About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
1996
>>
[1996] ZASCA 68
|
|
Nedperm Bank Ltd. v Lavarack and Others (418/94) [1996] ZASCA 68; 1996 (4) SA 30 (SCA); [1996] 3 All SA 171 (A); (31 May 1996)
Case No 418/94
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between:
NEDPERM BANK LIMITED
Appellant
and
MARGARET ELIZABETH LAVARACK
First Respondent
LEWIS DOUGLAS BAKER
Second Respondent
DAVID FREDERICK DEACON
Third Respondent
CHARLES PETER KERNICK
Fourth Respondent
IAN LOCKHART PORTEOUS
Fifth Respondent
CORAM: EM GROSSKOPF, NIENABER, MARAIS,
OLIVIER et SCOTT JJA
HEARD; 9 MAY 1996
DELIVERED: 31 MAY 1996
JUDGMENT
/NIENABER JA
2
NIENABER JA:
The appellant, a bank, (referred to hereinafter as "the Bank"
or "the Perm" or "Nedperm") agreed to finance a sectional title
development undertaken by a close corporation, Banner's Rest
Lodge CC ("the CC"), on a property described as rem of lot 766
Glenmore on the lower Natal south coast.
The agreement between the Bank and the CC is contained in
a series of inter-related documents: a main agreement, a mortgage
bond, the Bank's standard terms and conditions, a letter of advice
and a schedule of interest rates, to some of which I shall in due
course refer.
The Bank granted the CC a loan of R4 million. One of the
contract documents, the letter of advice, specified that repayment of
the loan was to be by way of monthly instalments of R71 529.
Another clause in another of the documents, the main agreement,
3
required the CC to "make payment to Nedperm of all amounts
received by it from the sale of units in the Development". The crisp
question is whether the CC was obliged to make a payment of a
monthly instalment of R71 529 even when, at any given date, the
sum of the proceeds from the sales of units, duly paid over to the
Bank, exceeded the sum of monthly instalments payable under the
contract up to that date. If yes, the CC was in arrears with the
payment of its monthly instalments. That would mean that the
Bank was entitled, as it purported to do, to invoke the acceleration
clause in the contract and claim payment of the entire outstanding
balance of the loan. And that in turn would mean that the Bank's action against the five respondents, members of the CC who stood
surety for its debts to the Bank, would have to succeed. The answer
of Thirion J, sitting in the Natal Provincial Division, was no. This
is an appeal, with his leave, against that rinding.
4
Clause 2.2 of the main agreement reads:
"Nedperm has agreed to grant the Owner [the CC] the said
loan and to participate in the Development for a share of the
profit on the terms and conditions contained herein."
The proposed development, to be known as Mbabala Lodge, was
to consist of 67 sectional title units constructed on the property
(comprising a Erst phase of 31 and a second phase of 36 units),
which would be marketed to members of the public under the
banner and with the assistance of the Bank "by means of an active
marketing programme throughout its Branches in the Republic of
South Africa and the canvassing of its major V.I.P clients." (Clause
12.1.3 of the main agreement). The main agreement also provided,
in clause 12.1.2, that in consideration for such participation by the
Bank each agreement of sale of a unit would include a clause
requiring the purchaser to apply to the Bank for any loan finance
which such purchaser may require to facilitate his sale. The Bank's
5
involvement, in short, went beyond the granting of a mere loan.
The agreement was finally concluded on 21 June 1989. The
money was to be advanced by the Bank "as work progresses to the
satisfaction of the Bank's valuers" (clause 4 of the letter of advice).
Marketing of the units had commenced even before the agreement
was finalised. Fourteen of the units had already been sold off plan.
Work thereupon commenced, money was advanced and the building
operations were completed by the anticipated date, 16 April 1990,
at which time the balance owing inclusive of interest exceeded
R4 million. The first monthly instalment was due on 15 May 1990.
It was not paid, nor was the second instalment, but by 15 July 1990
an amount of R534 650 had been deposited by the CC and
appropriated by the Bank in reduction of the CCs loan account.
If all had gone according to plan the entire loan inclusive of
interest would have been redeemed from the proceeds of the sales
6
of the units in the first phase within a year or so. The CC would
have made its profit from the sale of units in the second phase.
