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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION- MBOMBELA (MAIN SEAT)
CASE NO: BA23/2025
In the matter between:
SIFISO VUSUMUZI SIBANYONI
APPELLANT
and
THE STATE RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT: BAIL APPEAL
___________________________________________________________________
Vukeya J
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[1] The appellant, Mr Sifiso Vusumuzi Sibanyoni , appeared in the Magistrate’s
Court, Mbombela on charges of Conspiracy to commit Murder and Murder read with
the provisions of section 51 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 19971. He
was arrested on 08 July 20 25 and brought his formal bail application on 15 July
2025, which was opposed by the respondent.
[2] Because of the Murder charge , the bail application followed the procedure in
terms of section 60 (11) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 .2 This section
provides that where an accused is charged with an offence referred to in Schedule 6,
the court shall order that he or she be detained in custody until he or she is dealt with
in accordance with the law, unless the he or she , having been given a reasonable
opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that exceptional
circumstances exist which, in the interests of justice, permit his or her release.
[3] This section places the onus on the accused to prove to the court that there
are exceptional circumstances which, in the interests of justice, permit his release on
bail. To discharge the onus placed on him by section 60 (11 ) (a), the appellant
adduced evidence by filing his affidavit and that of his girlfriend Thulile Ntshangase.
The state led the viva voce evidence of Constable Sindisiwe Precious Nyaka, the
Investigating Officer, to rebut the evidence of the appellant.
1 Section 51(1) Act 105 of 1997. Discretionary minimum sentences for certain serious offences:
(1) Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or a High
Court shall sentence a person it has convicted of an offence referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to
imprisonment for life.
2 Act 51 of 1977 - Section 60 (11) - Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, where an accused is charged with
an offence referred to -
(a) in Schedule 6, the court shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he or she
is dealt with in accordance with the law, unless the accused, having been given a
reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that
exceptional circumstances exist which in the interests of justice permit his or her release;
3
[4] The appeal lies on the strength of section 65 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977 3 which provides that the court or judge hearing the appeal shall not set
aside the decision against which the appeal is brought, unless such court or judge is
satisfied that the decision was wrong, in which event the court or judge shall give the
decision which, in its or his opinion , the lower court should have given. This means
that, even if this Court finds that the Magistrate was wrong, it must consider the facts
before it afresh and determine whether the appellant has discharged the applicable
onus.
[5] In S v Barber4 1979 (4) SA 218 (D) at 220 E-H it was said that:
“It is well-known that the powers of this Court are largely limited where
the matter comes before it on appeal and not as a substantive
application for bail. This Court has to be persuaded that the magistrate
exercised the discretion which he has wrongly. Accordingly, although
this court may have a different view, it should not substitute its own
view for that of the magistrate because it would be unfair interference
with the magistrate’s exercise of his discretion. I think it should be
stressed that, no matter what this court’s own views are, the real
question is whether it can be said that the magistrate who had the
discretion to grant bail exercised that discretion wrongly…”
[6] The appellant’s evidence at the hearing of the bail application as tendered by
way of an affidavit can be summarized as follows: He is 39 years old and has been
residing at 2[...] S[...] Crescent in Mbombela for the past four (4) years. He has been
residing within the district of Ehlanzeni for at least 37 years. The appellant stated that
he was married to the deceased . He has four minor children. He possesses a
3 Section 65 (4) Act 51 of 1977 - The court or judge hearing the appeal shall not set aside the decision against
which the appeal is brought, unless such court or judge is satisfied that the decision was wrong, in which event
the court or judge shall give the decision which in its or his opinion the lower court should have given.
4 S v Barber 1979 (4) SA 218 (D) at 220 E-H.
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Nursing Certificate obtained from Ekufundeni Nursing College . At the time of his
arrest he was self -employed as a diesel supplier and also has property let out for
accommodation. His profit from these businesses is R80 000, 00 per month.
[7] The appellant told the court that he was arrested by members of SAPS at his
residential address and, when arrested, he gave his full co -operation. There were no
pending cases against him and he did not have previous convictions . He stated that
he does not have any relatives outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa ,
neither does he have a passport. The appellant’s evidence is that he owns six
immovable properties situated within the Ehlanzeni District . He averred that there
were exceptional circumstances which in the interests of justice permit ted his
release.
