Dlamini v S (CA & R 48/2025) [2026] ZANCHC 14 (6 February 2026)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law
View PDF SAFLII Source
Share WhatsApp LinkedIn X Email

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Sentencing — Appeal against sentence of 15 years for drug trafficking under Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act — Trial court misapplying s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act due to value of drugs being below statutory thresholds — Court finding sentence shockingly harsh and inappropriate, substituting it with 18 months' imprisonment.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal against sentence in the High Court of South Africa, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley. The appellant was Samson Vusi Dlamini, and the respondent was the State.


The matter originated in the Magistrates’ Court for the district of ZF Mgcawu, Upington, where the appellant was tried on two counts. On 13 May 2025 he was convicted on both counts, and on 18 May 2025 he was sentenced. The appeal before the High Court proceeded only in respect of the sentence imposed on count 1 (the drugs count), after the appellant petitioned for leave to appeal his convictions and sentence and was granted leave limited to sentence on count 1.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned sentencing for a drug-related offence, and in particular whether the trial court correctly applied the minimum sentence regime under section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 to a conviction under the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, given the value of the drug involved.


2. Material Facts


The appellant was charged, in count 1, with contravening section 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, read with various ancillary provisions of that Act, and further read with section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, alternatively contravening section 4(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act. In count 2, he was charged with an offence under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. He pleaded not guilty and provided no plea explanation.


Following conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant on count 1 as a first offender to 15 years’ imprisonment, on the basis that section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act applied, and that no substantial and compelling circumstances justified deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence.


A central, common-cause factual feature on appeal was that the relevant drug, Methcathinone, weighed approximately one kilogram and was valued at between R300 and R400. The High Court treated the value as critical because the applicability of the minimum sentence provisions in Part II of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Law Amendment Act depends on value thresholds (and, in one alternative, syndicate involvement).


The High Court also relied on the record regarding the appellant’s personal circumstances as placed before the trial court in mitigation. These included that he was a first offender, he was 44 years old at conviction, he had two wives and seven children, he worked as a barber and was the sole breadwinner, he had been awaiting trial for two years, and his status as a first offender at that age was advanced as indicating prospects of rehabilitation.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the trial court misdirected itself by applying section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 to the appellant’s conviction on count 1, given that Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Part II of Schedule 2 prescribe minimum sentences for certain drug offences only where the value of the dependence-producing substance exceeds stipulated thresholds (and, in one alternative, where a syndicate is involved).


A further issue was the appellate standard for interference with sentence: whether the sentence could be interfered with on the basis of a material misdirection (in which event the appellate court is entitled to consider sentence afresh), and, relatedly, whether the sentence imposed could be characterised as shockingly harsh or disturbingly inappropriate in the circumstances.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of law to fact (namely, whether the statutory minimum sentencing regime was legally triggered on the proven facts), together with the evaluation of the sentence under established appellate principles governing interference.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The High Court reiterated that sentencing is pre-eminently within the discretion of the trial court, and that appellate interference is limited. It relied on the principles articulated in S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) and restated in S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA); 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA); [2001] 3 All SA 220 (A), emphasising that an appellate court may interfere where there is a material misdirection vitiating the sentencing discretion, in which event the appellate court is at large to consider sentence afresh. It also reaffirmed that, even absent misdirection, a sentence may be interfered with if it is so disproportionate that it may properly be described as shocking, startling, or disturbingly inappropriate.


On the statutory question, the High Court considered the language of section 51(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, read with Part II of Schedule 2, which makes clear that the 15-year minimum sentence for a first offender applies to certain drug offences only if it is proved that the value of the dependence-producing substance exceeds R50 000, or R10 000 where the evidence shows that a syndicate is involved. On the accepted facts, the Methcathinone’s value was between R300 and R400, far below both thresholds. The court therefore held that section 51(2) did not apply on the facts of the case.