But, sadly, matters did not proceed according to plan. Sales lagged
and on 15 March 1992 the Bank instituted action against the
respondents as sureties on the ground of the CC's failure to meet a
particular monthly instalment. The amount claimed was the full
amount of the loan then owing. The fourth defendant died. His
executors were duly substituted as defendants in his stead.
As at 15 March 1992 the total of payments ex sales of units
exceeded the total of unpaid instalments.
It is necessary to return in somewhat greater detail to some
of the terms of the conglomeration of documents constituting the
agreement.
The loan was secured, first, by a first mortgage bond
registered in the Bank's favour over the property concerned (6,7839
7
hectares in extent) as well as over an adjoining property, described
as sub 1 of lot 766 Glenmore (2.0002 hectares in extent); secondly,
by the five members of the CC assuming liability as sureties and
co-principal debtors; and thirdly, by a cession in securitatem debiti
of the CC's right, title and interest as seller in and to all the
agreements of sale in terms of which units in the development were
disposed of.
In terms of the proposed cession in securitatem debiti
purchasers of units were obliged to make payment of their purchase
prices to the Bank. On the other hand clause 7.1 of the main
agreement, quoted earlier, required the CC to make payment to the
Bank of all amounts received by it from the sale of units in the
development. What in fact happened, was that the various purchasers paid the CC and it is common cause that the CC
channelled all monies thus received to the Bank, totalling, by the
8
date of summons, 15 March 1992, some R4 812 444,24.
In order to effect transfer of the units sold to the purchasers
it was necessary for the Bank to release such units from the
operation of the bond. This was provided for in clause 14.1 of the
main agreement. As units were sold, released from the bond by
way of endorsements, and transferred out to the purchasers
concerned, the extent of the Bank's security over the properties was
of course reduced; but to the extent that the proceeds of the sales
were applied to the reduction of the loan, the indebtedness was
commensurately reduced. All in all some 30 units were thus released from the operation of the bond.
Both the letter of advice and the main agreement refer to a
sum of R200 000 payable to the Bank by the CC. In the evidence
this was described as "an administration fee" but clause 6.1 of the main agreement refers to it in different terms. The
clause reads:
9
"6.1 The consideration to be paid by the Owner to Nedperm for
the loan shall be as follows:
6.1.1.
interest on the portions of the loan paid out by
Nedperm from time to time at Nedperm's rate of
interest charged on commercial loans from time to time in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement as
read with the Mortgage Bond;
6.1.2.
the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND RAND
(R200 000,00) being the consideration due to Nedperm
for its participation in the Development. The said sum
of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND RAND
(R200 000,00) shall be paid in instalments of THREE
THOUSAND AND THIRTY RAND (R3 030,00) each
payable as and when Nedperm releases units from the
operation of the Mortgage Bond provided that the
entire sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND RAND
(R200 000,00) or any balance due shall be paid no
later than 30th September, 1990."
To the extent that each payment of R3 030 was linked solely to the
release of a particular unit and not to a series of predetermined
dates, it is an indication that those amounts were intended to be
redeemable from the proceeds of the sales of units.
10
The pivotal clauses in this appeal are clause 7.1 of the main
agreement, clause 1.6 and 1.7 of the letter of advice and clauses 4,
6.1 and 7.2 of the standard terms.
Clause 7.1 of the main agreement reads as follows:
"7.1. Interest on the loan shall be debited in accordance with
Nedperm's Schedule of Standard Terms and Conditions
applicable to loans and Nedperm's Rules, Regulations
and Procedures from time to time. The Owner shall
make payment to Nedperm of all amounts received by
it from the sale of units in the Development."
Clauses 1.6 and 1.7 of the letter of advice stipulate that
instalments of R71 529 per month are to be paid, commencing on
15 May 1990. Clause 4 of the standard terms provides as follows:
"The Mortgagor shall, subject to the provisions of 5 below,
pay to the Bank monthly instalments as set out in the Letter
of Advice in reduction of the amount outstanding. Unless
otherwise specified in the Letter of Advice, the first such
instalment shall be paid on or before the 15th day of the
month following the month in which the Mortgage Bond is
registered and the subsequent instalments on or before the
11
15th day of each and every succeeding month."
"The amount outstanding" is defined in the interpretation clause of
the standard terms as meaning "the total amount owing from time
to time by the Mortgagor to the Bank in terms of or arising out of
the provisions of the contract".
