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Criminality, Political Interference and Corruption in the Criminal Justice ("the
Commission").
[2] The relief sought relates to his scheduled appearance under summons before
the Commission on Friday 06 February 2026.
[3] The applicant asks that this court interdict the respondent from calling on him to
file a written statement or subpoenaing him or, in any way, coercing him to appear
before the Commission pending the determination of Part B to the application.
[4] The relief is also aimed at a series of interrogatories which are contained in
correspondence dating from November 2025. The applicant seeks that this court
order the respondent to respond to these interrogatories within three days.
[5] It is immediately apparent that the time frames afforded the respondent are
extremely short. This application was set down for hearing on Tuesday 03
February and the relief sought is in respect of the scheduled appearance of the
applicant two days hence - on Friday 06 February. It stands to reason that the
interrogative process to which t he respondent is sought to be subjected is
logistically an impossibility even if the relief were competent.
[6] Because this is urgent court and because of the extremely truncated periods
afforded the Commission, the issue of delay and how it came about assumes a
broader significance.
[7] The interdict sought is framed on the basis that it is interlocutory to Part B which
is what is alleged to be an application under the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), alternatively the principle of legality to review and
set aside the decision to issue a regulation 10(6) notice in issue and any decision
to issue any further summons to appear at the Commission.
[8] The applicant also seeks that there be a recalling of key witnesses who
implicated the applicant in their testimony so that these witnesses may be cross-
examined by the applicant’s legal r epresentatives before he agrees to take the
stand at the Commission.
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[9] Costs are sought against Justice Madlanga personally should there be
opposition.
[10] The nature of the relief is important both to the question of delay and merits if
they are reached. The cause of action thus needs careful consideration on both
fronts.
The cause of action
[11] The contemplated review is directed at the decision to issue the regulation 10(6)
notice and any future summonses.
[12] It is helpful to have reference to the chronology around the regulation 10(6) notice
with references to the function of such notice within the Commission scheme.
[13] The regulations were issued as part of Proclamation 269 of 2025, signed by the
President under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution. They legally establish the
Commission, its mandate, and its operating framework.
[14] The Commission is widely empowered in terms thereof to conduct searches and
Perform seizures of documents, devices, or other evidence. These powers are
necessary because the Commissions mandate is investigatory.
[15] In addition, in terms of regulation 10(6) which is at issue in this matter, the
Chairperson may, inter alia, direct a person to appear and give evidence and be
examined at the Commission.
[16] The respondent has directed the applicant to appear on several occasions by
way of summonses spanning the period from November last year and up to and
including the latest summons in terms of which he is to appear tomorrow -Friday
06 February.
[17] The evidence sought relates to the nature of the applicant’s relationship with Mr
Vusimuzi “Cat” Matlala, Minister Senzo Mchunu and General Feroz Khan.
Information is sought as to the role that he performed for Mr Matlala in relation to
a contract between SAPS and Medicare 24, Minister Mchunu and the nature and
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extent of the applicant’s relationship with named individuals, including General
Shadrack Sibiya and Mr Brown Mogotsi and various legal entities.
[18] The providing of the evidence has been resisted by the applicant, through his
attorney, Sikander Tayob Attorne ys. The resistance has been framed on the
basis that the applicant has no objection to his appearance at the Commission
provided his detailed demands for information are met.
[19] It seems from the correspondence that, whilst feigning willingness to co-operate,
the applicant is, in fact, actively placing unreasonable impediments in the way of
the testimony which he will have to give before the Commission.
[20] The level of obstruction is such that the applicant’s attorney has refused even to
accept service of process through his office notwithstanding being on record;
physical service by the sheriff is insisted on.
[21] On 05 November 2025 the applicant, at his request, was provided with WhatsApp
correspondence which he will be asked to explain and, in addition, he was
provided with a link to the relevant transcripts of the Commission hearing.
[22] Having complained that he needed this information to prepare his testimony,
when provided with information he complained that it is too voluminous to work
through in the time allowed.