The High Court noted that, at trial, both the prosecutor and defence representative had confirmed that the minimum sentence of 15 years should be imposed in terms of section 51(2) absent substantial and compelling circumstances, and that the trial court sentenced the appellant on that basis. On appeal, counsel for the appellant relied on S v Ndaba (R 5/25) [2025] ZANCHC 92 (12 September 2025) to support the submission that section 51(2) had been incorrectly applied given the value of the drug. The State conceded that the trial court had indeed incorrectly applied section 51(2) and that the appeal should succeed.


Having found a material misdirection in the misapplication of the minimum sentence regime, the High Court held it was entitled to consider sentence afresh. In doing so, it evaluated the trial court’s approach to sentencing and concluded that the trial court had over-emphasised the seriousness of the offence and the interests of society, while under-emphasising the appellant’s personal circumstances. The High Court referred to the record showing that the trial court had regarded the offence as very serious and had quoted S v Bartlette (CA&R 92/07) [2008] ZANCHC 5 (15 February 2008) on the scourge of drug trafficking. It also observed that the trial court had fundamentally rested its sentencing approach on S v J 1975 (3) SA 146 (O), which stressed the primacy of the public interest in deciding sentence, and that this occurred against the erroneous premise that a prescribed minimum sentence applied.


In reassessing sentence, the High Court held that the trial court had failed to reasonably balance the objectives of punishment—identified as deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation, and retribution—against the triad set out in S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A), namely the personal circumstances of the offender, the nature and seriousness of the offence, and the interests of the community. It also referred to authorities emphasising fairness, proportionality, and mercy in sentencing, including S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A), and noted the importance of consistency while recognising that decided cases serve as guidelines rather than binding constraints.


To inform the fresh sentencing discretion, the High Court considered comparable matters referenced in the judgment, including S v Collins 1990 (1) SACR 577 (A), S v Harding 1996 (1) SACR 503 (C) (which involved the substitution of imprisonment with correctional supervision under the Criminal Procedure Act), S v Markus 1997 (2) SACR 538 (C), and the unreported decision May v S (CA & R 19/2025) [2025] ZANCHC 101 (19 September 2025). The High Court concluded that the 15-year sentence was out of kilter with the sentences imposed in those comparable cases and with what the High Court considered appropriate in the circumstances. It further found that the original sentence could properly be described as shockingly harsh and inappropriate.


Finally, the court took into account that the appellant had been sentenced on 18 May 2025 and by the time of the appeal had served almost eight months of imprisonment, which informed the order that the substituted sentence be antedated.


5. Outcome and Relief


The High Court upheld the appeal against sentence in respect of count 1. It set aside the sentence imposed by the trial court on 18 May 2025 and substituted it with a sentence of eighteen months’ imprisonment. The substituted sentence was antedated to 18 May 2025.


The judgment did not record any costs order in relation to the appeal.


Cases Cited


S v Ndaba (R 5/25) [2025] ZANCHC 92 (12 September 2025); S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A); [1975] 4 All SA 723 (A); S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA); 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA); [2001] 3 All SA 220 (A); S v Bartlette (CA&R 92/07) [2008] ZANCHC 5 (15 February 2008); S v J 1975 (3) SA 146 (O); S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A); S v Khumalo and Others [1984] 2 All SA 232 (A); S v Bodibe [2021] JOL 51537 (GP); S v Sinden 1995 (2) SACR 704 (A); S v O 1995 (1) SACR 259 (A); S v PB 2013 (2) SACR 533 (SCA); S v McMillan 2003 (1) SACR 27 (SCA); S v Tiry and Others 2021 (1) SACR 349 (SCA); S v Collins 1990 (1) SACR 577 (A); S v Harding 1996 (1) SACR 503 (C); S v Markus 1997 (2) SACR 538 (C); May v S (CA & R 19/2025) [2025] ZANCHC 101 (19 September 2025).