Clause 6.1 of the standard terms allows the CC, without prior
notice, "to make payments in addition to the instalments stipulated for by the Bank, or agreed upon, in terms of the contract."
Finally clause 7.2 of the standard terms reads as follows:
"The Bank shall be entitled in its sole discretion to
appropriate any amounts received from or for the account of
the Mortgagor towards the payment of any debt or amount
owing to the Mortgagor to the Bank. If the Bank does not
specifically appropriate amounts in terms hereof, all amounts
received shall be deemed to have been appropriated in the first instance to reducing the interest component of the
amount outstanding (resulting from interest being capitalised
in terms of 3)."
12
To sum up. In terms of the contract documents the CC was
obliged to pay: (a) R71 529 per month; (b) all the proceeds of the
sales of units received by it; (c) R3 030 in respect of each sale and
the balance of the R200 000 still outstanding, if any, by 30
September 1990.
The appellant's argument is that it is not permissible to apply
the proceeds of (b) to the satisfaction of (a). Two reasons in
particular are advanced. The main argument is that (a) and (b) are
two completely separate but parallel obligations and that there can
be no interaction between the two. The subsidiary argument is that
if (b) can be employed in payment of (a) the security provided by
the bond over the property may be wholly eroded long before the
debt is extinguished.
Neither argument is convincing. I deal with them in turn.
Counsel for the appellant readily conceded that all payments
13
ex sales of units had to be appropriated to the reduction of the loan indebtedness until it had been fully extinguished. (Clause 7.1
of the
main agreement, incidentally, does not expressly contain that
qualification; as it is worded it suggests that the Bank is entitled to
the proceeds of the sales even after the indebtedness had been
discharged. But that can never have been the intention.) Once the
concession is made, as it had to be, that the proceeds of the sales of
the units had to be allocated to the reduction of the loan
indebtedness, it subverts the notion that the agreement provides for
two entirely separate and compartmentalised obligations, the one to
pay R71 529 per month, the other to remit the proceeds of the sales,
and that the latter can never be employed in satisfaction of the
former. There is but one indebtedness, the loan plus interest. The
contract specifies two sources for its discharge. The minimum
amount to be paid in terms of the agreement is R71 529 per month.
14
In like manner that a debtor is permitted, pace the contract, to make
a payment in advance of an instalment date (cf Bennitz v Euvrard
1943 AD 595
at 602), so too he is entitled to make a payment in
excess of its amount. Provided it was intended as a payment on
account of the indebtedness and accepted as such, the over-payment
will discharge or reduce the indebtedness, as the case may be.
There is nothing in this agreement to inhibit the CC from paying
more than the minimum amount agreed upon. On the contrary,
clause 6.1 of the standard terms expressly permits it. The CC may
do so from its own sources of funding, if so minded. And where
the proceeds of the sales over any given period exceed R71 529 per
month it is obliged to do so in the terms of clause 7.1 of the main
agreement.
The position is therefore as follows: (a) if there were no sales
the CC had to pay R71 529 per month and it had to do so from
15
other resources; (b) if sales were to fall short of R71 529 per month
the CC had to make up the difference from other resources; (c)
where the proceeds of the sales exceeded the minimum payment
required the CC was excused, for as long as that situation obtains,
from paying the monthly instalments.
What the CC would obviously not have been permitted to do
was to peg the payments ex sales of units to the minimum of
R71 529 per month and to hold back the balance until it suited its
purpose to release it: the agreement obliged the CC to pay over the
entire proceeds of the sales to the Bank and any failure to do so
would have been a contravention of clause 7.1 of the main agreement.
I turn to the subsidiary argument. The reasoning is as follows.
If the only payments made were the monthly instalments of
R71 529, the entire debt, inclusive of interest, would have been
16
redeemed in approximately 20 years; initially by far the greater
portion of each payment of R71 529 would have been allocated to
the interest as opposed to the capital component of the debt. The same would be true if the opposing view is assumed to be correct,
namely, that payments ex proceeds of sales were to be regarded as
payments in lieu of the stipulated instalments. In that event, if the
proceeds of the sales happened, for instance, to be maintained at a
level of just above R71 529 per month then, because all amounts
received were deemed to have been appropriated to the redemption
of interest before capital (clause 7.2 of the standard terms), the capital component of the loan would have been reduced by less than
100% of the proceeds of the sale of the unit paid over. Meanwhile,
as each unit sold was transferred out, the value of the security will
have decreased by an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the
unit. A reduction of the value of the security at a rate in excess of
17
the reduction of the capital amount owing means that a point will
eventually be reached when the security is extinguished but the debt
is not. A secured debt is thus converted into an unsecured one and
that, so it was contended, could never have been the intention of the
parties.