[8] Amongst the factors he mentioned is an allegation that the state’s case is
weak. He stated that on 20 November 2024 he was never at the scene of crime at
Virgin Active, Ri verside, he was at his residential place sleeping . According to the
appellant, it will be impossible for the state to bring evidence that he committed the
offence as he was not at the scene of the crime and also because he did not commit
the crime. The appellant stated in his affidavit that from 19 November 2025, around
19h00 to 20h00 he was already in his house with his family , namely, his partner (not
the deceased), his son and his younger brother. He never left the house until the
next day on 20 November 2024 05h00 when he went to witness what had happened
at the scene of crime as informed by some doctors.
[9] The appellant denied that he conspired with anyone to kill the deceased and
does not know the people it is alleged he conspired with the commit the crime. He
stated that he did not act in common purpose with any person . What was also of
concern to the appellant is that his businesses will be affected by his further
concern to the appellant is that his businesses will be affected by his further
incarceration which will in turn affect his right to legal representation. This is because
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he would like to instruct very capable and experienced attorneys to represent him ,
which he may not be able to afford if his business is affected. Ms Thuli Ntshangase
only confirmed the evidence of the appellant that - he was at home on 19 November
2024 in the evening until the next morning when he was informed about the incident.
[10] Evidence led on behalf of the respondent , as tendered by Constable
Sindisiwe Precious Nyaka, can be summarized as follows: On 20 November 2024,
the deceased was shot in a parking lot at Virgin Active, Riverside and she attended
the scene afterwards. She became the Investigating Officer of the Murder case .
During her investigations , she discovered that the deceased and the appellant had
been married and that they were going through a divorce . She also discovered that
there was a protection order against the app ellant, and that the applicant was the
deceased.
[11] Nyaka further testified that she had two witnesses who stated that they had
been approached by the appellant and informed them that he wants his wife killed.
These witnesses informed Nyaka that they travelled with the appellant in two
vehicles to Nelspruit where they left the appellant’s vehicle at Sonpark parking lot
and proceeded to the deceased’s uncle’s place . The deceased resided there. The
appellant pointed out this residence and then they proceeded to Rob Ferreira
Hospital where the deceased was employed as a doctor . The appellant informed the
witnesses that the deceased leaves home around 05h00 to go to the gym and then
goes to work as a daily routine. According to these witnesses, the appellant also
showed them a picture of the deceased.
[12] On realising that the witnesses have not executed the plan to kill the
deceased, the appellant called them to enquire why they had not executed the plan,
they demanded payment before doing so . He told them that he had given some
people R75 000, 00 to kill the deceased , but that they had absconded with the
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money without having kept their end of the deal. He then demanded that they first
execute the plan before he pays them. It would seem that the se witnesses did not
execute the plan but stated that they only wanted some money from the appellant.
[13] It was the evidence of Nyaka that as she proceeded to investigate the matter,
she discovered that there was a protection order against the appellant in which he
was ordered, amongst others, not to threaten the deceased that he was going to kill
her. Furthermore, she discovered that the couple had been at the divorce court
during November 2024 and that the deceased had filed a Notice of Intention to
Defend the divorce action, demanding her 50% share of the estate. According to
Nyaka, a section 205 investigation revealed that the appellant made calls to the two
witnesses on 8 November 2024 . It was Nyaka’s evidence that the records revealed
that the appellant and the witnesses contacted each other on 20 November 2024, on
the date of the deceased’s shooting.
[14] In his decision not to grant bail, the Magistrate was of the view that the facts
before him relating to the strength of the state’s case showed that there was a prima
facie case against the appellant . His view was that there was evidence linking the
appellant on both charges. Furthermore, the Magistrate’s view was that the delay in
arresting the appellant after the death of the deceased was not to be regarded as
evidence of a reasonable suspicion on the part of the state . He did not regard this as
being exceptional because it was an opportunity for the police to investigate the
allegations levelled against the appellant.