Legislation Cited


Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992; Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997; Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004; Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


Section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was not applicable because the value of the Methcathinone fell far below the thresholds in Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Part II of Schedule 2. The trial court’s application of the minimum sentence regime was a material misdirection, entitling the appellate court to reconsider sentence afresh. On reconsideration, the sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment was found to be shockingly harsh and inappropriate in the circumstances, and it was replaced with a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, antedated to 18 May 2025.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Appellate interference with sentence is limited: sentencing is primarily within the discretion of the trial court, but an appellate court may interfere where there has been a material misdirection vitiating the exercise of discretion, in which case the appellate court is at large to determine sentence afresh, as articulated in S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA); 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA); [2001] 3 All SA 220 (A) and grounded in S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A); [1975] 4 All SA 723 (A). Even absent misdirection, interference may be justified where the disparity is so marked that the sentence is shockingly, startlingly, or disturbingly inappropriate.


The applicability of the minimum sentence provisions in section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 to certain drug offences depends on the statutory conditions in Part II of Schedule 2, including proof that the value of the dependence-producing substance exceeds specified thresholds (and, in one alternative, proof of syndicate involvement). Where those factual predicates are absent, it is a misdirection to sentence on the basis that the minimum sentence regime applies.


In determining an appropriate sentence, courts are required to balance the objectives of punishment with the sentencing triad in S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A), namely the offender’s personal circumstances, the seriousness of the offence, and the interests of the community, with punishment required to fit both the criminal and the crime, be fair to society, and be blended with a measure of mercy, consistently with S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A). Decided cases on sentence provide guidelines and promote consistency, but do not bind sentencing discretion.

THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)
In the matter between:
SAMSON VUSI DLAMINI
and
Reportable/Not Reportable
Case no: CA & R 48/2025
Appellant
THE STATE Respondent
Neutral citation: Dlamini v The State (CA & R 48/2025) (06 February 2026).
Coram: STANTON Jet TYUTHUZA AJ.
Heard: 24 November 2025.
Delivered: 06 February 2026.
Summary: Appeal against sentence of 15 years - Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act
140 of 1992 - s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 incorrectly
applied - Section 51(2) not applicable as value of the Methcathinone falls below the
thresholds stipulated in Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Part II of Schedule 2 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 - Misdirection resulted in sentence considered
afresh -The trial court over-emphasised the seriousness of the offence and the
interests of society - Under-emphasised the personal circumstances of the appellant
- Sentence is shockingly harsh and inappropriate.

2
ORDER
1. The appeal against the sentence in respect of count 1 is upheld.
2. The sentence imposed by the trial court on 18 May 2025 is set aside and
replaced with the following:
"The accused is sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment."
3 The sentence is antedated to 18 May 2025.
JUDGMENT
Stanton J
Introduction:
[1] The appellant was charged with two counts, namely:
1.1 Contravening the provisions of s 5(b). read with s 1, 13, 17 to 25 and 64
of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 ("the Act"), read with
the provisions of s 51 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
("the Amendment Act"), alternatively of contravening the provisions of s
4(b), read with s 1, 13, 17 to 25 and 64 of the Act ("count 1 "); and
1.2 Contravening s 4(1 )(b), read with s 1, 2, 4(2), 21, 24 to 26 and 35 of the
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 ("count 2").
[2] The appellant, who was legally represented at the trial, pleaded not guilty to the
charges proffered against him, but did not provide a plea explanation. The State

3
accordingly bore the onus of proving all the elements of the two charges,
beyond a reasonable doubt.
[3] On 13 May 2025, the Magistrates' Court for the district of ZF Mgcawu, Upington,
found the appellant guilty of: (a) Contravening the provisions of s 5(b), read with
s 1, 13, 17 to 25 and 64 of the Act, read further with the provisions of s 51 (2) of
the Amendment Act (count 1 ); and (b) count 2.
[4] According to the charge sheet, the minimum sentence provisions of the
Amendment Act are applicable to count 1. In the trial court, the appellant's legal
representative and the prosecutor confirmed that a 15-year minimum sentence
should be imposed in terms of s 51 (2) of the Amendment Act in respect of count
1, in the absence of substantial and compelling circumstances to justify a
deviation therefrom.
[5] On 18 May 2025, following the appellant's conviction, the trial court
consequently applied s 51 (2) to the conviction in respect of count 1 and
sentenced the appellant, as a first offender, to 15 years' imprisonment.
[61 The appellant petitioned this Court for leave to appeal his two convictions and
the sentence imposed in count 1. With leave of this Court, he is before us on
appeal against his sentence in respect of count 1 only.
Grounds of appeal:
[7] The grounds upon which the appellant initially relied in his notice of appeal in
respect of the sentence imposed were that the trial court erred in: (a) over­
emphasising the seriousness of the offence and the interests of society; (b)
under-emphasised his personal circumstances; (c) failing to find that
substantial and compelling circumstances were present to justify a deviation;
(d) not considering the mitigating factors as substantial and compelling; and (e)
imposing a sentence that is shockingly harsh and inappropriate.