I am unpersuaded by this argument. The potential erosion of
security complained of is a mere hypothesis founded on the inability
of the CC to maintain its schedule of sales. That was not an
eventuality that the parties anticipated or contemplated. It has not been suggested that there is scope for a tacit term to cater
for it.
Such a term would have had to provide that parity should at all
times be maintained between the value of the security and the
amount owing. If that had indeed been the thinking of the parties,
it is inconceivable that in a contract of this complexity they would
not have provided for it expressly. It would then have been an
18
express provision that the proceeds of the sales were to be kept intact by the Bank in a fund designed to protect the equilibrium
between the value of the bond and the level of indebtedness. If the
entire fund were kept intact until the debt had been extinguished,
the Bank would of course have become progressively over-secured;
and a scaling down exercise whereby only payments ex sales of
units in excess of the level of indebtedness were appropriated to
the debt, would itself require a sophisticated contractual mechanism.
Either way provision would have had to be made for other matters
such as the interest earned by the fund, whether it accrued to the
Bank or was to be applied to the debt, and so forth. Nothing of the
sort can be read into this contract.
There are additional reasons why the appellant's view, based
on a supposed correlation between the level of indebtedness and the
value of the security, is not in my view sound. I have earlier
19
alluded to the payment of R200 000. The payment of R3 030 is
specifically linked to the sale of each unit. If all 67 units were sold
the debt of R200 000 would have been discharged. The agreement
therefore recognises that the payment of R3 030 per sale can be
effected from the proceeds thereof. Any such payment,
accompanied as it is by the release of the unit concerned from the
bond, would reduce the security without reducing the indebtedness
under the loan of R4 million. A disturbance of the supposed
principle of parity between the value of the security and the level
of indebtedness under the loan is therefore implicit in the terms of
the agreement itself.
Finally there is the consideration which weighed with the
court a quo. It is stated in these terms:
"The Owner obtained the loan in order to finance the
development. Its only income from the development would
be from the sale of units. If the plaintiffs counsel's
contentions were to be upheld it would mean that the Owner
20
would have had to find R858 348 per year from 15th May
1990 from some source other than the development, in order
to pay the instalments. That would not have been feasible
and it could not have been what was in contemplation of the
parties when they concluded the agreement."
I fully agree. It is inconceivable that the parties could have
had in mind that the CC might be obliged, for instance, to approach
the Bank or some other financial institution to assist it to pay the
R71 529 per month when, as it happens, the sales were generating
an amount far in excess thereof.
For these reasons I agree with the court a quo. It follows that
the appeal must be dismissed. There was an application for
condonation by the appellant in respect of the late filing of its notice of appeal. The application was resisted by the respondents
solely on the ground that the appeal lacked merit. The result at
which I have arrived vindicated the respondents' counsels' attitude.
The application for condonation is accordingly refused with
21
costs, including the costs of appeal. Such costs are to include the
costs of two counsel.
P M Nienaber
Judge of Appeal
Concur
E.M. Grosskopf A
MaraisJA
Scott JA
Case No 418/94 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between:
NEDPERM BANK LIMITED
Appellant
and
MARGARET ELIZABETH LAVARACK
First Respondent
LEWIS DOUGLAS BAKER
Second Respondent
DAVID FREDERICK DEACON
Third Respondent
CHARLES PETER KERNICK
Fourth Respondent
IAN LOCKHART PORTEOUS
Fifth Respondent
JUDGMENT
OLIVIER JA:
The question to be decided in this appeal is whether
payments made by the debtor in fulfilment of its
obligation to pay over to the creditor the proceeds
from the sale of units can be said to constitute,
2
simul ac semel, the fulfilment of its obligation to
pay at some time in the future,monthly instalments in
terms of the loan agreement.
For the reasons that follow 1 hold the view that the
question must be answered in the negative.