[15] On the submission made that the appellant needed to prepare for the trial and
had to obtain legal representation out of funds which should be generated by his
businesses, the Magistrate was of the view that no proof had been provided to the
court of the existence of the businesses mentioned by the appellant . He was also of
court of the existence of the businesses mentioned by the appellant . He was also of
the view that had such information been given to the Investigating Officer, she would
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have confirmed the existence of these businesses to the court. He took into
consideration that although there was a protection order against him, the appellant
still told the two witnesses that he wanted the deceased to be killed.
[16] Although the Magistrate was of the view that the appellant was not a flight risk
because he has a fixed address and his children and relatives reside within the
jurisdiction of Ehlanzeni, he was of the view that the appellant , if released, would
interfere with the state witnesses as they were known to him. Furthermore, his view
was that the nature of the offence and the circumstances under which it had been
committed, were likely to induce a sense of shock and outrage in the community
where it was committed . He had also observed that every time the case for the
appellant was on the roll, there was chanting and singing by members of the
community outside the court, and the inside of the court was always full.
[17] Lastly, the Magistrate also considered the prevalence of crimes involving
domestic violence committed between people who were in a domestic relationship
with each other. He further considered that the case was of public interest and that
the appellant’s release would undermine or jeopardise the public confidence in the
justice system or the proper administration of justice. Based on the above reasons,
the Magistrate dismissed the application as he was of the view that the appellant had
failed to discharge the onus he had to show on a balance of probabilities that there
were exceptional circumstances which , in the interests of justice , permitted his
release.
[18] The appellant, having been aggrieved by the Magistrate’s decision dismissing
his application to be released on bail, approaches this court on appeal and contends
that the Magistrate erred, as follows:
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18.1. By discussing the requirements of bail in relation to the interests of
justice and then thereafter not applying the same to the facts of the
case and refused bail.
18.2. By not considering any of the arguments and authorities referred to by
the appellant’s attorney.
18.3. In refusing bail only because of the seriousness of the charges and the
alleged strength of the state ’s case and finding that there are no
exceptional circumstances.
18.4. By not considering or by ignoring the fact that the appellant might be
falsely implicated.
18.5. By not evaluating the evidence of the appellant but merely
summarising it.
18.6. By failing to attach sufficient weight to the personal factors of the
appellant and the prejudice that the appellant will suffer as a result of
the refusal of bail.
18.7. By failing to consider the imposition of suitable bail conditions and
relying on mere suspicion that the appellant may interfere with or
intimidate the state ’s witnesses. By finding that there are no
exceptional circumstances present , and therefore refusing bail . By
setting the bar with reference to exceptional circumstances so high that
no person will ever be able to get bail in circumstances of such a
nature.
18.8. By not finding that there are exceptional circumstances in the interests
of justice to grant bail to the appellant. By failing to take into account
that the presumption of innocence operates in favour of the appellant
even where there is a prima facie case.
18.9. By not considering that the case against the appellant is very weak , as
none of the witnesses implicate the appellant at the actual time and
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place where the incident happened. According to the appellant , the
evidence presented is weak, contradictory, and in several respects
hearsay. There is no evidence linking the appellant to the actual
shooting.
18.10 By not considering and giving sufficient weight that the appellant has
four minor children and that he is the main breadwinner.
18.11. By rejecting the evidence that the appellant has a lucrative business
and that his businesses will suffer severely if bail is refused.
18.12. By not considering the fact that there is no real likelihood established in
the evidence adduced by the respondent that:
18.12.1. The appellant will flee;
18.12.2. He will interfere with investigations, witnesses, bail
proceedings, the legal or criminal justice; and
18.12.3. That the appellant will commit further crimes and
that his release on bail will disturb public order.
18.13. The Magistrate should have considered that t he appellant has a fixed
address and strong family ties and is willing to comply with strict bail
conditions.
[19] What was common cause between the parties at the bail hearing was that the
appellant was not at the scene of the shooting , that he was arrested 6 months later
and that he had a fixed address.
[20] What needs to be determined in this appeal is the question of whether the
Magistrate’s finding that the appellant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities
that there were exceptional circumstances in which the interests of justice, permitted
his release and that the subsequent decision to refuse bail was wrong.
