Labour Court seeking to declare the suspension unlawful and to secure his
reinstatement. That application was argued in May 2025 and dismissed on 29 May
2025, on the same date that the municipal council resolved to proceed with disciplinary
action.
[10] Formal notice of a disciplinary hearing scheduled for 9 July 2025 was issued to
the applicant on 30 June 2025. The hearing did not proceed on that date due to the
applicant’s illness and was postponed by agreement to 27–28 August 2025.
[11] Before that postponed hearing could proceed, the applicant launched a second
urgent application in the Labour Court on 15 August 2025, contending that his
suspension had lapsed and seeking to interdict the disciplinary enquiry. That application
was struck from the roll for lack of urgency on 26 August 2025.
[12] The disciplinary enquiry thereafter commenced on 27 August 2025 and the first
witness was called to testify . On the following day, the applicant raised a point in limine
challenging the authority of the evidence leader and chairperson, which resulted in a
postponement to 4 November 2025 to enable formal filing of that point. The point in
limine was ultimately dismissed on 3 November 2025.
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[13] When the matter reconvened on 4 November 2025, it again could not proceed
due to the unavailability of the applicant’s counsel, and the enquiry was postponed by
agreement to 16 February 2026.
[14] Crucially, on the applicant’s own version, he became aware by the end of August
2025 of the alleged irregularities forming the basis of the present review. Yet the review
application was instituted only on 23 January 2026, nearly five months later, followed
immediately by this urgent application shortly before the disciplinary enquiry was due to
resume.
[15] No adequate explanation is furnished for this extended period of inaction. The
delays in the progression of the disciplinary enquiry are, to a significant degree,
attributable to the applicant himself — through illness-related postponement, successive
urgent litigation in the Labour Court, interlocutory challenges within the enquiry, and the
late institution of review proceedings.
[16] Against that background, the urgency relied upon cannot be said to arise from
external circumstances or impending irreparable harm. It is the direct consequence of
the applicant’s own litigation choices and delaying conduct. The inference that the
present urgent application constitutes a further attempt to disrupt, derail, or postpone
the disciplinary proceedings is difficult to avoid.
[17] The approach of the courts in comparable circumstances confirms this
conclusion. In Yako v National Lotteries Commission & Others,3 the Court held that a
delay of several months between suspension, knowledge of charges, and the institution
3 (2024) 45 ILJ 1352 (GJ).
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of urgent proceedings rendered the matter not urgent, and reaffirmed that intervention in
incomplete disciplinary proceedings is reserved for exceptional cases. Likewise, in
Nene v National Lotteries Commission, 4 the Court emphasised that the urgent roll is
reserved for genuinely urgent matters and that enrolling proceedings without primary
facts establishing urgency constitutes an abuse of urgent -court process warranting
punitive consequences.
[18] The present matter is no different . The chronology, the unexplained delay, and
the applicant’s own conduct in repeatedly postponing or interrupting the disciplinary
process all point to self-created urgency.
[19] Against that background, the applicant further contends that he will not obtain
substantial redress in due course. This submission rests on a single premise, namely
that he will incur legal costs in participating in the disciplinary enquiry, which he says
was initiated before the completion of a full report.
[20] That submission does not establish urgency. The incurring of legal costs in the
ordinary course of disciplinary proceedings is neither exceptional nor irreparable, and it
does not distinguish this matter from the many employment disputes that must proceed
through established statutory processes before judicial intervention is sought. To accept
such a proposition would be to render virtually every pending disciplinary process
susceptible to urgent interruption, contrary to the well -established principle that urgent
4 (2024) 45 ILJ 1334 (GJ).
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court intervention in incomplete disciplinary proceedings is reserved for truly exceptional
circumstances.
[21] In those circumstances, the application falls to be struck on urgency alone. It is
therefore unnecessary to determine the jurisdictional challenge raised by the
respondents or any of the remaining merits.
[22] In the result the following order is made:
1. The application is struck from the roll with costs including the costs of two
counsel where so employed.
________________
L. WINDELL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Delivered: This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 11 February 2026.
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant: V S Notshe SC
Instructed by: Shamase Ramotswedi Attorneys
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For the First Respondent: J Peter SC
Instructed by: Salijee Govender Van Der Merwe Attorneys
Date of hearing: 10 February 2026
Date of judgment: 11 February 2026