The contract:
The terms of the composite contract dealing on the
one hand with the total debt and on the other hand
with
the manner
in which that debt has to be liquidated, are the following:
The debt:
In terms of the grant of the building loan ("the grant") the amount of the loan was R4 million. It
would bear interest at a rate prescribed in the
schedule of standard terms and conditions ("the
schedule"), calculated monthly in advance on the 16th day of each month. Such interest would be capitalized
and thereupon it would form portion of the total
amount outstanding. In terms of the grant interest
3
would run on the portions of the loan paid out by the
bank from time to time.
Furthermore, in terms of the agreement ("the
agreement") signed by the bank and the borrower
respectively on 15th and 21st June 1989, the borrower
was also indebted to the bank in the sum of R200 000
as an "administrative fee".
The liquidation of the debt:
The composite contract made provision for the
following obligations relating to payment:
(i) The grant provided in paras. 1.6 and 1.7
that monthly instalments would amount to R71
529, payment thereof to commence on 15th
May 1990. The obligation to pay monthly
instalments was reiterated in para. 4 of the
schedule, which reads as follows:
The mortagor shall.. . .pay to the Bank monthly
instalments as set out in the letter of
Advice [i.e. the grant] in reduction of the
amount outstanding. Unless otherwise
4 specified in the letter of Advice, the
first such instalment
shall
be paid on or
before the 15th day of the month following
the month in which the Mortgage Bond is
registered and the subsequent instalments on
or before the 15th day of each and every
succeeding month. (My underlining.)
(ii) The last sentence of clause 7.1 of the agreement reads:
The Owner
shall
make payment to Nedperm of
all amounts received by it from the sale of
units in the Development. (My underlining.)
(iii)
Para
. 6.1.2 of the agreement stipulates that the
amount of R200 000 (the administration fee)
shall be paid in
instalments
of R3 030 each,
each payable as and when the bank releases
units from the operation of the mortgage
bond, provided that the entire sum of R200
000 or any balance due shall be paid no
later than 30th September 1990. (My
underlining.)
5
The last obligation mentioned under (iii) is only
indirectly relevant to the issue under discussion.
The crux of the issue stems from the fact that the
borrower failed to make any payment of instalments
under (i) above at all when they became due and
payable, but it did pay over the amounts received by
it from the sale of those units sold before the issue
of summons, i.e. it did fulfil its obligation under
(ii) above.
The borrower argues that the sum paid under (ii)
exceeds the sum due under (i), and that it was not in
arrears with its obligation under (i) when action was
instituted.
The bank argues that fulfilment of (ii) cannot be
and was not fulfilment of (i), as these two
obligations are independent and cumulative. By paying
over the proceeds of the sale of the units, the
borrower fulfilled its duty under (ii) and that obligation only. For such payment to be considered
also payment in advance of the monthly instalments due
under (i) one has to read (erroneously) something
into the composite contract that is not there at all,
viz. a qualification of obligation (i) (i.e. of
6
clause 1.7 that monthly instalments
shall
be paid in
the amount of R71 529 as from 15th May 1990) . The
bank's case is that the respondents have not relied on
any tacit or implied term to introduce such
qualification and that a proper construction of the
composite contract does not lend itself to the
interpretation contended for by the respondents.
The first step in the enquiry then takes us to an
analysis and interpretation of the terms of the
composite contract. If it appears from such enquiry
that payments of the proceeds from the sale of units
were automatically simul ac semel prepayment of future
instalments, cadit quaestio. It it appears otherwise,
the second step is to examine the common law rules
governing payment, the onus to prove payment of a
particular debt and the allocation of debts in the
context of the particular facts of the case.
The interpretation of the composite agreement.
Because our law in principle accepts that
consensu
s
is the foundation of contractual liability, it also
still adheres mainly to the historical-psychological
method of interpretation as opposed to the normative
approach. It is therefore necessary to determine the
7
common intention of the parties as a fact existing at
the time of contracting. (See Farlam and Hathaway,
Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary
, revised
by Lubbe and Murray, 3rd ed. Juta, 1988 at 451, 461,
463 and 469 for a discussion of the two approaches.
The normative approach is best advocated by the Dutch
writer J M van Dunne in his doctoral thesis,
Normatieve Uitleg van Rechtshandelingen:
Een
onderzoek naar de grondslagen van het geldende
verbintenissenrecht
,
Deventer
, 1971, at 7 et seq.).
In seeking the common intention of the contracting
parties, one must apply to the composite contract a contextual approach. This requires ..."that regard must be had not only to
the language of the rest of
the provision concerned or of the contract as a whole,
but also to considerations such as the apparent
scope
and purpose
of the provision."