4
[8] It is common cause that the Methcathinone in question weighed approximately
one kilogram and was valued at between R300 and R400.
[9] When the appeal was argued, Mr Biyela, on behalf of the appellant, with
reference to S v Ndaba 1, submitted that the trial court incorrectly applied s 51 (2)
of the Amendment Act to the sentence in view of the value of the Methcathinone
in question. He contended that, on this ground alone, the appeal should be
upheld, and a lesser sentence should be imposed.
[1 O] Section 51 (2)(a)(i) of the Amendment Act stipulates that:
'Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court
or a High Court shall sentence a person who has been convicted of an offence referred
to in Part II of Schedule 2, in the case of a first offender, to imprisonment for a period
not less than 15 years'
(11] Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Part II of Schedule 2 of the Amendment Act specify
that the minimum sentence would be applicable to any offence referred to in
section 13(f) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act if it is proved that the value
of the dependence-producing substance in question is more than R50 000 or
secondly, R10 000, if the evidence shows that a syndicate is involved.
[12] Ms Pillay, on behalf of the State, conceded that the trial court incorrectly applied
s 51 (2) of the Amendment Act and that the appeal should succeed.
Applicable law:
[13] It is necessary to reiterate the trite sentencing principle that punishment is pre­
eminently a matter for the trial court's discretion.2 The circumstances in which
a coutt of appeal may interfere in the sentencing discretion of a lower court are
1 (R 5/25) [2025) ZANCHC 92 (12 September 2025).
2 See S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 857D - E; [1975] 4 All SA 723 (A) at 724.

5
circumscribed. The principles were restated in S v Malgas3 in the following
terms:
T he mental process in which courts engage when considering questions of sentence
depends upon the task at hand. Subject of course to any limitations imposed by
legislation or binding judicial precedent, a trial court will consider the particular
circumstances of the case in the light of the well-known triad of factors relevant to
sentence and impose what it considers to be a just and appropriate sentence. A court
exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot. in the absence of material misdirection by the
trial court, approach the question of sentence as if it were the trial court and then
substitute the sentence arrived at by it simply because it prefers it. To do so would be
to usurp the sentencing discretion of the trial court. Where material misdirection by the
trial court vitiates its exercise of that discretion, an appellate Court is of course entitled
to consider the question of sentence afresh. In doing so, it assesses sentence as if it
were a court of first instance and the sentence imposed by the trial court has no
relevance. As it is said, an appellate Court is at large. However, even in the absence
of material misdirection, an appellate Court may yet be justified in interfering with the
sentence imposed by the trial court. It may do so when the disparity between the
sentence of the trial court and the sentence which the appellate Court would have
imposed had it been the trial court is so marked that it can properly be described as
"shocking", "startling" or "disturbingly inappropriate". It must be emphasised that in the
latter situation the appellate Court is not at large in the sense in which it is at large in
the former. In the latter situation it may not substitute the sentence which it thinks
appropriate merely because it does not accord with the sentence imposed by the trial
court or because it prefers it to that sentence. It may do so only where the difference

court or because it prefers it to that sentence. It may do so only where the difference
is so substantial that it attracts epithets of the kind I have mentioned. No such limitation
exists in the former situation.'
Evaluation:
[14] Section 51(2) clearly does not apply in casu as the value of the drugs is far less
than the amounts of R50 000 or R 10 000 as specified in the Amendment Act
3 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA); 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA); [2001] 3 All SA 220 (A) para 12.