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[21] The principle of “ interests of justice” is to be applied in accordance with the
grounds as found in Section 60 (4) of the CPA, which provides that:
“(4) The interests of justice do not permit the release from detention of an
accused where one or more of the following grounds are established:
(a) Where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were
released on bail, will endanger the safety of the public, any person
against whom the offence in question was allegedly committed, or any
other particular person or will commit a Schedule 1 offence;
(b) where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were
released on bail, will attempt to evade his or her trial; or
(c) where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were
released on bail, will attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses or to
conceal or destroy evidence; or
(d) where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were
released on bail, will undermine or jeopardise the objectives or the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system, including the bail
system;
(e) where in exceptional circumstances there is the likelihood that the
release of the accused will disturb the public order or undermine the
public peace or security;…”
[22] It is important , at this point , to start with the applicant’s contention that the
Magistrate failed to consider that the case against the appellant is very weak as
none of the witnesses implicate him at the actual time and place the incident
happened. His further contention was that the evidence presented is weak,
contradictory, and in several respects, hearsay-based, and that t here was no
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evidence linking him to the actual shooting. Kriegler J in S v Dlamini, S v Joubert; S v
Schietekat5 stated that:
“It is that there is a fundamental difference between the objective of bail
proceedings and that of the trial. In a bail application, the enquiry is not
really concerned with the question of guilt. That is the task of the trial
court. The court hearing the bail application is concerned with the
question of possible guilt only to the extent that it may bear on where
the interests of justice lie in regard to bail. The focus at the bail stage is
to decide whether the interests of justice permit the release of the
accused pending trial; and that entails in the main, protecting the
investigation and prosecution of the case against hindrance.”
[23] Bail applications are distinct and unique in nature, as they do not fall strictly
under civil or criminal proceedings. As a result, the rules of evidence typically
followed in trial actions are not rigidly enforced, and the presiding officer possesses
greater inquisitorial powers. This procedure allows for the admissibility of hearsay
evidence without the formalities applicable under the normal evidence rules
applicable in a trial.
[24] The nature of the evidence itself and the manner in which the crimes were
allegedly planned and committed does not require the presence of direct evidence.
The Magistrate did not err in concluding that there was prima facie evidence that the
appellant may have committed the offence. This, after having considered the
hearsay evidence of the presence of witnesses who were , according to the evidence
of the investigating officer, hired by the appellant to execute the killing of the
deceased. Furthermore, the Magistrate accepted evidence that the appellant had
hired other people, other than the witnesses, whom he paid R70 000, 00 but failed to
execute the plan.
5 1999(2) SACR 51 (CC), CCT21/98, CCT22/98, CCT2/99, CCT4/99) [1999] ZACC 8; 1999 (4) SA 623; 1999
(7) BCLR 771 (3 June 1999).
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[25] The contention that the Magistrate failed to consider that the appellant was
not at the scene of the crime when the shooting happened is neither here nor there,
as that is not what the state alleged as a fact. The circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that, even with the material the state had at th e
time of the bail application , the state’s case against the appellant was strong. In
terms of section 60 (4) of the CPA, t he interests of justice do not permit the release
from detention of an accused where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or
she were released on bail, will attempt to evade his or her trial.
[26] When making a determination whether the interests of justice do or do not
permit the release of the accused, Section 60(6) becomes relevant , and the court
may consider, where applicable, the strength of the state’s case against the accused
and the incentive that he or she may in consequence have to attempt to evade his or
her trial . For purposes of the above, the Magistrate cannot be faulted for having
accepted that the circumstantial evidence available at the time of the bail application
was sufficient and relevant to be taken into account.
[27] It is trite that an accused person is presumed to be innocent until proven
guilty. In S v Essack6, the court stated that the court hearing the bail application must
express a balanced value judgment considering the factors mentioned in Section
60(4). This therefore means that t he presumption of innocence operates in favour of
an applicant even where there is a strong prima facie case against him . I n S v
Acheson7, Mahomed J remarked as follows (at 822A–B):
“An accused person cannot be kept in detention pending his trial as a form of
anticipatory punishment. The presumption of the law is that he is innocent
until his guilt has been established in court. The court will therefore ordinarily
6 S v Essack 1965 (2) SA 161 (D) 162C.
7 S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 805 (Nm).
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grant bail to an accused person unless this is likely to prejudice the ends of
justice.” [My underlining]
[28] In determining the question of bail, too much emphasis cannot be placed
upon the presumption of innocence ; that is not what was intended in Acheson
(supra). The interests of justice still play a pivotal role in the decision whether to
grant bail or not. In other words, the accused’s right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty takes the backseat where the interests of justice do not permit his
release. The court hearing a bail application is not precluded from considering other
relevant factors to be able to maintain a balanced value judgment between the
presumption of innocence favouring the applicant and the interests of justice.