(Melmoth Town Board v
Marius Mostert (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 70
;
1984 (3) SA 706
(A) at 728 G
per Van Heerden JA) . The apparent scope and purpose
of the provisions of the contract (as they appear from
the document itself) may be complemented by such
information regarding the background circumstances
under which the contract was concluded as will
enlighten the Court on the broad context in which the
8
words to be interpreted were used
(Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Bekker NO
[1991] ZASCA 183
;
1992 (1) SA 617
(A) at 624 F-G;
Jaga v D
nges NO: Bhana v Donges NO
1950 (4) SA 653
(A) at 662 G-H). It follows that interpretation of a
contract should not proceed from a consideration of
the words and terms of the contract
in abstracto
, but
always having regard to the broad context, nature and
purpose of the contract (
Swart en 'n Ander v Cape
Fabrix (Pty) Ltd
1979 (1) SA 195
(A) at 202 B-D).
On this approach, the following facts appear to be
relevant:
(a) The borrower, Banners Rest Lodge CC, whose
members are the respondents, wished to
develop a piece of land at
Munster
as
"Mbabala Lodge". The development would
produce 67 units, which would be registered
on a sectional title basis and sold to the
public. When negotiations between the
borrower and the bank started in March/April
1989, the projected profit forecast was
R2,76 million, and 14 units had already been
sold off plan. It was also envisaged that the first phase, consisting of 31 units,
9 would be completed in 6 to 8 months, i.e. at the latest by April 1990. That is why para. 1.10 of the grant stipulates the completion
date as 16th April 1990.
(b)
The borrower needed to secure R4 million
to complete the first phase of the project,
and wished to make withdrawals against this
sum from time to time as necessary. Interest on the amount advanced would run from the moment of each advance, capitalized as aforesaid.
Provisions to this effect were made in the grant and the agreement. Should the building work on the property not be completed by
16th April
1990, interest would be charged on the full
amount of the loan, i.e. R4 million, from that date. This was provided for in the
further conditions annexed to the grant.
(c)
It was agreed that the financing by the bank
would take the form of a conventional mortgage bond, the capital and interest to be paid off by monthly instalments over a period
of time. That is why the grant
(b)
10
refers to monthly instalments of R71 529.
It was common cause that if no earlier capital redemption was effected, the total
amount outstanding would be liquidated after
twenty years.
(d)
The obligation to pay monthly instalments would commence only one month after the
envisaged completion date, i.e. on 15th May
1990, so as to give the borrower an opportunity to complete the building work
without having to pay interest before such
completion. That is why para. 1.7 of the grant provides for 15th May 1990 as the commencement date for payment of monthly instalments.
(e)
The release of each unit from the bank's
mortgage bond,as it was sold, would diminish
the security provided by the bond; on the other hand, the total amount outstanding
would be reduced by the said payments.
(f)
It was envisaged that the first phase of the
development, consisting of 31 units, would
(d)
11
be completed early in 1990 and that sales of
the units would continue throughout,
reducing the total indebtedness of the
borrower to the bank within a very short
period. If this had not taken place before
16th April 1990, monthly instalments as
aforesaid would become due and payable as
from 15th May 1990.
(g) The purchase price of a number of units sold
was paid over by the borrower to the bank,
the amount of the debt commensurately
lessened, and the relevant units were
released from the mortgage bond. A number
of units remained unsold because of a slump
in the market.
(h) The borrower did not effect payment of any
instalments as envisaged by the grant, nor
did it allocate or designate any payment as
prepayment of a monthly instalment or
instalments. However, by the time of issue of summons the total amount paid by way of
the payment of the proceeds from the said
sales exceeded the amount which was due and
12
payable in the form of instalments. If one
allocates the proceeds from such sales to
the instalments, the borrower was not in
mora. But if one allocates the proceeds
from sales to fulfilment of an obligation to
pay to the bank the full proceeds from such
sales, and only to the fulfilment of that
obligation, the borrower was in mora as from
15th May 1990.
(i) The grant, incorporating the obligation to
make monthly payment of instalments, is
dated 3rd June 1989. The written agreement
relating to the payment of the proceeds from
the sale of units and the payment of the fee
of R200 000, was signed by the appellant
and the borrower respectively on 21st and
15th June 1989, i.e. quite some time after
the date of the grant.