6
[15] The learned trial magistrate therefore misapplied s 51(2) of the Amendment Act
when she imposed the sentence of 15 years' imprisonment in respect of count
1. This irregularity and grave error has the resultant effect that the sentence of
the trial court stands to be set aside.
[16] In view of the trial court's material misdirection, this Court is thus entitled to
consider the question of sentencing afresh.
[17] In the trial court, the following facts were submitted as the appellant's personal
and mitigating circumstances: (a) The appellant is a first offender; (b) He was
44 years old when he was convicted; (c) He has two wives and seven children;
(d) He is a barber and the only breadwinner of his family; (e) He was awaiting
trial for two years; (f) The quantity of the drugs (Methcathinone), was
approximately only one kg; and (g) Being a first offender at 44 years, is
indicative that the appellant can be rehabilitated.
[18] The record reflects that the trial court considered the appellant's personal
circumstances, but emphasised that it regarded the offence as very serious;
and quoted S v Bartlette4, where the following was stated:
'The problem of drug-trafficking has haunted mankind for many years. With the
passage of time, it has metamorphosed into a huge and intricate business enterprise
which involves drug-lords, couriers, so-called runners and those who buy and use it. .
I strongly believe that it is no exaggeration to state that, with the effluxion of time,
instead of abating the problem of dealings in drugs concomitant with drug abuse has
become pandemic. It has developed into a serious malignant cancer which is fast
eroding the social and moral fabric of our society. This is notwithstanding the tough
stance taken by the Legislature, coupled with the severe sentences which our courts
impose. There is hardly a day that passes without a report in the media of some people
arrested for either dealing in drugs or using drugs or importing them into our country.

arrested for either dealing in drugs or using drugs or importing them into our country.
In recent times our country has been seriously invaded by a variety of drugs which are
4 (CA&R 92/07) [2008) ZANCHC 5 (15 February 2008) paras 9 and 10.

7
imported from some overseas countries. Quite paradoxically, our country has become
a safe haven for drug-lords since the advent of democracy . We are caught in the big
and intricate web of internatio nal drug-trafficking. What is even more frightening is how
drugs have found their way into our schools which used to be regarded as safe citadels
for our children. Our youth, students and even school children are at a serious risk of
becoming drug addicts. In the quest for quick profit, the unscrupulous drug pedd lers
make no distinction. Nobody is spared from this scourge as drug-dealers spread their
tentacles more wider. They sell their drugs to everybody including our youth , students
and school children . In fact, because of their youthfulness , naivety , peer pressure and
simple gullibility, our youth have become their easy target.'
[19) The trial court fundamentally rested its decision on the 1975 judgment of S v J5
where the court, in deciding on the appropriate sentence, held that it should first
and foremost consider the public interest.6 As this Court has already concluded ,
the trial court sentenced the appellant on an erroneous premise, which
constituted a material misdirection that section 51(2) of the Amendment Act
was applicable in the context of the present case. Consequently, the trial court
found that no substantial or compelling circumstances existed to justify a
deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment.
[20] There is no doubt that the trial court failed to reasonably balance the four
objectives of punishment (deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution)
against the triad of factors as set out in S v Zinn. 7 These factors are: (a) the
personal circumstances of the offender, including his character, conduct in life
and personality, and everything that influenced the commission of the offence ;
(b) the nature and seriousness of the offence committed ; and (c) the interests

(b) the nature and seriousness of the offence committed ; and (c) the interests
of the community, including the necessity for a level of uniformity in sentencing .8
Punishment must indeed fit the criminal, as well as the crime, be fair to society
and be blended with a measure of mercy according to the circumstances.9
5 1975 (3) SA 146 (0)
6 Ibid at 155E-H.
7 1969 (2) SA 537 A at 540G; see also S v Khumalo and Others [1 984] 2 All SA 232 (A) at 234.
8 S v Bodibe [2021] JOL 51537 (GP) para 2.
9 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862G; [1975) 4 All SA 723 (A) at 729.