[23] The applicant saw fit to threaten that “ [s]hould a substantive and full response
to all queries not be received from the Commission by 1 December 2025, [the
applicant] will not consider himself bound to the 15 January 2026 date” this being
an arranged date.
[24] The applicant seeks in Part B to set aside the notice which he has had since 23
October 2025 and in which he is told that he will be called on to provide answers
to well defined queries.
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[25] Had the applican t sincerely wished to protect his position and render himself
lawfully free of the obligation to provide the information, it was open to him to do
so immediately on the receipt of the notice. He did not do so. Instead he
embarked on what can only be referred to as a process of stalling of the
inevitable. This has continued and is still underway and this application seems to
me to be yet another orchestrated part of this stalling stratagem.
[26] The following are central considerations in the determination of Part A:
a. First, if the regulation 10(6) notice was to be set aside this had to be done
in good time. Three months have been allowed to elapse and now there is
an attempt, through the courts, to frustrate a lawful process days before the
appearance is set to commence.
b. Second, the applicant has known since at least October 2025 that his
presence is required by the Commission and that, at law, summons under
the hand of the respondent serves to secure this presence under threat of
criminal sanction.
c. Third, summons for the appearance tomorrow (Friday 06 February) is
extant, in force and valid. There is not even an attempt made to set it aside.
This is unsurprising as there is no cause for its setting aside. The legal
position is clear; it must be complied with.
[27] The approach taken by the applicant is overly ambitious in the context of the
investigative role which the Commission occupies. It reflects a lack of
understanding of this role and the position of the Commission from a legal
perspective. The position adopt ed is that the applicant will not comply until and
unless he is provided with a long list of information relating to his being implicated
in relevant activity under investigation. This is not a position which he is entitled
to adopt in the face of the summons.
[28] If every witness before the commission were entitled to impose conditions under
which he would comply with the directions, notices and summonses, the process
which he would comply with the directions, notices and summonses, the process
would be rendered impossible and the constitutional purpose for which it has
been convened thwarted.
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Consideration of urgency
[29] The procedure set out in Rule 6(12) is not for taking. An applicant must set forth
explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the matter urgent.
[30] When urgency is in issue the primary investigation should be to determine
whether an applicant will be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due
course.
[31] But the enquiry does not end there. Other factors which a court will take into
consideration inc lude whether the respondents can adequately present their
cases in the time available between notice of the application to them and the
actual hearing, other prejudice to the respondents and the administration of
justice, the strength of the case made by t he applicant and any delay by the
applicant in asserting its rights. This last factor is often called self -created
urgency.1
[32] Self-created urgency implies more than mere delay. It often involves a degree of
contrivance and abuse of process.
[33] When a party fails to approach a court at the earliest possible opportunity and
then delays unduly to approach court, he risks not affording a party’s opposition
sufficient time to place its case before the court. This may cause prejudice to a
respondent and will necessarily impact upon the urgent court’s ability to properly
manage its roll which in turn undermines the proper administration of justice.2
[34] It is expected of litigants to react immediately to remedy or prevent harm and/or
prejudice, rather than standing back and doing nothing until it is too late.3
1 Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo and Others
(35248/14) [2014] ZAGPPHC 400; [2014] 4 All SA 67 (GP) (19 June 2014) para 64.
2 Chung-Fung (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mayfair Residents Association and Others (2023/080436)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1162 (13 October 2023) para 25.
3 Radebe and Others v Aurum Institute (C662/2023) [2023] ZALCCT 66; (2024) 45 ILJ 876 (LC)
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(22 December 2023) para 20.
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This Judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading to the electronic
file on Caselines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 05 February 2026.
Date of Hearing: 03 February 2026
Date of Judgment: 05 February 2026
Appearances:
Counsel for the Applicant: Adv K Premhid
Adv B Casey
Adv I Macingwane
Ms B Koitsioe (pupil)
Attorneys for the Applicant: Sikander Tayob Attorneys
Counsel for the Respondent: Adv N Maenetje SC
Adv P Sokhela
Attorneys for the respondent: Diale Mogashoa Attorneys
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