In my view the interpretation of the composite
contract advocated by the respondents is untenable for
the following reasons:
(a) It is clear that the dominant obligation of
13
the borrower was to pay the monthly
instalments. Not only was such obligation
chronologically the first one to be
undertaken, but the evidence is to the effect that the loan was given on the
ordinary home-owner's commercial terms,
i.e. the debt had to be paid in monthly
instalments which would reduce the interest and capital indebtedness. The obligation to
pay the monthly instalments would endure
even if no units were sold, or if the
proceeds from the units sold were
insufficient to extinguish the whole debt.
On the other hand, if the debt was
extinguished after 20 years solely by the
borrower paying the monthly instalments,
the obligation to pay over the proceeds from
the units would fall away, because such
payment would then be indebitum.
(b) It is also clear that the two obligations,
the one to effect payment of monthly instalments and the other to pay over the
proceeds from the sale of units were
expressed as two separate obligations. The
14
one arose from the grant, the other from
the agreement. The one, for payment of the monthly instalments, arose on a specified date, became due and payable on specified dates,
and was for the payment of a sum of
money fixed and certain. The other, the payment of the proceeds from the sale of
units, was a conditional debt, i.e. it
became due and payable only upon the
happening of a future, uncertain event,
viz. the sale of a unit. It was not for a
specified amount, but for the proceeds from
the sale, whatever they might be. And it
would terminate on an unspecified date,
i.e. when all units had been sold.
(c) The two obligations are treated as separate,
distinct obligations in the composite
contract, and there is no indication that
payment of the one would be considered as
payment for the other. This proposition is
evident and incontrovertible in the case of payment of the monthly instalments. Suppose
the borrower had paid four monthly
instalments on due date, i.e. R286 116, and
15
then sold the first unit for R250 000. An
argument by the borrower that it was exempt
from payment of the proceeds from the sale
of the unit because it had paid these
proceeds in advance by paying the said
monthly instalments would rightly be regarded as absurd: in paying the
instalments the borrower liquidated a
particular obligation in terms of the
composite contract and it could not, by the
very same payment, also claim to have
fulfilled another obligation. In such a
case it could hardly be argued that
liquidation of the one debt was
simultaneously liquidation of the other.
The same logic, and the same legal
principle must surely apply to the actual
facts now under discussion: here,
conversely, the borrower paid over proceeds
of sale with no express agreement or
allocation that the payment should serve as
monthly instalments. By paying as it did,
the borrower was fulfilling a separate and distinct contractual obligation and its
intention could not have been otherwise. By
16
accepting the proceeds from the sale, the bank was accepting payment in fulfilment of a particular obligation of the borrower, and
its intention could not have been otherwise.
(d)
There are, in my view, no
indicia
in the composite contract that payment of the proceeds from the sale of a unit was simultaneously prepayment of future instalments.
On the contrary, the obligation to pay monthly instalments is expressed in absolute, unqualified terms. The verb
shall
, not
may
, is used, indicative of a peremptory obligation. There is no cross-reference to payment of the proceeds from the sale of units which
one would have expected had it been the intention that such payment would be an alternative manner of liquidating the
obligation to pay monthly instalments.
(e)
That the interpretation favoured by the respondents is untenable, can also be illustrated by the following example:
(d)
17
Suppose the borrower had sold a unit for
R150 000, and with the money in hand had
approached the bank and offered to pay R71
529 thereof as a prepayment of a future
instalment, not yet due, and the balance
in satisfaction of its obligation to pay
over the proceeds from the sale. Suppose
also that the contract was silent on this
point. Surely the bank justifiably would
have responded that such allocation was
unacceptable, because its effect would be
that the capital redemption, envisaged by
the obligation to pay over the proceeds from
the sale, would then fall short by R71 529.
Or, to put it differently, to the extent
that part of the payment went as payment of
future instalments, there was non-
fulfilment of the obligation relating to
capital redemption. Under the common law,
the bank would have been entitled to reject
such an offer or allocation by the debtor,
by virtue of the rule that a debtor cannot
by anticipation extinguish debts not yet due
to the detriment of debts already due.
(Executors of Jacob Watermeyer v Executor of
18
E B Watermeyer
1870 Buch 69 at 71 in medio).
Can the intention that such an allocation
would take place automatically each time the
proceeds from a sale were paid over be
found in the documents making up the
composite contract? In my view the answer
is no.