8
[21] In the context of the present case, the sentence imposed by the trial court can
proper~y be described as "shocking", "startling" or "disturbingly inappropriate".
[22] What remains is what a just and appropriate sentence would be in the
circumstances. It is trite that each case has to be decided on its own facts, and
sentences imposed in similar cases do not bind the sentencer's discretion but
rather provide guidelines for sentencing.10 In S v 0 ,11 it was aptly stated that
"decided cases on sentence provide guidelines, not straitjackets". In S v PB12,
the Supreme Court of Appeal cautioned against a slavish following of decided
cases on sentences, which could result in an abdication by the court of 'its duty
and discretion to consider sentence untrammelled by sentences imposed by
another court, albeit in a similar case'. It is, however, equally important: that
sentences imposed in similar cases must be seen to be consistent.13 Regard
being had to these principles, it is therefore apposite to consider sentences
imposed in comparable cases.14
[23] In S v Collins 15, a 37-year-old appellant was convicted of dealing in one Mandrax
tablet in contravention of s 2(a) of the Abuse of Dependence-Producing
Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 41 of 1971. He was sentenced to
four years' imprisonment, of which two years were conditionally suspended for
five years. On appeal, the sentence was altered to two years' imprisonment
wholly suspended for five years on appropriate conditions.
[24] In S v Harding16, the accused was convicted on three counts of contravening s
5(b) of the Act as he had sold 112 LSD tablets through police traps on three
separate occasions. On appeal, the sentence of eight years imprisonment was
10 See S v Sinden 1995 (2) SACR 704 (A) at 708A-B.
11 1995 (1) SACR 259 (A) at 260E.
12 2013 (2) SACR 533 (SCA) para 16.
13 S v McMillan 2003 (1) SACR 27 (SCA) para 10.
14 See S v Tiry and Others 2021 (1) SACR 349 (SCA) para 120.
15 1990 (1) SACR 577 (A).

14 See S v Tiry and Others 2021 (1) SACR 349 (SCA) para 120.
15 1990 (1) SACR 577 (A).
16 1996 (1) SACR 503 (C).

9
set aside and substituted with a sentence of three years of correctional
supervision in terms of s 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act.17
[25] In S v Markus18, a 42-year-old accused and a first offender, was convicted of
possession of six Mandrax tablets. Because he had already spent five months
in prison awaiting trial, and earned R350 per week with four minor children to
support, the appeal court found the sentence of R2000 or 18 months'
imprisonment to be harsh. The appeal court set aside the sentence and
substituted it with a fine of R500 or four months' imprisonment.
[26) In a recent unreported judgment of this Division in May v S19, the Court found
that the trial court erred in imposing a five-year imprisonment on the appellant,
who had pleaded guilty to possession or use of 5 Mandrax tablets and 13
quarter Mandrax tablets containing methaqualone in contravention of s 4(b) of
the Act (Drugs andDrug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992). The sentence imposed
by the trial court on 26 September 2024 was set aside, and replaced with a
sentence of two years' imprisonment, of which one year is suspended for three
years on condition that the accused is not found guilty of contravening s 4(a) or
4(b) of the Act during the period of suspension.
Conclusion:
[27] The sentence imposed by the trial court in casu is out of kilter with those
imposed in comparable cases, as well as the sentence this Court would impose
under the circumstances. As a consequence, this Court is entitled to interfere
and alter the sentence.
[28) The appellant was sentenced on 18 May 2025 and has served almost eight
months of his sentence.
17 51 of 1977.
18 1997 (2) SACR 538 (C).
19 (CA & R 19/2025) [2025) ZANCH C 101 (19 September 2025).

10
[29] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The appeal against the sentence in respect of count 1 is upheld.
2. The sentence imposed by the trial court on 18 May 2025 is set aside and
replaced with the following:
"The accused is sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment"
3. The sentence is antedated to 18 May 2025.
Appearances
For the appellant:
Instructed by:
STANTON J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION
I concur.
UT
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIG
NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION
Mr K Biyela
Legal-Aid South Africa

11
For the Respondent: Ms L Pillay
Instructed by: The Director of Public Prosecutions

Back to Law Reports