[29] When dealing with the question whether the interests of justice permitted the
appellant’s release, t he Magistrate conceded that the appellant was not a flight risk
but was more concerned that the appellant knew the witnesses and , therefore, if
released, there was a likelihood that the appellant would threaten or intimidate them.
He was right, and I cannot fault him. A likelihood is a reasonable probability that can
be based on the surrounding circumstances to calculate the risk.
[30] In S v Dlamini, S v Joubert; S v Schietekat8
“[53] Section 35(1)(f) presupposes a deprivation of freedom - by
arrest - that is constitutional. This deprivation is for the limited purpose
of ensuring that the arrestee is duly and fairly tried. But s 35(1)(f)
neither expressly nor impliedly requires that in considering whether the
interests of justice permit the release of that detainee pending trial, only
trial-related factors are to be taken into account. The broad policy
considerations contemplated by the “interests of justice” test, in that
context, can legitimately include the risk that the detainee will endanger
8 Supra at footnote 5.
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a particular individual or the public at large. Less obviously, but
nonetheless constitutionally acceptably, a risk that the detainee will
commit a fairly serious offence can be taken into account. The
important proviso throughout is that there has to be a likelihood, i.e. a
probability, that such risk will materialise. A possibility or suspicion will
not suffice. At the same time, a finding that there is indeed such a
likelihood is no more than a factor, to be weighed with all others, in
deciding what the interests of justice are. That is not constitutionally
offensive. Nor does it resemble detention without trial, the
reprehensible institution really targeted when one speaks of preventive
detention.”
[31] The fact that the state witnesses were some of the people he is alleged to
have conspired with or made an attempt to get them to kill the deceased, the fact
that they did not execute the plan, the fact that he knows them and most importantly,
the fact that they seem to be the only witnesses that link him to the alleged
commission of the crime of murder which he vehemently denies, are all factors
pointing to the direction that a real probability exists that he will attempt to threaten or
intimidate them if released 9. It is also a real probability that if released, the appellant
will will endanger the safety of these two witnesses10.
[32] Section 60(4)(e) provides that ; where,in exceptional circumstances , there is
the likelihood that the release of the accused will disturb the public order or
undermine the public peace or security, the interests of justice do not permit the
accused’s release 11. The Magistrate was criticised by the appellant for taking into
consideration the fact that the case was of national interest and that the appellant’s
9 Section 60 (4) (c) Where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were released on bail,
will attemptto influence or intimidate witnesses or to conceal or destroy evidence.
will attemptto influence or intimidate witnesses or to conceal or destroy evidence.
10 Section 60 (4) (a) Where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were released on bail,
will endanger the safety of the public or any particular person or will commit a Schedule 1 offence.
11 Section 60 (4) (e) reads-where in exceptional circumstances there is the likelihood that the release of the
accused will disturb the public order or undermine the public peace or security.
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release would undermine or jeopardise public confidence in the justice system or the
proper administration of justice.
[33] Section 60(4)(e) must be read alongside Section 60(8A), which provides that
in considering whether the ground in subsection (4) (e) has been established, the
court may, where applicable, take into account the following factors, namely –
(a) whether the nature of the offence or the circumstances under
which the offence was committed is likely to induce a sense of
shock or outrage in the community where the offence was
committed;
(b) whether the shock or outrage of the community might lead to
public disorder if the accused is released;
(c) whether the safety of the accused might be jeopardized by his
or her
release;
(d) whether the sense of peace and security among members of the
public will be undermined or jeopardized by the release of the
accused;
(e) whether the release of the accused will undermine or jeopardize
the public confidence in the criminal justice system; or
(f) any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be
taken into account.