(f) The only mention in the composite contract
of anticipation of payments is in clause 6.1
of the schedule, and it is against the
interpretation contended for by the
respondents. It reads as follows:
The Mortgagor shall be entitled at any time
and without notice to make payments in
addition
to the instalments stipulated for
by the Bant, or agreed upon, in terms of
the contract. (My underlining.)
I am of the view that clause 7.1 of the
agreement, which provides for payment of
the proceeds from the sale of units, was
intended not to be in conflict with, but
reconcilable with clause 6.1 of the
19
schedule. The two clauses make it clear,
in my view, that payment of the proceeds
from the sale of units as "agreed upon in
terms of the contract" were "in addition to
the instalments stipulated" - and not
as
prepayment of future instalments.
In my view the respondents' contention, as far as
it is based on the interpretation of the composite
contract, must fail.
That introduces the second phase of the enquiry,
viz. the application of the common law to the facts.
Under the common law, a debt cannot be paid by
instalments without special agreement. It follows
that a debtor is not entitled to pay instalments on
account against the wish of the creditor unless in
accordance with the terms of an agreement to that
effect
(Bernitz v Euvrard
1943 AD 595
at 602 in fine
- 603).
This rule accords with the basic point of departure
that payment of a debt is a bilateral juristic act,
requiring consensus between the creditor and the
debtor.
(Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman
20
1979 (3) SA 978
(A) at 992 H-993E;
Volkskas Bank Bpk
v Bankorp Trust (h/a Trust Bank) en 'n Ander
1991 (3)
SA 605 (A) at 612 C-E).
It is also trite law that the onus to prove valid
payment rests on the debtor
(Pillay v Krishna
1946 AD
946
at 955).
From these basic principles of law it follows
logically, in my view, that where there are two
obligations to be fulfilled by a debtor, he bears the
onus
of proving, not simply that a payment was made,
but also of proving the necessary
consensus
regarding
which
debt was paid. I agree, therefore, with the
formulation of the relevant principle by Viljoen AJ in
Italtile Products (Pty) Ltd v Touch of Class
1982 (1)
SA 288 (0) at 290 H, viz.:
Although I have myself also not found
authority dealing with a case such as the
present, where payment is admitted but
there is a dispute regarding the debt for
which it was intended, I have no doubt that
the onus of proving, not only that payment
was made, but that the debt in question was
21
paid, rests upon the debtor. This is in
accordance with the principle that it is the
party making a positive averment who bears
the onus of proof. Moreover, it seems to
me that the very requirement that a debtor
should prove payment of a debt, in itself
necessitates proof that the debt in guestion
has been paid and not simply that a payment
has been made to the creditor.
As pointed out above, such onus would require proof
of consensus regarding the identity of the debt being
paid.
Did the respondents in the present case acquit
themselves of this burden?
It was never averred by nor argued on behalf of the
respondents that there was, subsequent to the
conclusion of the original, composite contract,
consensus that payment of the proceeds from the sale
of units would be accepted as prepayment of future
monthly instalments.
It was never averred by nor argued on behalf of the
22
respondents that the borrower had allocated payment of
the proceeds from the sale of units to pre-payment of
monthly instalments. What is more, they have not
proved any acceptance by the bank of any such payments
as prepayment of monthly instalments.
In the view that I take of the matter, the bank was
entitled to allocate the said payments in the manner
in which it did. When the borrower did not pay the
monthly instalments on due date, it committed a
breach of contract, which entitled the bank to put
the acceleration clause in operation. As sureties,
the respondents are liable in terms of the composite
agreement.
It was agreed between the parties that should the
appeal succeed, the order set out hereunder, shall
replace that of the court a quo.
I would, therefore, have made the following order:
The appeal succeeds with costs, including the costs
of two counsel. The order made by the court a quo is
replaced by the following order:
23
1.
There shall be judgment for the plaintiff
against respondents in solidum for payment
of the sum of R3 398 912,33 together with
interest thereon at the rate of 18,75%
subject to the variation thereof in terms of
the plaintiff's schedule of interest rates)
calculated from 10th November 1993 to date
of payment.
2.
Defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff's
costs of suit on the scale of attorney and
client, including the costs of two counsel.
P J J OLIVIER JA