[32] The prevalence of offences pertaining to domestic and gender-based violence
offences was one of the reasons why the Magistrate was of the view that the
interests of justice do not permit the release of the applicant . It must be noted that
this was not the main reason why the application was refused. Nevertheless, his
remarks were that every time the matter was on the roll, the court was full to capacity
and members of the community were singing and chanting outside the court building.
The case was o f national interest as according to the Magistrate , even the
proceedings were broadcasted.
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[33] In S v Miselo12 the Court held that Section60(8A) enjoined the Court to, in
considering the question whether the release of the accused would disturb the public
order or undermine the public peace or security, take into account a number of
factors. Two of these factors were whether the nature of the offence or the
circumstances under which the offence was committed was likely to induce a sense
of shock in the community where the offence was committed, and secondly, whether
the sense of peace and security among members of public would be undermined or
jeopardised by the release of the accused. The Court held further that it had to
exercise great caution before placing reliance on the sections and that they were
only to come into play in 'exceptional circumstances'. It considered the
circumstances of the matter it was dealing with to be exceptional, having regard to
what had taken place over a lengthy period in the Division. The Court found that
there was a likelihood that if the appellant were to be released pending his trial , such
release would 'disturb public order or undermine the public peace or security'. It was
clear that the nature of the offence which the appellant had committed and the
circumstances under which it was committed was likely to induce a sense of shock
or outrage in the community where the offence had been committed. It found that the
release of the appellant would certainly undermine or jeopardise the public
confidence in the criminal justice system. It dismissed the application.
[34] I am inclined to agree with this approach. In casu, the Magistrate correctly
considered the nature of the offence, its prevalence, the manner in which it was
committed, the fact that it was getting media coverage and that it had attracted a lot
of interest form the community where the offence had been committed. Because of
the domestic relationship that existed between the appellant and the deceased, the
the domestic relationship that existed between the appellant and the deceased, the
view of the Magistrate was that it was a pandemic in the society. This was correctly
stated. Gender-based violence and domestic violence are a horror which does not
only affect individuals, it has an impact on families and communities across all races.
It is a human rights issue which should not be viewed lightly . These, in my view , are
exceptional circumstances which permit the court to consider that the appellant’s
12 S v Miselo 2002 (1) SACR 649 (C).
17
release will undermine or jeopardise public confidence in the justice system or the
proper administration of justice.
[35] The appellant was aggrieved by the fact that the Magistrate failed to consider
that his businesses would suffer if his incarceration is continued, and he will not be
able to afford legal representation of his choice out of a lack of funds, which would
have been generated by his business . The Magistrate’s reasoning was that the
appellant had shown him no proof of the existence of such businesses and that, had
such information been given to the Investigation Officer, she would have confirmed
the existence of these businesses to the court. The Magistrate has not erred in his
reasoning. The application was dealt with by way of filing an affidavit, which meant
that the appellant could not be cross -examined regarding the existence of these
businesses and the potential loss he stood to suffer because of his continued
incarceration. Whether the businesses existed or not, it was not known to the
Magistrate. Moreover, whether they generated reasonable income as suggested was
not tested in cross-examination. No bank statements were presented to the court
and no documentary proof of their existence was made available to the court for
perusal. I am therefore disinclined to agree with the appellant that the Magistrate
erred in this regard , as the appellant did not provide him with sufficient evidence to
make that determination.
[35] While recognizing the appellant’s Constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty, the interests of justice must still permit his release . In these
circumstances, my view is that the Magistrate did not err in dismissing the
application. He was able to maintain a balanced value judgment when he considered
the factors contained under Section 60(4)(a) to (e) and Section 60 (8A), and came
to the conclusion that the appellant has failed to discharge the onus he had on him to
to the conclusion that the appellant has failed to discharge the onus he had on him to
establish exceptional circumstances which in the interests of justice permitted his
release.
[36] In the result, the following order is made:
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36.1. The appeal against the refusal to grant bail is dismissed.
Appearances:
For the Appellant Adv NJ Du Plessis
Instructed by:
Coert Jordaan Inc Attorneys
For the Respondent: Adv I Phatudi
Instructed by:
Office of the Director of Public
Prosecution